Q Suppose you tell us about some of the excesses which the strictly army units committed. Let's put the SS aside for a moment.
A I am quite certain of the fact -- and I don't dispute it although I only learned it after the acts -- that, for instance, during the operation against the insurgent center of Kalavritha, according to all things which became apparent from the reports, there was no doubt that there the 117th Light Infantry Division incited by acts carried out by the opposite side and which are quite beyond imagination, took strinent measures and exceeded their duty.
I can imagine, although I don't remember the files and I don't believe that I ever saw it -- I can well imagine that they went too far; but all that has nothing to do with matters of principle. There would always be such individual cases. I don't dispute that fact.
Q General, in your affidavit which you gave on behalf of General Felmy which is in Felmy Document Book II on page 59, Felmy Document No. 65, Felmy Exhibit No. 44, you mention the Kalavritha incident and you say that the intention to engage in the Kalavritha operation was communicated to the commander in chief of Army Group E by the headquarters of the 69th Army Corps and had his approval. Do you remember that?
A I recall that affidavit which I gave on the basis of what I recollected?
Q I take it you meant by that that before the Kalavritha operation had been undertaken. General LeSuire had communicated that fact to General Felmy and General Felmy had passed it on to General Loehr.
A The tactical or, if I may in this connection use the term, the operational order of this operation, was reported according to custom through official channels. It was reported previously.
Q Now to go back just a minute to what you said previously about excesses committed by German units, would you consider the execution of captured prisoners of war an excess?
A The shooting of prisoners of war without any reason or without any court procedure, I would regard as an excess; of course, I would.
Q Do you remember that happening while you were commander in chief of Army Group E. I beg your pardon -- as chief of staff of Army Group E.
A Without any further information which you might give me, I cannot remember these things.
Q Well, you remember the Commando Order, don't you, General Winter?
A I personally, if my memory is correct, read this order the first time when I was a prisoner of war. The Commando Order was issued at the time when I was Ia of an army group in the East and whether I read it at that time as an incoming document I cannot tell you today, much as I would like to.
Q General ----
A It is quite possible that I did. I don't know.
Q What is your best recollection? Do you think you did see it or do you think you didn't see it?
A Mr. Prosecutor, I don't know it. It is possible. I was at that time Ia of the Supreme Commander Army Group Southeast. It is possible I road it. I don't know. In any case, at that time I was in no way interested personally in the Commando Order. For one thing it didn't come into my sphere of work and for the other part, it didn't play any particular part in the Southeast.
Q General, the Commando Order was unusual enough for you to have to embedded in your memory, wasn't it?
A It was unusual enough, certainly, to remain in one's memory if one is concerned as a commander with its actual execution but I was at that time the expert for operations in the supreme command. It had nothing to do with the Commando Order. Daily I read an enormous number of documents of an unusual nature and I don't remember many of them. The Commando Order did not concern me in the least because I had nothing to do with it.
Therefore, this order and its text I no longer remember and, much as I would like to, I cannot tell you today when and where I read it for the first time and whether I read it at that time. Let us assume I did.
Q I don't want you to assume anything you are not sure of, General.
A Mr. Prosecutor, much as I would like to, I cannot tell this Court whether I read it at that time or not. I know now that I read it while I was a prisoner but to distinguish whether I read it then or before, I cannot do. I can certainly not make such a statement under oath because I am not sure of my facts.
Q You didn't mention the Commando Order in the course of the conference with the chiefs, did you, General, when you were Chief of Staff of Army Group E?
A Not that I remember.
Q You had nothing to do with the Commando Order?
A In the Southeast we had something to do with the Commando Order and I know that the Commando Cyder was referred to during a discussion with General Foertsch, I believe. I am not sure; I don't know with whom I talked. This discussion took place on the occasion of an enemy commando on the Island Alenna near Rhodes under General Kleemann on the occasion on which an enemy unit insisting of British officers and Greek civilians was captured whom we treated as prisoners of war. We transferred than to the mainland immediately and through prisoner of war channels brought them to the rear.
I feel inclined to assume that there was certainly some discussion of the Commando Order and that at that time I knew what the Commando Order meant but, Mr. Prosecutor, when and how and whether I read the Commando Order, I cannot tell you. At that time I am sure I had an oral report made to me concerning the Commando Order in Saloniki when the actual event took place and this is the only case I remember in this connection.
