He held General v. Stettner, as the authorized divisional commander, responsible for this condition, in which connection apparently -- so far as I could gather from v. Stettner's remarks -- a few sharp words had been uttered.
"Just shortly after this, General von Stettner expressed himself in roughly the following words on the occasion of a troop report; Now if only no other commander has committed some arbitrary act and Lanz learns about it, then the devil is loose again."
"As far as I recall," the witness goes on to say, "this involved an operation against a partisan village near Joannina, which later led to a court martial prosecution at the express instigation of the Commanding General."
The affidavit is dated 29 October 1947 and it is signed by Heinz Groth. The affidavit has been sworn to duly and certified.
Q General Lanz, I would now like to have one document submitted to you which is on page 68 of Document Book XVII of the prosecution. This is page 93 of the English version. This is document NOKW-044 and Exhibit 418. It is a report about the destruction of a village in the area of Korea and, as it says, the shooting of all men capable of bearing arms.
The same report, General Lanz, is also contained in Document Book XX on page 76 which is page 107 of the English version, and this is Document NOKW-1402, Exhibit 476.
Would you please look at those two documents and then tell me whether or not you gave the order for this action?
A I did not give any orders for this action.
Q Who, according to you findings, had ordered this measure?
AAs I could establish from the documents here in Nurnberg, the man concerned was a Major Schreiber who was probably at the time Sector Commander of Korea.
Q Was the intention of the Sector Commander known to you before the action took place -- I mean the intention to attack the village and to destroy it?
A No, this intention was not known to me.
Q Can you give us any indications either from orders or reports which you have seen; how this operation came about?
A If I am to make a statement here, I have to rely on the information which I gathered from documents here. According to these, the village concerned is a band stronghold of Communists, north of the place Korea. From this area frequent attacks were made on the highway and mainly of the security installations on the outskirts of Korca.
I have to mention briefly the following circumstances. This small town Korca is in Albania. The district around Korca was during the whole period of my tenure in Greece particularly bothered by the bands.
Q General, this place Korca is no longer contained in that small map which we have submitted but it is considerably farther north of your area in Albania. That is why it is not on the map.
A Yes, that is why it is not on the map. It is about two inches north of the edge of the map. Korca was in Albania about 160 kilometers nor of Joannina. Around the district of Korca there were constantly active communistic bands carrying out their activities which, by the way, are there even today. From that district the constant invasions into the Greek area are started.
In one village a few kilometers away from Korea -- and this village is apparently concerned here -- these Communist bands were staying. If I am not very much mistaken. I passed that village at a later date. The place had been destroyed and it was situated near the right side of the road leading from Korca to the north and there were graves there of German soldiers as well as of partisans and these graves were quite close to the road. Without doubt, this was a Communist band village which, at the order of Major Schreiber, had been attacked in order to eliminate the constant attacks carried out from this village. Whether in the attack artillery, trench or mortar were used I don't know today and, of course, I cannot find out the facts any longer now. According to the reports which I have, the village was destroyed during the course of the combat action. Houses were burned down and destruction of places mostly consisted of burning down the place or part of the place because there were no explosions or anything of that type carried out.
The male defenders of the village, if I may put it that way, were shot during the fighting for this village. I have to assume that these male inhabitants, as it says here, capable of bearing arms, were the defenders of the village and that they were shot in the course of the fighting for the village.
To the best of my knowledge and according to my impression, this took place during a combat action for the village.
Q If you look at the report, witness, can you see, even from the report that this was a combat action, that a destruction was involved which was carried out during a combat action?
A To the best of my knowledge, it says in the report that the village was defended. It says here that the village was taken against resistance.
Q And you said, General Lanz, that this Communist band group, against which the action was carried out, was particularly active and carried out a number of attacks. What did you think was the main aim of the attacks of these partisans? Was it a town; was it a road; what was it?
AAll I can tell you is I didn't ask the band group.
Q But you had the report, General Lanz.
AAbove all, they wanted to attack the traffic along the highway because, as I described, a main highway passed this village from Korca to Fiorina and along that highway all our supplies were directed, at least until the Mezovon Highway could be used again and even at a later time the supplies were directed towards this road Korca-Florina and all the goods which were carried along this highway had to reach us eventually along that road. The partisans, therefore, were particularly interested in attacking this supply route, in disturbing it and finally preventing it from functioning.
