PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The objection will be sustained. It is the view of the Tribunal that evidence of the character that was put in by the defendants can only go to show the fairness of the present trial insofar as it may bear upon that. We are not trying tho American Army or the French Army or any other army for any offenses they may have committed and to permit the offer of proof to be made we inject an issue which we think is outside of the scope of this trial and on that basis we sustain the objection to the offer of proof.
MR. FULKERSON: Very well, your Honor.
Before we continue with the cross examination, there is one matter still anding fire; that is this document NOKW-1045 which I introduced or attempted to introduce yesterday afternoon. Dr. Tipp said he wanted to look at the photostat and he has it now, I believe.
DR. FRITSCH(Counsel for General Rendulic): Your Honors, I am in a similar situation as I was yesterday afternoon during the submission of tho Document 673. I have no formal objections to the submission of this document, Exhibit No. 674, but the situation is like this.
This exhibit must be brought into connection with the defendant General Rendulic and, therefore it may formally happen now that a report or order or teletype may be one of these things to the 2nd Panzer Army but, since the knowledge of this teletype must be presupposed with General Leyser, I am able to prove with the aid of his pay book that during time in question until the end, the 11th of January 1944, General von Leyser was on leave. Therefore, I must request that to this extent my counter evidence is admitted.
PRESIDING JUDGE CERTER: This is being interpreted as applying to General von Leyser. Is that what you are saying -- General von Leyser or General Rendulic?
MR. FULKERSON: Both, your Honor.
DR. FRITSCH: The Prosecutor stated yesterday that he wished to submit tho evidence against both of the defendants, General Rendulic and General von Leyser Excuse me, I just heard, your Honor, that there was a mistake in translation, I talked here about General Rendulic and the fact that General Rendulic in the time in question was on leave.
Therefore, I would ask the Tribunal to allow counter evidence to be produced in this case and to show that General Rendulic at least knew nothing at all and could knew nothing at all about this matter.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I think probably that is a matter of subrebuttal that will have to be ruled upon at that time if you will show it at that time. I don't think it is proper for us to rule on it here.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I submitted this now because there was mention that counter rebuttal evidence would not be admissible but I gather from the statement of the Tribunal yesterday with regard to 673 and also from this ruling I assume that we may be allowed to introduce counter rebuttal evidence.
MR. FULKERSON: If your Honor please, if this document -- if the introduction or rejection of this document means the difference between sur-rebuttal and no sur-rebuttal, I withdraw it right now.
DR. FRITSCH: Of course, I agree with the Prosecutor then.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: It is the opinion of the Tribunal that if the exhibit is offered in rebuttal and raises a point such as has been raised with Dr. Fritsch, that it wasn't there at that particular time, if he deems in particular that on that one point alone, I don't think the Tribunal would deny sur-rebuttal to that extent.
MR. FULKERSON: Well, could I make this request of defense counsel now so as to follow up the last statement I made? Is there any other sur-rebuttal that they propose to put on because if this is the only one I withdraw this document right now, if this is the only one that is going to cause any sur-rebuttal.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I think that then both documents must be withdrawn: 673 and 674.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Whether or not sur-rebuttal is to be permitted is a little difficult to rule on in advance.
MR. FULKERSON: It was just a question of my asking them, if Your Honor please -- if they are going to request it, is all.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I understand that, but the Tribunal is not going to permit any sur-rebuttal of any great length.
DR. FRITSCH: Excuse me, your Honor; might I then ask that at the end of the rebuttal I can then bring sur-rebuttal evidence?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: That is something we will have to rule on at that time.
DR. TIPP (Counsel for defendant von Leyser); Your Honors, I object to the introduction of the document, against my client first of all, for formal reasons. In the document against my client the Prosecution wishes to convince the Tribunal that from this teletype from the 2nd Panzer Army to the 5th SS Corps they only submitted one figure, namely, "6," but the document, as can be seen from the photostat copy, contains 7 paragraphs. 7 figures. If the document is accepted in this form as it is now submitted to the Tribunal, then the impression can be created as if it concerned some kind of reprisal measures and also that it was an order to the 15th Mountain Army Corps; but from the original of the photostat copy it can be seen that the document is an order to the 5th SS Corps which only sent this teletype to the 15th Army Corps as information only and from this escerpt which the Prosecution has submitted this cannot be seen at all but it can be seen from the whole document. If this exhibit is accepted as it is now submitted by the Prosecution to the Tribunal, then I must request that the Prosecution also submit the rest of the paragraphs in this exhibit.
