WITNESS HOELTER: I'm afraid I can't answer the question any differently than I have answered it just now.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you may proceed.
BY MR. RAPP:
Q. You did not know, in other words, that Hammerfest was raided and completely destroyed up until February, 1945?
A. I know that in January or February the destruction of Hammerfest had been concluded.
Q. Now, just how long did the Operation Northern Light last?
A. The Operation Northern Light lasted into the months of January and February. During that period evacuations were still carried out from the Alta area etc.
Q. That is, not less than two and possibly not more than three months since the date that the Russians had not advanced beyond the Alta River. Is that right?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Witness, you spoke about the fact that there was a constant threat of an Anglo-American amphibious invasion in Norway, especially in the neighborhood of Narvik. Did you make that statement?
A. Yes, that is what I said.
Q. Will you tell us what that particular threat has to do with the destruction of the province of Finnmark?
A. This particular threat has nothing to do directly with the destruction of Finnmark. Only then would the province of Finnmark play a part if a joint operation from the East through the province of Finnmark and from the sea against the area of Narvik would be carried out.
Q. Witness, would you be so kind and point out for us where Narvik is? And then...
(WITNESS STANDS AT THE WITNESS BOX AND LIFTS POINTS TO CHART BEHIND HIM)
A. Narvik is here (POINTING).
Q. And would you then point out to us the province of Finnmark?
A. The province of Finnmark is the area around the Lyngen-fjord to the Kirkenes area via the Northern Cape, and It includes the entire island area, right down again to the Lyngen-fjord. And that is the area which I am outlining with my stick here.
Q. Thank you. Witness, assuming that you gave serious consideration to the possibility that the Allies would select an arctic winter to invade the province of Finnmark, do you believe that the Allies had been prevented from doing so because you had destroyed that province, especially in view of the fact that the allies just gave a pretty good account of themselves, of what they could do, in Normandy?
A. The destruction of the province of Finnmark was in no immediate connection with those combat action which we expected the Western forces to carry out against the area of Narvik. The destruction of the province of Finnmark was to keep the enemy away who was threatening from the East and from the Finnish area and whom we expected to push up.
Q. But you still expected the Russians to follow up. Isn't that correct--either by land or by sea?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. And you must have expected the Russians to follow you up right up to February 1945 because you still were carrying on destructions in the Finnmark as a military necessity. Is that correct?
A. Yes, it is correct.
Q. At that time Germany was practically sliced in two. Isn't that correct?
A. Is this a statement, or am I to comment on it?
Q. I am asking you whether you know that.
A. Yes, I know that.
Q. But you still thought, if I understand you correctly, that the Russians still would make these advances up there, despite the fact that they were doing rather well in the heart of Germany?
A. It is the task of an Army Commander to wage the war in that area for which he is responsible. Now, the developments within the Reich, we could not consider in our operations or with regard to those measures which we considered military necessary.
Q. Now, Witness, you will admit that when you got the order from the OKW for the destruction of the Finnmark in later October 1944 the situation on the Continent was somewhat different than in February 1945?
A. Yes, I admit that.
Q. Did the OKW ever cancel the order for the destruction of the Finnmark?
A. No.
Q. Therefore, what the OKW considered military necessity in October 1944 was still considered a military necessary many months later. Is that correct?
A. Yes, seen from our point of view that is correct.
Q. And in spite of the fact that the fortunes of war had turned considerably against you?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A. The fortunes of war had turned against us for sometime.
Q. I meant in relation to the invasion of Germany proper.
A. Those months were certainly very critical months for the development of the final stages of the war.
Q. Witness, was there any disagreement or arguments between Rendulic and Terboven when Terboven permitted some evacuated Norwegians to return prematurely to the evacuated homes, for the purpose of salvaging some scarce goods?
A. I believe that, at one time, some fishery equipment was supposed to be salvaged, and I believe that I can remember that the Army High Command opposed this measure in order not to let any Norwegians re-enter the area, especially not for propagandists reasons and as a matter of principle. I only very vaguely recall this incident.
Q. Could you elaborate on what you mean by "propaganda purposes" or "on account of propaganda purposes"?
A. If, from a built-up area and an area where the Norwegian population and we lived side by side, the people are Allowed to go back to their destroyed homes and houses in order to salvage some goods there, and if they then return and tell their friends and acquaintances that their houses were burned down and everything was destroyed, I am sure that will not contribute to a good relation between the two parties concerned.