Q When was that, General, when you talked with General Foertsch about the Commando Order?
A I can merely conclude nor from the result that General Foertsch and I were of the same opinion, after having reported to our commander in chief, of course, because the chief of staff did not decide on such important matters. General Foertsch and I agreed that these people captured on Rhodes were not to be treated in accordance with this fact which the result proves. Army Group E would never have been able to do that without the consent of Army Group F. These people were brought to the rear through prisoner of war channels.
Q Just when was that?
A Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot tell you that from my recollection. It took place in the course of the winter 1943-1944. It must have been towards the end of 1943 or at the beginning of 1944, to the best of my recollection.
Q Do you recall that some Englishmen who were captured in the course of a Commando raid on the Island of Rhodes were treated as prisoners of war on that occasion and not with accordance with the Commando Order?
A What island did you say?
Q Didn't you mention the Island of Rhodes?
A Yes, this Commando operation which I remember, if I remember it correctly, took place on a small island by the name of Alenna near Rhodes.
Q Do you remember how many commandos were involved, how many were captured?
A I don't know that. I only know and I remember that because I discussed it with General Kleeman while we were prisoners of war. I would like to state here under oath that without this discussion I would not remember the details. What I do remember is that it was a sailboat equipped with a radio transmitter, commanded by a British officer, and some British soldiers as crew, and supported by a number of Greek civilians.
Q You think that was the first time you ever heard of a Commando Order in the Southeast?
A To the best of my recollection, that was the first time that it was reported orally to me. I may by way of explanation add that when I took over the position of Chief of Staff there there the supreme commander of Army Group E had been newly installed and the files of the commander in chief Southeast were passed on to Army Group F so that I had practically to start from scratch, I did not have the time to read the old files either.
Q Do you remember whether any commandos were ever executed while you we e in the southeast, General Winter?
A To the best of my recollection, I don't believe that was the case.
Q Now, except for that one occasion when you talked about the Commando Order with General Kleeman, I take it you had nothing more to do with the Commando Order; it was outside your sphere of influence and jurisdiction.
A I cannot recall that I did. I do not remember any particular incident in which I would have been connected with it.
Q Suppose you take a look at this document, General Winter. It might refresh your recollection a little bit. This is NOKW-1824, marked as Prosecution Exhibit 672.
Q In this document, General Winter, there are some notes on a lecture which you delivered at a chief of staff meeting on 25 July 1944.
A Yes, yes, I did.
Q Do you notice -
DR. WEISGERBER (Counsel for defendant Speidel): If it please the Tribunal, I object to this manner of examination of the witness. In this case we are concerned with the cross examination which should exclusively refer to those questions which were dealt with in one of the affidavits submitted by the defense. The prosecutor for some time has been dealing with questions which were touched upon in neither of the affidavits submitted.
Also, we have the same state of affairs concerning this document which the prosecution believes to be able to introduce in this manner. This is no cross examination. The Prosecutor seems to be trying to make this witness his own witness. Therefore, I object to this manner of questioning and I also object to the introduction of this documents.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection as to cross-examination might have been good if timely made, but the extent of the examination that has been made up to this time and the questions which have been given to this witness or the answers which have been given by this witness, it seems to me that this document that is now presented bears upon the question of his veracity and truthfulness; it will be admitted for that purpose.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General, do you see the reference here to your statement that the number of Englishmen who died fighting with the bands and with enemy kommandos is to be reported? "The British and Americans must know that they must pay for a commitment on the Balkans with the bands with their last commitment." Now you are here talking about enemy kommandos, aren't you?
A. I beg your pardon, may I correct you? In the photostat which I have, it does not say "pay with their lives. " It says "pay with their last commitment." I am talking about enemy kommandos here. That is quite correct.
Q. But how could you be lecturing with respect to kommandos when you had nothing to do with kommandos? That was outside your jurisdiction you told me.
A. I never said that enemy kommandos were not within the scope of my activities. I don't know when I should have said that. Furthermore, I did not hold a lecture concerning enemy kommandos. Instead, when informing the chiefs of Army Group F, I informed them not of my own ideas but of that material of which I had to inform the chiefs officially, and on that occasion I also discussed enemy kommandos. After all, enemy kommandos were a general conception. They were small groups especially established who had as their aim sabotage acts or other things end for this purpose landed along the coast and of course all security measures had to be taken against such kommandos which could be invented, because they presented an enormous danger for the rather weak defense forces in our area.
