Q Witness, in the same document, then, we find Special Order No. 9, by the First Mountain Division, of 25th October 1943. Just a moment please; let me give the reference. It is in Volume XIX, on Page 150 of the German text and Page 139 of the English text. It is Special Order No. 9 of 25th October 1943. These directions, witness, are identical with those you have discussed of late, and in which we found that the Corps had no knowledge of these special directives. Is that correct?
A That is quite correct, yes.
Q In the reports contained in the same document we find a report by the First Mountain Division concerning fighting with the bands near the village of Kranja. Is it that report known to you, and when did you receive it?
A It's possible that that report became known to me. It is the Ic report to my staff by the First Mountain Division. And it is entirely possible that this affair was brought to my knowledge in a report. How the reporting was done I don't know, of course, any more. I am inclined to assume that this affair was brought to my knowledge as an operational action with which we are actually concerned here, and I saw no reason to do anything against it. I cannot say anything about the details of the incident because apart from the things contained in the report here I have no other evidence or any other recollection of the incident.
Q Witness, the next document I want to show you is Document NOKW864, contained in the same Document No. 19. The Exhibit No. is 455, and it is on Page 152 of the German and Page 143 of the English Document Book. I repeat: It is on Page 152 of the German and Page 143 of the English. This is a report by the First Mountain Division concerning a mopping-up operation which was given the code name "Tiger" at the time. What can you tell us about that?
A I recall the title of the operation because, as I remember, it took several days. It was a tactical operation directed against Communist bands along the Mecovon Road and along the Arachtos Valley.
Several units were sent out against these bands, and they fought for about three days. The area concerned is a mountainous one, difficult of access, and it was situated mainly in the area between the Arachtos Valley, which is a very deep valley with a small river, and the Mecovon Road. This group of bands had established itself in this area, and it had stayed there for many months, by the way. He attacked them frequently and took evasive action with them, of course, to the sea, if I remember rightly. There were high mountains there and a very difficult mountainous area. Along the Arachtos Valley, as far as I remember, there were about five or six smaller villages. For the rest it was along a mountain slope which was about eight or ten Km. long, and there was a large number of isolated farm houses which reached high up into the mountains. Similar conditions prevailed along the Mecovon Road where there was only a bigger village, namely the village of Mecovon itself. But? as I mentioned before, that valley village was left completely intact and later served as accommodation for units and the population, of course.
Q Were these settlements, witness, which you were talking about, just now, known to your troops as definite strong-points of the bands?
A I can only talk about what I had to do myself in this case. I know that the Communist bands had settled down in this area. They were incidentally the same bands who were attacked time and again by the partisans under Zervas because I remember that fighting done by Zervas against the Communists there was of importance. Now, those villages and settlements which were widely scattered over the area in this mountainous country had been occupied for many months by the Communist bands. The operation made it clear that some of these villages or hamlets, as I think I had better call them, had been extended and fortified by the Communists for defensive purposes. In their localities the houses contained hidden ammunition and arms or explosives for the Communists. This was a typical band-infested area which, for a long time, was not attached by us.
But finally it had to be tackled after the opening of the Mecovon Road. By the middle of October, 1943 the constant attacks on the road made it necessary for the bands finally to be attacked. This is the reason why the operation was initiated.
Q Witness, you have reported to us that the houses in this part of the road consisted mainly of stone houses with thatched roofs. Now, if a report of this sort says that the village was destroyed, what was it that was destroyed, as a rule? I mean were all the houses so destroyed that no stone was left on them, or what happened in actual fact?
