In my affidavit, I stressed that I am citing the formulation of the service regulations from memory since of course I no longer have them. Furthermore I referred back to conversations with General Speidel during our joint terms of Office in Greece. That is from recollection.
Q.- What did you mean when you said that the Higher Police and SS Leader was subordinate to the Military Commander Greece by assignment?
A.- That means the following. The Military Commander Greece was, at least during certain periods of his activity and by virtue of his general service instructions, responsible for the security within the country. The commitment of troops, directly or indirectly subordinate to him by this I mean security troops amongst them police troops -- were ordered by him. In this capacity he gave operational and tactical orders to the Higher SS and Police Leader. For instance, he could order him that the focal point or the bulk of the police troops subordinate to him for security purposes was to be assigned to a certain railroad line or to a certain area. Here again, the execution of this order, the number of the troops or anything else which was to be ordered in this connection, was left in the hands of the Higher SS and Police Leader. That is what I mean by subordinate for assignment.
Q.- What reprisal ratios were used in the event that any police troops were killed by partisans or unknown perpetrators?
A.- From my recollection, I am not in a position to give any information concerning this point. I believe that during the period while I was chief of staff any instructions, any detailed instructions did not exist concerning this point. However, I do not know.
Q.- You don't remember anything about reprisal ratios, General Winter?
A.- No. Now, after the war, I learned several things about it and I read several things but I have to tell this Court that from my recollection of the time in the Balkans I cannot remember any such ratios.
Q.- Now, General, wasn't it your task to call together certain of the Chief of Staff of the units subordinate to Army Group E and instruct them regarding reprisal ratios?
A.- No that was not my task. Such informations, as a matter of prin ciple, if they were given at all -- which I do not know and which I do not remember -- they would originate with the Commander in Chief.
The calling together of chiefs within the Army Group E while I was Chief of Staff, referred purely to those tasks which the Supreme Commanded of Army Group E had to solve and that was the operational defense of Greece, toward an external or internal enemy, Police or reprisal matters were not concerned.
Q.- You never gave any reports concerning reprisal ratios?
A.- I assume that the Supreme Commander of Army Group will have passed on such reports if they received them from subordinate units. At the moment I cannot remember any such individual cases, but I assume that such reports were made.
Q.- Suppose you take a look at this document, General Winter. It is NOKW--839, It is offered as Prosecution Exhibit 671.
A.- I should like to ask the Court to give me some time to read this document, in case I am supposed to make any comments on it.
Q.- Would you look at the heading on the document, General Winter, and identify it? On the first page.
A.- Yes, it says it was the report which I had made concerning the general situation. However, without having examined the document in detail I cannot make any comments as to whether it was or whether what the document contains is in accordance with the heading. It has no signature, nor any certification notes.
Q.- What is the date?
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the witness should be given an opportunity to read it.
A.- At this point, I can make one statement, which I can gather from the text -- that it is undoubtedly the expose of an officer of the staff which neither according to its contents nor according to its form has any claim to be a document and does not contain my signature saying that I ap-
proved of that expose.
Q.- What is the date on the document, General Winter?
A.- I beg your pardon? 9 December 1943.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Would your Honors please note on your mimeographed copies the date "9 December 1943"? Unfortunately it was eliminated at the time it was translated. Would you let me know, General Winter, when you are ready to discuss the document with me?
DR. SAUTER: If it please the Tribunal, Dr. Sauter for the defendant Geitner. Perhaps I could use this interval in order to make a statement concerning this document so that there may be no misunderstanding. During this chief's conference, to which the document submitted refers, the defendant von Geitner was not present. Apparently the document refers -which, however, does not become apparent from the copy submitted, to a conference of the chiefs of the general staff of Army Group E. In this connection I would like to state that at that time von Geitner was not za member of that Army Group. In the copy submitted, the list of those present is not contained. In the photostat which has been submitted as an exhibit in evidence, the list of those present is contained and from this list I gather that the defendant von Geitner is not listed herein. Mr. Fenstermacher at this moment just had a look at it and I believe that he will confirm that what I said is correct.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I wonder if Dr. Sauter would stipulate that there is in fact a representative from the staff of the Military Commander Southeast present at the conference. I am willing to stipulate that from the list of persons present von Geitner was not present, if Dr. Sauter will stipulate what I just asked him to.
