The fighting reported in this report I touched on briefly yesterday as well. An affidavit was read by Captain Spindler who was in command at that time and also about the affair Linkiades. As I explained before, this was the case where I intervened with a court martial.
Q. Witness, in Document NOKW-909, which we are discussing at the moment , which is Exhibit 454 in Document Book 19, on page 137 of the German and 117 of the English, we find reports about the attack by bands on your escort and your alleged order for the seizure of hostages. This question has been discussed once before in a different context and I hardly think you want to add anything there.
A. You are quite right, Dr. Sauter. It is not an alleged order. It is an order which I issued. I have discussed this order, and it was proved that these hostages were released afterwards.
Q. I believe you have submitted an affidavit about that yesterday which proves this. To repeat this once more -- or let me ask you a question. Is that actually the order order concerning hostages which you issued at that time?
I am still discussing the order which an affiant has testified that the hostages were in no case shot. They were either released or sent somewhere else. Is that correct?
A. I am afraid you make a small mistake, Dr. Sauter. These hostages were not sent somewhere else. They were released.
DR. SAUTER: In this connection I offer another affidavit to the Tribunal. It is contained in Document Book IV. It is Document 112 on page 1 of Document Book IV. Just a moment , please. This document was given an exhibit number once before. It was Exhibit 16. I have read it in a different context. I won't refer again to the same document because it is connected with the same problem we are dealing with at the moment.
Q. The next report, witness, in the same document deals with the mopping-up operation of Akmotopos. There a gain you have given an explanation in a different context. I assume you don't want to add anything there. Is that correct?
A. Quite so.
Q. The next daily report and evening report again discuss the fighting at Akmotopos and they also report a measure taken for the safeguarding of the supply route and Joannina-Arta and there the male population from the surrounding villages was employed, What can you tell us about that,witness?
A. The safeguarding of the supply road which had become unsafe by repeated attacks on our transport was carried out and ordered by the so-called road commandant. It was ordered, it appeared, by agreement with the 1st Mountain Division, and what I remember is that this measure was made known to me when I was on a trip from Joannina to Arta. I saw civilians sitting along the road. They had built small huts from straw. One or two men sat together in these straw huts from straw. One or two men sat together in these straw huts along the road, without arms, of course, and members of their families were with them, and their food was sent along. I stopped my car, as I remember very well. I wanted to find out what all this was about . It was somewhat difficult to understand these people but it was found out that the road commandant had to take this measure which was mentioned in the report. He employed these men along the road or, that is to say, along certain stretches of the road, in order to discourage surprise attacks and acts of sabotage along the road.
I inquired into this measure when I returned and I found out that the idea was not a particularly good one and I, therefore, rescinded it. The people were sent back to their villages which were in the neighborhood.
DR. SAUTER: About that problem, if the Tribunal please, a document is of interest which is contained in Document Book Lanz Number III. It is Document No. 72 on page 26 and it is offered as Exhibit 116. It is an affidavit by Hans Mayr who was the garrison commander of Joannina between September 1943 until the early part of October 1943. He speaks about the question of alleged shooting of hostages, acts of sabotage, and also about the employing of male population from the villages in the vicinity for the guarding of telephone lines against acts of terror.
Q Witness, perhaps it is of some importance to clear up this point about the employing of the male population for the safeguarding of the supply road. Can you tell us about that?
A Well, I thought I explained that just now. I explained just now that I encountered these people one day and so forth.
Q Well, did it become known to you whether on that occasion shooting of hostages took place and things like that?
A Nothing of that sort became known to me; namely, that hostages were shot in this connection.
Q In another document contained in Document Book XIX on page 144 of the German and 129 of the English there is a report concerning the burning down of two villages. It is a report by the 1st Mountain Division of 6 October 1943. This burning down was supposed to have been carried out by the reconnaisance detachment 54. Can you recall that case?
A I do not recall the incident. I am sorry. I no longer remember it at all.
DR. SAUTER: Well, I shall now discuss a different document -but I assume that the officer in charge of that operation must have expressed his own comments and it seems to me that the attitude he took was brought to my knowledge here. This report by the officer in charge to which you just had reference is an affidavit contained in Lanz Document Book IV. The number of the document is 144. It is on page 4 of the English book and this is offered as Exhibit 117. It is an affidavit by Kost.