Q Witness, you stressed just now that you had not ordered that action, that before the action was carried out you didn't know anything about it. Perhaps, you could tell us when and how did you after the facts had taken place learn something about them.
A I can only tell you for certain that I learned about them in Nurnberg. Whether I learned about them at the time I could only assume. Of course, it is not possible to remember every single report. That's just not humanly possible. It is possible, just possible, that I learned about it but I cannot say so with certainty.
Q And if you now look at the reports and if you recall the way in which you received them and in which you reacted to such reports during 1943 and 1944, can you tell us whether, according to these reports, you would have seen cause to carry out an investigation as in the other case or would you have been under the impression that, according to the report everything was well? How would you as an expert in military matters judge this report?
A I believe that would depend on the way in which I gained this knowledge. If my Chief of Staff had reported to me, which is quite possible, that in the area of Korca a band operation had taken place and that certain villages had been taken against band resistance, then I would see no cause whatsoever to interfere in these things. That would be nothing but purely a combat action which would offer me no cause to take any further action against it. I assume that that is how it was.
If I had learned details about the incident it would have been likely that I would have investigated the affair but I do not remember anything of that sort. Therefore, I assume that I received a tactical report about a combat action which gave me no cause whatsoever for interference. That is what I have to assume.
Q This brings me to another document, witness, with which you were charged by the prosecution. It can be found in Document Book XIII of the prosecution. It is Document 1552, Document Book XIII of the prosecution page 93, which is page 123 of the English text. The exhibit number was 333. I will have this document submitted to you. Will you please have a look at it and tell us what you know about this incident?
A To the best of my recollection, this incident, was an operation of the reconnaisance detachment of the 1st Mountain Division against a band ammunition depot which had become known to the German Security Forces stationed there.
This ammunition depot was attacked by us by way of a surprise attack. This resulted in a combat action with the bands who were there and who defended the ammunition depot and during this operation a number of bandits were killed. Whether they were 50, as reported, I no longer know. That seems a highly rounded figure to me.
Q Could you tell us whether you had ordered this operation as the Commander of the Mountain Corps?
A No, I only heard about the whole incident much later. I did not know anything about the operation before it took place.
Q And how did you later on gain knowledge of the incident?
A Probably through the channel of reports. I assume that the report after the operation had occurred was sent to the Corps Headquarters.
Q Did you as a result of this report see any cause to take any measures or did you at the time think that the action of the troops was a correct one?
A It is quite obvious that I did not see any cause to interfere and the way the operation was reported I could not see any cause.
DR. SAUTER: May it please the Tribunal, I am in this connection going to read a very brief affidavit consisting only of a few sentences. It is contained in Document Book III for General Lanz, Document 74, page 32, which I shall offer under Exhibit No. 61. This is an affidavit which has been duly sworn to and properly certified. The affiant is Matthias Starl. He has executed an affidavit which I have read yesterday. He was captain and chief ADC with the defendant Lanz from 14 November 1943 until 8 August 1944 and for some time he was Ia with the combat group Steyrer. He says the following and I quote:
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
"The area of Korca was heavily infested with bands since the arrival of the First Mountain Division about the beginning of July 1943 in that area. The Albanian and communist bands in that border area were especially active. Almost all the villages in the vicinity of Korca were known to be bases for the bandits. From there the bandits regularly attacked the supply traffic on the only highway which was then open, from Joannina via Korca to Florina. Even within the town of Korca there were several firefights with the bands, which attacked the town in broad daylight. The electric power station of the town of Korca, which was located about 10 km to the South of the town within the bandit infested area, had to be recaptured several times and had to be guarded constantly.
"During such a mopping-up operation, -
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, Dr. Sauter, Apparently you will not be able to complete the reading of this before out morning recess. Consequently, we will take our recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please take their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Your Honors, I then continue with the reading of the affidavit by the witness Starl. It is on page 32 in Lanz Document Book No. III, Document No. 74, Exhibit No. 61, I read from the last paragraph, where the affiant states:
"During such a mopping-up operation, the battle for an ammunition depot of the bands, as mentioned in the report of 26 September 1943, occurred.