Q. Witness, was the creation of a new Norwegian Government opposed to Quisling circumvented by the fact that you destroyed Finnmark and evacuated its population?
A. Will you please repeat the question?
Q. Was the threat of the Norwegian Government in Exile to establish a new government on Norwegian soil opposed to the quisling government, In other words, that the government being opposed to the quisling government, circumvented by the fact that you destroyed and evacuated the province of Finnmark?
A. I know nothing of such a political intention of a change of governments in Norway which we occupied.
Q. You told us yesterday, Witness, that you were afraid that a new Norwegian Government was to settle down in Norway. That is, a government which, of course, would have been opposed to the already established quisling Government. And I'm asking you whether or not you seriously thought that the destruction of the Finnmark and the forcible evacuation of the population prevented such a government from being created.
A. Such a government actually existed. It was located in London. What the OKW or the Fuehrer wanted to orevent politically was that somewhere there would be a Norwegian populated area which was not under our control.
Q. But Finnmark was under your control wasn't it?
A. Yes, out the people had left.
Q. Well, who evacuated them?
A. Yes, that's just why they were evacuated, to prevent this.
Q. Now, to follow that through to the logical conclusion you would really have to evacuated all of Norway wouldn't you?
A. We had occupied Norway to the Lyngen-fjord and, therefore, there was no reason to evacuate all of Norway. Only after the capitulation did we leave the occupied Norwegian areas. That is, we were made to leave them.
Q. Witness, I don't quite understand you. Do you mean that the fact that the German Army was there a Norwegian Government in Exile could not be formed in Norway or the fact that the Norwegian population was there?
A. A government in a territory can only make sense if there are people living in such a territory.
Q. Well, wasn't there a constant threat that such a Norwegian government could have established itself any where in Norway if it chose to?
A. Well, where we were it would not have been possible for a Norwegian Exile Government from London to settle down and take over.
Q. I still can't see the connection of the evacuation of Finnmark and the establishment of an Exile Government.
A. That's not what I maintained either. All I said was that we wanted to prevent that another Norway should develop in a populated area of Norway outside our sphere of control. Whether this Exile Government happened to be in London or whether it would have gone to Hammerfest made no difference whatsoever to us.
Q. But that statement you made presupposes the fact that the German Army would give up Finnmark without a fight.
A. I didn't understand that question.
If you didn't want the Norwegian Government in Exile to return to Norway and you felt that the presence of the Norwegian population would stimulate such a return and you, therefore, evacuated it, the Norwegian Government could only have landed in Finnmark if you had meanwhile withdrawn. Isn't that right? Otherwise the same conditions in Finnmark existed as anywhere else in Norway. That is, you occupied it?
A. In those areas where we, the occupation forces were, I've never expected a Norwegian Exile Government to put in an appearance.
Q. Listen. From the 18th of December 1944 on General Rendulic in addition to his other duties also became Armed Forces Commander Norway. Is that correct?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. And when General Rendulic left General Boehme succeeded him in the position as Armed Forces Commander in Norway as well as Commander in Chief of the XXth Mountain Army?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Will you explain to us what other duties were involved in being Armed Forces Commander Norway?
A. In what respect?
Q. In reference to his command over the XXth Mountain Army. In other words, which additional tasks did he have to assume?
A. You mean the tasks of the Armed Forces Commander in Norway?
Q. Yes.
A. The Armed Forces Commander had mainly the task to coordinate the three parts of the armed forces around the coastal area, and to prepare this battle according to particular instruction given in the Fuehrer Directive No. 40. And in the event of an enemy invasion the Armed Forces Commander was to lead the defensive fight of all three parts of the Armed Forces around that coastal area. That was the task of the Armed Forces Commander in an operational and tactical respect. Beyond that he had the job to coordinate also the inner work of the three branches of the Armed Forces. That is, he had to prepare quarters, accommodations, flak-batteries etc. as part of the preparation for the war which was to be waged. Generally speaking, he had to give directives for the behavior of the soldiers in public.
To put it briefly he had to do what every commander, in every district, in every town, in every village, does in order to achieve uniformity of the Armed Forces.
THE PRESIDENT: We'll take our morning recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom please take their places.