In my opinion, one gets a completely wrong picture from just one figure and, in addition, in this case, I must also request that surrebuttal evidence be allowed in my case as in the case of my colleague Dr. Fritsch.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Does the original exhibit contain all the paragraphs?
MR. FULKERSON: The original exhibit, as far as I can tell, your Honor, seems to be an entire message -- that is if the pages arc numbered consecutively that is in German handwriting here.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The Exhibit will be received and the defense counsel may read into the record such other portions of the exhibit as they see fit.
DR. TIPP: Then, Your Honor, might I ask if the Tribunal desires that I do this reading now or should I do it during the sur-rebuttal?
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: After Mr. Fulkerson has finished such parts as ho cares to read you may read such parts as you care to put into the record.
MR. FULKERSON: The paragraph in question here merely roads:
"It is planned that the murder of the Oak Leaf wearer, Captain Kirchner, by the Reds is to be retaliated through the liquidation of as great a number of prisoners as possible which are" -- and here there is a translation error there in the document; it should be, "which are from the 29th Division" stated "in Herzegovina.
"For this purpose the 5th SS Corps is to carry out an operation as soon as possible where over there is a sufficient number of prisoners, about 200, whereby a sufficient number of prisoners, about 200 from the 29th Division on a Montenegro-Croatian-Southeast border are brought in. Intentions and time table are to be reported."
THE PRESIDENT: I am wondering if the defense counsel agree to the change of translation.
MR. FULKERSON: I made two changes, if you will notice. I used -- I changed the word "wherever" on the second page to "whereby."
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Is that agreeable, Dr. Tipp?
DR. TIPP: Yes, your Honor.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Dr. Tipp, having consented to the change, it will be made. Are there any parts of this exhibit you care to read into the record, Dr. Tipp?
DR. TIPP: Your Honor, perhaps we could shorten the matter a little. Mr. Fulkerson only read Figure 6, and here it states that through the SS Corps an operation is to be carried out. If Mr. Fulkerson states as the opinion of the Prosecution that the 5th SS Corps was not subordinate to General Leyser, then in my opinion that would be sufficient and therefore I need not read the rest of the paragraphs, which are rather long.
MR. FULKERSON: Well, I will agree that the 5th SS Corps was not subordinate to General von Leyser.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Very well. You may proceed.
MR. RAPP: If, your Honor please, I would like to continue with the cross examination of the witness.
CROSS EXAMINATION (continued) BY MR. RAPP:
Q. When this Court recessed last night, did you have any contact with Defense Counsel or their representatives?
A. I was merely in the office of Dr. Sauter and fetched my coat and my things, but I didn't talk to him at all.
Q. By the way, I want to remind you that you are still under oath.
THE PRESIDENT: I think that is quite apparent to a gentleman of his intelligence.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, we have had that occasionally to come through by the Defense Counsel, and I think it is perfectly proper to remind the witness of the fact that he is under oath, because I am going to ask him a few very definite statements, I want to remind him -
THE PRESIDENT: When there is an indication that it becomes apparent that he is not telling the truth, possibly that might be the appropriate time.
MR. RAPP: Very well, I withdraw the statement and the record may show so.
Q. Did you receive any communication from Defense Counsel last night, in writing?
A. No.
Q. You are sure of that point?
A. Yes.
Q. And not from any individual working with Defense Counsel either?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall, witness, the last answer you gave yesterday prior to the recess?
A. As far as I remember, at the end we were talking about the attitude of General von Geitner to reprisal measures, whether he was in agreement with them or whether he rejected them. I think that was the last thing.
Q. Well, do you recall yesterday, just shortly before we recessed, you made the statement that General Bader considered it to be his own prerogative to order reprisal measures?
A. Yes.
Q. And in connection with a subsequent question, the name of General Kuntze and General List, and General Boehme, and Field Marshall Keitel were mentioned by you?
A. Yes, I remember that.
Q. Witness, what was the purpose of reprisal measures? You recall having gone very much on record on the purpose of reprisal measures in these affidavits?