The affiant, Herner Kost, tells us that he was the commanding officer in the cavalry detachment in the period from March 1943 until the 31st of October 1943. In his affidavit he gives us his comments on the report by the 1st Mountain Division of 6 October 1943 which we have just mentioned. This report says -- I quote:
"In the area southeast of Arta 2 villages were burned down by the 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion 54 for bandit activities during the last days."
About this incident with which the prosecution have attempted to incriminate General Lanz, Kost speaks as follows -- I am reading from page 3.
"This report is not quite in accordance with the facts, My troop, the 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion 54, had been detailed at that time to effect security measures for the road loading from Arta to the Gulf of Arta, and to maintain connections with the security company which had been posted at the Gulf of Arta. The troop was distributed along the road at 3 strong points. An uninhabited village, completely destroyed except for 3 houses, was approximately 2 kilometers in front of the center strong point. Regularly every night, at about 2300 hours, these 3 houses were occupied by bandits. From there, almost every night, they raided strong point 2. During a counter-attack these 3 houses were destroyed by mortar fire. After this attack everything remained completely quiet, as the bandit formations evidently withdrew right into the mountains. When this village, with the exception of those 3 houses, was destroyed, and who effected it, is beyond my knowledge. I assume, however, judging by the ruins already covered with grass, that the village fell victim to the battles of the Balkan campaign, or the Greece campaign of the Italians."
This village was approximately 4 to 3 kilometers to the back of our security lines and was completely intact, and all of the population, as far as I was able to judge, was still there. Approximately twice every week a man from this village came up who offered us eggs for sale. As I found out that he did this for the solo purpose of spying, I gave him orders not to come any more.
After approximately 8 days we noticed that along the road telephone poles were blown up during the night, obviously to endanger the communication service, which was done by motor bicycle, from the troop command post to the individual strong points.
These blastings were repeated three times, until we found out one morning that the men of that particular village planted the high explosive charges.
The battalion commander ordered me, following this, to search the village with a platoon of my company. I detailed the 1st platoon for this task. During the search this platoon established that one of the houses in the center of the village had been reconstructed like a pillbox, and that small and large British high explosive charges, several boxes with Italian infantry ammunition, 2 German and several Italian carbines, as well as a German uniform, thoroughly soaked with blood, and a German fatigue suit with waist belt and cap, were concealed there.
In another house, in which as school room was located on the first floor, and the mayor's office on the top floor, several boxes with Italian infantry- and mortar ammunition, as well as some belts with Italian machine gun ammunition, were found. Because of those ammunition finds the village was occupied, in order to await further instructions from the battalion commander.
"During the afternoon of the same day a group of the Mountain Engineer Battalion 54 arrived, who examined the ammunition finds. took along some British explosives and then blew up the two houses containing the ammunition. These two villages were not burned down."
Werner Kost has signed his affidavit and it is duly sworn to and properly certified. It is General Lanz's intention to prove by this affidavit how wrong it is to charge him or any other officer with any other accusation in connection with this particular operation.
Q This brings me to the end of my discussion of Document 909, a long voluminous document, but I would like you, witness, to give us your comments on a different document. This is document 864. It is also contained in Document Book XIX. It is the number NOKW 864. Exhibit 455 contained in Document Book XIX on page 148 of the German and 136 of the English.
This document, witness, is a file note dated 18 October 1943. It is a compilation concerning arrested persons who, it would appear, had been apprehended in the area of the 1st Mountain Division. The file note is addressed to the Commanding General, at least in the copy which is in front of me; that is to say, I assume that means you. will you please look at this file note and tell the court what you can about it?
A The incident concerned with this file note I can still remember. The reason why I can s till remember it is that the file note had a prelude to it. In these days I had inspected the prisoner collecting center in Joannina and supervised it. Without announcing my visit first -- as was my custom to visit various installations in my area without announcing my impending visit, -- on that occasion, namely, when I checked up on the prisoners' collecting center, I was not furnished by the men in charge of the collecting center with the information which I would have needed. He was unable to tell me -- at least, in some cases, he was unable to tell me ---- why the various individuals were in the collecting center at all, which was the very thing I wanted to know. I was absolutely annoyed at this.
When I returned to my office I asked the Ic to come and see me as he was the competent expert. I gave him the order to clear up this affair and report to me orally. I think I am justified in assuming that thereupon Rittmeister von Lenthe contacted the Ic of the 1st Mountain Division and obtained the necessary documents. Having obtained these documents, he reported to me orally about the whole problem. Whether it was on that occasion that he gave me this document which is now a part of Document Book XIX or whether he only used it as an aid memoire for his own report, I am unable to say. I could not tell you.
