Q It still is not quite clear to me, general, why you concerned yourself with the matter at all. From my point of view one could perhaps say the matter didn't concern you at all. Why, then, did you concern yourself with the matter?
AAs a precaution, I tried to find out whether this whole matter concerned me at all because, after all, this Italian capitulation altered the whole situation and I had to tell myself that in some way on another I would be concerned by this because I knew that the Army Group intended, if the Italians left, to intervene in my staff. Therefore I was interested in it.
Q And where were the other generals at that time, who had been in action, and why weren't they entrusted with this task?
A If I was informed correctly, when the Italian delegration arrived, and this, of course, was counted upon, the German military commander was to carry out the necessary negotiations with the Italians; but just at that moment, on this day, that German commander was not in Athens -- he was on an official trip somewhere -- and the Commanding General of the 69th Corps, stationed in Athens, was also not present there, I think he was in the Peleponnes. So I was the only one there. General Loehr, my commander-in-chief, then told me on the telephone that unfortunately he could not comply with my request but he had to commission me, as the senior general in Athens at the moment, to take up negotiations with the commander-in-chief of the Italian 11th Army and to take to him the orders for the disarming and surrender of the Italians.
Q How did you cope with this request from your commander-in-chief, General Loehr?
A First of all I told the German Chief of Staff at that time, who was the liaison officer with the Italian High Command, to see me; also my own Chief of Staff; and I discussed the whole matter with them which had come so unexpectedly upon me. Thereupon I asked the German generals who were in Athens at that time and also the admiral who was present, to come to me and I told them that the Commander-in-Chief had just given me the order to conduct the negotiations with the Italian Commander-inChief with regard to the disarming and the surrender and that I wanted to discuss this with them, that is, the gentlemen who were present then, and decide what was to be done.
In addition, I wanted to get some information about the situation of the German troops and the Italian troops around Athens because these things were rather unknown to me. Up until then I had not had anything to do with them at all; until then I had been living as a kind of private individual in Athens.
Q And then, after this discussion with the German officers in Athens, what picture did you get of the situation?
A The impression I got was mainly that in Athens there were very few German troops and very many Italian troops; in any case, the ratio was approximately 1 to 5.
Q Then what did you do, in order to carry out the disarming and surrender of the Italian Army, which you had been ordered to do?
A I based my hopes on the fact that I would be able to settle this matter peacefully with the Italian Commander from the very beginnings. I determined that any kind of dispute or even fighting should be avoided. I told this to the Army Group too and I told them that in any case I would try to do my very best to conduct this not very pleasant task in a friendly manner with the Italians and to bring it to a successful conclusion.
Q Did you also make preparations in case the Italian Commanderin-Chief in Athens refused to surrender?
A Of course we talked about that; that was fairly obvious; we did no know what his attitude was. It was a very vague and unclear situation -a very unpleasant situation. I ordered that all the German troops in and around Athens should be prepared to carry out further orders and then I telephone his Excellency Vecchiarelli, the Commander of the Italians.
Q And then you thereupon probably visited the Italian Commander in Greece, Vecchiarelli, and then what happened?
A I went to him with my chief. The impression I received I can never forgot. The Italian Staff Headquarters was strongly defended with barbed wire and fortifications, and machine guns and guards and a large number of officers were collected in front of the building and inside the building. They lived in the villa of the Greek Crown Prince. Of course I was greeted by Vecchiarelli - I did not expect anything else. It was a rather cool reception. I gave him the order for complete disarming -- all the weapons had to be given up and he had to surrender; and I asked him to capitulate to us.
Q How did the Italian Commander-in-Chief behave in the face of this demand?
A Of course he was rather shocked by this demand and he made objections to it; mainly, and I remember this, he said the complete disarming of his army would hot be in agreement with the honor of his army and therefore I should refrain from this. He realized the situation and also realized that he had to surrender to us but disarming would be too harsh. Thereupon, of course, there a discussion and during the course of this discussion, after we had learned to know each other a bit, Vecchiarelli then suggested to me, on his own initiative, that he would go on fighting, on our side, and that, therefore, the disarming would be without point in his surrender and his capitulation to us. He would obligate himself to go on fighting as before, but on our side.
Q But did the Italian Commander-in-Chief say anything, perhaps, about what would happen if this suggestion was not agreed with?