A. Yes, I remember that.
Q. Then tell us that once again.
A. The reprisal measures, according to your questioning, Mr. Prosecutor had no actual purpose but they were caused by the attitude of the population and became a punishment on various parts of the peculation in order to prevent and in order to avoid further acts of sabotage and murders being carried out by the Partisans on German soldiers.
Q. Was this purpose accomplished?
A. Yes, partly.
Q. Why was General Geitner opposed to reprisal measures?
A. As I mentioned, yesterday, he was against reprisal measures all together because this form of warfare for us soldiers was quite apart from our feelings.
Q. Well, let's go right down to the point, witness. You claim now that the purpose of reprisal measures, as far as its deterrent nature is concerned, was accomplished?
A. Yes.
Q. And that every individual, in particular General Geitner, was opposed to it because they didn't like that kind of action -- that is to say, reprisal measures?
A. As far an they were absolutely necessary, General Geitner realized that they were necessary and that is also what I expressed in my affidavit, they were a necessary evil.
Q. Did Geitner have any influence over Bader?
A. Yes, in general, since he was Chief of the General Staff and they had discussions daily and they discussed the general situation and in addition they met each other outside their official work, and as his first collaborator and advisor, of course, he always had a certain influence on his Commander in Chief.
Q. To what extent?
A. Well, I can't limit it, sir, exactly, because in conversations which General Geitner had with General Bader I was not always present.
Q. But you made it quite clear in your affidavit you gave, for instance, that you had been down there a long time and that you know a lot of things that General Geitner was not and you said that you derived that knowledge from your intimate acquaintance with General Geitner and his activities in his Staff. Do you recall having made words to that effect?
A. As far as I can remember, yes.
Q. Did Geitner at any time condemn the senseless spreading of the war?
A. Yes.
Q. Those were your own words?
A. Yes. He expressed that to me personally in conversations.
Q. For what reasons? Why did he condemn it? Why did he consider it senseless?
A. Because he saw the danger that in this kind of spreading of the war in the Southeast our fronts would become so long that a victory in the war would depend on this and this would be quite unlikely.
Q. Now, you also made the statement that Geitner went on record to say that the way in which this war was conducted would ultimately lead to a "katastrophe", or catastrophe; is that true?
A. Yes, that is what I said.
Q. Will you expound on this statement for a minute, please, and tell us what General Geitner meant?
A. As I understood it, General von Geitner foresaw the catastrophe which from 1945 onwards finally appeared. And for us juniors officers the thought, the idea of this came in the Summer of 1942, since one realized then -- that it would only be very difficult to take action against the insurgence in the Balkans and to overcome them and that our flanks in the south against the Mediterranean was becoming too long, and therefore we were not in a position to supply the Main front in Russia properly and to maintain it.
Q. In other words, Witness, the statement by General Geitner made sometime in Summer of 1942 to the effect that the war would be lost ultimately by Germany was solely based on the fact that Germany over extended its flanks in the Southeast and the Mediterranean; is that correct?
A. I assume that. I had some kind of idea in this direction as a parallel to the first World War.
Q. Thus the word that you used, the way this was was conducted would ultimately lead to a catastrophe, is confined merely to the tactical application and does not, as you understand it, offer any criticism of any political conduct, does it?
A. But yes, it does at the same time as well, since during the course of the war it led more and more to the fact that the SS tried to bring us to their -- to bring us away from the ideology of waging war as we as soldiers had always had.
Q. Now, remember we are talking about the Summer of 1942. Are you going to confirm your statement as far as the Summer of 1942 is concerned also?
A. I did not quite get your question? Will you please put the question in a different way? It isn't quite clear in the form in which you put it.
Q. You said that the political criticism was directed toward the SS because you realized that they were doing things with which you generally -- that is, you and your staff and officers -- did not agree, and I asked you whether or not you are already speaking of the period of 1942 or whether or not you are speaking of a later period.
A. No. I am already talking from the time since 1942 onwards.
Q. Now just what has the SS done up to that time, up to 1942, that drew your criticism?
A. In the course cf 1942 in the Balkans -- I am talking in this connection only about the Balkans -- more and more SS agencies were formed in the Balkans which had not formerly existed, and, first of all, they worked independently, and secondly, they were severe on the Wehrmacht agencies and made things difficult for them.
Q. Witness, tell us the incident you referred to in your affidavit regarding Major Kalsow. Do you remember having given some statement regarding this gentleman?