Q Witness, about the people mentioned under "b", did you order anything there? What type of prisoners are those? Perhaps you can tell us that first.
A What I remember is that in the course of the report I gave instructions to Rittmeister von Lenthe because, after all, this was the purpose of the whole arrangement. I remember giving him instruction to the effect that the prisoners are to be weeded out according to the reasons why they were in the collecting cantor at all. I also remember that I gave orders that no labor must be sent away from the corps area; they should remain in the area because I needed these people myself in order to look after our supply roads, and so on because this was the beginning of the winter and we had very long roads, about 300 kilometers in length, and it gave us very much work. I still remember those instructions.
Q About this incident, the Ic at the time has given us a comment. The Ic's name is Gebhardt von Lenthe, he is 39 years of ago and is a lawyer. He has given us a few affidavits. In this particular one he presents his comments on this problem. It is contained in Lanz Document Book V; it is Document No. 115, on Page 5. This document is offered as Exhibit No. 118. In the first paragraphs the affiant tells us that he was the Ic with the XXIInd Mountain Army Corps, that is to say, under General Lanz, from September, 1943 until the end of the war. He also says that his affidavit concerns the Memorandum for the Commanding General dated the 18th of October 1943, which is the document about which General Lanz has been talking just now. The affiant says in his affidavit as follows, from which I beg to read as it is of great importance for General Lanz' conception of duty. I am reading from the middle of Page 5. This is what the affiant says:
I recall this incident very well indeed. It referred to a report which I requested by order of General LANZ of the 1st Mountain Division, as the population had submitted complaints to LANZ about unjustified arrests, and as he had not received a satisfactory reply from the chief of the prisoner collecting point. At that time, the first Mountain Division, under the Italian High Command, had occupied the sector Joannina for almost 2 months, and the Corps LANZ, which succeeded, did not have any records covering the time before they took over the sector. With tho exception of one case (Lingiados), which General LANZ submitted to a courts martial to be dealt with, no such incidents had come to his knowledge. In order to investigate those complaints, the General requested the report in question. After it arrived I reported to General LANZ.
Concerning the individual points the following was initiated:
1.) All prisoners have to be screened why they are being detained. Particularly those of the Italian period. Whenever no conclusive evidence can be found, the prisoners are to be released.
2.) Nobody must be posted to the labor details, as all workers at our disposal will be used for the maintenance of the supply road, and for the impending winter to clear away the snow.
3.) As to the executions by shooting it has to be ascertained, why, and on whose orders they were done. Therefore, I made all the necessary arrangements. The majority of the prisoners were released after they had been screened. I myself gave orders for their release.
The commanding officer of the engineers attached to the Corps was instructed on how to commit the workers at our disposal for work on the supply roads Joannina-Korca and Joannina-Metsoven, within the road construction program. I investigated about the executions by shooting at tho 1st Mountain Division. As this was connected with repeated inquiries, and as at the beginning of November the Division was suddenly shifted from the Corps area, I was unable to get a clear picture. Part of the shootings happened before our Corps Staff arrived. I cannot recall if I submitted the original of that particular report of the 1st Mountain Division to General LANZ. Anyhow, my reporting was based on this report.
The affidavit is signed "Gebhard von Lenthe," and it has been duly sworn to and properly certified.
General Lanz offers this affidavit because in a concrete example of this sort the Tribunal will be able to realize how the General took care of matters which were not really part of his competence, but where he saw the possibility of alleviating conditions.
Q Witness, in the same Document Book, on Page 148, which is Page 138 of the English, there are two reports by the units, dated tho 19th and 20th of October 1943. Can you toll us anything about these two reports -- their contents and the responsibility?
A I'm afraid I cannot do so in this case because this is a report given by the unit to the division, but not by the division to me. I, therefore, only found this report herein the documents. Therefore, I am afraid I do not know to what the incident referred and where.
Q Witness, in the same document, then, we find Special Order No. 9, by the First Mountain Division, of 25th October 1943. Just a moment please; let me give the reference. It is in Volume XIX, on Page 150 of the German text and Page 139 of the English text. It is Special Order No. 9 of 25th October 1943. These directions, witness, are identical with those you have discussed of late, and in which we found that the Corps had no knowledge of these special directives. Is that correct?