A He mentioned, during the course of this discussion, that if I insisted on a complete disarming, then there would be a possibility that the Italians would oppose this and there would be fighting. He stressed again and again and asked that his soldiers be allowed to keep their guns.
Q. Then what was your reaction to this suggestion of the Italian Commander-in-Chief Vecchiarelli?
A. The situation was, of course, not very simple for me. On the one hand I had my order to demand a capitulation of the Italians; on the other hand, Vecchiarelli made the proposal to me that he wanted to go on fighting, on our side; and I was in the middle. Just try to imagine the situation -- everybody was standing around and waiting for something to happen. Since it was my determination to come to peaceful and friendly conclusions with the Italians, and at all costs to avoid fighting and hostilities with the Italians, I said to him: "Well, if my Army Group agrees to that, which, of course, I do not know beforehand, then, your Excellency, I agree with your proposal, that is, that you go on fighting on our side." I was of the opinion that that actually was the best solution. Thereupon the faces around me were rather relieved and Vecchiarelli, of course, was pleased about it. I was too, and in the conviction that right had been done, I took my leave. That was about half past 12:00 or 1:00 O'clock.
Q. When was that?
A. That was in the night, 8 - 9 September, about half past 12:00 or 1:00 o'clock.
Q. And then what happened further during this night? Did you report to the Army Group?
A. I then called up the Army Group, of course, and first of all told the Chief of Staff who was there and who came to the telephone, that I had done this and this. I did not know whether I was going to get praise or censure. He said that was not the task I had been given. He did not think that the Commander-in-Chief would agree to my measures. Shortly afterwards, General Loehr came to the telephone and I reported to him. He rather attacked me and asked me very harshly how did I come to alter this order which had been given to me, to act on my own authority, and to oppose the order of the O.K.W.? He could in no way agree to this.
Then I answered that I had hoped that was the best way. That otherwise there was a danger there that fighting would take place with the Italians - there was a possibility; and I thought that I had done the best thing that could possibly be done. My objections were without success and General Loehr was very harsh towards me and told me "I order that the agreements which you have made should be rescinded at once and that you carry out the orders I have given you - that is, the Italian 11th Army is to be immediately and completely disarmed and is to surrender to us." That was the essential point of what he said to me.
Q. So thereupon you received again the same task which you had received before. Then what did you think about this new commission? Did you want to carry it out, or did you want to remain by your, let us call it disobedience? What was your intention then?
A. First of all I was very angry, of course, over the fact that my good intentions had gone awry. Thereupon I talked with the gentlemen and told them what the Commander-in-Chief had ordered me to do and told them that they must, of course, prepare now for fighting with the Italians, which was extremely undesirable, because of the population. I asked them about their opinions as to what one should do in such a situation but they did not know either what to say.
Q. Witness, Lanz, you have just said that you talked about this to "the gentlemen." Were those the German generals present in your billet, whom you have mentioned before?
A. Yes; there was the German liaison officer with the Italian High Command and then there was my own Chief-of-Staff, who is now in Russia - I do not know whether he is living or not - and then there was the commander of the 11th Air Force Division, General Dromm. He had some of his own troops in and around Athens. Then there was a Brigadier General Holle; he was a commander of the Air Force which was in Athens; and then there was Vice Admiral Lange, who had a so-called naval force under him.
I asked these men what was to be done; they shrugged their shoulders. At any rate we were clear then and I was absolutely determined that fighting should not take place. This was an absolute impossibility.
Q. But General Lanz, in the face of the order of your commanding chief, after all, you had to do something. What did you do?
A. I then called up General Vecchiarelli again on the telephone.
Q. That was still at night?
A. Yes, that was around about 3:00 o'clock in the morning. There wasn't anything else to do. I went again with my chief by car to the Italian Headquarters. When I arrived there there was, of course, a great shock. General Vecchiarelli had already gone to bed and had to be called. Of course it was terribly embarrassing for me. He himself did not speak very much German and all had to be translated by an interpreter. General Vecchiarelli was, of course, terribly shocked that I had come back again. I told him that I regretted very much that I had to come back to him again but I had the strict and unavoidable order that my Commander-in-Chief was not agreeable in any way to the preliminary agreement which I had made with him and he had definitely rejected it and had demanded that I should obtain the surrender and disarming of the 11th Italian Army - and this was the order which I had to bring him. I told him that I regretted very much that this had come about but there remained nothing else for me to do except transmit this order to him.