A. Yes, I remember very well.
Q. In a few words, please.
A. The officer for dealing with enemy matters in this Staff was Major of the Reserve Kalsow. Kalsow was a learned legal man and he thought very much in a legal way and he was a very straightforward man and who was against this method of warfare for his own person and he always tried to look after the Balkans peoples and therefore he was regarded as a pro-Serb. And from the Ic, the superior office tried at that time certainly to get rid of him. General von Geitner, who thought especially well of this, man because of his fine and upright attitude to this question, tried everything possible to keep Major Kalsow in his Staff and he was successful in this.
Q. Who was at that time the Ic of the 12th Army?
A. I think at that time it was still a Colonel Pfafferoth.
Q. And who was the Chief of Staff?
A. General Foertsch.
Q. And who commanded it?
A. At that time it was I believe General Kuntze already.
Q You say that this Ic officer wanted to recall this Major Kalsow on account of his pro-Serbophile attitude, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. By that I mean, wanted to suggest that he be replaced. He had no power physically to recall him but he wanted to suggest that he be replaced on account of his pro-serbian attitude; is that right?
A. Well, I can't say it as definitely as that, because I was not in the Staff of the superior offices, but I only know that he was to be relieved and that General, von Geitner prevented this.
Q. Very well. Witness, regarding the execution of so-called reprisal orders, did your superior echelon, that is, the 12th Army, ever inquire as to whether or not you carried these reprisal measures actually into effect -- you carried them out?
A. Such inquiries, were made to us but as far as I can remember the inquiries came even from a higher quarter and when I was personally called up by an officer from the OKW who found out about the execution of reprisal measures because, as far as I still remember, he had to make an oral report to Field Marshall Keitel. I can't remember the name of this officer.
Q. And you answered about the OKW, but I asked you about the 12th Army. Now give me the answer about the 12th Army.
A. I have just said that the superior agency, that is, the 12th Army Group, made such inquiries but, as far as I know, they were -- had been asked for by even higher quarters.
Q. On what do you base that knowledge?
A. I base this on conversations which I had at that time with the Ia, at that time Major Bacher, when he visited us in Belgrade.
Q. In other words, you want to say that the bad boys were really at the OKW but not at the 12th Army, is that it?
A. Yes, that is my opinion, since after all the severe orders came down from the OKW.
Q. Now, do you recall ever having made a statement which I want to read to you now and then I want to ask you whether or not you like to modify that statement or whether or not you want to leave it as it is. "By the 12th Army and by orders and directions of the highest offices again and again ruthless measures were ordered." Did you make that statement?
A. Yes, I made this statement, but later on in another affidavit I made such corrections in this statement as I have just previously mentioned After I made this statement I had misgivings about it because I remembered the discussions which I had at that time with Major Macher.
Q. The thoughts you had prevailing you to change this affidavit at a later time were not motivated by the fact that you would probably drag any of these defendants in the picture, would you?
A. No. I wanted---but perhaps even "yes". Since I have been here several times I got acquainted with the material and then it became clear to me that things really had actually happened as I stated just now and it was not my intention to make changes against any of the defendants for the benefit of another it wasn't correct, and that is why I changed my statement as I did in the second affidavit.
DR. SAUTER: Your Honors, first I would like to ask the Prosecution to inform me which document they are submitting to the witness. I have some affidavits in front of me, but at the moment I cannot find out which document the Prosecutor is now talking about with the witness. The Prosecutor has just shown me Document Number 20 in Geitner Document Book and I would like to point out that this Document Number 20 at the time was withdrawn by me, and this was done with the agreement of the Prosecution. I think that as a result of this it is not correct for the Prosecution now during cross examination or the rebuttal to show and discuss with the witness a document which was not submitted by me and a document which did not come to the judicial notice of the Tribunal. I don't think that this is admissible.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: It is proper to show previous contradictory statements of any kind that the witness may have made, bearing on his credibility. The objection will be overruled.
DR. SAUTER: Could I perhaps hear the final words? I didn't quite got them.
Might I just ask another question on this? Does this ruling also apply to such documents which in compliance with all the news I have withdrawn? I really can not imagine that at this stage the Prosecution is to have the right to produce almost anything, because this document was not submitted to the Tribunal, was not brought to the judicial notice of the Tribunal, and I really doubt whether the interpretation of the Tribunal is correct that at this stage of the proceedings such documents can be submitted to the witness.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I have no doubt as to the correctness of the ruling. The objection is overruled.