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY MR RAPP:
Q. Before the recess, you explained to us the mission of the Armed Forces Commander Norway as distinguished from the Commanding General of the 20th Mountain Army. Witness, were there any Russian prisoners-of-war in the Finnmark?
A. There may have been Russian prisoners-of-war with the divisions there in Finnmark but I don't know any details about it.
Q. Have you ever seen any Russian prisoner-of-war camps or inspected them?
A. Not in the Finnmark?
Q. You didn't see any along Highway 50 when you were driving?
A. No, no prisoner-of-war camps.
Q. You can't remember any?
Q. No, and I am not aware that I saw any prisoner-of-war camps on Highway 50.
Q. Who was with the administration of these Russian prisonersof-war?
A. Prisoners-of-war at this time were under the administration of the higher SS and Police Leader in Norway.
Q. In other words, you say that Russian prisoners-of-war who were captured by the German army were turned over to an SS office for safe-keeping?
A. No, I didn't say that. The whole prisoner-of-war system in Germany was subordinate from autumn 1944 onwards to the Commander of the Reserve Army and under him I think there was as an expert SS Obergruppenfuehrer Berger.
Q. Witness, I am familiar with all these facts, but that doesn't answer my question. Are you saying that the prisoners in Norway, pri soners-of-war, were administered by the SS Leader in Norway?
Isn't that what you said?
A. Yes.
Q. In his capacity as SS Leader in Norway or in his capacity as an Army General or something like that?
A. No, in his capacity as SS Fuehrer in Norway.
Q. In other words, then what I said is true, isn't it? That the prisoners-of-war which the German army held in Norway were the responsibility of the SS?
A. Yes, since autumn 1944 there was this change in the responsibility as far as I know.
Q. Well, the fact that you pointed to the fall of 1944 leads me to believe that because the Commander of the Reserve Army was Himmler and he happened to be the Chief of the SS, he turned over the whole prisoner-of-war affairs to the SS. Is that what you meant to say?
A. I don't know the reasons for it. I only know the fact itself, that we were not in charge of the prisoners-of-war.
Q. And you further say that Gottlob Berger, as Chief of the prisoners-of-war.Administration, was not a part of the OKW but became a part of the SS?
A. No, I didn't mean that. I didn't say that, and furthermore with regard to the details about the administration at top level I really know nothing at all.
Q. Yes, therefore I am trying to ask you only about Norway, Now these prisoners-of-war worked with divisions, is that right?
A. Well, it was quite different in some cases. Prisoners-ofwar were used for all possible kinds of work in Norway. The greater majority as far as I know were employed on the railway. Others on the roads, road--building, and in brief on work which needed a large number of people.
Q. Who built some of the snow tunnels across Highway 50?
A. The organization Todt.
Q. What labor did they use?
A. I don't know. I never saw a snow tunnel under construction. When I came to Norway for the first time these snow tunnels were already in existence.
Q. Would you say, witness, that the Armed Forces Commander Norway is the highest military representative the German Reich had in that country?
A. The Armed Forces Commander Norway was the highest military representative in the occupied Norwegian territory.
Q. He had no influence over prisoner-of-war affaris?
A. No.
Q. You know that definitely?
A. Yes, because I was the chief of this command.
Q. Where was the 6th Mountain Division stationed around April, May, 1945?
A. The 6th Mountain Division was on the Lyngen front.
Q. Were you ever there during that time?
A. No, I was for the last time in the Lyngen positions on an inspection in November, 1944. The army high command at that time was in Lillehammer, 200 kilometers North of Oslo.
Q. Did General Pemsel at that time command the 6th Mountain Division?
A. Yes.
Q. Did the 6th Mountain Division have any Russian prisonersof-war at its disposal at that time?
A. The 6th Mountain Division had construction troops of various kinds at its disposal. Whether this also included construction battalions which consisted of former prisoners-of-war, I don't know in detail.
Q. Witness, I didn't ask you about construction battalions which consisted of former prisoners-of-war.
I am asking you whether or not the 6th Mountain Division had Russian prisoners-of-war at that time working for them?
A. I don't know about this in detail but it is possible that up there amongst forces of the organization Todt forces of the inspectorate of prisoners were there but I really don't know how they were constituted because at that time I was never in the Lyngen positions.
Q. Yes, I didn't ask you about the organization Todt. I didn't ask you about anybody else. It is a question which you could answer yes or no or you could say I know or I don't know.