Q. General, I don't want to misquote you, so suppose I ask you this question again. Do you know anything about the execution of captured kommandos when you were in the Southeast?
A. Mr. Prosecutor, I can only repeat under oath that from memory I do not know any such thing. It may have happened. I don't know, but as much as I would like to, from memory I can only answer the question to the effect that by heart I do not remember such an incident. Would you please take into consideration the fact that after four years I am in no position to recall such details. I don't believe that it occurred but possibly it did. In any case, I don't know from memory.
Q. You have rather a good memory regarding details that are helpful to General Felmy and General Speidel, General Winter.
A. I don't know what details you mean that I testified to concerning these two gentlemen. I believe I just made statements concerning matters of a general nature.
Q. You remembered that the Kalavrita Operation had been cleared through the Commander of the LXVIIIth Army Corps and also through the Commander in Chief of Army Group E. It is rather a small detail for you to remember, isn't it?
A. The Kalavrita Operation was not dealt with by the Chief of Army Group E. The Kalavrita Operation was a very important operation concerning security on the Peloponessus, and the 117th Light Infantry Division was on its own and reinforced only by a number of security battalions. In such a position, when more than one-third of a division is involved in an operation, this operation is important enough that if I remember it correctly, seeing that my command had about five or six divisions at its disposal and in that case one would undoubtedly remember it. If you ask me concerning the details of such an operation, I will have to, according to my duty, state under oath that I cannot give you those details but the purpose of it, the aim of the Kalavrita Operation, as I recall it, compared with our strength at the time, and with the scope of our task, was an important one at that time.
Q. How many divisions did you say were involved in the Kalavrita Operation on the German side?
A. There were considerable parts of the 117th Light Infantry Division I believe a third of the division, i.c., reinforced infantry regiment -that was 25 per cent of the troops -- committed in the Peloponessus for defense purposes. This unit was committed for several days and could there fore not be used for the cost defense during that time and the coast defense was our main task.
Q. Was the Kalavrita Operation more important than the carrying-out of the Kommando Order?
A. For me, it was more important since I was Chief of Staff. That is according to my ideas, it was more important. After all, when the task to defend Greece and all our thoughts at that time circled round the one important question , how with those few troops we could counter an anticipated Anglo-American attack which we thought was to take place for sure -- that is what our ideas were concerned with, almost exclusively concerned with.
Q. General Winter, isn't the execution of captured prisoners-ofwar such a despicable act that you would have remembered it if it had taken place?
A. The execution of prisoners-of-war is at all times -- what do you mean by "execution?" You mean an execution on the oasis of a Court sentence? That is no more despicable concerning prisoners-of-war than concerning other people. An execution is always a terrible act. A shooting of prisoners-of-war without a court sentence would be a despicable thing in my opinion.
Q. I had in mind the execution of prisoners-of-war on the basis of a Hitler Order without a trial.
A. The execution of prisoners-of-war on the basis of a Fuehrer Order without a trial -- I don't know what I am supposed to imagine.
DR. WEISGERBER: Dr. Weisgerber for General Speidel. I object to this manner of questioning. The prosecutor is trying here to argue with the witness. He should ask for facts. He should not argue. The question as to whether or not the execution of prisoners-of-war is anything despicable or anything unlawful is purely an argumentation.
THE PRESIDENT: The matter concerning which the Tribunal is interested in the cross-examination of this witness is relative to matters which are in the affidavit. The cross-examination necessarily must be restricted somewhat. The objection will be sustained.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General, you mentioned in your affidavit on behalf of General Speidel that the guarding of communication lines was a very important matter?
A. Yes.
Q. I take it your communication lines were being interrupted from time to time?
A. Yes.
Q. Now was it possible to telephone from Saloniki to Athens and from Saloniki to Belgrade whenever you wanted to?
A. From Saloniki to Belgrade it was possible almost at all times. From Saloniki to Athens the communications were disrupted; if not frequently they were disrupted at some time for shorter periods of time. On the whole , the communications functioned properly. In order to be more precise, by communication lines I do not necessarily mean the telephone. I mean mainly highways and railroad lines. That is the technical term we use. There might be translation difficulties in that connection.