Q. What was the attitude taken by the Italian Commander-inChief Vecchiarelli towards this order which you had to give him on behalf of your Commander-in-Chief?
A. General Vecchiarelli said, first of all, that he was very sorry that the agreement we had made was ruled out and he objected again to the total disarming. He said that would be dishonor for his troops to give up their arms. He could understand that the army had to surrender to us in the situation but he really could not agree at all to the complete disarming.
He then implied that if the complete disarming of his troops was ordered they probably would not obey an order of this kind and that there would be the possibility of fighting. I assurred him that I wanted to do my very best.
Q. Perhaps you would begin the sentence again, Witness.
A. I told him that I certainly did not intend that fighting or hostilities should take place and that he should do his best to avoid this. Then he kept on repeating his suggestion that his troops should be allowed to keep their guns so that the troops would not appear to be externally disarmed.
Q. Well, if I understand you correctly, Witness, during this second discussion General Vecchiarelli was in agreement with the surrender and the disarming, in principle, but he wanted this disarming to be carried out in a way which would be in conformity with the honor of the Italian Army. Did I understand you correct?
A. Yes, that is a correct description. We then talked about the possibility which then remained in this situation, with respect to what we could do. Then I told him that for my part I would do my best to see that, for the moment at least, his troops retained their arms in order to allay his fear of the dishonoring of his troops, I told him, and I said that I would do my best, provided that he was in agreement that the XIth Army should surrender to the German Army, and that if the heavy arms -- the heavy machine guns etc. -- were to be given up immediately, so that at least a part of the disarming order was carried out.
Q. So, General, you deviated again from the order of your Commander-in-Chief?
A. Yes, that's correct. But in this situation I thought -- I might even say -- that was the most tactful and most clever thing I could do. I was forced to do this.
Q. And then, Witness Lanz, after you offered to the Italian Commander Vecchiarelli that, to begin with, his light arms should be left with the troops, what did General Vecchiarelli say? Did he accept this offer, or did he reject it.
A. Well, of course, we talked about the situation, and the matter was very clear.
Then he convinced himself that the measures which I had asked him to take in the matter then in existence was correct, and it was a sign of my goodwill; so he declared himself to be in agreement with it. That is, the Army should surrender and that the heavy weapons should be given up, and that he would distribute the orders for this to his troops if the guns should be left. That was his request. Thereupon I told him that I would take notice of the fact that he was in agreement with the surrender and that the heavy weapons should be given up and that he should issue orders to that effect, and that I, for my part, should do my best to see that the rifles remained with the troops. That was the final result of our discussion. With this my task, that is the disarming, had not been actually carried out, but the surrender had been completely carried out, and the Italian general was in agreement with this.
Q. But this mitigation of the capitulation conditions on your own initiative, with which you had agreed and you had allowed General Vecchiarelli, did these things meet with the approval of your Commanderin-Chief, General Loehr?
A. I reported to the Army Group when I returned that I had now carried out the order, and that General Vecchiarelli had accepted the surrender, and that he was in agreement with it, but he had urgently requested that, temporarily at least, the rifles should be kept; otherwise, his troops world feel that they had been dishonored. I said that I myself urgently requested that this suggestion should be complied with by the German High Command?
Q. And what did General Loehr say to that?
A. He was in agreement with that. He did not have anything against it; he agreed to it.
Q. And then subsequently, that is, now your task had been completed, did you have anything else to do with the question of the carrying out of the disarming?
A. The next morning, that is after this very hectic night, at about 10 o'clock in the morning, General Felmy came to me in my billet and took over the measures to be done and, of course, I was very pleased that I was relieved of this unpleasant situation.
Q. And then did the Italian Commander-in-chief, General Vecchiarelli, adhere to this agreement? In other words did he give the order to his troops for disarming and surrender?
A. I know only the following; that he had agreed with me that the disarming would be carried out. That's what I know. Therefore, I must assume that he issued the order because the troops then gave up their weapons by themselves. Of course, the disarming of the whole XIth Army was carried out on the Crock mainland during the next 14 days quite smoothly. I don't know of one single case in which there were any difficulties.
Q. You said, therefore, that the whole Italian XIth Army in Greece, under the Command of General Vecchiarelli, as Commander-inChief, carried out the capitulation, the disarming, and the surrender without any great friction?