A. I said I don't know in detail how the labor was constituted in the construction of the Kittal positions.
Q. What relation has your answer to the question as to whether or not the 6th Mountain Division used Russian prisoners-of-war.
A. I don't know to what extent Russian prisoners-of-war were used by them, and whether they were construction troops or whether they were prisoners-of-war which had been authorized in some other way, who were in some way under the organization Todt, and who worked there because the Todt organization was used to a large extent in building and extending these positions.
Q. Witness, how far was the Tana River approximately from Hammerfest?
A. I estimate approximately 400 kilometers.
Q. Hammerfest was destroyed 400 kilometers beyond the point where the Russians,so to speak, didn't advance any more?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever talk to the defendant Rendulic or were you ever present when General Rendulic discussed with other persons ideological matters, or his attitude towards the church?
A. No, at that time we were undertaking an operation which occupied the Chief of the Army from early morning until very late at night, and whenever he could be had to undertake trips to critical points of the Front and I had no time at all for any ideological conversations during this period, that is during the autumn and winter of 1945.
Q. Witness, I don't want you to confine yourself to any particular time; my question was applicable for the entire time that General Rendulic was in Norway.
A. I have already stated that I had no important conversations of this kind with my Commander-in-Chief.
Q. Do you know his attitude towards the church?
A. I have no idea at all of what General Rendulic's attitude was towards the church.
Q. Are you familiar with his political ideology?
A. Yes, I think I know that.
Q. Would you care to tell us that?
A. He was a convinced German officer and leader of troops.
MR. RAPP: I have no further questions on cross-examination, Your Honor.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I have a few questions arising from the cross-examination.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
Q. General, first of all a general question; you feel that you are under oath as far as not only facts are concerned, but also as to military views and conclusions?
A. Yes.
Q. There has been mention of the term Fuehrer Order, and in connection with this the question of military necessity; did you regard every Fuehrer Order from the very beginning entirely as a military necessity or did you presuppose that the question of military necessity was not necessarily bound up with a Fuehrer Order; do you understand that?
A. Yes, I understand you. Fuehrer Orders of this kind--
Q. Excuse me, witness. Did a Fuehrer Order, according to your views at that time always contain a military necessity? At the moment I am not only talking about the order of 20 October.
A. Yes, as far as they concerned military matters.
Q. Then you want to say that a Fuehrer Order and Military necessity correspond, so to speak?
A. Well, I can't think anything else than that the Fuehrer Orders in a military sphere were chocked as far as their military necessity was concerned, and they were issued in this sense.
Q. General, it is well known that military orders in themselves are not supposed to be checked because in this way the sense of a binding order would be changed; in military life were there orders where in spite of this restriction which I have just stated, the military necessity was particularly mention or discussed?
A. Yes, discussions of this kind were made.
Q. Therefore then does the question of military order and military necessity necessarily coincide?
A. In my opinion, yes.
Q. We have spoken about the military necessity of this Norwegian operation, and in this connection the question of whether in addition to that which we call military necessity there were other necessities or reasons mentioned in it, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, when you received the order of 28 October did you raise the question of military necessity or not?
A. Of course I and other people in a small circle considered this question.
Q. Then did you carry out the order because it was a Fuehrer order or did you also carry it out because you realized the military necessity?
A. We carried it out because in this order we saw clearly an order of military necessity.
Q. Therefore, then General are there not two check points, firstly the point of whether the Fuehrer order can be checked at all and the question of whether the military necessity contained in the order may be checked?
A. Every responsible soldier would with regard to such a grave order consider the question of military necessity.
Q. And at that time did you ask yourself the question?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. General, then in this connection there was also mentioned, as I have already mentioned, that other reasons played a part; by this I mean the political reasons which have already been extensively discussed;
did these reasons play a part in your answering in the affirmative the question of military necessity?
A. These political reasons did not concern us as military authorities.
Q. And then when agreeing to the question of military necessity did you reckon with these reasons at all?
A. This for us had nothing at all to do -with the question of military necessity, therefore we didn't reckon on this in the consideration of the military necessity.
Q. General, you know the order of 28 October, but nevertheless I would like to submit it to you again. It is Exhibit 503 in Document Book 22, page 6. German page 6 and English page 8. I would ask you to read the second paragraph marked by me:
A. "Commander-in-Chief, North Finnland." That was the Commander in Chief of 20th Mountain Army. "Is responsible for the ruthless execution of the Fuehrer Order. Only in this way can we prevent the Russians, equipped with strong forces and supported by habitable dwellings and the population which knows the locality, from following our withdrawal movement in the winter and in a short while appearing before the Lyngen positions. Compassion for the civilian population is uncalled for."