Q. What happened, as a rule, was this: As a matter of course, if one fights for a village or a hamlet, as was the case in this operation, houses in a village or hamlet simply turned down. I described once before that these strong--points were fired at by trench mortars and sometimes by mountain artillery. Then the thatched roofs which we had all over the place here caught fire relatively easily, particularly in view of the very hot climate, as it was completely dry. And the result we that the houses in the villages and hamlets were not on fire and were finally gutted. The walls remained because they were stone walls. The roofs burned down, and thereupon the unit would report in a case like this that the village in question had been destroyed. I did not experience total destruction of a village in the sense that all houses were razed to the ground because in these events that would have necessitated the blowing up of these stone walls for which we had no cause nor interest. Nor did we have the time nor the explosives. These acts of destruction, therefore, should be understood to mean that houses--isolated houses, several houses in a village--were gutted, and the remainder of the village was left intact. That is what generally happened in these cases. The cause given was the fact that these houses were being fought for because the bands has occupied the houses as strong points, and they had to be fought for.
Q. If the Tribunal please, Defendant General Lanz has just described to you the operation "Tiger," a mopping-up operation by the First Mountain Division. Now, in this operation "Tiger" there participated, as adjutant of the unit, a man by the name of Walter Hoelz. His affidavit is contained in Lanz Document Book IV. It is Document NO. 126, on Page 53, and it is offered as Exhibit No. 119. The document has been properly signed and sworn to and certified.
The certificate actually comes from the Burgermeister. The affiant Walter Hoelz, was the adjutant with the combat unit, "von Hirschfeld," a name we have come across before. He was there until the end of October, 1943, and he makes statements about his participation in the "Tiger" operation in the Pindue Mountains, in October, 1943, The Pindus Mountains are contained on the sketch which the defendant has submitted here. It is in the Eastern part of the Corps area. In the first paragraph the affiant describes incidental details of the operation. It is worthy of note that he says that the fighting lasted several days, and that it had to be carried out against a Communist group of bands consisting of about 1,000 men, almost as strong as a regiment, and that the area was 40 Km in length and 20 Km in depth.
Your Honors, it is my opinion that these statements are of particular interest to the Tribunal, so that one can form a correct impression of the extent and the significance of a mopping-up operation of this type. This is an operation directed not against a few men but it is a full-fledged battle extending over several days and a fairly large area. I shall not read the first paragraphs. I shall merely read the last two paragraphs on page 57. The affiant says as follows:
"In the battle with the bands there were several attacking columns, whose approach, however, was known to the opponent in good time, because of the well organized intelligence and espionage system of the bands. The civilian population, in so far as it did not fight with the bands, had left the villages, as was usual in such cases, and gone to the mountains in the east with all their belongings and live stock (goats and sheep). The bands hid themselves in or near the villages in order to attack our troops when they approached. If they were then attacked by us, they cleverly retreated, using the cover provided by the mountainous terrain, from one strong point to another. The majority of these bands fought in civilian clothes and, when they hid their weapons, could not be told apart from the farmers or shepherds. So far as possible, the bands took their wounded and dead with them; we had already observed this in Russia. Prisoners often attempted to flee by taking advantage of their knowledge of the territory and of accomplices; several were shot in the attempt. When our soldiers approached a strong point defended by the bands, they first used mortar fire. Due to the dryness, the straw covered roofs easily caught fire, so that often several houses, and sometimes the whole village burned down.
Ammunition was hidden in many of the houses, which exploded when a house caught fire. If the bands shot from a village of a settlement, or if ammunition or guns were found in a place where bands had entrenched themselves, this place was designated as a band strong point and burned down. I can no longer say from memory exactly how many such villages or settlements were partly or wholly destroyed in that operation.
It was very difficult to determine this at that time, because the individual attacking columns were widely separated and the mountainous terrain allowed only a very limited view."
" I recall that most of the bands escaped, as is usual in such cases due to their knowledge of the territory and their way of fighting, and that we found ammunition in a great many houses.
The results of the operation were compiled by Major v. Hirschfeld for the entire battle area and reported to the division by radio. The written report of 28. Oct. 1943 was sent in later.
At that time I was with the Staff of the Combat Command and thus came through various destroyed and undestroyed villages, but I do not recall their names."