A That is quite correct, yes.
Q In the reports contained in the same document we find a report by the First Mountain Division concerning fighting with the bands near the village of Kranja. Is it that report known to you, and when did you receive it?
A It's possible that that report became known to me. It is the Ic report to my staff by the First Mountain Division. And it is entirely possible that this affair was brought to my knowledge in a report. How the reporting was done I don't know, of course, any more. I am inclined to assume that this affair was brought to my knowledge as an operational action with which we are actually concerned here, and I saw no reason to do anything against it. I cannot say anything about the details of the incident because apart from the things contained in the report here I have no other evidence or any other recollection of the incident.
Q Witness, the next document I want to show you is Document NOKW864, contained in the same Document No. 19. The Exhibit No. is 455, and it is on Page 152 of the German and Page 143 of the English Document Book. I repeat: It is on Page 152 of the German and Page 143 of the English. This is a report by the First Mountain Division concerning a mopping-up operation which was given the code name "Tiger" at the time. What can you tell us about that?
A I recall the title of the operation because, as I remember, it took several days. It was a tactical operation directed against Communist bands along the Mecovon Road and along the Arachtos Valley.
Several units were sent out against these bands, and they fought for about three days. The area concerned is a mountainous one, difficult of access, and it was situated mainly in the area between the Arachtos Valley, which is a very deep valley with a small river, and the Mecovon Road. This group of bands had established itself in this area, and it had stayed there for many months, by the way. He attacked them frequently and took evasive action with them, of course, to the sea, if I remember rightly. There were high mountains there and a very difficult mountainous area. Along the Arachtos Valley, as far as I remember, there were about five or six smaller villages. For the rest it was along a mountain slope which was about eight or ten Km. long, and there was a large number of isolated farm houses which reached high up into the mountains. Similar conditions prevailed along the Mecovon Road where there was only a bigger village, namely the village of Mecovon itself. But? as I mentioned before, that valley village was left completely intact and later served as accommodation for units and the population, of course.
Q Were these settlements, witness, which you were talking about, just now, known to your troops as definite strong-points of the bands?
A I can only talk about what I had to do myself in this case. I know that the Communist bands had settled down in this area. They were incidentally the same bands who were attacked time and again by the partisans under Zervas because I remember that fighting done by Zervas against the Communists there was of importance. Now, those villages and settlements which were widely scattered over the area in this mountainous country had been occupied for many months by the Communist bands. The operation made it clear that some of these villages or hamlets, as I think I had better call them, had been extended and fortified by the Communists for defensive purposes. In their localities the houses contained hidden ammunition and arms or explosives for the Communists. This was a typical band-infested area which, for a long time, was not attached by us.
But finally it had to be tackled after the opening of the Mecovon Road. By the middle of October, 1943 the constant attacks on the road made it necessary for the bands finally to be attacked. This is the reason why the operation was initiated.
Q Witness, you have reported to us that the houses in this part of the road consisted mainly of stone houses with thatched roofs. Now, if a report of this sort says that the village was destroyed, what was it that was destroyed, as a rule? I mean were all the houses so destroyed that no stone was left on them, or what happened in actual fact?
Q. What happened, as a rule, was this: As a matter of course, if one fights for a village or a hamlet, as was the case in this operation, houses in a village or hamlet simply turned down. I described once before that these strong--points were fired at by trench mortars and sometimes by mountain artillery. Then the thatched roofs which we had all over the place here caught fire relatively easily, particularly in view of the very hot climate, as it was completely dry. And the result we that the houses in the villages and hamlets were not on fire and were finally gutted. The walls remained because they were stone walls. The roofs burned down, and thereupon the unit would report in a case like this that the village in question had been destroyed. I did not experience total destruction of a village in the sense that all houses were razed to the ground because in these events that would have necessitated the blowing up of these stone walls for which we had no cause nor interest. Nor did we have the time nor the explosives. These acts of destruction, therefore, should be understood to mean that houses--isolated houses, several houses in a village--were gutted, and the remainder of the village was left intact. That is what generally happened in these cases. The cause given was the fact that these houses were being fought for because the bands has occupied the houses as strong points, and they had to be fought for.