DR. SAUTER: With the permission of the Tribunal I would briefly like to ask the defendant von Geitner about this fact and then I am ready to give the information.
If the Tribunal please, in the list of those present, no member of the agency of the defendant von Geitner is listed whatsoever. Therefore, neither the defendant von Geitner was present nor was any other representative of his agency. The explanation for this is that concerning this particular matter he and his agency were not involved in it. I wanted to make the statement lest there be any misunderstanding.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q.- Are you ready now to discuss the document. General Winter?
A.- Yes, I am. This document, the documentary value of which I am in no position to recognize -- I have read the document to the extent that I am ready to discuss it now.
Q General Winter, isn't it true that on this date, 9 December 1943, you held a conference at which you made an address or delivered a lecture, and these are the notes which were taken of that conference?
A Yes, I assume that this is correct. I don't remember the date but I have no reason to doubt your statement.
Q Do you recall this conference?
A I recall it.
Q Now, would you look under Paragraph 3? it relates to reprisal measures.
A Paragraph 3?
Q Aid you talk there about a minimum ratio for shooting to death of hostages having become the maximum: "1 to 50 if they are dead, 1 to 10 if they are wounded." I thought you told me you didn't know anything about reprisal measures and reprisal ratios.
A I said that I didn't recall them. This document, if the notes are correct, proves that I knew about these things at the time and that I expressed the fact that I knew them -- that is an instruction of the gentlemen there at the time concerning the orders which were valid at the time.
Q You have rather a bad memory, don't you, General?
A I believe, Mr. Prosecutor, that it would be a phenomenal memory if after four years after the war one could still remember all those details of conferences or documents, I must state that such a good memory I do not have. I believe in the preliminary discussion I have proved that it is no bad intention on my part if there are gaps of memory.
Q Reprisal ratios were a rather important matter for you, weren't they, when you were Chief of Staff of Army Group E?
A I believe that the importance to me as Chief of Staff of Army Group E is being overestimated. As Chief of Staff of Army Group E, I would like to repeat again I had nothing to do either with the ordering or with the establishing of reprisal orders immediately.
If in this conference here I announced these measures, I fulfilled a duty which was to inform the officers present about everything that went on in the area where army troops were committed. Of course, within the scope of the extensive work of the Supreme Command which concerned a different sphere altogether, it was not my task as Chief of Staff to be particularly interested in reprisal measures which, after all, had been ordered from higher levels and were not due to an initiative of my own commander in chief.
Q You think this is the first time you were heard about a 50 to 1 ration, General?
A I cannot tell you that, Mr. Prosecutor. It is possible that I had heard about it before. That is even probable because I don't think it was on the 9th of December that I learned about those figures for the first time but I may again stress that the focal point of my statements was not the announcement of these reprisal measures as something new but it becomes evident from the whole of the question of reprisal measures the emphasis is put on the restrictions which I pointed out to the officers of the Staff who were present there. From the whole tendency of my then commander-in-chief and his staff, if I may mention, this fact becomes very evident.
Q You mention here -- you apparently mentioned during your conferences "unfortunately it is not feasible to behead everybody." Is that your attitude?
A I believe that again has to be read in the proper context. Of course, it was never my attitude that everybody should be beheaded. I believe from the text which I used, although again this is not the actual words which I used -- it is just an excerpt -- I still believe from this it is evident that such a thing was out of the question. I stated that one would have to look for other means to counter this danger in a reasonable way.
In this case I merely transmitted what my commander in chief wanted passed on concerning information concerning this particular fact.
Q You were just a messenger boy, weren't you, between your commander-in-chief and the army groups subordinate to Army Group E?
