Q. Very well. Witness, regarding the execution of so-called reprisal orders, did your superior echelon, that is, the 12th Army, ever inquire as to whether or not you carried these reprisal measures actually into effect -- you carried them out?
A. Such inquiries, were made to us but as far as I can remember the inquiries came even from a higher quarter and when I was personally called up by an officer from the OKW who found out about the execution of reprisal measures because, as far as I still remember, he had to make an oral report to Field Marshall Keitel. I can't remember the name of this officer.
Q. And you answered about the OKW, but I asked you about the 12th Army. Now give me the answer about the 12th Army.
A. I have just said that the superior agency, that is, the 12th Army Group, made such inquiries but, as far as I know, they were -- had been asked for by even higher quarters.
Q. On what do you base that knowledge?
A. I base this on conversations which I had at that time with the Ia, at that time Major Bacher, when he visited us in Belgrade.
Q. In other words, you want to say that the bad boys were really at the OKW but not at the 12th Army, is that it?
A. Yes, that is my opinion, since after all the severe orders came down from the OKW.
Q. Now, do you recall ever having made a statement which I want to read to you now and then I want to ask you whether or not you like to modify that statement or whether or not you want to leave it as it is. "By the 12th Army and by orders and directions of the highest offices again and again ruthless measures were ordered." Did you make that statement?
A. Yes, I made this statement, but later on in another affidavit I made such corrections in this statement as I have just previously mentioned After I made this statement I had misgivings about it because I remembered the discussions which I had at that time with Major Macher.
Q. The thoughts you had prevailing you to change this affidavit at a later time were not motivated by the fact that you would probably drag any of these defendants in the picture, would you?
A. No. I wanted---but perhaps even "yes". Since I have been here several times I got acquainted with the material and then it became clear to me that things really had actually happened as I stated just now and it was not my intention to make changes against any of the defendants for the benefit of another it wasn't correct, and that is why I changed my statement as I did in the second affidavit.
DR. SAUTER: Your Honors, first I would like to ask the Prosecution to inform me which document they are submitting to the witness. I have some affidavits in front of me, but at the moment I cannot find out which document the Prosecutor is now talking about with the witness. The Prosecutor has just shown me Document Number 20 in Geitner Document Book and I would like to point out that this Document Number 20 at the time was withdrawn by me, and this was done with the agreement of the Prosecution. I think that as a result of this it is not correct for the Prosecution now during cross examination or the rebuttal to show and discuss with the witness a document which was not submitted by me and a document which did not come to the judicial notice of the Tribunal. I don't think that this is admissible.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: It is proper to show previous contradictory statements of any kind that the witness may have made, bearing on his credibility. The objection will be overruled.
DR. SAUTER: Could I perhaps hear the final words? I didn't quite got them.
Might I just ask another question on this? Does this ruling also apply to such documents which in compliance with all the news I have withdrawn? I really can not imagine that at this stage the Prosecution is to have the right to produce almost anything, because this document was not submitted to the Tribunal, was not brought to the judicial notice of the Tribunal, and I really doubt whether the interpretation of the Tribunal is correct that at this stage of the proceedings such documents can be submitted to the witness.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I have no doubt as to the correctness of the ruling. The objection is overruled.
QUESTIONS BY MR. RAPP (continued)
Q. Witness, I continue on that. You then said that "After this dispatch of the daily reports very often the Chief and I--" meaning you, I presume -- "were asked by the 12th Army what had been done as a result of reports of a tax for acts of sabotage. This is proof that the Operational Staff was checked and supervised." Did you make that statement?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, what did you do or what did General Geitner do extricate yourself from this position -- that is to say, what would you do to avoid continuous supervision by the OKW or the 12th Army? Did you do anything about it?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell us about it, please.