Kohlberg, 5 October 1947.
signed: Walter Hoelz He has duly sworn to his affidavit and it is properly certified by the Burgomaster, General Lanz thinks this document is of importance, if one wants to form a correct impression of these conditions.
Witness, the next relevant document is NOKW-1113 in Document Book 19. It is Exhibit 426 on page 154 and 145 of the English. These are two orders by the 1st Mountain Division, not your orders--orders by the 1st Mountain Division dated 20 and 23 October 1943 concerning the establishment of a column, an assistant company for the dressing station in the mountains, and Italians were used for this purpose. What do you know about this measure which, as I say, represents an order by the 1st Mountain Division and not by you?
A I saw these orders for the first time here when I was handed this document book. These measures were unknown to me up till now. They are quite obviously measures taken by the division in its own area without calling me or the corps in at all. Therefore, there is nothing very much I can say about it now. I assume that these were people who volunteered or were willing to help and as such were employed, but this is an assumption on my part.
Q About that problem, if the Tribunal please, I offer as Exhibit 120 a document contained in Document Book Lanz No. 3. It is Document No. 91 on page 56. The affiant in this case is called Wilhelm Thilo, who was Ia with the 1st Mountain Division under General Lanz. He says at first he was going to speak about the establishment of a column and a temporary collecting company for a mountain medical station of the 1st Mountain Division of 20 and 23 October, 1943. The affidavit has been properly signed, duly sworn to, and certified. This is what he says:
"The establishment of the aforementioned column and of the temporary collecting company for a Main Mountain Medical Aid Station on 20 and 23 October 1943 was carried out according to the order of the Ib of the First Mountain Division and was made up of Italian Volunteers as far as I know on the basis of the directives given by the OKW at that time. (OKW "Basic directives with regard to the treatment of soldiers of the Italian army and militia," of 15 September 1943)."
And he takes reference to OKW Basic Directives with regard to the treatment of soldiers of the Italian Army and militia of 15 September 1943. The Document is contained in Lanz Document Book No. III on page 56 and is properly certified, but if the Tribunal please this document lacks the formula of the oath. The oath is not contained in the document. The document is merely headed with the word "affidavit."
Now I have made up for this; I have before me a special document which is contained in Document Book VI on page 6; it is Document No. 91--that document does not contain any statements. It merely contains the formula of the oath and it is the oath connected with the affidavit which I have just read. The formula was signed by the affiant Thilo and his signature is properly certified by the Burgomaster which makes Document No. 91 in Lanz Document Book No. III a formally proper one. This was Exhibit No. 128 Witness, in Document Book 19, the last document with which you are connected is Document NOKW--959. It is Exhibit 457.
This document an pages 156 through 164, which is in English 147 through 155, contains several reports by units concerning fighting against bands as well as two reports by the 1st Mountain Division to the corps headquarters.
Can you tell us anything about the contents of these reports?
A I can say something about the reports addressed to the headquarters and I assume that I received knowledge of them at the time. One of them is concerned with the village of Draguni which is near Paramythia which this report says was taken in the teeth of strong enemy resistance. This was quite obviously a battle for a village, and the village was burned down. I assume that it burned down in the course of the actual fighting; whether it burned down partly or totally cannot be seen from the report. I am sure that this incident, as all the other incidents, entailed the fact that some of the village burned down.
In the case of Operation Puma where it was reported that eight villages were destroyed and the main strong points of the bands are named individually, that operation was a tactical operation in the neighborhood of Kalabakka--that is to say, beyond the Pindus Mountains along the border, the demarcation line of the Corps area. It is the point where the road gradually joins the plains of Trikkalo. I can recall this operation.
