Q. But if for other than historical reasons you had to fall back on the war diaries you had to assume that they would be correct at that time?
A. Well we did not have to refer back to them but if reference had been made to them later on the historian who would do so would first of all have to test the reliability of these war diaries by checking back with the persons concerned and so forth. I do not believe that a war diary can be regarded quite so easily as a fully objective document.
MR. RAPP: Did that come over your translation, your Honor?
Q. Flat you mean to say, witness -- am I right -- is the fact that the war diary is full of human errors as happen in connection with any type of office work we are performing daily but there is no deliberate attempt to falsify them.
A. Of course, a falsifying of the war diaries was not intended.
Q. Witness, I would like to come now to the so-called "Frisierte Berichte."
MR. RAPP: May I inquire from the interpreter how that is being translated?
Q. Fill you first tell us the reason for having these so-called "Frisierte Berichte": ("dressed up reports")
A. There were matters which the troops had to carry out without having had the permission of their superior agency. For instance, a corps had been ordered to defend a certain line. It was quite obvious that this was not possible without sacrificing the majority of the troops. Any motion in that direction was hopeless from the very beginning. It had been frequently turned down so all they could do was to say in the face of a superior enemy attack: "The corps using all it available means held this or that line and the enemy offensive was intercepted." That is a matter which amounts to a dressed up report.
Q. Has this any application as far as reprisal measures is concerned?
A. Yes, you can up to a point connect it with reprisal measures because after all these reprisal measures had been ordered by the Supreme authority at that and with great emphasis and I can quite easily imagine that the indignation higher up concerning the permanent disturbances along the railway line and the damage inflicted on a number of things thereby would use them to inquire from us, "What did you do in this affair?" The troops therefore had to report something. I can easily imagine that they then would send up a "dressed up" report.
I know, for instance, that the army itself would send up reports concerning British prisoners of war which were phony. It had been ordered that Commando units were to be killed in combat. That order was not executed in the area of the 2nd Panzer Army but then in the Ia reports the figures of British prisoners of war appeared. That caused automatically the higher agency to ask from us "What type of British prisoners of war are they? Are they members of commando units?" For that reason the report was dressed up to the effect that the British prisoners of war did not appear in it. It was in fact dressed up to such, an extent that it had to be camouflaged even as far as the Quartermaster General was concerned. Otherwise, the inquiry would come: "How is it that in the prisoner of war camp a certain number of prisoners of war have been reported to the Quartermaster General which have not been reported along the Ia channel. I can remember what an enormous amount of work was caused by this trifle of camouflaging these things.
Q. Witness, will you first tell me why the lower units that you are speaking about did not want to take any reprisal measures and resort to this type of reporting?
A. Well, perhaps it would not have been proper in certain cases to take reprisal measures of that sort but at the same time they had to answer something to the inquiry from higher up: "What has been done?"
Q. Let's for a minute define two particular issues we are talking about to get them clear in our mind.
When you talk about "unten", that is "down there"; just what units do you include -- divisions, regiments, corps, armies or what, from your point where you sat in the headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Army. What was "down there"?
A. I am speaking of the units subordinate to the army.
Q. And when you speak from "oben" -- that is "up there" -- what do you talk about then?
A. Then I mean those agencies superior to the army; that is to say, OKW and so on.
Q. And just what is the army itself?
A. Us.
Q. You mean you are in between. In other words, isn't it true that if you are a division the army is classified as being way up there?
A. Quite.
Q. And when you are in the army it is the OKW which is classified as being "way up there", isn't that right?
A. Yes.
Q. How, just who did the snooping if "down there" -- that is at divisions -- something happened; who was the one that put the pressure on the division to find out what retaliation measure was taken?
A. These inquiries, if I refer to the army as ourselves, came from above and would reach through us the units lower down as we had to pass back in answer to above.
Q. In other words, if I understand you correctly, whether you are "up there" or whether you were "down there," you never put any pressure on anybody. Is that right?
A. No, that is not correct, nor did I say that or mean it.
Q. Well, now, witness, are you trying to tell me that if an act of sabotage occurred at the 118th Division you are going to got a telegram from the OKW asking you: "What reprisal measures did the Commanding General of the 118th Division order in retaliation for the attack?" and then if they didn' t -
A. Quite. It is quite possible that such an inquiry from the OKW would come down. I don't think it is very probable and it is entirely possible that in a case like that the army would inquire what has boon done by the corps or the division in this case, and then the answer would come up. Whether the answer was a phony one or not was up to the local situation --lower down, I beg your pardon, to the corps.
Q. In other words, there was somebody sitting up there at the OKW, as you say, who was looking after the fact that these reprisal measures are actually being carried out in retaliation of acts of sabotage against German troops. That is all that the person or these persons had to do all day long because it must have occupied then around the clock if so many acts of sabotage occurred all over the Southeast theater as you have told us; just reams of paper and telegrams must have been sent down there from the OKW telling you just what retaliation measures you took.