Q Now, besides these military reasons is there perhaps somewhere else in the order a political reason which would have influenced you?
A This paragraph which I have just read only talks about the military reasons.
Q And do you remember from whom you heard about the alleged political reasons which were mentioned in the cross-examination?
A Perhaps from telephone calls which were made with the OKW I must have heard about that, because with the Reich Commissary or any other office, I never talked at all about this order.
Q General, then what was the actual purpose in holding up the Russians?
A The purpose in holding back the Russians was one to carry out the movement unhindered, and secondly, the gain time in order to construct now positions.
Q General, well then what was the purpose for whose protection were these things done?
A The purpose of our measures was to spare the lives of German soldiers and to prevent them from destruction.
Q How long does the winter last in Finnmark?
A Winter in this area lasts well into May.
Q And when was the withdrawal of the troops, which you wanted to maintain and protect, concluded?
A The bulk of the troops had marked across the Lyngen Fjord in January -- February. The movement toward the counter and south of Norway was still however in progress when we capitulated.
Q Until which time of the year were accommodations of great significance?
A Until the snow had melted, that is about until then end of May.
Q General, in this connection there was mention in the cross-examination about the position in Germany.
I think we must talk briefly about this. When did the Russian offensive start in 1945 on the Vistula?
A I can't remember the date anymore.
Q Do you know where the Russians were on the German front in the middle of January?
AAs far as I know fighting was going on on the border of East Prussia.
Q And the Western forces?
A The Western forces were in the west, the Ardennes offensive was concluded so that at this time the enemy was standing approximately on the Reich Frontier.
Q I am interested to know whether at this time the occupation of any of Germany had occurred.
According to what you just said it hadn't taken place.
A Yes, if I can remember correctly at this time the actual Reich territory was in German hands and fighting was going on at the Reich frontiers.
Q General, in your direct examination you stated that by reason of the OKW order of 28 October a telephone conversation took place between your Commander in Chief and General Jodi in the OKW, and in cross-examination you were also asked again about this. This telephone conversation could perhaps create the impression as if they were not in agreement with the whole solution. Can you please given an explanation about this at all?
A The whole solution was not our liking, that is it gave us great anxiety as regards our own troops, and then also the fate and welfare of those Norwegian people, and for this reason the whole solution was not our liking.
Q Now, just one brief question; there was mention of the prisoner of war system; you stated that since the Autumn of 1944 the prisoner of war administration was under Himmler.
At that time did Himmler belong to the Army?
A In his capacity as Commander of the Reserve Army, yes.
Q And Berger who was mentioned by the prosecution, did he belong to the Wehrmacht?
A Yes, he also belonged to the Wehrmacht.
Q For which reason?
A Well, I assume he had some kind of sphere of work with the commander of the Reserve Army, but details about his tasks are not known to me.
Q Then there was mention about the employment of prisoners of war and the name of General Pomsel was mentioned. Were these discussions concerned with the time when General Rendulic was still in command in Norway?
A I don't know what period of time the prosecution was thinking about. The construction of the positions by the 6th Mountain Division lasted until the capitulation, and at that time it wasn't anywhere near finished.
Q And when did General Rendulic leave Norway?
A General Rendulic left Norway in the last days of January 1945.
Q When did you say, General?
A In the last days of January.
Q As far as I remember it was January 13, do you know?
A Well, I can't say by heart.
DR. FRITSCH: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any further questions on behalf of defense counsel? Is there any further re cross-examination?
MR. RAPP:
I have one question, Your Honor.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. RAPP:
Q Witness, was the 20th Mountain Army at all times prepared to engage and successfully defeat the Russian enemy in opinion?
A The 20th Mountain Army was only in 1941 capable of an offensive operation as regards forces.
Q I don't know how the word "offensive" got into your answer. I merely asked whether they were prepared to engage, but how about then from a defensive point of view?
A Please, would you put this question more precisely? It wasn't clear to me.
MR. RAPP: May I ask you whether the interpreter translated "to engage" as to angreifen?
THE INTERPRETER: The answer is, yes I did.