A Messenger boy is not quite enough. I transmitted the ideas of my commander in chief just as every chief of staff does; I believe that is the same in all armies. I myself had no jurisdiction over armies nor was I entitled to make any arrangements which deviated from those of my commander-in-chief. I merely had to transmit the orders and instructions of my commander-in-chief and that is the task of the chief of staff and I don't believe any chief of staff has any different task -- at least, I didn't in the German army.
Q General, you apparently mentioned during this conference that unless you got the really guilty and s topped burning down entirely innocent villages, the bands would increase in number. You meant by that, I take it, that reprisal measures were boomeranging -- they were making matters worse.
A That is what I meant. That was my contention which I stressed at all times and of which I informed all officers who worked in my staff.
Q You meant that reprisal measures were not a military necessity; they were, in fact, military suicide?
A I don't believe one can put it in this way. It was unfortunate that during that terrible war on all parts reprisal measures took place if one believed that one could not achieve one's purpose by other means, that the reprisal measures were only a last resort if one could not succeed in bringing the population in some other way to a peaceful attitude which would not impair the military operation. This fact, unfortunately, cannot be denied.
I have always regarded reprisal measures as a very last resort but without them one could not get along in this war, particularly in the specific conditions in the Balkans which I believe have been discussed before this Court.
This is my contention, even today.
Q You said during the conference that reprisal measures were increasing the number of bandits, as you called them.
A Reprisal measures which eventually lead to the fact that any country with the idea of vendetta has been a moving factor for centuries and is today reprisal measures only sponsor this idea of vendetta and are, therefore, wrong in their efforts because they only represented a chain without any end to it; but I can well imagine that in individual operations under certain circumstances reprisal measures were necessary because in any other way it was not possible to cope with the situation. If these reprisal measures hit only the guilty and in this way they were made to realize that only the guilty were being hit, then the danger I described only hit to the extent to which I mentioned it and you will realize that these necessary measures can be a deterring measure against new acts from the opposite side.
I believe, if I may summarize, that the problem of reprisal measures cannot be appraised and decided as a matter of principle but only in individual cases and pending the individual situation. I believe that was the case in all armies during this war.
Q You mentioned, General, that there were certain excesses on the part of even German troops in the Balkans. Suppose you tell us a few of those.
A I recall an incident in Greece, which took place in the area of Ottoc, where troop units of the forces SS Panzer Grenadier Division, undoubtedly were guilty of excesses. By heart I cannot remember the date of that event. It can, however, not be disputed that German troops were also guilty of excesses here and there. At no time, however, was this done on order or with the knowledge of their higher leader but I would assume that it was conditioned by the manner of the warfare and the provocation which existed.
Q The SS units were the bad boys of the German Wehrmacht, weren't they?
A Yes, in my opinion, they were.
Q And the strictly German army units always behaved themselves.
A Mr. Prosecutor, even today it is my contention that with the troop units of the German army, of course, also certain things occurred like they did in all armies, certain things which were not justified, but it is my contention that on the whole they upheld their honor. At this point, however, I have to state without wanting to decide questions of guilt that the measures which took place within the Waffen SS and which are connected with matters under discussion here were carried out not with the approval of the any commanders and they were at no time approved by the any commanders because they exceeded the scope of matters concerning the army. The army units could not call them to account because there was no jurisdiction by army commanders over the Waffen SS.
Q Suppose you tell us about some of the excesses which the strictly army units committed. Let's put the SS aside for a moment.
A I am quite certain of the fact -- and I don't dispute it although I only learned it after the acts -- that, for instance, during the operation against the insurgent center of Kalavritha, according to all things which became apparent from the reports, there was no doubt that there the 117th Light Infantry Division incited by acts carried out by the opposite side and which are quite beyond imagination, took strinent measures and exceeded their duty.
I can imagine, although I don't remember the files and I don't believe that I ever saw it -- I can well imagine that they went too far; but all that has nothing to do with matters of principle. There would always be such individual cases. I don't dispute that fact.
Q General, in your affidavit which you gave on behalf of General Felmy which is in Felmy Document Book II on page 59, Felmy Document No. 65, Felmy Exhibit No. 44, you mention the Kalavritha incident and you say that the intention to engage in the Kalavritha operation was communicated to the commander in chief of Army Group E by the headquarters of the 69th Army Corps and had his approval. Do you remember that?