We were concerned there with a few villages, small mountain villages as is usual in this part of the world, which were situated in valleys. From there for a long period of time raids were made by the bands on a certain sector of the Mecovon Road. I know this neighborhood fairly well myself because on numerous occasions we fought the bands there and suffered frequent losses among our own men along the road. These villages were situated about two to five kilometers away from the supply road in the mountains. They were difficult of access. They were far away and had been occupied by the bands for some lengthy period of time.
Originally, we were quite content with fighting the bands on the spots where they raided the road. We reinforced our security detachments but that was of no avail at all. The bands changed their tactics. They attacked at different points of the road and our spies and reconnaissance men found out that the hands had entrenched themselves in certain villages. Therefore, all we could do was to go out on an operation of our own, for which we took one battalion of the regiment 98, and to attack these villages which were defended by the bands.
They had all sorts of stores and depots in these villages. We had to take these villages in combat. Most of the bands, as was usual in these cases, disappeared, and only some of the bands could be engaged. The villages had been deserted by the inhabitants who had taken along all their belongings, and they therefore served only as strong points for the bandits. If one found ammunition in the houses in such villages, they were burned down so that the bands would lose their strong points. That was roughly what went on in this operation which had the code name Puma.
Q Witness, now please look at Document Book XX of the prosecution. Look at the document which is on page 4 of the German and 5 of the English. This is Document NQKW-1551 in Exhibit 458, a report by the Corps troop of Joannina, of 15 April 1944. What can you tell us about that report? What is it concerned with?
A This is a raid by the communist bards in that neighborhood on the small railway which goes from Mezalongi to a graveyard. This event occurred at a period of time--that is to say in April, when I was in Hungary. I was not in the Balkans at the time.
Q To bear out the truth of General Lanz's later statements, I offer a document to the Tribunal; it is contained in Lanz Document Book No. III. It is Document 92 on page 57 which will become Exhibit No. 121. Affiant Max Prollius confirms--he was the adjutant of the Corps and the personnel expert of the XXII mountain Corps--and he confirms that General Lanz was absent from Joannina at that period of time.
This affidavit has been duly sworn to and properly certified.
The next report, witness, is also a report by the Corps Group Joannina dated 27 April 1944 contained in Document Book XX, NOKW-1551, Exhibit 458, on pages 6 and 7 of the German and 8 and 9 of the English. Can you tell us briefly what this report is about?
A It is a similar incident; it is once again an event which took place during my absence in April when I was in Hungary. I had no knowledge, in other words, of these incidents.
Q The same Document Book XX contains another document which is NOKW-885, Exhibit 459 on pages 8 through 10 of the German and 10 through 12 of the English. On page 10 through 12 of Document Book XX.
This, witness, concerns the deportation of Jews from the Island of Korfu. This document was discussed in another connection, but not in your own case. Was the Island of Korfu part of your area?
A Yes, certainly.
Q Was the deportation of Jews, such as this document reflects, ordered by you?
A No, most certainly not.
Q Who ordered it?
AAccording to the document, the order came from Army Group E, but I think one may take it for granted that the initiative did not come from Army Group--that must have been an order which came from higher up. Presumably from the Reichsfuehrer SS, because it was not an isolated case.
Q What, witness, did you hear about this affair at the time? The deportation of Jews from Korfu?
A Well, first of all, I heard nothing. I heard when the matter was already under way. The reason for this was that a representative of the Reichsfuehrer had arrived in the area of my Corps without my knowing anything about it. He went to Korfu in order to make the necessary arrangements there for the evacuation. He kept his order a secret there, and it was only afterwards that I heard through the commandant of Korfu about all this, namely that this man was staying in Korfu.
Q What did you do, General Lanz, when you were informed about the presence of this gentleman and also of his assignment?