A. I myself was for the most of the time during 1942 the responsible person to summarize the daily reports and to submit them. According to our experience on such orders, presumably -- probably from the OKW even, small surprise raids and sabotage acts should be retaliated. General von Geitner wanted to prevent under all circumstances that these kind of small surprise raids should be retaliated. If I may quote an example here which I remember quite definitely, it must have been in September, October 1942, where an automobile on the journey from Sabac to Belgrade was shot at on the road. This report was included in our daily report, but it must have gotten to the knowledge of the OKW, because I, as expert for the compilation of the daily reports, later received an inquiry through the 12th Army, transferred from the OKW, to the effect as what the cause was and what had been done, and why one had not shot so and so many people from the district in which the shot had been fired.
This is proof because at the time General Geitner told me, "We want to prevent that such kind of reports are followed by forced measures." And therefore, when I summarized the daily reports, I worked on the basis that the reports should be so compiled that small surprise raids and acts of sabotage should show the numbers of Partisans and people killed during the actual lighting, and that these figures should cover the number which have been land down for reprisal ration. Shall I give you -- Shall I extend this example?
Q I will cover that point of mock or shadow executions with you in a few minutes. I first want to ask you a couple of other questions. What could be expected from your superiors -- that is, the Twelfth Army and the OKW in case there was non-compliance or a discovery of noncompliance with their orders and directives?
A The translation did not all come through. Could you please repeat? (Question repeated by interpreter) It was to be expected, as was the case with many other German generals that a considerable punishment or removal from post would follow.
Q Could you just mention one or two of the many generals that you cited just now who were removed because they didn't comply with the orders of their superiors?
A I know two very special cases, one was General Hein. He was Commanding General at Stalingrad.
Q Just give us the names.
A The second was General Graf Soneck.
Q That is the only two that you can remember out of the many, just now?
A No, I know of a few others; for instance, Generaloberst Blaskowitz and then all those who were shot in connection with the 20th of July.
Q I presume they were hanged on account of having not carried out orders, is that right?
A Yes.
Q Now, Witness, did you make a statement -- I will read it to you and want to ask you whether or not you still affirm that statement now: "The stern measures ordered by superiors were checked. In case of noncompliance, the responsible persons had to reckon with investigation and punishment?
A Yes.
Q Now we will come to the mock executions which you have already talked about, very shortly.
A Might I add something here? I really haven't talked about mock executions.
Q Well, as a matter of fact, you said that the reports which you rendered did not correspond to the actual figures of executions carried out by your headquarters. Isn't that what you said?
A No, I didn't say that.
Q Well, will you restate once more, so I am clear about it?
A I said something to this effect: I had to deal with the compilation of the daily reports and in regard to small surprise raids and sabotage acts which had happened, I added together the numbers of dead which had taken place in the district in which the attacks had taken place in the recent days. That is......
Q All right we understand that. For what purpose?
A So that in this area there was a certain number of enemy dead given and, therefore, further number of Serbs would not have to be shot.
Q Now, do you realize or do you not understand yet why I am talking about shadow executions or mock executions? Isn't that what it in affect amounted to?
A No.
Q All right, then we will cover it question by question. Who, in your headquarters, know about the fact that you were reporting false reports to higher headquarters?
A To my knowledge only the chief of staff and the commanding general.
Q And you?
AAnd I, yes.
Q How about Lieutenant Bode?
A Lieutenant Bode was the export for the retaliation shootings, I think I must come back to my former statement that my reports only had the purpose that no retaliatory shootings were ordered. For instance, if a sabotage act took place --.
Q Just one second please. Just try and answer my question. It was very plain. I asked you whether or not Lieutenant Bode also know about the scheme that you were making false reports?
A I assume that, but I can't say it with certainty.
Q How about the 1-A?
The 1-A concerned himself very little about the daily reports, because mostly I submitted them at once to the Chief of Staff himself.
Q And the 1-C?
A The 1-C received the reports in copy form, therefore he didn't know how they were compiled.
Q Is it customary, Witness, to give false reports, generally speaking, or was this an exception?
A Well, in a way, they weren't false reports.
Q Now, if you counted all the dead in the area, and you substituted a lot of figures, would you still that this was a correct report or a false report?
A Well, that's open to argument.
Q It may depend on what you and I understand under the word "correctness", don't you think so?
A Now, to make this perfectly clear, I had better describe once again how the whole thing came about.
Q If you please could make it very short.