Q. If the Tribunal please, Defendant General Lanz has just described to you the operation "Tiger," a mopping-up operation by the First Mountain Division. Now, in this operation "Tiger" there participated, as adjutant of the unit, a man by the name of Walter Hoelz. His affidavit is contained in Lanz Document Book IV. It is Document NO. 126, on Page 53, and it is offered as Exhibit No. 119. The document has been properly signed and sworn to and certified.
The certificate actually comes from the Burgermeister. The affiant Walter Hoelz, was the adjutant with the combat unit, "von Hirschfeld," a name we have come across before. He was there until the end of October, 1943, and he makes statements about his participation in the "Tiger" operation in the Pindue Mountains, in October, 1943, The Pindus Mountains are contained on the sketch which the defendant has submitted here. It is in the Eastern part of the Corps area. In the first paragraph the affiant describes incidental details of the operation. It is worthy of note that he says that the fighting lasted several days, and that it had to be carried out against a Communist group of bands consisting of about 1,000 men, almost as strong as a regiment, and that the area was 40 Km in length and 20 Km in depth.
Your Honors, it is my opinion that these statements are of particular interest to the Tribunal, so that one can form a correct impression of the extent and the significance of a mopping-up operation of this type. This is an operation directed not against a few men but it is a full-fledged battle extending over several days and a fairly large area. I shall not read the first paragraphs. I shall merely read the last two paragraphs on page 57. The affiant says as follows:
"In the battle with the bands there were several attacking columns, whose approach, however, was known to the opponent in good time, because of the well organized intelligence and espionage system of the bands. The civilian population, in so far as it did not fight with the bands, had left the villages, as was usual in such cases, and gone to the mountains in the east with all their belongings and live stock (goats and sheep). The bands hid themselves in or near the villages in order to attack our troops when they approached. If they were then attacked by us, they cleverly retreated, using the cover provided by the mountainous terrain, from one strong point to another. The majority of these bands fought in civilian clothes and, when they hid their weapons, could not be told apart from the farmers or shepherds. So far as possible, the bands took their wounded and dead with them; we had already observed this in Russia. Prisoners often attempted to flee by taking advantage of their knowledge of the territory and of accomplices; several were shot in the attempt. When our soldiers approached a strong point defended by the bands, they first used mortar fire. Due to the dryness, the straw covered roofs easily caught fire, so that often several houses, and sometimes the whole village burned down.
Ammunition was hidden in many of the houses, which exploded when a house caught fire. If the bands shot from a village of a settlement, or if ammunition or guns were found in a place where bands had entrenched themselves, this place was designated as a band strong point and burned down. I can no longer say from memory exactly how many such villages or settlements were partly or wholly destroyed in that operation.
It was very difficult to determine this at that time, because the individual attacking columns were widely separated and the mountainous terrain allowed only a very limited view."
" I recall that most of the bands escaped, as is usual in such cases due to their knowledge of the territory and their way of fighting, and that we found ammunition in a great many houses.
The results of the operation were compiled by Major v. Hirschfeld for the entire battle area and reported to the division by radio. The written report of 28. Oct. 1943 was sent in later.
At that time I was with the Staff of the Combat Command and thus came through various destroyed and undestroyed villages, but I do not recall their names."
Kohlberg, 5 October 1947.
signed: Walter Hoelz He has duly sworn to his affidavit and it is properly certified by the Burgomaster, General Lanz thinks this document is of importance, if one wants to form a correct impression of these conditions.
Witness, the next relevant document is NOKW-1113 in Document Book 19. It is Exhibit 426 on page 154 and 145 of the English. These are two orders by the 1st Mountain Division, not your orders--orders by the 1st Mountain Division dated 20 and 23 October 1943 concerning the establishment of a column, an assistant company for the dressing station in the mountains, and Italians were used for this purpose. What do you know about this measure which, as I say, represents an order by the 1st Mountain Division and not by you?
A I saw these orders for the first time here when I was handed this document book. These measures were unknown to me up till now. They are quite obviously measures taken by the division in its own area without calling me or the corps in at all. Therefore, there is nothing very much I can say about it now. I assume that these were people who volunteered or were willing to help and as such were employed, but this is an assumption on my part.