A First of all, I was most annoyed. I thought this measure was completely superfluous and undesirable. I could not see why this should be done at all. On the other hand, it was quite obvious to me that eventually I could not prevent these things, unfortunately, I told my staff, and my officers knew that I did not wish to be mixed up in this business and that, therefore, this gentleman from the SS would not receive any support from us. If I remember correctly, I reported to the Army Group that I regarded this matter as a highly undesirable one, and superfluous and unnecessary and that I would be grateful if it could be discontinued, but if it could not be avoided I would ask that it should be done in one blow as quickly as possible. I added that I could not do anything to assist. I had no shipping nor men available. That is what I told the Army Group.
Q Were you asked before you sent out this communication--did anybody ask you whether you could give guards, for instance, for the evacuation of Jews from Korfu?
A That is entirely possible that people asked me for that.
Q And you turned it down, did you?
A Yes, I turned it down in the manner which I have just described, but that was my conviction. I was very indignant about the whole incident and opposed it as much as I could.
Q Did you in your area while you were down there have any difficulties with Jews or were your relations with them smooth? What were the experiences you made and what attitude did you take?
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, please. We will take our morning recess and we will get the answer to the question when we return.
(A recess was taken.)
Q. Witness, we had stopped before the recess when were discussed the Jewish question; perhaps you can now give us your answer to who question which I put to you just before.
A. Please, what was your question?
Q. When we discussed the deportation of Jews from Kerfu I asked you what kind of experiences you had made during the period of your activities in Greece in 1943 and 1944 with the Jews who lived there, what was your attitude towards this whole problem?
A. I didn't make any particular experience in this sphere. Where the Jewish question was concerned, if I may put it this way, I was completely indifferent. There was no such thing as a Jewish question to me personally, and I did not attach any particular importance to these matters as far as my own person was concerned. The Jews never done me any harm nor had I done them any warm. Therefore, I was completely Indifferent where this matter was concerned, but I couldn't see any reason for this measure which we had discussed. I considered it superfluous and it annoyed me.
Q. You assumed that this measure had been ordered at the time by the SS or possibly by the Reichsfuehrer of the SS Himmler; do you happen to know whether anything in particular had happened regarding the Jews from Korfu because they were the ones to be deported; was any reason for this action known to you?
A. What I am going to say now is only assumptions, but there was something in the air in those days and these things happened all the time. After all this was not an individual action. Such actions took place everywhere. It was not a special case. I would just like to recall the measures taken in Hungary, which I partly saw or experienced because I was there when I was in Hungary.
Q. Do you believe that you, as commanding general of a corps, had any actual possibility to prevent the deportation of the Jews from Korfu?
A. I am of the opinion that at that time I had no actual such possibility, Of course I could have opposed with force. I could have forbidden the SS to enter the island of Korfu, and enforced this roder, but all that would have only been a temporary measure. It would not have altered any material facts ever which I had no actual possibility to intervene. The consequences of such an action, by the way, are quite obvious. I don't think I have to comment on them.
DR. SAUTER: If it please the Tribunal, in this connection I would like to offer a few more documents in evidence. The documents concerned are contained in Lanz Document Book IV. There is Document 138 on page 63. This will be offered, as Exhibit Lanz 122. This is an affidavit. The affiant is Ulrich Buerker. From February 1944 until August 1944 he was Chief of Staff with the Headquarters of the 22nd Mountain Corps. That is he served under General Lanze. I dont believe I have to read the document, because the statements of the affiant completely coincide with the testimony given by General Lanz. In the concluding sentence on page 53a the affiant Buerker confirms that the deportation of Jews from Korfu was strictly a matter of the Reichs-fuehrer SS and the agencies subordinate to him.
The further document which I am going to offer in evidence is the following document in Document Book Lanz IV, which is Document 139 on pages 64 and 65 of Document Book IV. This will become Exhibit Lanz 123. This again is an affidavit of a former captain, Matthias Starl, who has furnished other affidavits which have been introduced here. He was, as he states, in the introductory paragraph, a captain and first Ad.C. of the 22nd Mountain Corps from 3 September 1943 until 14 November 1943, and later on Ia with combat group Steyrer. The affiant reports on the deportation of certain Jews from Korfu in a similar manner as the previous affiant, therefore, I am not going to read this document verbatim. It shows that the whole action was organized by the SC.