A I will give you the following example: An automobile is shot at in a certain district. For such a case the OKW at that time demanded retaliation. We then reported that an automobile was shot at in the Locality A, and in Locality A ten Serbs fell in combat and were dead.
These ten Serb deaths came from reports which the Serbian police, the troops, the National Cetnik units, the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, sent us, because around Locality A on this day fighting had taken place and partisans were shot, perhaps bandits were shot by Serbs themselves, and they were reported at the same time as the surprise raid on the car, so that when the report was submitted in that form to the OKW, then no further reprisal measures were necessary to be ordered by the Commanding General, and the question as to what happened then need no longer be put to us.
Q Witness, this injects an entirely now and unheard of statement into this interrogation and I am forced to kind of open it up. Are you stating that these ten men died in battle? Am I understanding you right? Witness, did you hear my question?
A Yes.
Q Did you state in those reports that these ten men you just gave us died in battle? Is that what you want to say?
A Yes.
Q Are you further on to say that inasmuch as ten men had died as the result of battle action the OKW usually would then be satisfied and would not order reprisal measures? Is that what you said?
A Yes.
Q So then it amounts to that if enough blood had been spilled there was no necessity to order reprisal measures, is that what you want to say?
A We wanted to prevent reprisal measures being ordered.
Q I realize that very well, Witness. I understand that.
A Yes.
Q But my point is, you came here and you told us that reprisal measures were first of all to act as a deterrent?
A Yes.
Q Now, I don't see any connection between ten men killed in battle -- in a battle action -- the killing of a German driver in an automobile, and reprisal measures.
A I didn't say in my example that the driver was shot, but merely that there was an attack on a motor vehicle, and the Chief of Staff wanted to prevent that for this fact for reprisal measures were taken, because he --.
Q Very well, Witness. I understand that. I am sorry. I am very sorry. I made the error. Nobody get killed in the car, but nevertheless we are still talking about reprisal measures. Now you go on record to say that no reprisal measures were ordered in the event that the OKW realized already ten dead had occurred -- or ten deaths had occurred in battle action. Is that what you want to say?
A Yes.
Q Now, how was it in the event people got killed on your side? Were they then also satisfied, or was it only when you suffered material damage?
A. I, myself, only had to do with reprisal matters insofar as after discussions with the Chief of Staff, I prevented that matters came to the knowledge of superior quarters which would have led to the ordering of reprisal measures. In other words, the Commander ordered and I had no influence on it at all.
Q. Witness, I never even by insinuation said that you had any influence over reprisal measures. I merely asked you as to a fact. What was done in case lives were lost? Was this scheme also applied that you were just telling us, or did it only refer if the German Army suffered losses pertaining to material, or did it also go into effect when you lost lives?
A. That one can not define as exactly as that. In any case, we tried in those cases in which a reprisal measure would, perhaps, have hit non-participants, we tried to prevent this.
Q. How, witness, did attacks acts of sabotage, murders on the part of the enemy, diminish once you put these reprisal measures into effect?
A. I remember quite definitely that the movement of Draja Mihajlovic - because of the reprisal measures ordered - stopped the revoked acts of sabotage, and this knowledge I received personally from but Ic Major Macher.
Q. Well, Witness, we want to be very clear on one point, that the reprisal measures -- that the hostile acts on the part of the enemy did not diminish when you did not carry out the reprisal measures, is that right?
A. No.
Q. In other words, when you reported to higher headquarters that you had done certain things, which you in fact did not do, the enemy, of course, was unconcerned about it. It didn't affect them one way or the other, isn't that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Were there ever any serious conflicts or differences of opinion that you were a witness to between Geitner and Bader?
A. Perhaps differences of opinions is rather too strong a term. The Chief of Staff often stated that he was not in agreement with the reprisal measures. The Commanding General, however, was independent and was such a strong personality that he took the whole responsibility on his own shoulders and acted accordingly.
Q. Now, didn't you say in your affidavit that General Geitner wanted to preserve the valuable lived of the national Serbs because he needed them for the reconstruction of Serbia? Did you say that, or similar words?