Q. But Belgrade was able to get in touch with you in Saloniki and ascertain exactly what was going on within the area of Army Group E almost any time they wanted to, weren't they?
A. As a general rule, possibly, but I have to qualify this statement as far as the first time after defection of the Italian 11th Army from the Axis is concerned. At that time, the telephone not in Greece had not been built up on the part of the German side. There was a good telephone communication with Saloniki and Athens but the Epirus area could not be reached from us by telephone at all. It took quite some weeks until in the late fall of 1943 these lines had finally been completed.
Q. They mentioned the Italian surrender. How were the communications during that period? Were you able to communicate with Athens and Belgrade regarding the surrender of the Italians?
A. Yes. During that period of time, we had a connection with Belgrade and Athens.
Q. So the people at Army Group F were fully informed of the events that were transpiring within the area of Army Group F during that time?
A. Yes, Army Group F was currently informed.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: No further questions, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Any further examination by defense counsel?
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q. Dr. Weisgerber for General Speidel. General, answering a question of the prosecutor during cross-examination, you stated that the Military Commander for Greece was responsible for the security within a country. The commitment of troops directly or indirectly subordinate to him was ordered by the Military Commander. Now, I would like to discuss with you the conditions which prevailed at the time from the beginning of the activities of the Military Commander for Greece. when was the agency of the Military Commander for Greece created?
A. It was established before I took over the office of Chief of Staff of Army Group E. Therefore, I cannot give you the date exactly. I believe it was in summer, July or August, 1943, but I am not competent to answer that question.
When I took over office towards the end of September, that agency was already in existence.
Q. At that time, was there already the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece?
A. I believe I recall that the Higher SS and Police Leader Schimana, at least where his own person was concerned, arrived when I was already down there but I am not in a position to say that precisely under oath. I know that he made a visit when he arrived with my Commander in Chief in Saloniki which is a matter of courtesy and that took place at a time when I was already Chief of Staff, presumably at the beginning of September.
Q.- Did the Military Commander of Greece at that time have any security tasks?
A.- At that time, the Military Commander had the general task to secure law and order within the country. Whether he had any specifically formulated security tasks which exceeded the basic tasks as laid down by the service regulations, I am in no position to tell you from memory.
Q.- Perhaps you can then recollect if I ask you whether the Military Commander at that time -- that is in September-October 1943 -- had to look after the security of pass highways?
A.- Yes, I am inclined to assume that he had to. Police Regiment 19, for instance, which was his main security unit, which was indirectly subordinated to him -- that it, it was also under the Higher SS and Police Leader -- a position of subordination which I tried to explain previously -- this regiment had security tasks. How the Military Commander committed this regiment in actual fact at the time I don't know but I am very sure he committed it for the security of pass highways because these passes were important for the inner tactical situation. Without having an indication by way of a map, I am in no position to make these statements from recollection and to give any information as to how the security troops were distributed at the time.
Q.- General, concerning the Higher SS and Police Leader for Greece, at any time was a band combat area assigned to him?
A.- Yes, in an affidavit for General Speidel, I testified to that effect from recollection. I said that in the late fall 1943, for reasons which in this affidavit I stated in detail, the Higher SS and Police Leader was assigned a certain area -- I think it was Boeotia -- for security purposes in the interior of that area. The purpose was that the units subordinated to him be concentrated there and that there should be no overlapping concerning security of communication lines. By that I mean roads and railroads with the troops under the corps. At that time, we had to commit troops also because since the 11th Italian Army was no longer available for our purposes, there was a complete vacuum in Greece.
Therefore, it became necessary that we did not have the forces which we had at our disposal work so that they overlapped, but that instead we should separate those forces. Therefore, the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group E instructed the Military Commander that the Higher SS and Police Leader with his units, according to the immediate instructions of the army group, be assigned a certain area, and be there charged with the exclusive security in that area. There were no troops of the tactical units committed in those areas.
Q.- The band combat area Boeotia-was that area established by the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group E?
A.- Yes, it was established by the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group E.
Q.- Is it correct that the Military Commander to that extent then only played the part of a passing on command agency?
A.- Concerning that particular commitment, the Military Commander was only the agency which passed on orders. The Commander-in-Chief of Army Group E had instructed him that the Higher SS and Police Leader and forces which were also assigned be assigned to a certain area which was also previously ordered.