"During a reconnaissance sortie, the bicycle troop of the 54th Reconnaissance Battalion learned by coincidence of the above mentioned ammunition depot from a civilian. The troop staged a surprise attack on the depot, which was being guarded by the bandits. In the course of the fighting, the ammunition depot was destroyed, several weapons, among them a heavy mortar, were captured, and 40 - 50 bandits, who resisted stubbornly, were killed in battle. I no longer recall the number of bandits show in the course of the battle. This action was afterwards reported by radio to Corps Headquarters at Joannina."
The affiant Matthias Starl who was at the time captain and first ADC with Lanz, has properly sworn to this affidavit and the signature is certified. The report of 26 September 1943 which the affiant mentions is, of course, the report NOKW-1552, Exhibit No. 333 which is to be found in Document Book XIII, page 39.
Now, witness, I come to the last individual count of the indictment dated the 12th of May, 1947, as far as this concerns you. It concerns the case of the Italian General Gandin. With regard to this case, in order to refresh your memory, I will show you the report concerned which is to be found in Document Book 19 of the prosecution, page 12 of the German and page 19 of the English.
This is the report NOKW1354, Exhibit No. 447. Have you got this report?
Now, please, would you state something about this incident?
A. This was at the conclusion of the fighting against the Italian division which was on the island of Korfu and Cathalonia after the Italian capitulation.
Q. And when was this?
A. This was the second half of September, 1943.
Q. And before this incident, had you had anything to do with the Italian capitulation?
A. Yes, my connection with the Italian capitulation was more or less accidental. This was while I was in Athens at the beginning of September 1943.
Q. That is before your arrival in the Epirus?
A. Yes, immediately before.
Q. And the negotiations at that time which you had to carry out in Athens -- did they have anything immediately to do with the case of Gandin on Korfu and Cathalonia?
A. Yes, they were immediately connected.
Q. And what did you have to do at the beginning of September in Athens with the Italian capitulation? Witness, I am asking you this question because at that time as you told us yesterday and the day before, you hadn't yet had anything to do. You hadn't been in action.
A. Well, it happened like this. On the 8th of September in the afternoon, I was in my billet in Athens and I heard by chance on the radio about the Italian capitulation. Thereupon, I asked the ADO who was with me to ask the army group whether I had anything to do with this matter at all, and I think it was the chief of staff at that time who told me that it was possible that I would perhaps be entrusted with the carrying out of the counter-measures as planned in an order called "Achsenmaechts."
Q. Witness, and why were you entrusted with this? At that time, you hadn't yet been in action.
A. I asked myself that question too at the time, because in itself I had nothing at all to do with these things, and also at that time I expressly asked that if possible I would not be bothered with this matter. Thereupon, I was told that shortly I would be told something else about it.
Q It still is not quite clear to me, general, why you concerned yourself with the matter at all. From my point of view one could perhaps say the matter didn't concern you at all. Why, then, did you concern yourself with the matter?
AAs a precaution, I tried to find out whether this whole matter concerned me at all because, after all, this Italian capitulation altered the whole situation and I had to tell myself that in some way on another I would be concerned by this because I knew that the Army Group intended, if the Italians left, to intervene in my staff. Therefore I was interested in it.
Q And where were the other generals at that time, who had been in action, and why weren't they entrusted with this task?
A If I was informed correctly, when the Italian delegration arrived, and this, of course, was counted upon, the German military commander was to carry out the necessary negotiations with the Italians; but just at that moment, on this day, that German commander was not in Athens -- he was on an official trip somewhere -- and the Commanding General of the 69th Corps, stationed in Athens, was also not present there, I think he was in the Peleponnes. So I was the only one there. General Loehr, my commander-in-chief, then told me on the telephone that unfortunately he could not comply with my request but he had to commission me, as the senior general in Athens at the moment, to take up negotiations with the commander-in-chief of the Italian 11th Army and to take to him the orders for the disarming and surrender of the Italians.