A. Yes, that was his definite opinion, because General Geitner thought that the Serbs were an especially valuable people; as they demonstrated already in the First World War.
Q. On that point he must have had some different opinions from the one demonstrated by General Bader, didn't he?
A. I assume that General Bader also had a similar opinion, but he, because of the orders given, could not act differently. As far as I know, later on he was also relieved on the Balkans and sent home.
Q. Well, do you want to make that statement in inference to the fact that he was opposed to these kind of measures, or do you just mention it parenthetically?
A. Yes, -- no, by this I meant to say that -- I wanted to try and say that General Bader, as far as any impression of him went, that he was also not one hundred per cent for the reprisal measures, because he mentioned this during the submission of the daily reports. He personally suffered from the necessity of issuing orders on request of the OKW.
Q. How did these orders from the OKW usually reach him?
Directly, or through the Twelfth Army, or both ways?
A. I assume always through the Twelfth Army.
Q. Witness, did you have sufficient troops at your disposal to combat the partisans effectively?
A. The question is difficult to answer in that form. The country was effectively occupied with approximately a strength of troops which the Americans and the Allies now have in the American and British Zone. According to my knowledge and according to my observation, I think the strength is about the same.
Q. How, how was the quality of the troops? Was it adequate for the task?
A. At the beginning, yes. After the insurrection movement began to spread and as from the outside - especially from the Italian occupied territory - insurgents, Tito Bands, etc., streamed into the country, they were in that extraordinarily difficult terrain-we must remember that Yugoslavia is a very mountainous country they were actually not up to the task.
Q. Witness, you said "At the beginning, yes". Of what period do you speak?
A. That was from the the of my arrival in Serbia, August, September, 1941. We then had an increased band activity from about October onwards and to suppress this band activity one division came from France, the 243rd; and one came from Russia, and who were in complete mastery of the situation and were able to crush the insurrection.
Q. Do you recall having made the following statement, Witness: "Herr von Geitner in repeated reports and messages to his superiors stated that a real pacification of the country and the securing of the German supply lines on the Danube and the railway to Greece is not possible without sufficient good German troops."
A. Yes.
Q. You didn't talk about any particular period and you didn't talk about the fact that that fluctuated; that you sometimes had more and some times had less divisions. Generally speaking, would you still say that during the entire period that you were there this statement would hold true?
A. I would like to maintain my statement, as I said it previously, because when I made my affidavit I was not replying to your questions. I only stated what I knew about General Geiter, adding that the forces which he had were not sufficient at the time to crush the insurrection.
Q. You said the troops were "bad". You mean the quality of the troops?
A. Yes, first of all, - at least - they had bad equipment. They were so-called Divisions of the 15th Wave, which were set up at home and were originally provided for other tasks, and they were not adequate to deal with the combating of bands in this mountainous terrain.
Q. Was the SS Division, Prince Eugene, qualified to carry out its task against the partisans?
A. In another country, perhaps yes, but for Serbia they seemed to us to be unsuitable, since in the Balkans blood fueds, etc., play a very great part, and when a division is committed which has been recruited from the country itself, it has an unfavorable effect in the country, because these mentioned feelings of hate come to the fore.
Q. You said the racial Germans of the SS Division Prince Eugene and of the police battalions were not fit for the pacification of Serbia, because personal revenge of the racial Germans against the Serbians often was carried out in that way?
A. Yes, I believe I stated that, too.
Q Witness, what was the highest ratio that you have personal knowledge of that was carried out in connection with reprisal executions?
A I think I remember that at my time it was 1 to 100, as was actually ordered; and then, on the protest of the competent commander, it was decreased to 1 to 50.
Q Have you ever put your own signature, in the name of the Commanding General of Serbia, under any paper which mentioned these reprisal figures?
A No, I cannot remember.
Q Was that your job?
A No.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will take its morning recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
MR. RAPP: Thank you.
BY MR. RAPP:
Q Witness, prior to the recess, we discussed the point of whether or not you personally, in the name of the Commanding General for Serbia, Bader, ever signed your name to reports which dealt with reprisal measures.