A I recall that affidavit which I gave on the basis of what I recollected?
Q I take it you meant by that that before the Kalavritha operation had been undertaken. General LeSuire had communicated that fact to General Felmy and General Felmy had passed it on to General Loehr.
A The tactical or, if I may in this connection use the term, the operational order of this operation, was reported according to custom through official channels. It was reported previously.
Q Now to go back just a minute to what you said previously about excesses committed by German units, would you consider the execution of captured prisoners of war an excess?
A The shooting of prisoners of war without any reason or without any court procedure, I would regard as an excess; of course, I would.
Q Do you remember that happening while you were commander in chief of Army Group E. I beg your pardon -- as chief of staff of Army Group E.
A Without any further information which you might give me, I cannot remember these things.
Q Well, you remember the Commando Order, don't you, General Winter?
A I personally, if my memory is correct, read this order the first time when I was a prisoner of war. The Commando Order was issued at the time when I was Ia of an army group in the East and whether I read it at that time as an incoming document I cannot tell you today, much as I would like to.
Q General ----
A It is quite possible that I did. I don't know.
Q What is your best recollection? Do you think you did see it or do you think you didn't see it?
A Mr. Prosecutor, I don't know it. It is possible. I was at that time Ia of the Supreme Commander Army Group Southeast. It is possible I road it. I don't know. In any case, at that time I was in no way interested personally in the Commando Order. For one thing it didn't come into my sphere of work and for the other part, it didn't play any particular part in the Southeast.
Q General, the Commando Order was unusual enough for you to have to embedded in your memory, wasn't it?
A It was unusual enough, certainly, to remain in one's memory if one is concerned as a commander with its actual execution but I was at that time the expert for operations in the supreme command. It had nothing to do with the Commando Order. Daily I read an enormous number of documents of an unusual nature and I don't remember many of them. The Commando Order did not concern me in the least because I had nothing to do with it.
Therefore, this order and its text I no longer remember and, much as I would like to, I cannot tell you today when and where I read it for the first time and whether I read it at that time. Let us assume I did.
Q I don't want you to assume anything you are not sure of, General.
A Mr. Prosecutor, much as I would like to, I cannot tell this Court whether I read it at that time or not. I know now that I read it while I was a prisoner but to distinguish whether I read it then or before, I cannot do. I can certainly not make such a statement under oath because I am not sure of my facts.
Q You didn't mention the Commando Order in the course of the conference with the chiefs, did you, General, when you were Chief of Staff of Army Group E?
A Not that I remember.
Q You had nothing to do with the Commando Order?
A In the Southeast we had something to do with the Commando Order and I know that the Commando Cyder was referred to during a discussion with General Foertsch, I believe. I am not sure; I don't know with whom I talked. This discussion took place on the occasion of an enemy commando on the Island Alenna near Rhodes under General Kleemann on the occasion on which an enemy unit insisting of British officers and Greek civilians was captured whom we treated as prisoners of war. We transferred than to the mainland immediately and through prisoner of war channels brought them to the rear.
I feel inclined to assume that there was certainly some discussion of the Commando Order and that at that time I knew what the Commando Order meant but, Mr. Prosecutor, when and how and whether I read the Commando Order, I cannot tell you. At that time I am sure I had an oral report made to me concerning the Commando Order in Saloniki when the actual event took place and this is the only case I remember in this connection.
Q When was that, General, when you talked with General Foertsch about the Commando Order?
A I can merely conclude nor from the result that General Foertsch and I were of the same opinion, after having reported to our commander in chief, of course, because the chief of staff did not decide on such important matters. General Foertsch and I agreed that these people captured on Rhodes were not to be treated in accordance with this fact which the result proves. Army Group E would never have been able to do that without the consent of Army Group F. These people were brought to the rear through prisoner of war channels.
Q Just when was that?
A Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot tell you that from my recollection. It took place in the course of the winter 1943-1944. It must have been towards the end of 1943 or at the beginning of 1944, to the best of my recollection.