Q How did you cope with this request from your commander-in-chief, General Loehr?
A First of all I told the German Chief of Staff at that time, who was the liaison officer with the Italian High Command, to see me; also my own Chief of Staff; and I discussed the whole matter with them which had come so unexpectedly upon me. Thereupon I asked the German generals who were in Athens at that time and also the admiral who was present, to come to me and I told them that the Commander-in-Chief had just given me the order to conduct the negotiations with the Italian Commander-inChief with regard to the disarming and the surrender and that I wanted to discuss this with them, that is, the gentlemen who were present then, and decide what was to be done.
In addition, I wanted to get some information about the situation of the German troops and the Italian troops around Athens because these things were rather unknown to me. Up until then I had not had anything to do with them at all; until then I had been living as a kind of private individual in Athens.
Q And then, after this discussion with the German officers in Athens, what picture did you get of the situation?
A The impression I got was mainly that in Athens there were very few German troops and very many Italian troops; in any case, the ratio was approximately 1 to 5.
Q Then what did you do, in order to carry out the disarming and surrender of the Italian Army, which you had been ordered to do?
A I based my hopes on the fact that I would be able to settle this matter peacefully with the Italian Commander from the very beginnings. I determined that any kind of dispute or even fighting should be avoided. I told this to the Army Group too and I told them that in any case I would try to do my very best to conduct this not very pleasant task in a friendly manner with the Italians and to bring it to a successful conclusion.
Q Did you also make preparations in case the Italian Commanderin-Chief in Athens refused to surrender?
A Of course we talked about that; that was fairly obvious; we did no know what his attitude was. It was a very vague and unclear situation -a very unpleasant situation. I ordered that all the German troops in and around Athens should be prepared to carry out further orders and then I telephone his Excellency Vecchiarelli, the Commander of the Italians.
Q And then you thereupon probably visited the Italian Commander in Greece, Vecchiarelli, and then what happened?
A I went to him with my chief. The impression I received I can never forgot. The Italian Staff Headquarters was strongly defended with barbed wire and fortifications, and machine guns and guards and a large number of officers were collected in front of the building and inside the building. They lived in the villa of the Greek Crown Prince. Of course I was greeted by Vecchiarelli - I did not expect anything else. It was a rather cool reception. I gave him the order for complete disarming -- all the weapons had to be given up and he had to surrender; and I asked him to capitulate to us.
Q How did the Italian Commander-in-Chief behave in the face of this demand?
A Of course he was rather shocked by this demand and he made objections to it; mainly, and I remember this, he said the complete disarming of his army would hot be in agreement with the honor of his army and therefore I should refrain from this. He realized the situation and also realized that he had to surrender to us but disarming would be too harsh. Thereupon, of course, there a discussion and during the course of this discussion, after we had learned to know each other a bit, Vecchiarelli then suggested to me, on his own initiative, that he would go on fighting, on our side, and that, therefore, the disarming would be without point in his surrender and his capitulation to us. He would obligate himself to go on fighting as before, but on our side.
Q But did the Italian Commander-in-Chief say anything, perhaps, about what would happen if this suggestion was not agreed with?
A He mentioned, during the course of this discussion, that if I insisted on a complete disarming, then there would be a possibility that the Italians would oppose this and there would be fighting. He stressed again and again and asked that his soldiers be allowed to keep their guns.
Q. Then what was your reaction to this suggestion of the Italian Commander-in-Chief Vecchiarelli?
A. The situation was, of course, not very simple for me. On the one hand I had my order to demand a capitulation of the Italians; on the other hand, Vecchiarelli made the proposal to me that he wanted to go on fighting, on our side; and I was in the middle. Just try to imagine the situation -- everybody was standing around and waiting for something to happen. Since it was my determination to come to peaceful and friendly conclusions with the Italians, and at all costs to avoid fighting and hostilities with the Italians, I said to him: "Well, if my Army Group agrees to that, which, of course, I do not know beforehand, then, your Excellency, I agree with your proposal, that is, that you go on fighting on our side." I was of the opinion that that actually was the best solution. Thereupon the faces around me were rather relieved and Vecchiarelli, of course, was pleased about it. I was too, and in the conviction that right had been done, I took my leave. That was about half past 12:00 or 1:00 O'clock.