The SS kept the organization of this action strictly secret, even from the Wehrmacht and on page 55 towards the end of his affidavit the affiant Mathias Starl says that General Lanz explicitly forbad to put shipping space at the disposal of 22nd Mountain Corps for the deportation of the Jews on Korfu, and that he also forbad that soldiers under his command should be detailed as escorts for the deportation, which did not happen, as a fact.
About the same subject matter, there is another document, the next document, No. 140 on page 66 of document book Lanz 4. This will become exhibit Lanz 124. It is an affidavit by the affiant Fritz Doeppenschmitt, whose name is known to us from other affidavits and whose name was furnished and introduced in this case. He was a clerical officer under General Lanz from the period of August, 1943 until August, 1944. His statements also coincide with the statements contained in the two previous affidavits. I, therefore, do not want to read this document. I recommend it to the judicial notice of the Tribunal. The three documents, which were just introduced by me and which received exhibit Nos. 122, 123 124 have all been duly sworn to and properly certified.
Witness, this brings me to yet another document, which is contained in document book 20 of the Prosecution. This is NOKW 885, which is exhibit 459 - exhibit 459, it is on page 10 of document book 20. It is a report of 12 May 1944, according to which two villages were destroyed in the area of Kalabakka. What can you tell us about this document, witness?
A This is a similar combat action only dated somewhat later than the one described by me previously. Here again it deals with Communist bands who stayed in the Kalabakka area and from that area attacked our traffic along the main-highway, which led from Mecovon to Trikkala.
Q Can you as an expert tell from the report if this was an action of military necessity?
A That can be seen from the actual text, as it is reproduced here. It is quite obvious that this is a purely technical military action. I have no doubt that this is so.
Q You mean the action against the band strongholds?
A Yes, there is no question that that is it.
Q Then, in document book 20 of the Prosecution we have another document, NOKW 942, which became exhibit 460. This is on page 12 of the German text and page 16 of the English document book. It contains a report of Army Group E to the Commander in Chief Southeast, dated 31 July 1944.
This report deals with the area under the XXII Corps, which is the area under your jurisdiction. Can you give us your comments on this affair?
A This matter is repeatedly mentioned in subsequent reports. To the best of my information, the facts are the following. On the local railway from Messolonsion to Agrinion attacks had frequently been carried out by Communist partisans. During these surprise attacks, not only soldiers had been killed, but also civilians. A similar raid on this railroad is obviously concerned in this case which we are dealing with now. An additional fact here shows that a telephone communication group had been attacked by these Communists, which resulted in eight dead and fourteen wounded. These Communists mentioned here were shot. I believe I can recall that this measure mentioned here was not carried out by the 104th Division, but by an Efson unit which was stationed in the area of Messolonsion and Agrinion. The report was passed on because the division had to report everything that had been happening in the area, but it does not mean that the division itself carried out the measure. From a previous incident that I happen to know, I am fairly sure that the Efsonen were the ones who carried out the shooting here. I am inclined to believe that was the case here, particularly so because the division had reported to me it had not carried out the measure.
Q If I interpret your answer correctly, General, you mean that you only heard of that report after it occured and through the reports?
A That is correct.
Q You said the measure was carried out by a unit of the Efzones, that is a Greek unit; isn't it?
A To the best of my knowledge that was a Greek police unit.
Q And who was in charge of the Efzones units in your area; were they subordinate to you or to whom?
A They were under no circumstances subordinate to me. I am not sure whether they were subordinate to the Greek Government, or whether they were subordinate to the Higher SS and Police leader. I am not sure of this, all I do know of this for sure is that they were not subordinate to me.
Q And when you received the report of the division, irrespective of the fact whether the division was the unit that carried out the measure, did you take any steps, General, and if so, what steps did you take?