Q About that problem, if the Tribunal please, I offer as Exhibit 120 a document contained in Document Book Lanz No. 3. It is Document No. 91 on page 56. The affiant in this case is called Wilhelm Thilo, who was Ia with the 1st Mountain Division under General Lanz. He says at first he was going to speak about the establishment of a column and a temporary collecting company for a mountain medical station of the 1st Mountain Division of 20 and 23 October, 1943. The affidavit has been properly signed, duly sworn to, and certified. This is what he says:
"The establishment of the aforementioned column and of the temporary collecting company for a Main Mountain Medical Aid Station on 20 and 23 October 1943 was carried out according to the order of the Ib of the First Mountain Division and was made up of Italian Volunteers as far as I know on the basis of the directives given by the OKW at that time. (OKW "Basic directives with regard to the treatment of soldiers of the Italian army and militia," of 15 September 1943)."
And he takes reference to OKW Basic Directives with regard to the treatment of soldiers of the Italian Army and militia of 15 September 1943. The Document is contained in Lanz Document Book No. III on page 56 and is properly certified, but if the Tribunal please this document lacks the formula of the oath. The oath is not contained in the document. The document is merely headed with the word "affidavit."
Now I have made up for this; I have before me a special document which is contained in Document Book VI on page 6; it is Document No. 91--that document does not contain any statements. It merely contains the formula of the oath and it is the oath connected with the affidavit which I have just read. The formula was signed by the affiant Thilo and his signature is properly certified by the Burgomaster which makes Document No. 91 in Lanz Document Book No. III a formally proper one. This was Exhibit No. 128 Witness, in Document Book 19, the last document with which you are connected is Document NOKW--959. It is Exhibit 457.
This document an pages 156 through 164, which is in English 147 through 155, contains several reports by units concerning fighting against bands as well as two reports by the 1st Mountain Division to the corps headquarters.
Can you tell us anything about the contents of these reports?
A I can say something about the reports addressed to the headquarters and I assume that I received knowledge of them at the time. One of them is concerned with the village of Draguni which is near Paramythia which this report says was taken in the teeth of strong enemy resistance. This was quite obviously a battle for a village, and the village was burned down. I assume that it burned down in the course of the actual fighting; whether it burned down partly or totally cannot be seen from the report. I am sure that this incident, as all the other incidents, entailed the fact that some of the village burned down.
In the case of Operation Puma where it was reported that eight villages were destroyed and the main strong points of the bands are named individually, that operation was a tactical operation in the neighborhood of Kalabakka--that is to say, beyond the Pindus Mountains along the border, the demarcation line of the Corps area. It is the point where the road gradually joins the plains of Trikkalo. I can recall this operation.
We were concerned there with a few villages, small mountain villages as is usual in this part of the world, which were situated in valleys. From there for a long period of time raids were made by the bands on a certain sector of the Mecovon Road. I know this neighborhood fairly well myself because on numerous occasions we fought the bands there and suffered frequent losses among our own men along the road. These villages were situated about two to five kilometers away from the supply road in the mountains. They were difficult of access. They were far away and had been occupied by the bands for some lengthy period of time.
Originally, we were quite content with fighting the bands on the spots where they raided the road. We reinforced our security detachments but that was of no avail at all. The bands changed their tactics. They attacked at different points of the road and our spies and reconnaissance men found out that the hands had entrenched themselves in certain villages. Therefore, all we could do was to go out on an operation of our own, for which we took one battalion of the regiment 98, and to attack these villages which were defended by the bands.
They had all sorts of stores and depots in these villages. We had to take these villages in combat. Most of the bands, as was usual in these cases, disappeared, and only some of the bands could be engaged. The villages had been deserted by the inhabitants who had taken along all their belongings, and they therefore served only as strong points for the bandits. If one found ammunition in the houses in such villages, they were burned down so that the bands would lose their strong points. That was roughly what went on in this operation which had the code name Puma.
Q Witness, now please look at Document Book XX of the prosecution. Look at the document which is on page 4 of the German and 5 of the English. This is Document NQKW-1551 in Exhibit 458, a report by the Corps troop of Joannina, of 15 April 1944. What can you tell us about that report? What is it concerned with?
A This is a raid by the communist bards in that neighborhood on the small railway which goes from Mezalongi to a graveyard. This event occurred at a period of time--that is to say in April, when I was in Hungary. I was not in the Balkans at the time.
Q To bear out the truth of General Lanz's later statements, I offer a document to the Tribunal; it is contained in Lanz Document Book No. III. It is Document 92 on page 57 which will become Exhibit No. 121. Affiant Max Prollius confirms--he was the adjutant of the Corps and the personnel expert of the XXII mountain Corps--and he confirms that General Lanz was absent from Joannina at that period of time.