QUESTIONS BY MR. RAPP (continued)
Q. Witness, I continue on that. You then said that "After this dispatch of the daily reports very often the Chief and I--" meaning you, I presume -- "were asked by the 12th Army what had been done as a result of reports of a tax for acts of sabotage. This is proof that the Operational Staff was checked and supervised." Did you make that statement?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, what did you do or what did General Geitner do extricate yourself from this position -- that is to say, what would you do to avoid continuous supervision by the OKW or the 12th Army? Did you do anything about it?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell us about it, please.
A. I myself was for the most of the time during 1942 the responsible person to summarize the daily reports and to submit them. According to our experience on such orders, presumably -- probably from the OKW even, small surprise raids and sabotage acts should be retaliated. General von Geitner wanted to prevent under all circumstances that these kind of small surprise raids should be retaliated. If I may quote an example here which I remember quite definitely, it must have been in September, October 1942, where an automobile on the journey from Sabac to Belgrade was shot at on the road. This report was included in our daily report, but it must have gotten to the knowledge of the OKW, because I, as expert for the compilation of the daily reports, later received an inquiry through the 12th Army, transferred from the OKW, to the effect as what the cause was and what had been done, and why one had not shot so and so many people from the district in which the shot had been fired.
This is proof because at the time General Geitner told me, "We want to prevent that such kind of reports are followed by forced measures." And therefore, when I summarized the daily reports, I worked on the basis that the reports should be so compiled that small surprise raids and acts of sabotage should show the numbers of Partisans and people killed during the actual lighting, and that these figures should cover the number which have been land down for reprisal ration. Shall I give you -- Shall I extend this example?
Q I will cover that point of mock or shadow executions with you in a few minutes. I first want to ask you a couple of other questions. What could be expected from your superiors -- that is, the Twelfth Army and the OKW in case there was non-compliance or a discovery of noncompliance with their orders and directives?
A The translation did not all come through. Could you please repeat? (Question repeated by interpreter) It was to be expected, as was the case with many other German generals that a considerable punishment or removal from post would follow.
Q Could you just mention one or two of the many generals that you cited just now who were removed because they didn't comply with the orders of their superiors?
A I know two very special cases, one was General Hein. He was Commanding General at Stalingrad.
Q Just give us the names.
A The second was General Graf Soneck.
Q That is the only two that you can remember out of the many, just now?
A No, I know of a few others; for instance, Generaloberst Blaskowitz and then all those who were shot in connection with the 20th of July.
Q I presume they were hanged on account of having not carried out orders, is that right?
A Yes.
Q Now, Witness, did you make a statement -- I will read it to you and want to ask you whether or not you still affirm that statement now: "The stern measures ordered by superiors were checked. In case of noncompliance, the responsible persons had to reckon with investigation and punishment?
A Yes.
Q Now we will come to the mock executions which you have already talked about, very shortly.
A Might I add something here? I really haven't talked about mock executions.
Q Well, as a matter of fact, you said that the reports which you rendered did not correspond to the actual figures of executions carried out by your headquarters. Isn't that what you said?
A No, I didn't say that.
Q Well, will you restate once more, so I am clear about it?
A I said something to this effect: I had to deal with the compilation of the daily reports and in regard to small surprise raids and sabotage acts which had happened, I added together the numbers of dead which had taken place in the district in which the attacks had taken place in the recent days. That is......
Q All right we understand that. For what purpose?
A So that in this area there was a certain number of enemy dead given and, therefore, further number of Serbs would not have to be shot.
Q Now, do you realize or do you not understand yet why I am talking about shadow executions or mock executions? Isn't that what it in affect amounted to?
A No.
Q All right, then we will cover it question by question. Who, in your headquarters, know about the fact that you were reporting false reports to higher headquarters?
A To my knowledge only the chief of staff and the commanding general.
Q And you?
AAnd I, yes.
Q How about Lieutenant Bode?
A Lieutenant Bode was the export for the retaliation shootings, I think I must come back to my former statement that my reports only had the purpose that no retaliatory shootings were ordered. For instance, if a sabotage act took place --.
Q Just one second please. Just try and answer my question. It was very plain. I asked you whether or not Lieutenant Bode also know about the scheme that you were making false reports?