A. Even today I still don't know about any case in which resistance was shown. The whole Greek mainland did not resist at all or shoot within the sphere of my Corps. This was, of course, with one exception. The people otherwise surrendered and gave up their arms. I have already described how the Italians were gathered together in collection centers. The Italians then marched in groups to the railroad station. Then they collected there. I don't know any case in which there was difficulty anywhere on the Greek mainland. No complications or difficulties were shown during this surrender.
Q. And in Joannina, the Capital of the Epirus, where you went afterwards, the surrender of arms, on the whole, was carried out without friction. Is that correct?
A. I have already stated that the local Corps Staff there told me when I arrived that I was to remain there and that the disarming and surrender were to be carried out. This whole surrender and disarming was carried out completely and smoothly, and I don't know of one single case in which resistance occurred. The Italian Corps Headquarters had tried to get the people in Corfu and Kephalonia to be sensible about this. I will talk about this later. The Italian Commander sent his own Chief of Staff in order to make Gandin surrender properly.
Q. And where was the one case in which there were difficulties, Witness?
A. Only with the one division which was on the island of Corfu and Cafalonia.
Q. Corfu and Kephalonia.
Your Honors, I now come to a new subject which will deal with the incidents on the islands of Corfu and Kephalonia. I suggest that I continue with this after the recess.
DR. GAWLIK: Dr. Gawlik for the Defendant Dehner.
Your Honor, I would like to ask the permission of the Tribunal for General Dehner to be absent from the session on Monday, in order to prepare his case.
THE PRESIDENT: The permission is granted.
The Tribunal will be in recess until 1:30 this afternoon.
(The Court recessed at 1220 to resume session at 0130.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 21 November 1947).
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Sauter.
KARL HUBERT LANZ - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. SAUTER:Witness, before the recess we had stopped when you said that the disarming of the Greek Armies in Greece took place on the mainland without any major difficulties.
You have already mentioned that an exception occurred only on the two islands Kephalonia and Korfu. They are on the western coast of the Epirus. What was the situation on these two islands-Kephalonia and Korfu?
A. On those two islands there were troops of the Italian division which was under the command of General Gandin. This division, or rather parts of it, had refused to surrender and to deliver up their arms as it had been ordered to do by its own Italian superior officers.
Q. Can you tell us, Witness, how many German units, at that time, were stationed on those two islands and how large they were?
A. I'm in no position to give you an exact answer, but I can give you an approximate answer. To the best of my recollection there were, on the island Kephalonia, one regimental staff and two so-called fortress battalions. The leader of the regiment was, at the same time, the German Commander of the island. The Italian Island Commander was the Commander of the Italian Division. On Korfu there were approximately one-third of the Italian division of General Gandin. With respect to German troops there was one air-field command staff, consisting of about 100 members, and, apart from that, there were a few naval engineers. Altogether there were very weak German forces there.
Q. The Italian fortress Commander, you say, the Commander of the Island, was the Divisional Commander. That was the Italian General Gandin whose name has been repeatedly mentioned. Can you tell us the name of the German Commander of the Island?
A. That was, at the first time, Lt. Col. Barge.
Q. Perhaps you would spell the name "Barge."
A. (Spelling) B-A-R-G-E. He is, at the moment, a Gritish PW in Egypt.
Q. And do you also know, General, in order to anticipate this, the name of General Gandin's Division?
A. The Division was called the "Division Aqui."
Q. I see. Perhaps you would spell it.
A. (Spelling) A-Q-U-I, Aqui.
Q. Perhaps you could, first of all, tell the Tribunal what conditions prevailed on the island of Kephalonia and what events took place. That was the island where General Gandin himself was stationed with the bulk of his Division.
A. General Gandin was, on my request, asked by the German Island Commander to surrender his arms and to capitulate, as was done everywhere. General Gandin refused to do that. Thereupon General Gandin received also from his XIth Italian Division the order to surrender his arms.
Q. Just a moment, Witness.
A. Even this request was in vain strangely enough.
Q. Just a moment, Witness.
If the Tribunal please, it is not possible for us to produce this order which the Italian Commander in Chief Vecchiarelli issued to his Divisional Commander Gandin. Instead I am submitting another document which may show the proof for the fact that this order of the Italian Commander in Chief Vecchiarelli was sent to General Gandin amongst others. In the War Diaries which we received from Washington, War Diaries of the XXIInd Mountain Corps, we found a radio message which, in consideration if its importance, I have incorporated into Lanz Document Book V. In this Document Book we find Document No. 165, on Page 15.