Q Do you recall that some Englishmen who were captured in the course of a Commando raid on the Island of Rhodes were treated as prisoners of war on that occasion and not with accordance with the Commando Order?
A What island did you say?
Q Didn't you mention the Island of Rhodes?
A Yes, this Commando operation which I remember, if I remember it correctly, took place on a small island by the name of Alenna near Rhodes.
Q Do you remember how many commandos were involved, how many were captured?
A I don't know that. I only know and I remember that because I discussed it with General Kleeman while we were prisoners of war. I would like to state here under oath that without this discussion I would not remember the details. What I do remember is that it was a sailboat equipped with a radio transmitter, commanded by a British officer, and some British soldiers as crew, and supported by a number of Greek civilians.
Q You think that was the first time you ever heard of a Commando Order in the Southeast?
A To the best of my recollection, that was the first time that it was reported orally to me. I may by way of explanation add that when I took over the position of Chief of Staff there there the supreme commander of Army Group E had been newly installed and the files of the commander in chief Southeast were passed on to Army Group F so that I had practically to start from scratch, I did not have the time to read the old files either.
Q Do you remember whether any commandos were ever executed while you we e in the southeast, General Winter?
A To the best of my recollection, I don't believe that was the case.
Q Now, except for that one occasion when you talked about the Commando Order with General Kleeman, I take it you had nothing more to do with the Commando Order; it was outside your sphere of influence and jurisdiction.
A I cannot recall that I did. I do not remember any particular incident in which I would have been connected with it.
Q Suppose you take a look at this document, General Winter. It might refresh your recollection a little bit. This is NOKW-1824, marked as Prosecution Exhibit 672.
Q In this document, General Winter, there are some notes on a lecture which you delivered at a chief of staff meeting on 25 July 1944.
A Yes, yes, I did.
Q Do you notice -
DR. WEISGERBER (Counsel for defendant Speidel): If it please the Tribunal, I object to this manner of examination of the witness. In this case we are concerned with the cross examination which should exclusively refer to those questions which were dealt with in one of the affidavits submitted by the defense. The prosecutor for some time has been dealing with questions which were touched upon in neither of the affidavits submitted.
Also, we have the same state of affairs concerning this document which the prosecution believes to be able to introduce in this manner. This is no cross examination. The Prosecutor seems to be trying to make this witness his own witness. Therefore, I object to this manner of questioning and I also object to the introduction of this documents.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection as to cross-examination might have been good if timely made, but the extent of the examination that has been made up to this time and the questions which have been given to this witness or the answers which have been given by this witness, it seems to me that this document that is now presented bears upon the question of his veracity and truthfulness; it will be admitted for that purpose.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General, do you see the reference here to your statement that the number of Englishmen who died fighting with the bands and with enemy kommandos is to be reported? "The British and Americans must know that they must pay for a commitment on the Balkans with the bands with their last commitment." Now you are here talking about enemy kommandos, aren't you?
A. I beg your pardon, may I correct you? In the photostat which I have, it does not say "pay with their lives. " It says "pay with their last commitment." I am talking about enemy kommandos here. That is quite correct.
Q. But how could you be lecturing with respect to kommandos when you had nothing to do with kommandos? That was outside your jurisdiction you told me.
A. I never said that enemy kommandos were not within the scope of my activities. I don't know when I should have said that. Furthermore, I did not hold a lecture concerning enemy kommandos. Instead, when informing the chiefs of Army Group F, I informed them not of my own ideas but of that material of which I had to inform the chiefs officially, and on that occasion I also discussed enemy kommandos. After all, enemy kommandos were a general conception. They were small groups especially established who had as their aim sabotage acts or other things end for this purpose landed along the coast and of course all security measures had to be taken against such kommandos which could be invented, because they presented an enormous danger for the rather weak defense forces in our area.
Q. General, I don't want to misquote you, so suppose I ask you this question again. Do you know anything about the execution of captured kommandos when you were in the Southeast?