Q. When was that?
A. That was in the night, 8 - 9 September, about half past 12:00 or 1:00 o'clock.
Q. And then what happened further during this night? Did you report to the Army Group?
A. I then called up the Army Group, of course, and first of all told the Chief of Staff who was there and who came to the telephone, that I had done this and this. I did not know whether I was going to get praise or censure. He said that was not the task I had been given. He did not think that the Commander-in-Chief would agree to my measures. Shortly afterwards, General Loehr came to the telephone and I reported to him. He rather attacked me and asked me very harshly how did I come to alter this order which had been given to me, to act on my own authority, and to oppose the order of the O.K.W.? He could in no way agree to this.
Then I answered that I had hoped that was the best way. That otherwise there was a danger there that fighting would take place with the Italians - there was a possibility; and I thought that I had done the best thing that could possibly be done. My objections were without success and General Loehr was very harsh towards me and told me "I order that the agreements which you have made should be rescinded at once and that you carry out the orders I have given you - that is, the Italian 11th Army is to be immediately and completely disarmed and is to surrender to us." That was the essential point of what he said to me.
Q. So thereupon you received again the same task which you had received before. Then what did you think about this new commission? Did you want to carry it out, or did you want to remain by your, let us call it disobedience? What was your intention then?
A. First of all I was very angry, of course, over the fact that my good intentions had gone awry. Thereupon I talked with the gentlemen and told them what the Commander-in-Chief had ordered me to do and told them that they must, of course, prepare now for fighting with the Italians, which was extremely undesirable, because of the population. I asked them about their opinions as to what one should do in such a situation but they did not know either what to say.
Q. Witness, Lanz, you have just said that you talked about this to "the gentlemen." Were those the German generals present in your billet, whom you have mentioned before?
A. Yes; there was the German liaison officer with the Italian High Command and then there was my own Chief-of-Staff, who is now in Russia - I do not know whether he is living or not - and then there was the commander of the 11th Air Force Division, General Dromm. He had some of his own troops in and around Athens. Then there was a Brigadier General Holle; he was a commander of the Air Force which was in Athens; and then there was Vice Admiral Lange, who had a so-called naval force under him.
I asked these men what was to be done; they shrugged their shoulders. At any rate we were clear then and I was absolutely determined that fighting should not take place. This was an absolute impossibility.
Q. But General Lanz, in the face of the order of your commanding chief, after all, you had to do something. What did you do?
A. I then called up General Vecchiarelli again on the telephone.
Q. That was still at night?
A. Yes, that was around about 3:00 o'clock in the morning. There wasn't anything else to do. I went again with my chief by car to the Italian Headquarters. When I arrived there there was, of course, a great shock. General Vecchiarelli had already gone to bed and had to be called. Of course it was terribly embarrassing for me. He himself did not speak very much German and all had to be translated by an interpreter. General Vecchiarelli was, of course, terribly shocked that I had come back again. I told him that I regretted very much that I had to come back to him again but I had the strict and unavoidable order that my Commander-in-Chief was not agreeable in any way to the preliminary agreement which I had made with him and he had definitely rejected it and had demanded that I should obtain the surrender and disarming of the 11th Italian Army - and this was the order which I had to bring him. I told him that I regretted very much that this had come about but there remained nothing else for me to do except transmit this order to him.
Q. What was the attitude taken by the Italian Commander-inChief Vecchiarelli towards this order which you had to give him on behalf of your Commander-in-Chief?
A. General Vecchiarelli said, first of all, that he was very sorry that the agreement we had made was ruled out and he objected again to the total disarming. He said that would be dishonor for his troops to give up their arms. He could understand that the army had to surrender to us in the situation but he really could not agree at all to the complete disarming.
He then implied that if the complete disarming of his troops was ordered they probably would not obey an order of this kind and that there would be the possibility of fighting. I assurred him that I wanted to do my very best.
Q. Perhaps you would begin the sentence again, Witness.
A. I told him that I certainly did not intend that fighting or hostilities should take place and that he should do his best to avoid this. Then he kept on repeating his suggestion that his troops should be allowed to keep their guns so that the troops would not appear to be externally disarmed.