A It is quite possible with reports which were channeled to superior headquarters, if they had something to do with daily reports etc. I do not recall that with respect to any other instances.
Q In other words, I understand you correctly that you did not sign orders, in the name of the Commanding General, for the execution of reprisal measures. Is that right?
A I cannot conceive that I would ever sign something like that.
Q Why not?
A Because the Commanding General himself reserved the right to do that.
Q Witness, I don't think you understand me. I said that you signed for, or in the name of; I did not say that you ordered it. I merely said:
For the Commanding General and Military Commander. Serbia, signed with the typewriter his name, and, underneath, your signature. Now, is that impossible?
A I cannot remember.
Q Well, let us for a minute forget whether you can recall it or not. I would like to first of all ascertain whether that that I have asked you would be possible or probable?
A No.
Q I will summarize your statements. It is neither probable nor possible nor did you do it, as far as you can recall?
A Yes.
Q Now did I hear you correctly to say that the signing of reprisal measures was the prerogative of the Military Commander, Bader?
A Yes.
Q And did I furthermore understand you correctly when you say that nobody, including yourself, was authorized to sign such orders in the name of the Military Commander?
A Yes, that did happen.
Q Will you tell us about that - when did that happened?
A There are the following examples: In the first place, the deputy to the Military Commander could do that; on principle, in the second place, the Chief, General von Geitner, as far as I recall in one or two cases signed such an order if the Commander was not present and the reprisals had been ordered orally or in writing by the Deputy, or the reprisal measures had been authorized by him. The clerical matters relating to the reprisal measures were then dealt with by the Chief.
Q Witness, in your affidavit you stated that the Chief of Staff, General von Geitner, directed you to put all the correspondence and orders which he, Geitner, had signed, before General Bader for his approval in the event he had returned from a trip, or he was absent?
A I should like to state in this connection that this did not concern all the orders but merely such matters as came within my sphere of work.
Q Now I want to narrow it down, now, and want to talk about reprisal orders, and I want to put the question to you this way. General Bader is absent. His Deputy Commander, or Acting Commander at that time, instructs General Geitner to issue an order for the execution of hostages, as a reprisal measure. Geitner puts that order out in the name of that Acting Commander. Did you have to put this letter or order before the Military Commander, for his approval, when he returned?
AAs far as I recall, all essential matters which had been ordered in his absence were submitted to him in a file, which ho either took home and studied in the evenings, or which he returned to us at the end of the day.
Q I understand that, witness. There is only one word I would like you to clarify for me. In the affidavit you used the German word "Genehmigung" which I believe is "approval." Do you want to say that you put that to the Commanding General for his information or for his approval?
A That is very difficult for me to say because the General wanted to see all matters, so that if ho did not agree with any matters he would ascertain and call to account the responsible party who ordered the matters and tell them to do things differently the next time he was absent.
Q But you realize, witness, that dealing with the complex of reprisal measures it is rather beside the point, is it not, if General Bader, upon his return, approves of the measures or not, because the people, I am sure, have already been executed?
A But in the case something wrong had been done, I am only assuming that - then he would have been able to correct matters, so that things would have been done differently the next time.
Q But as far as the act itself is concerned, what was wrong at that time could not be rectified any more.
A No, it could not.
Q Witness, in your affidavit you also stated that somebody in the Twelfth Army considered General Geitner's attitude towards the Serbian population as being too kind. The word you used was "wohlwollend."
A Yes.
Q Who, specifically, in the Twelfth Army, raised that objection?
A I cannot say that. I only know it from utterances made by General von Geitner to me, because he had the feeling that he was not trusted in this matter.
Q Who was General Geitner's counterpart in the Twelfth Army at that time?
A You mean as Chief of Staff?
Q Yes?
A That was General Foertsch.
Q Did Geitner and Foertsch have any business dealings with each other?
A General Foertsch, in his capacity as Chief of the General Staff of the Army and the Army Group, was the superior of General von Geitner. They telephoned frequently and, on the occasion of visits in Belgrade or Saloniki, they met and talked with each other.