Q.- The Commander-in-Chief of Army Group E -- did he instruct the Higher SS and Police Leader for Greece concerning his antiband activities?
A.- No. There is always some talk here about band combat activities. The task of the Higher SS and Police Leader read, although of course I haven't got it available here --perhaps it, in actual fact, reads a little differently from the way I remember it -- the instruction read that he was to secure the area. Concerning security tasks, we had our basic instructions which had been supplemented by instructions from the Highest levels and therefore it was impossible to prescribe certain de tails as to how he was to carry out his tasks.
That was left to his own discretion within the scope of the task which he was given. I can well imagine that it was pointed out to him that the South-North railroad was of particular importance.
Q.- General, during cross-examination, you talked about the service instructions for the Higher SS and Police Leader?
A.- Yes, I did.
Q.- I'll have this instruction shown to you, General.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I object to this type of re-direct examination. Dr. Weisgerber has relied on his affidavits. He chose not to call this man as a witness on his own behalf. I submit that this is outside the scope of the cross-examination which went almost entirely to the credibility of this witness.
DR. WEISGERBER: I couldn't quite understand the translation of the last sentence.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: It was to the effect that the bulk of my cross examination went to the credibility of the witness and not to substantive matters brought out in the affidavits.
THE PRESIDENT: The cross-examination and re-direct examination necessarily should be somewhat restricted. However, because of the extent to which the prosecution carried on its examination along certain lines, we will permit this question to be answered; but in permitting it to be answered, Dr. Weisgerber, it is no indication that we will not limit further matters which are not covered in the affidavit.
DR. WEISGERBER: If It please the Tribunal, in any case, I shall endeavor to be as brief as possible. I will now show to the witness his own affidavit executed 20 December 1947, which was starting point of the cross examination.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q.- This is Speidel Exhibit No. 14 contained in Speidel Document Book I.
Witness, would you please read paragraph 4?
A.- I believe that is comparable with what I said just now.
Q.- My question was whether on the basis of cross-examination -- you see any cause to change anything in this affidavit?
A. -- No.
Q.- Therefore, it is correct that at a date late in 1943 the Higher SS and Police Leader in the area assigned to him by the Commander of Army Group E for security purposes took his measures on his own initiative and responsibility?
A.- The Higher SS and Police Leader in the area assigned to him for security purposes took measures which had to be taken on the basis of his tasks on his own responsibility to the extent as every troop leader of the same rank would have done it in his area and had to do it in his area.
Q.- General, through the assignment of an own security area to the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece, was any change effected concerning the state which prevailed up to that time?
A change occurred inasmuch as the Military Commander of Greece, concerning the tactical security of communication lines outside of this particular security area, had no longer any responsibility because he had no longer any forces which he could assign outside of this area for the purpose mentioned.
Q.- Just before you said Military Commander for Greece was a command agency which passed on orders.
A.- Concerning this particular mission.
Q.- Yes, I see, this particular mission. In the service regulations for the Higher SS and Police leader, it is further provided that in the band combatting, according to directives of the Reich Fuehrer SS, he acted on his own responsibility. Is that fact known to you?
A.- Yes, I know that. That was contained in his service regulation.
Q.- Did the Military Commander for Greece -- and here I have to ask for your personal opinion -- have any responsibility whatsoever then?
A.- Counsel, you ask me a question which only an expert could answer. Since I am under oath here, I must stress that I don't think I am competent to answer that question. I was neither a member of the staff of the Military Commander nor was I ever interpolated in territorial tasks. If you ask me for my own personal opinion, I will have to state that, according to that passage which was contained in all service regulations -
MR. FENSTERMACHER: He said that he feels incompetent to answer the question, and now he appears to be going on to answer it.
DR. WEISGERBER: If the Tribunal please, I am of the opinion that the objection of the prosecution is to late.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: It certainly is not too late. The witness has not yet given his personal opinion. The first part of his answer he has given, and he made it quite clear that he was not competent to answer the second part. Now it is time enough to prevent him from doing so.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be sustained. The Tribunal will be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
MARSHALL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. WEISGERBER: Your Honor, I have no further questions.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Dr. Mueller-Torgow for General Felmy. General, I only have one question to ask you because I don't know whether a misunderstanding occurred during the cross examination or not. You said that the so-called operation of Kalavritha was carried out by the 117th Infantry Division and this was reported via the Corps to the Army Group previously, is that what you said?