A I assume that, but I can't say it with certainty.
Q How about the 1-A?
The 1-A concerned himself very little about the daily reports, because mostly I submitted them at once to the Chief of Staff himself.
Q And the 1-C?
A The 1-C received the reports in copy form, therefore he didn't know how they were compiled.
Q Is it customary, Witness, to give false reports, generally speaking, or was this an exception?
A Well, in a way, they weren't false reports.
Q Now, if you counted all the dead in the area, and you substituted a lot of figures, would you still that this was a correct report or a false report?
A Well, that's open to argument.
Q It may depend on what you and I understand under the word "correctness", don't you think so?
A Now, to make this perfectly clear, I had better describe once again how the whole thing came about.
Q If you please could make it very short.
A I will give you the following example: An automobile is shot at in a certain district. For such a case the OKW at that time demanded retaliation. We then reported that an automobile was shot at in the Locality A, and in Locality A ten Serbs fell in combat and were dead.
These ten Serb deaths came from reports which the Serbian police, the troops, the National Cetnik units, the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, sent us, because around Locality A on this day fighting had taken place and partisans were shot, perhaps bandits were shot by Serbs themselves, and they were reported at the same time as the surprise raid on the car, so that when the report was submitted in that form to the OKW, then no further reprisal measures were necessary to be ordered by the Commanding General, and the question as to what happened then need no longer be put to us.
Q Witness, this injects an entirely now and unheard of statement into this interrogation and I am forced to kind of open it up. Are you stating that these ten men died in battle? Am I understanding you right? Witness, did you hear my question?
A Yes.
Q Did you state in those reports that these ten men you just gave us died in battle? Is that what you want to say?
A Yes.
Q Are you further on to say that inasmuch as ten men had died as the result of battle action the OKW usually would then be satisfied and would not order reprisal measures? Is that what you said?
A Yes.
Q So then it amounts to that if enough blood had been spilled there was no necessity to order reprisal measures, is that what you want to say?
A We wanted to prevent reprisal measures being ordered.
Q I realize that very well, Witness. I understand that.
A Yes.
Q But my point is, you came here and you told us that reprisal measures were first of all to act as a deterrent?
A Yes.
Q Now, I don't see any connection between ten men killed in battle -- in a battle action -- the killing of a German driver in an automobile, and reprisal measures.
A I didn't say in my example that the driver was shot, but merely that there was an attack on a motor vehicle, and the Chief of Staff wanted to prevent that for this fact for reprisal measures were taken, because he --.
Q Very well, Witness. I understand that. I am sorry. I am very sorry. I made the error. Nobody get killed in the car, but nevertheless we are still talking about reprisal measures. Now you go on record to say that no reprisal measures were ordered in the event that the OKW realized already ten dead had occurred -- or ten deaths had occurred in battle action. Is that what you want to say?
A Yes.
Q Now, how was it in the event people got killed on your side? Were they then also satisfied, or was it only when you suffered material damage?
A. I, myself, only had to do with reprisal matters insofar as after discussions with the Chief of Staff, I prevented that matters came to the knowledge of superior quarters which would have led to the ordering of reprisal measures. In other words, the Commander ordered and I had no influence on it at all.
Q. Witness, I never even by insinuation said that you had any influence over reprisal measures. I merely asked you as to a fact. What was done in case lives were lost? Was this scheme also applied that you were just telling us, or did it only refer if the German Army suffered losses pertaining to material, or did it also go into effect when you lost lives?
A. That one can not define as exactly as that. In any case, we tried in those cases in which a reprisal measure would, perhaps, have hit non-participants, we tried to prevent this.
Q. How, witness, did attacks acts of sabotage, murders on the part of the enemy, diminish once you put these reprisal measures into effect?
A. I remember quite definitely that the movement of Draja Mihajlovic - because of the reprisal measures ordered - stopped the revoked acts of sabotage, and this knowledge I received personally from but Ic Major Macher.
Q. Well, Witness, we want to be very clear on one point, that the reprisal measures -- that the hostile acts on the part of the enemy did not diminish when you did not carry out the reprisal measures, is that right?
A. No.
Q. In other words, when you reported to higher headquarters that you had done certain things, which you in fact did not do, the enemy, of course, was unconcerned about it. It didn't affect them one way or the other, isn't that correct?
A. Yes.