A. Mr. Prosecutor, I can only repeat under oath that from memory I do not know any such thing. It may have happened. I don't know, but as much as I would like to, from memory I can only answer the question to the effect that by heart I do not remember such an incident. Would you please take into consideration the fact that after four years I am in no position to recall such details. I don't believe that it occurred but possibly it did. In any case, I don't know from memory.
Q. You have rather a good memory regarding details that are helpful to General Felmy and General Speidel, General Winter.
A. I don't know what details you mean that I testified to concerning these two gentlemen. I believe I just made statements concerning matters of a general nature.
Q. You remembered that the Kalavrita Operation had been cleared through the Commander of the LXVIIIth Army Corps and also through the Commander in Chief of Army Group E. It is rather a small detail for you to remember, isn't it?
A. The Kalavrita Operation was not dealt with by the Chief of Army Group E. The Kalavrita Operation was a very important operation concerning security on the Peloponessus, and the 117th Light Infantry Division was on its own and reinforced only by a number of security battalions. In such a position, when more than one-third of a division is involved in an operation, this operation is important enough that if I remember it correctly, seeing that my command had about five or six divisions at its disposal and in that case one would undoubtedly remember it. If you ask me concerning the details of such an operation, I will have to, according to my duty, state under oath that I cannot give you those details but the purpose of it, the aim of the Kalavrita Operation, as I recall it, compared with our strength at the time, and with the scope of our task, was an important one at that time.
Q. How many divisions did you say were involved in the Kalavrita Operation on the German side?
A. There were considerable parts of the 117th Light Infantry Division I believe a third of the division, i.c., reinforced infantry regiment -that was 25 per cent of the troops -- committed in the Peloponessus for defense purposes. This unit was committed for several days and could there fore not be used for the cost defense during that time and the coast defense was our main task.
Q. Was the Kalavrita Operation more important than the carrying-out of the Kommando Order?
A. For me, it was more important since I was Chief of Staff. That is according to my ideas, it was more important. After all, when the task to defend Greece and all our thoughts at that time circled round the one important question , how with those few troops we could counter an anticipated Anglo-American attack which we thought was to take place for sure -- that is what our ideas were concerned with, almost exclusively concerned with.
Q. General Winter, isn't the execution of captured prisoners-ofwar such a despicable act that you would have remembered it if it had taken place?
A. The execution of prisoners-of-war is at all times -- what do you mean by "execution?" You mean an execution on the oasis of a Court sentence? That is no more despicable concerning prisoners-of-war than concerning other people. An execution is always a terrible act. A shooting of prisoners-of-war without a court sentence would be a despicable thing in my opinion.
Q. I had in mind the execution of prisoners-of-war on the basis of a Hitler Order without a trial.
A. The execution of prisoners-of-war on the basis of a Fuehrer Order without a trial -- I don't know what I am supposed to imagine.
DR. WEISGERBER: Dr. Weisgerber for General Speidel. I object to this manner of questioning. The prosecutor is trying here to argue with the witness. He should ask for facts. He should not argue. The question as to whether or not the execution of prisoners-of-war is anything despicable or anything unlawful is purely an argumentation.
THE PRESIDENT: The matter concerning which the Tribunal is interested in the cross-examination of this witness is relative to matters which are in the affidavit. The cross-examination necessarily must be restricted somewhat. The objection will be sustained.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General, you mentioned in your affidavit on behalf of General Speidel that the guarding of communication lines was a very important matter?
A. Yes.
Q. I take it your communication lines were being interrupted from time to time?
A. Yes.
Q. Now was it possible to telephone from Saloniki to Athens and from Saloniki to Belgrade whenever you wanted to?
A. From Saloniki to Belgrade it was possible almost at all times. From Saloniki to Athens the communications were disrupted; if not frequently they were disrupted at some time for shorter periods of time. On the whole , the communications functioned properly. In order to be more precise, by communication lines I do not necessarily mean the telephone. I mean mainly highways and railroad lines. That is the technical term we use. There might be translation difficulties in that connection.
Q. But Belgrade was able to get in touch with you in Saloniki and ascertain exactly what was going on within the area of Army Group E almost any time they wanted to, weren't they?