A I believe I can recall that I got in touch with the division, but unfortunately there were at the time disturbances of the communication lines, as I have already mentioned. In July bandit attacks had been carried out by the Zervas partisans and these disturbed the communications on the road from Joannina via Arta to Athens at least temporarily. I think I can remember, though, that I tried to gather information about the facts and that on that occasion it was reported to me that it was not the division unit which carried out the measure, but a unit of the Efzones. I believe I can recall that information quite well.
Q If it please the Tribunal, there is a document in Lanz document book 5, which is concerned with this case. This is document 160 on page 8 of document book Lanz 5, which will be offered under exhibit Lanz No. 125. It is an affidavit executed by Gebhardt von Lenthe, who was I-C under General Lanz from September, 1943 until the end of the war. The statements refer to document NOKW 942, which the defendant has just discussed. It is exhibit 460 of the prosecution and the statements contained in the affidavit are more or less identical with the statements made here by General Lanz. The affidavit has been properly sworn to by the affiant Lenthe and the affidavit has been certified in the correct manner.
The Prosecution has also incriminated you with participation in the operation Kreuzotter. This is document NOKW 162, contained in document book 20, it is exhibit 461 on pages 13 and 14 of document book 20 and pages 17 and 18 of the English text in document book 20. This document contains a report by the 104th Mountain Division, dated 22 August 1944. It says that the connecting circle Karpenission and several other localities were destroyed.
I ask you now did you order this operation and if you did, why?
A This operation was directed against Communist partisans, who were staying in the border area between the area of my corps and the area of the neighboring corps. The operation had been ordered at that time by the army group and was passed on by me to the 104th Infantry Division for execution. The partisan group involved here had for several months stayed in the area around Karpenission. This place Karpenission is a larger mountainous place, which is also mentioned in the map submitted and it was located in a border area between the area of my corps and the neighboring corps. Karpenission had for some time been known to us as the seat of communist fighting leadership in that area and this had been confirmed to us. Once or twice we had carried out tactical operations against Karpenission in order to prevent this band group from continuing its activities, however, we did not succeed in doing this. The Communist bands congregated again and again in this border area, which is a mountainous terrain, where they felt comparatively safe. From this mountain area they directed their operations and attacks against us.
Q. The localities were destroyed, were they witness?
A. Yes, according to the reports they were. The places involved are Karpenission and a few other places, which according to the troop reports were destroyed during this operation.
Q. And here again you maintain that purely military reasons were decisive, is that so?
A. As far as I am concerned, I do not doubt this in the least, because the operation was carried out mainly to eliminate this band group which we had not succeeded in doing in previous operations which had been going on for months. That is why the Army Group insisted that this source of danger, this centre of the Communist bands, should at least be rendered harmless.
Q. In this connection, I am offering A document to the Tribunal in document book Lanz 3. This is document No. 82 on page 44, which will be offered under exhibit No. 126. This again is an affidavit executed by the affiant Bruno Willers, who from October, 1943 until 1944 was First General Staff Officer with General Lanz. The affiant testifies to the operation Kreuzotter in document 82 in the same way it has been discussed here by General Lanz. Toward the end of his statement he confirms that the majority of the population there fought together with the partisans. The places concerned were band nests of resistance and from them attacks were constantly carried out against German troops. The destruction of these bands of resistance was, therefore, as the affiant says an absolute military necessity.
The next document, which we want to discuss, witness, is also contained in document book 20 of the Prosecution. This is document NOKW 940, exhibit 462. It contains several reports of Army Group E to the Commander in Chief Southeast concerning the area of the XXII Mountain Corps. The document can be found on pages 17, 18, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the German version, which are pages 25, 27, 29, 30, 31. 32 and 33 of the English version. From these reports it can be seen that during several reconnaissance and mopping-up operations directed against bands, the band villages concerned were destroyed.