Q. Well, if I understand you correctly, Witness, during this second discussion General Vecchiarelli was in agreement with the surrender and the disarming, in principle, but he wanted this disarming to be carried out in a way which would be in conformity with the honor of the Italian Army. Did I understand you correct?
A. Yes, that is a correct description. We then talked about the possibility which then remained in this situation, with respect to what we could do. Then I told him that for my part I would do my best to see that, for the moment at least, his troops retained their arms in order to allay his fear of the dishonoring of his troops, I told him, and I said that I would do my best, provided that he was in agreement that the XIth Army should surrender to the German Army, and that if the heavy arms -- the heavy machine guns etc. -- were to be given up immediately, so that at least a part of the disarming order was carried out.
Q. So, General, you deviated again from the order of your Commander-in-Chief?
A. Yes, that's correct. But in this situation I thought -- I might even say -- that was the most tactful and most clever thing I could do. I was forced to do this.
Q. And then, Witness Lanz, after you offered to the Italian Commander Vecchiarelli that, to begin with, his light arms should be left with the troops, what did General Vecchiarelli say? Did he accept this offer, or did he reject it.
A. Well, of course, we talked about the situation, and the matter was very clear.
Then he convinced himself that the measures which I had asked him to take in the matter then in existence was correct, and it was a sign of my goodwill; so he declared himself to be in agreement with it. That is, the Army should surrender and that the heavy weapons should be given up, and that he would distribute the orders for this to his troops if the guns should be left. That was his request. Thereupon I told him that I would take notice of the fact that he was in agreement with the surrender and that the heavy weapons should be given up and that he should issue orders to that effect, and that I, for my part, should do my best to see that the rifles remained with the troops. That was the final result of our discussion. With this my task, that is the disarming, had not been actually carried out, but the surrender had been completely carried out, and the Italian general was in agreement with this.
Q. But this mitigation of the capitulation conditions on your own initiative, with which you had agreed and you had allowed General Vecchiarelli, did these things meet with the approval of your Commanderin-Chief, General Loehr?
A. I reported to the Army Group when I returned that I had now carried out the order, and that General Vecchiarelli had accepted the surrender, and that he was in agreement with it, but he had urgently requested that, temporarily at least, the rifles should be kept; otherwise, his troops world feel that they had been dishonored. I said that I myself urgently requested that this suggestion should be complied with by the German High Command?
Q. And what did General Loehr say to that?
A. He was in agreement with that. He did not have anything against it; he agreed to it.
Q. And then subsequently, that is, now your task had been completed, did you have anything else to do with the question of the carrying out of the disarming?
A. The next morning, that is after this very hectic night, at about 10 o'clock in the morning, General Felmy came to me in my billet and took over the measures to be done and, of course, I was very pleased that I was relieved of this unpleasant situation.
Q. And then did the Italian Commander-in-chief, General Vecchiarelli, adhere to this agreement? In other words did he give the order to his troops for disarming and surrender?
A. I know only the following; that he had agreed with me that the disarming would be carried out. That's what I know. Therefore, I must assume that he issued the order because the troops then gave up their weapons by themselves. Of course, the disarming of the whole XIth Army was carried out on the Crock mainland during the next 14 days quite smoothly. I don't know of one single case in which there were any difficulties.
Q. You said, therefore, that the whole Italian XIth Army in Greece, under the Command of General Vecchiarelli, as Commander-inChief, carried out the capitulation, the disarming, and the surrender without any great friction?
A. Even today I still don't know about any case in which resistance was shown. The whole Greek mainland did not resist at all or shoot within the sphere of my Corps. This was, of course, with one exception. The people otherwise surrendered and gave up their arms. I have already described how the Italians were gathered together in collection centers. The Italians then marched in groups to the railroad station. Then they collected there. I don't know any case in which there was difficulty anywhere on the Greek mainland. No complications or difficulties were shown during this surrender.
Q. And in Joannina, the Capital of the Epirus, where you went afterwards, the surrender of arms, on the whole, was carried out without friction. Is that correct?