MR. RAPP: I have no further questions, your Honor.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. MENZEL (Counsel for defendant Kuntze):
Q Witness, at the end of yesterday's examination you stated as to who was competent and responsible for ordering reprisal measures and you said that the commanders were responsible.
A Yes.
Q In this connection you also mentioned the names of the two supreme commanders, General Field Marshal List and General Kuntze. Did I understand you right, that individual reprisal measures were only ordered by the commander himself?
A Yes, in the area of Serbia, certainly. How the procedure was in other areas, I do not know.
Q Yes, certainly, for the area of Serbia. Did the supreme commanders ever issue an order for reprisals in individual cases?
A That is not known to me.
Q Now, I would like to leave reprisal orders in individual cases aside, I would like to drop this end and return to the basic order providing for reprisal measures. Were these basic orders, referring to reprisal measures, inventions of whoever happened to be the Commander in Chief Southeast or did they originate from a superior agency?
AAs far as I know, they did originate from a higher agency, the OKW and or Hitler himself personally.
Q And how then did it happen that they were forwarded to the Commander in Chief Southeast?
A I suppose through channels or mail.
Q In other words, they were orders that were transmitted through channels?
A They came from the superior agency via mail and so forth.
Q Do you know whether reprisal measures on principle were only to be effected if the perpetrators had not been apprehended?
A I do remember that.
Q Do you know whether in the case of reprisal measures, as a matter of principle, prisoner bandits -- that is guerillas -- were used or any other people?
AAs a rule, those persons were used who, as I said yesterday, had collaborated with the partisans, people who had plotted and perpetrated raids, who had supported the saboteurs, who had sheltered them or fed them and so on.
Q Also partisans themselves?
A Partisans, too, unless they had been shot in combat. There was a case, as you are asking me, that was somewhat different. That was under General Boehme in the year 1941. That was the Kraljevo incident.
Q Do you recall the month when this Kraljevo incident happened?
A I think in October 1941.
Q Could it also have been September 1941?
A That might have been possible. I believe that General Boehme, as Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, had been assigned in the middle of September.
Q Do you know whether reprisal measures in Serbia in the course of the year 1942 decreased in number?
A That is very difficult to answer.
Q You don't know?
A It is very difficult to say. In 1942 there was a time when they did decrease very considerably. That was when the mopping-up operations in Southern Serbia had been effected, about at the end of March 1942. The partisan insurgent activity increased especially in the summer of 1942 when the Combat group "West Bosnia" was being committed at Sarajervo.
Q Was it then so that the decrease occurred in the first half of 1942?
A I should prefer to say in the summer 1942. I then also recall the reason for this phenomenum; the reason were the successful measures against the insurgents in Serbia. By virtue of those successful measures, a number of partisans had left for Bosnia and Croatia.
Q Now, quite briefly, as for the reduction of the reprisal ratios. You said previously that the reprisal ratios had been reduced -- you mentioned in this connection the commanders. Do you know that this reduction of reprisal ratios occurred in agreement with and upon the instigation of General Kuntze?
A I do know that and I also committed myself in writing to this effect General Kuntze on his trip to Northern Italy for a conference with the Italian General Staff, to which I was detailed as ADC, told me in the train in the course of a conversation that he did not agree with the reprisal ratio as ordered by the OKW and that at that time he had taken measures that they were to be reduced from 1 to 100 to 1 to 50. That happened in the first days of February 1942.
Q In the beginning of 1942?
A Yes, certainly.
Q You say that this reduction was effected by petitions. Do you recall the details or would you say, as you did in your affidavit -- may I quote to you the sentence as contained in the affidavit and I would like to ask you whether that sentence is correct:
"General Kuntze voiced several times his opinion that the number appeared to him to high and that upon his instigation it had been substantially reduced."
Do you still hold this sentence and maintain it?
A Yes, I do.
Q One more brief question as to the Ic, Kalsow: did he remain or didn't he?
A He did remain.
Q Do you know whether his replacement had been applied for because of his false appraisal of the situation or don't you recall that?
A That may have been one of the reasons, the initial reason. If I may think about it for a moment, I may say something more about it. I do remember it now. It was like this: