A No, that was exactly the same, and where the cigarettes and cigars are concerned I would like to say that the Croatian monopoly factory for tobacco, cigarettes, and cigars was located in Senj. That's where those cigarettes, cigars, and tobacdo came from. And then this, as well as everything else, had been really hidden from the civilian population.
Q It seems of importance in this report that a command and medical but is reported as having been destroyed. When we discussed the report of the 114th Rile Division you said that the destroyed hospital in Moshune was merely a hut. Here you have a report of your own division, Herr Kobe. Can you, from your own knowledge of the district and of the locality, tell us something about the destruction of the command hut and the medical hut?
A Yes, it so happens that I remember this report very well. One or two days after the report had come in I myself got up there to that district where our battle was being waged in order to convince myself of the extent of the booty and in order to check on the transport of the booty. The troop leader there, who accompanied me, and I went into the woods and found out the code, according to which the enemy designated these camps, and then we found some of the camps, I saw some wooden huts, such as our foresters use in winter time when they want to war themselves, and I asked the officer who accompanied me whether the cabins which he had reported were of the same type, and he confirmed this. This man was inclined to exaggerate his reports in such cases in order to illuminate favorably the deeds and accomplishments of his troops, I reproached him for this, but I don't even want to attempt here to prove that this medical hut did not, at sometime, serve for the accommodation of wounded persons, but instead I would like to emphasize two points: One -- all these huts were only in the process of being built. They were not inhabited by anybody, which can be seen from our report. It says hero, "When further mopping up the area west of Drezenica, at present inconsiderable resistance by minor bands."
In other words the real battle had taken place on the preceding days. The enemy knew quite well what we were driving at, and the enemy had withdrawn, with the exception of dispersed parts of his troops. He had also taken his wounded along, and I do not want to make a derogatory remark about our very brave opponent and say that he withdrew and left his wounded behind. This was what we called, at that time, "purely looking for Easter eggs." Two, the second point is that we now had this particular area tightly in our own hands. That made the command hut and the medical hut impossible for the enemy to use in the future. Just these two huts were three to four Km. west of Drezenica. I could easily show you that exactly on the map. This was an area which was daily checked up on by reconnaissance squads from our troops in Drezenica. These huts could, therefore, no longer serve the enemy for hospital purposes. In my opinion it would be asking too much if we would have brought these cabins to an area where they could have been of use to him -- 20 to 30 Km. further north of the area. After a defensive battle these huts could no longer be used since, on principle, we pursued the enemy 10 to 20 Km. further. I believe that in saying this I have sufficiently clarified this point.
Q I believe the same, Herr Kobo, and I believe that we do not have to spend any more time with this point. One other question which is concerned with another document, which is also connected with this problem. This morning you told us something about the organization of the indigenous units. Above all, you told the Tribunal that these indigenous units carried out operations on their own initiative. And now you told us something about the destruction of band hospitals, as the huts are called, according to this report. Amongst the Prosecution material we have one document which, in my opinion, belongs to this set of questions which we have now discussed and which, up to this point, has not been clarified sufficiently. This document is also contained in Document Book XVI, which I believe you still have in front of you. It is on Page 139 of the German text, which is Page 93 of the English text.
Here you have a Daily Report of the XVth Corps, of the 5th of June 1944. This is Prosecution Document N0KW-1428, which is Prosecution Exhibit No. 393. In order to make my question clear I would like to quote the entry about which I want to ask you. It is the entry of the 373rd Division, and it reads: "Croatian combat unit groups have destroyed a bandit hospital southeast of Udbina, thereby 20 enemy dead, including 2 physicians. In addition 93 wounded and sick massacred." I may presuppose, witness, that the incident which is described here by the 373rd Division was not known to you at that time.
A No, we had no direct contact with that division.
Q But perhaps, on the basis of your general knowledge of the combat conditions in that area, seen on a large scale, you can tell us something in order to make this incident a little more clear.
A Yes, the corps which is concerned here expresses that the Croatian combat groups have fought hero and that enemy dead were made on that occasion. Then, the corps reports that apart from that the Croatian combat groups massacred 93 wounded and sick. Let us assume I was a member of the Army Staff and read this report. Then, I would know that the Corps in this way of reporting complains bitterly about the Croatian combat groups. But there's no time to go into details about this because it's only a very short teletype, but by clearly separating the combat action, on the one hand, and the massacring on the other hand, everybody would realize that tho corps clearly dissociates itself from this incident. it would have mentioned all dead and Otherwise, simply enemy together would not have particularly mentioned this separation. In other words, tho corps reports one incident which took place in its area, and, at the same time, expresses in this report that it dissociates it with this action and complains about it. it would be the task of tho higher Now, agencies to discuss the incident with the corresponding Croatian agencies. Furthermore, I would like to say one more thing based on my experiences. I am sure that these wounded and sick here were members of another ethnic group because we had the experience that the Croatians never -- I wouldn't say never, but generally speaking -- did not treat Croatian partisans in this way, but only Serbians.
On the other hand, the Serbians would never treat their Serbian partisans in this way only the Croatian partisans. We have here in the middle of our own fighting a fight for ethnic reasons.
Q Herr Kobo, you, as Ia, were, for a long time, a member of the XVth Crops, and as such under the command of General von Leyser. Can you tell us about how the XV Corps as General von Leyser, in particular, we acted in general if such a thing happened?
A Yes. We received the monthly reports, and, on other occasions if the overburdened teletype communications allowed, the information about those things which the corps reported, if only to be informed about the ideas by the corps. I know, therefore, quite well that General von Leyser always complained bitterly about such incidents and always took the severest steps which he could take within the scope of his own authority. We were always glad that we did not make too much trouble for him in this direction, within our divisional area.
Q. Did the Corps on its own have any opportunity to take steps against such actions as have been mentioned here and to call the perpetrators to account?
A. No, not that I know of. To the best of my recollection the relationship between the corps and the Croatians were on exactly the same basis as they were with us with the divisional Croatians.
Q. After this interpolation, let us return to your own division, fitness, after the last incident concerning the 373rd Division, before I turn to discussing further documents with you, one additional question; how did your division wage the battle against the minor bands as they are called here, by these I mean those partisans who carried out the surprise attacks and the sabotage acts?
A. We first of all tried through smaller or larger operations to get hold of the perpetrators. With these operations we connected our own propaganda in order to deter the population from the senseless and unlawful interference with our own fighting. Through this means, as I repeatedly said, our area became increasingly quiet and the attacks became more scarce. That, of course, also had to do with the fact that our Coratian soldiers were able to talk to the population and above all, we had to be thankful for the reasonable attitude of the population and that very little happened in our area.
Q. Do you mean to say, Herr Kobe, that no further sabotage acts and surprise attacks occurred in your area at all?
A. No, I don't mean to say that, but while at the beginning of our commitment, the sabotage acts and surprise attacks were very frequent and were carried out by the population because they were incited against us, but they became scarcer as time went on so at the end we hardly had to take measures or steps of any kind. The population in the final analysis saw in us the successors of a very happy time for them, which was the Austrian Hungarian occupation and they had no further desires.
Q. You said, witness, you did not have to take any further measures and steps against sabotage acts or surprise attacks?
A. Hardly any.
Q. Do you mean reprisal measures or any steps?
A. Yes.
Q. In this connection, I would like to ask you, witness, what fundamental orders about reprisal measures were known to you during your commitment in the Croatian area?
A. I only know one order, which we received at the very beginning of our commitment and which I could not even recall any longer, but saw here again.
Q. I would then like to ask you to take document book 16 to hand and please turn up page 98 of your test. This is page 37 in the English document book. Here you find prosecution document exhibit 379 which is NOKW 172. There you find the order of Army Group F, dated 22 December, 1943 and this order was signed by General Leehr. May I ask you, Herr Kobe, whether this is the order, which you mentioned just now?
A. Yes, this is the one I mean.
Q. You said first, Herr Kobe, that reprisal measures harkly played any part with your division. In connection with this statement I would like to discuss one incident with you, which was reported from the 392nd division, according to a document. Maybe I might add here that according to the prosecution documents that it is the only incident of a reprisal measure which occurred with your division.
The incident, which I mean, is contained in document 23 of the prosecution. You have document book 16, Mr. Kobe, I will have document book 23 shown to you and will you please turn up German page 41, which is page 32 in the English text?
Here you see prosecution exhibit 670, which is prosecution document NOKW - 1772. On the page indicated you have a daily report of Courts 5, Case 7 XV the corps, dated 8 February, 1944.
Under the 382nd division you have the report of an intention and here it reads:
"It is intended to have retaliation measures for an attack on a battery chief northwest of Pattovic."
On page 53 of the English text you have the daily report of the Corps, dated from the following day. Here your division reported:
"As a retaliation measure for stabbing of an officer, the western sector of Podom, 3.5 kilometers northeast of Ottoshac was taken in spite of resistance and burned down."
Can you from your own experience remember this incident, Herr Kobe?
A. Yes, I remember this incident quite well, because it was the first attempt of murder which had occurred in our division and at that time it caused great excitement among us.
Q. Herr Kobe, I have had these two reports shown to you which arc the reports of the 8th of February, which gave the intention of the reprisal and the report of the 9th of February, which gave the execution of the reprisal measure, Will you please tell us whether both these reports clear up the whole of the incident or whether at that time your division made any further reports to the corps about this incident?
A. One might assume it for certain that we reported this incident the day before or two days before to the corns as a very special incident, which had occurred in our divisional area. In actual fact, it was a very special incident, and in the intention to carry out reprisal measures for an attack on the battalion chief, it is assumed as known that the attack had occurred.
Q. If I understand you correctly, Herr Kobe, what you intend to say is that these two reports do not clear up the report with sufficient clarity?
A. No, for someone who is not familiar with the facts, it does not.
Q. From your own memory, are you in a position to give this historical incident in the same manner in which it occurred at the time?
A. Yes, I remember it very well. We had taken the town of Ortoshac and had been welcomed by the population as liberators, because they had suffered terribly under the terror of the occupation by the partisans. We still fought against the partisans in a terrain of mountains and woods about five to six-kilometers northeast of Ortoshac. This particular battalion was with its gun positions on the outskirts of Ortoshac and its observation post was stationed on the foot of the mountain of Um. At the foot of the mountain of Um, there was the village Podom, which is concerned here. The infantry fought about two kilometers north of that point and the battalion chief had gone to the observation point by bicycle from his station. When he reached the road fork, some civilians equipped with knives came out of the surrounding houses and butchered him to death. That was the incident and how it had occurred.
Q. How, Herr Kobe, do you know the incident so well?
A. We all concerned ourselves very much with this incident and the occurrence itself was observed by some soldiers from the top of the mountain. Apart from that, we were given exact information from the Croatian inhabitants, who also observed it and immediately reported what had happened.
Q. Did the troops take any measures on the spot to catch the perpetrators?
A. The soldiers of the battalion of course immediately searched the district and vicinity, but of course could not find anybody.
Q. There is something, which is not quite clear to me Mr. Kobe, and maybe you can help me. In the second report, it says the western sector of Podom was taken against enemy resistance and you just told me that the district was already occupied?
A. Well the one unit that fought there was not very strong and in the evening we had to withdraw it to the outskirts of Ortoscac.
We fought until one or two days later the district was freed. In the meantime, my divisional, commander discussed with State Secretary Markovic the reprisal measures which were to be carried out. Markovic, to the best of my knowledge, came from Ortoshac and it was decided that the houses from which the murderous attack had taken place were to be burned down. On the day, which is also reported by date in the report, our own troops attacked again and they had the order to burn down these houses. They throw back the enemy and in combat action burned the houses mentioned and at a later time I saw frequently the remains of these houses. They were the very houses, which were situated around the road fork where the attack had occurred.
Q. Can you tell us how many houses there were?
A. There may have been five or six houses in all.
Q. You toll us the houses concerned were around the road fork; what do you mean by that?
A. I mean they were the houses from which the partisans came in order to carry out the murderous attack. I mean that I would not like to dispute two or three houses here, after one of our officers, who was quite helpless, had been ruthlessly butchered.
Q. Now, one more general question about these reprisal measures, Herr Kobe; do you know whether on principle, the population had been warned not to take part in such sabatage and surprise attacks? Do you know how these warnings were carried out?
A. Yes. We ourselves produced posters which contained a warning to this effect and we had those posters given to the Croatian State Secretary so that he could exhibit them in public places. I myself saw such posters.
Q. One other question concerning the reprisal measure in Ortoshac: was the execution of this reprisal measure and the reason for it made known to the population at any time?
A. Yes, to the best of my recollection, a poster to that effect was exhibited in Ortoshac. We had there a large board where we exhibited our announcements.
Q. This brings us to the conclusion of this particular incident. Is there anything that you would like to say in a general way and which would perhaps clarify even further this incident?
A. Yes, I would like to stress the discipline of the troops because the men did not take reprisal measures on their own initiative which would nave been understandable from a humane point of view. Instead they waited for an order coming from the division and, furthermore, I would like to stress the fact that this particular district was the home of those men who later on, together with Erremic, came to us because they were convinced of the cause. Had they not been under the impression that we would take just measures and that we showed a corresponding attitude, I am sure they would not have come to join us.
Q. My last question concerning these facts goes to the following: was this reprisal measure seen to be a success at a later time?
Did it seem expedient and did it have any effect on the population?
A. Undoubtedly it did. That is what I emphasized just now and even before I said that these attacks later on decreased considerably.
Q. When we discussed reprisal measures here in these proceedings, the taking of hostages and the execution of hostages played an important part. There are hardly any documents in this connection from the 15th Corps and none at all, to the best of my discovery, from the area of your division. Can you from your memory tell us whether the troops of the 392nd Division took any hostages or whether any shootings or hangings of hostages were ever carried out by any troops of your division?
A. I do not recall one single incident of an arrest or of a shooting of even one single hostage. My divisional commanders and 1 were both principally of the opinion that the real fight against the bands took the foreground and we acted in accordance with this opinion.
Q. Did the troops of the 392nd Division make prisoners?
A. Yes, constantly we made very many. Up to the summer of 1944 we had altogether 200,000 prisoners and deserters.
Q. How were the prisoners treated with your division, Herr Kobe?
A. The prisoners were kept in a small prisoner camp and an accommodation which was in the immediate vicinity of our divisional headquarters and when we had a certain number of prisoners together then they were transported to Karlovac or Zagreb in empty trains which went back. There they were delivered in the prisoner camps against a receipt and this was reported along the so-called "quartermaster Channel".
Q. Herr Kobe, do you know which agencies were in charge of the prisoner of war camps where you delivered your prisoners?
A. I did not concern myself with this and all I can say is that, to the best of my knowledge, one of the camps was subordinated to the sub-area administrative headquarters in Karlovac and how the matters stood around Zagreb I do not know.
Q. You said that your division had a number of deserters. What happened to them?
A. The deserters were brought into a special small deserters' camp which we also had in the division area. They were well treated there and they were separated from the prisoners and brought separately to the roar. Every one of them received a note saying that he was a deserter. Of course, there were quite a number of them, who voluntarily reported for the Ustasha units or for the units of Major Erremie. These people were then assigned to the corresponding units.
Q. Witness, up until now we have discussed the bandit fighting a lot, the mopping-up operations and reprisal measures. Before we continue and come to another chapter I would like to put to you one more question to this last set of questions. You said that reprisal measures did not play too large a part in the area of your division. Perhaps, you could clarify for us what it is you actually want to say. Did you mean that the population in your area, as you indicated, acted so reasonably that it was not necessary to take reprisal measures?
A. Yes. That was one reason and then we had such a lot to do that we really could not delay to deal with reprisal measures.
Q. Now, witness, let us turn to something which you indicated just now when you said you had so very much to do. Was the combating of the bands the main activity of your division or what was the main assignment of your division in that area?
A. Our special assignment was to defend the coast in the area mentioned, and to build fortifications. Furthermore, in order to fulfill this assignment we had to keep the rear area free. We did that and we fought in such away that we actually had a large area at our disposal where not one single enemy unit was left. These two tasks went parallel with the third task which was to help the poor Croatians to build up their own state, One task merely supplemented the other one and we cannot imagine one of these tasks without the others.
Q. You said just now that you had complete control over your area. One question in this connection: in these proceedings the evacuation of the male inhabitants from certain band suspect areas has played a considerable part in the examinations; were such evacuations carried out in the area of your division?
A. N o, these evacuations played no part in our area because the population had actually made their positions clear. One part of them took the side of the bands and fought with them and the other part was on our side and fought with the Croatians or with the Serbs, as the case might have been.
Q. One further chapter from the area of your division: your division was one of the so-called coastal divisions, Kerr Kobe, wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Since your division was a coastal division, the name already indicates that you had to deal with the securing of the coast against a possible enemy landing and with the building of coastal fortifications. In this connection, we have a further part of the indictment which plays a considerable part. This is the ordered and, according to the indictment, the carried out evacuation of the population fit for military service for the islands and the deportation into the Reich for forced labor. If I for the moment omit the deportation to the Reich for forced labor, do you still remember any basic orders on the evacuation of the male population?
A. actually, I do not remember any such reports but it so happened that I saw such an order here and when I saw it I vaguely remembered it.
Q. Would you please take Document Book XVI to hand, Herr Kobe, and turn up page 104 of the German text which is page 55 of the English text. Here you find Document N0KW-674 of the prosecution which was submitted as Prosecution Exhibit 361, an order from the 13th of February 1944 which deals with the evacuation of the islands and of the coast in the event of an enemy landing. Before you give us your comments on this order I would like to ask you to also look at page 109 of the German Document Book which is page 61 of the English Document Book. Here you have an order dated the 21st of February 1944 and perhaps you could tell us whether you can remember those two orders.
A. I remember the first one but not the second one and I don't even believe we ever received the second one.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER:
While he is examining these orders we will take our usual afternoon recess.
THE MARSHAL: The court will be in recess until trreefifteen.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q Herr Kobe, before the recess we were discussing the two orders about the evaluation of the island of the coast, which I submitted to you, and you said that you only knew the first order -- that is, the order of the 13th of February 1944. Now, what can you tell us about how this order was carried out within the sphere of your division?
A First of all, the evacuation of the coast would not have been carried out at all, would have been impossible, because there weren't enough forces there. We had our forces, three battalions and one regimental staff, along 120 to 130 kilometers of coast. On the islands we were also only interested in the men capable of bearing arms. The islands Rab and Pac were the main ones which were in front of our coast. On both we had strong points -- bases.
Q With regard to the evacuation of the Island of Rab, the prosecution submitted no document originally; only in the cross examination of General von Leyser did the prosecutor present a document, which was mainly concerned with the evacuation of the island of Rab. It is Prosecution Document NOKW-1426 and it was offered under the Exhibit Number 613. I would like to show you the photostat of this document, Witness.
A Doctor Tipp, perhaps before we come to this matter, I mention a matter with regard to the evacuation of the coast. It is perhaps of our attitude.
Q Yes, please do.
A During our consolidation of the coast and the main strong points large shelters were driven into the fields, and when we had found out that an immediate landing was not imminent we suggested to the Corps that the buildings which we had built for accommodation of our troops should be placed at the disposal of the population for air raid shelters, and this was immediately granted by the Corps, with the result that when the air raid attacks started soon after, these air raid shelters, as they had become, were used by the population. That is, we did not evacuate the population there but, on the contrary, we helped them to shelter from the enemy air attacks.
That was all I wanted to say with regard to this question.
Q And now, Witness, we can go over to the evacuation of the Island of Rab. This is Exhibit 613 and is before you. First of all, I would like to say that the dates of the document are not in order. The first document we wish to discuss is on one pg. of the Prosecution's and probably on one of the original. It is a teletype from the 2nd Panzer Army to the 15th Mountain Corps. It is dated 14 March 1944. Under figure 1, it states there, "After the Port of Tablanac has been occupied by the 392nd Infantry, it was necessary for the Division to free and clear the island of Rab as soon as possible from the bands and to evacuate the able bodied men from the island." Would you please say something about this, Witness?
A It is a clear order which we distributed according to orders and which we carried out as far as we could.
Q The next letter, in the document is a teletype of the 15th Mountain Corps, dated the 15th of March 1944, and here it mentions that as soon as the necessary preconditions are available the clearing out and evacuation of the able bodied men, is to be done according to figure 1 concerning the Island of Rab. Can you remember --- Oh, you haven't got it yet. It is page 16 on the original. I don't know if the pages are numbered through. Did you find it, Herr Kobe? Can you remember which order your Division received by reason of the correspondence and what took place between your two superior officers on the basis of this document?
A No, I don't know it in detail any more, but I assume that it had a similar text.
Q And now I would like to ask you, Herr Kobe, how the evacuation of Rab, the occupation of Rab, was actually carried out.
A The execution, as I had already said, was carried out according to the sense of our conditions. That is, we got into contact with the Landrat of Senj and the who the island belonged and then we discussed the operation with him. The land rat was very proud about the occasion and boasted and spoke about it beforehand, so that the enemy knew about our intentions beforehand and the hostile elements had an opportunity to withdraw.
And then we -- that is, not the troops, but our troops then went over one day to the Island of Rab, and the Croatian Landrat with his administrative people and his police, as well as the Ustasha, took part in this. He told the people who had assembled there that he knew exactly who was the enemy and who was the friend. And then he assembled a Ustasha unit with the people who were there, and these people were shortly taken to Shujac and they were included on that island.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q You said then, Herr Kobe, that the rounding up of the people on the island was under the command of the Croatian Landrat?
A Yes. It was in charge of this Croatian Landrat and we, in connection with the Ustasha and the police there, had, of course, the task of going around and finding out whether all the people really* had been rounded up. But with the word "rounded up" I would like to stress more the registration because this means in the German language, mainly, registration.
Q You just said, witness, that these people were taken by the Ustasha Battalion on the island and then were taken over to the Island of Shujac. In the documents which we still have to discuss the name Fieume-it crops up again and again. When you talk about the word FiumeShujac perhaps you could tell us the local conditions there and what this double name of Fiume-Shujac means.
A Fiume and Shujac are two towns which run into each other. In Shujac, there was as I already mentioned at the beginning, first of all the administrative apparatus of the Landrat of Senj and also there was the equipment and clothing of the Ustasha which was sent there by railway. With regard to Rab I would like to say one thing, that there also a rather young Croatian official was set up there with his own police so that we had the exclusive military task of establishing strong points about the Northern and Southern ends of Rab.
Q And now, witness, I would like to ask you to look at the daily report of the 392nd Division dated 20 March 1944. It is on Page 12 in the original. It states for your division, the 392nd Division: "the operation 'Illusion', after the navy had failed, was carried out. No contact with the enemy." Then comes the sentence: "100 able-bodied men transferred to Fiume." And a preliminary question with regard to this:
It isn't quite clear from the document. Was this code name "Illusion" chosen for the operation Rab? Can you see that from this?
A From this report which comes from the Corps, not from the Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Division, it is rather clear.
Q Now, here in this report it states that 100 able-bodied men have been transferred to Fiume, Have you anything to say about that, anything additional to what you have already said?
A No.
Q Then, witness, I would like you to turn to the last report. This report is dated the 24 March 1944. It is on Page 15 in the original Here again a hundred persons are mentioned who were taken to Fiume but here it says, "A hundred people arrested". Can you explain anything about this?
A Yes. First of all I would like to stress that the division is not responsible for a report which is made by the Corps. I personally assume that the Corps used this expression and took it over so that by this the carrying out of the original order should be set down in writing I didn't concern myself with the question at all at that time as to whether these people were to be described as arrestees or future Ustashamen or as able-bodied men. This played no part at all. I only know that these people at the time were transferred to Fiume-Ghujac; that those about to join the Ustasha received clothing on the Island of Rab and that everything was in the hands of the Croatian government authorities.
Q And now with regard to the last report, one more question, Herr Kobe. In this concluding report it says that 25 Jews were also taken over to Fiume. Can you remember that and can you tell us what this is all about?
A Yes. I only remember very vaguely about this matter. As far as I recall, they were Jews who, from the area of Zara, were on the way into the Italian territory and either in Rab or in Hvar were taken there by our ships. With regard to the arrest of these people, nothing can be seen from the concluding report. I can only mention one detail which perhaps illustrates something about the position of these Jews.
At that time the commander of these coastal platoons told me that one of our German soldiers in Senj, while they were there, had Court No. V, Case No. VII.