A Yes, I assume that with certainty.
Q What does an "Entsatz" operation mean? That is, a relief operation?
A I do not remember that I used this term "relief operation".
Q Well, it would be a kind of tactical operation.
A Yes, I probably called it a tactical operation.
Q Well, then, might I repeat briefly, that the tactical operation of Kalavritha was previously reported through the usual channels up to the Army Group?
A Yes, I assume that with certainty.
Q Therefore, you do not mean by this that the reprisal operation was previously reported to the division?
A No, sir. Certainly not.
Q I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there questions by other defense counsel? Are there any questions by members of the Tribunal? If not, the witness will be excused.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors will recall that last week the Prosecution offered as a rebuttal document an affidavit by Dr. Erich Lattmann; that document NOKW 2679 was offered and received into evidence as Exhibit 653. At that time I believe it was Dr. Laternser who asked that the affiant be brought to Nurnberg for cross examination. The affiant is now here and available to the defense to proceed with their cross examination.
DR. LATERNSER: I am afraid this is rather a surprise to me, Your Honor. I only should like to undertake the cross examination today after the noon recess.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Your Honor please, if the man had been present on the witness stand, the defense would have had to go forward immediately. They are not entitled to any particular notice, but the man has come from the British Zone and he wants very much to go back there tonight.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, of course, I am ready to do this. I am only rather astonished at the position taken by the Prosecution, who, when I finished the cross examination of Field Marshal List, was of a different opinion, but I am ready to undertake the cross examination now.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: That was an entirely different case; in that case a document was put to the witness and offered and received in evidence which had not been translated in its entirety. That was an entirely different case.
DR. LATERNSER: Of course, it is always a different case. If the witness had been there, I would have cross examined him immediately, I just want to point out that one time the Prosecutor says one thing, and the next time he says another. I am quite ready, but before I do that I would like to make a motion. Unfortunately, I must again refer to Exhibit No. 664. This is a rebuttal document, the staff order dated the 30th of October, signed by Field Marshal List. Your Honor, I looked at this document again and I have discovered the following. At the top, on the right hand corner, you will find the words "KTB", that is "war diary". These are the initials for war diary, and I have already mentioned this, but in the left hand corner you will find page numbers -- page 32/5, and at the bottom you will find another number, page 17. If you turn over this photostat copy you will find on the back "Orig.", which I think stands for "Original", "18 pages", and underneath that another figure "16". Your Honor, the certificate was made in Nurnberg on the day the document was submitted and this gentleman who gave this certificate, who therefore must have had something in front of him so that he could make out the certificate - I must have this man as a witness here in order to find out what is the basis for this certificate. What was submitted to him, because I assume that lots of pages were submitted to him and I want to find out whether this is the war diary, which I was not allowed to see.
I consider this a fundamental question in this case.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Now, Your Honor, I submit this whole document has been entirely disposed of. Dr. Laternser made his objection last week; the affidavit was received into evidence, and the objection overruled. Now any questions regarding any numbers on the document, I submit, are entirely irrelevant. The document speaks for itself.
DR. LATERNSER: I haven't any answer to that at all.
THE PRESIDENT: May I inquire, Mr. Fenstermacher, if there are any other portions of this document?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Not to my knowledge, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have any knowledge -- I don't wish to question you or cross examine you. Do you have any knowledge of whether this is a part of some other document?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: My only knowledge in this respect, Your Honor, is this: that we get documents from time to time from Washington in great bulk. Some of them we use; some of them we discard. Now this particular one I have no personal knowledge about.
MR. RAPP: If Your Honors please, I possibly could also add to clear this up: Washington has for many months sent us documents, which we were interested in, and they have arbitrarily stapled them together. That is, when documents are sent over here either by pouch or via airmail, in order that the individual pages of these documents do not get lost, they are being stapled together; sometimes fifty or sixty pages, with a great, big staple put right through, or they are being bound with cord. In any event, when you open these documents they don't necessarily cover the same units or the same areas of any of the particular defendants here. They deal with the Southeastcase, of course, but if a document has a number on the back, number 17, we have to sign -- that is, I, for my person, have to sign that I have received documents containing sixty-three pages, and I have to send that to Washington with my name on it, and we have actually received sixty-three pages, but these sixty-three pages may be composed of twenty different items.