This document will receive Lanz Exhibit No. 62. I would, again, like to draw the Tribunal's attention to the fact that this is a document which was found amongst the documents of the Prosecution and which was sent here from Washington, together with the War Diaries. The photostat of this document has been submitted, and I am reading an excerpt from this document, which refers to the order in question. I am reading from Page 15 of Lanz Document Book V. This is a radio message, dated the 11th of September, of course 1943. It is Appendix No. 30, 3-GN-54. That means "Third Company, Mountain Signal Detachment 54," No. 347, Secret, from the XXIInd Mountain Corps, to the Fortress Grenadier Regiment 966, Kephalonia, via Athens. The text of this radio message reads as follows, and I quote:
"Ital. 11th Army", that is the Army under Vecchiarelli, "has given orders to Acqui Division", which as the Tribunal will remember, is General Gandin's Division, "in Kephalonia to lay Gown their arms. Report to Corps Headquarters XXII Mountain Army Corps as soon as possible whether disarmament of Italians on island has been carried. out. How situation is at the time. Establish radio contact directly with 22nd Army Corps in Jannina." The signature "22nd Mountain Corps" and the message is signed by a Colonel in the General Staff, and there is a handwritten notice below that, saying "dealt with Bub. Cpl." That is the man who sent out the radio message. In this radio message, if it please the Tribunal, the Fortress Grenadier Regiment 966 is mentioned to which the radio message is addressed, and I beg to recall that General Lanz has just how said that two fortress Battalions were stationed in Kephalonia. This unit is identical with the unit to which the message of the 22nd Mountain Corps is addressed. I am submitting this radio message as proof for the fact that the Division Acqui and General Gandin received the order for surrender and laying down of their arms, from their superior officer General Vecchiarelli in Athens, who was the Commander in Chief. This was Exhibit 62.
Q Witness, how did things proceed after that, did General Gandin carry out the order or not?
A No, he did not carry out this order.
Q But - -?
A He constantly evaded our negotiations. Discussing further development I shall refer back to this.
DR. SAUTER: In this connection, if it please the Tribunal, I would like to submit a further document which is contained in Lanz Document Book V, Document No. 167, and the page number is 17. I shall submit this document as Exhibit 63. This again is a document which was found amongst the War Diaries of the 22nd Mountain Corps, and it was sent here from Washington.
This again is a radio message - radio message No. 17 - dated 13 September, again of course 1943. This radio message was sent at a date two days later than the radio message just read which was offered under Exhibit 62. This radio message No. 17, dated 13 September, shows as the authority transmitting the message "Kephalonia ". You can see that it is signed "Barge", and you will remember that General Lanz said just before that the German Commander on the island was Barge. The radio message is addressed to the 22nd Mountain Corps, therefore to Lanz. The excerpts which is of interest to us reads -- the photostat again was submitted. I quote: "Temporary new agreement with General Gandin. Massing of the Division with weapons eastern part Kefalonia to the West and South of Lami. Signed:Barge."
Below that we have a certification of the signature, and we cannot read who signed the certification. I am submitting this document to the Tribunal in order to prove that General Lanz's statement is correct according to which his detailed negotiations took place with General Gandin in order to avoid bloodshed.
Witness, how did things proceed on the 13th September, which is the day from which the radio message just read from Barge dated; did any fighting start then, or can you remember?
A On the 13th September the Italians opened hostilities against us very suddenly and surprising to us, although not a single shot was fired before that. Two of our ships were shot at, and there were wounded and killed, and the Italian batteries fired at the place, Lixuri, which is also mentioned in the map which is in the possession of the Tribunal. This place Lixuri situated on a peninsula, was the headquarters of the German Commander.
Q Just a minute, General, the place Lixuri, as you can see, is situated along a bay on the Island Kephalonia, to the left on the bottom of the map next to the letter "A" of Kephalonia, this is the place Lixuri just mentioned by the defendant.
You can continue now, General.
AAfter our discussions in Kephalonia had, strange enough, remained without any result and the Italians for some incomprehensible reason started open hostilities against us, -- this was the only such case in Greece - I flew with a sea plane to Kephalonia.
Q When was that?
A On 13 September, towards noon.
Q I see.
AAt that time I was of the optimistic opinion that I might succeed in achieving in a discussion with General Gandin, an adequate solution of the affair. I could really see no reason why that should not be possible. There could be no longer any doubts that the 11th Italian Army had surrendered or troop units had surrendered. The Italian Supreme Command had agreed to this surrender, and had also addressed the order to General Gandin to surrender. I could therefore see no reason why the same thing should not apply for Kephalonia and this is why I flew to Kephalonia, with the intention to visit General Gandin, and to talk to him. As my place approached the town of Argostolion, which is also on the map --- this is the capital of the island where General Gandin's staff was located -- my plane was shot at. Therefore, it was not possible for me to land there. That is, I could not go down on the wafer. It was a seaplane. Consequently, I flew to the northern end of the large bay, about 5 kilometers distant from Argostolion, and I landed there. From there I went to Lixuri to the German Commander of the Island. When I arrived there I still saw the marks of grenades which had been caused just before that by the Italian artillery. I remember quite clearly one of these marks was on the building where the Italian Island commander with his staff was quartered. I then asked Lt. Col.
Barge to inform me about the situation, because the whole situation was not quite clear to me. I asked him, after he had informed me, whether I could in some way contact General Gandin. That, after all, had been the purpose of my trip, merely to discuss things with General Gandin. Barge told me that he had a telephone connection with Gandin. Then I asked him to put me into contact by telephone with Gandin.
Q Can yon perhaps tell us what kind of a telephone connection that was?
A I believe it was a sear-cable between Argostolion and Lixuri.
Q I see.
A Yes, there was water between, of course.
Q You reached General Gandin by telephone?
A Yes, and I talked to General Gandin.
Q Just a moment. And will you tell us as clearly and precisely as possible what was said during your telephone conversation with General Gandin?
A Today, after four years, I cannot of course remember verbatim what was said, but I can still recall certain trends of thought. Substantially I told General Gandin that I regretted not to be able to come to Argostolion, as I had intended to, because to my intense surprise I had been shot at while going there. Further I told him that I was surprised that on that dry in the morning he had opened fire against German troops, and against Lixuri. I believe I said that I couldn't understand the meaning of such action. I then told him - I always mean along those lines - that it should be known to him that his Army under General Vecchiarelli had capitulated and had surrendered its arms and that he himself had received an order from the Italian Army to surrender his arms. I asked him why he didn't do that. Gandin replied, which I still remember, "the orders which I received were not clear". I believe that is the way he put it, his orders were not clear.
He asked me, as I also remember, to give him a clear order, telling him what he was supposed to do. That is what he told me. I said to him, "You will immediately receive the order from me, but I would like to point out to you that if the orders which you have are not carried out you and those responsible for this fact will be taken to account in a very severe manner." That is what I particularly stressed. He gave me to understand that if he received an order from me everything would be in order and that he would arrange for the necessary steps to be taken. That is in substance the course of my conversation with General Gandin.
Q. Witness, did you subsequently send such an order to General Gandin as you have said, an order such as he asked you to send?
A. Yes, on the very same table where I telephoned I wrote myself this order in my own handwriting, and had this order transmitted by telephone, to General Gandin. He received this order, and the text of this order is amongst the documents.
DR. SAUTER: May it please, the Tribunal, we have no opportunity to prove through documents what General Lanz has said here because he and his officers lest all their documents and their baggage on the retreat. In spite of this we are still in a position to submit to you this order, thanks to the ruling of the Tribunal that the War Diaries of the 22nd Mountain Corps and General Lanz, were to be brought here. In these War Diaries we find this order, we managed to trace it there, and I am now in a position to submit this order in documentary form, which of course, is of great importance. That the order was not created now but in 1943 is quite obvious, because it came from Washington. This order can be found in Document Book V for Lanz on page 16. It is Document 166, and it will be given Exhibit 64. It is page 16 of Lanz Document Book V. This order, which is a part of the War Diary of 22nd Mountain Corps, General Lanz's Corps, has the following text. I quote:
The Commanding General of the Dated, 13 September 1943, XXII Mountain Corps TO The Commanding Officer of the Italian Division "Acqui". i.e. Gandin.
1.) The Division "Acqui is ordered, effective immediately, to surrender all weapons, except the officers' small arms. to the German Military Commander of the island, Lieut.-Colonel Barge, as has already been done by all parts of the Italian VIII and XXVI Army Corps.