A. No, Mr, Rapp; we started from different assumptions. We started from the phony reports and the necessity for them. I did not assert that for each reprisal measure, there was always inquiry on the part of the OKW. I must, it is true, state that reports from the Southeastern area were in the Fuehrer's headquarters read with the greatest attention and that we were receiving inquiries very often. In the final analysis the OKW regarded the Balkans as an OKW theater of war and it was the ultimate responsible agency for this theater.
Q. Now , witness, since you told us that you received dressed up reports from below and you sent dressed up reports up was there anybody who could got a true picture of the situation down there which, after all, is a prerequisite to conduct any military engagement or any military encounter. Somebody must have been in a position to got a true and accurate picture of what is happening. Did anybody have that?
A. It certainly wasn't easy to evaluable these phony reports, at least as far as tactical matters were concerned, they became so numerous and frequent only in the later stages of the war and it was very often difficult to form a clear picture of the tactical situation unless you yourself want to the spot in order to find out how the land lay and that man would then be in a position to say, "This is the situation."
JUDGE CARTER: We shall take our recess at this time.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
BY MR. RAPP:
Q. Colonel, will you please tell us which other reports or official documents besides the War Diary and the daily reports one cannot rely on because they are either full of errors or have been intentionally changed? Are there any others we should know about?
A. I believe that, in spite of the fact that we have discussed the question of reports for quite some time here, I did not succeed in making my points clear. It is not so, that the daily reports and War Diaries, etc. are full of errors or intentionally changed, dressed up. Dressed up reports were in the period under discussion now clearly an exception, They would only be considered and were applied after considerable conflicts of conscience when the person concerned believed that he had no other way out of it, if he wanted to achieve something which he believed he had to achieve because of his own conscience and belief, Generally speaking, I don't think one can say that the reports which were submitted were false and that the War Diaries were full of mistakes and errors. I have tried to make it clear also yesterday of what kind those mistakes were which occurred in the War Diaries and I don't believe it is necessary that I repeat it here again.
Q. If you feel that it was add to your testimony that possibly it will be clearer, go ahead and do it. If it is merely what you have said before we won't need it.
A. No, and I don't think it is necessary that I repeat what I said. I talked about the youthful exuberance of the officers who tried to emphasize the achievements of their own troops and to emphasize the difficulties of their area as well as to stress the achievements of their own units in that manner, and I talked about the lack of training which these officers had.
I said that in the final analysis, these reports and Diaries.... the historical value of the documents is not quite certain.
Q. Now, witness, to summarize your testimony in regard to these daily reports and War Diaries, would you-
A. I beg your pardon. Carry on. There is a slight danger in mixing up the War Diaries and daily reports because the War Diaries are the task of the ADC and the daily reports are not his task. They are merely drafted by him but they are daily checked again and every word is evaluated. I don't know what your question is driving at; therefore, excuse my interrupting you.
Q. I am talking about the unreliability that is common to both. That is what I was driving at. Would you now say, witness, that the daily reports and the War Diaries are, generally speaking, true and correct or not?
A. In War Diaries, we find those weaknesses which I explained yesterday and which I repeated again today. As a rule, in spite of this fact, they can be used as a basis because as I have said before, not only the text is to be considered but also the many enclosures and annexes which consist of documents, communications, maps, sketches, etc.
The daily reports with a probability of 99 per cent are reliable. The only exception here is if in a special case for some special reason a report is dressed up in some way and even then only with respect to one particular point contained in the document. The War Diaries were the work of the ADC's and the daily reports were the job of the general staff officers.
Q. You stated that these dressed-up reports increased or started--when? Could you tell us about when?
A. Yes, I can. I observed this increase during the last month of this war on the battlefields of East Prussia and near Berlin. At that time there were concerned mainly dressed up reports in respect to technical matters.
Q. Was there any SD operating in the Area of the Second Panzer Army?
A. Not that I remember, but looking back on it now I think it is quite probable that there were SD units there.
Q. Now, witness, you, as the Ia of the Second Panzer Army, only call it possible or probable that it was there but you can't recall it. Is that right?
A. Yes, I don't know it any more, whether an SD group was in that area, but I assume that it was present because in the normal course of events SD would be there and since I was the Ia of the Second Panzer Army I had nothing to do with the SD in that area.
Q. Now, witness, I didn't ask about SD groups. I talked about SD generally.
A. Yes, I am not very well informed about the organization of the SD. I don't know whether that is a special expression, this "SD groups". What I was talking about was that parts, units of the SD were probably present in that area at the time.
Q. Now wasn't there any possibility that the SD could report on you in regard to these dressed up reports and send to their headquarters different stories than you did through army channels?
A. I would not exclude that possibility but that is only an assumption of mine now. I do not remember any specific case.
Q. I am not referring to a specific case you know. I am merely speaking now of the element of possible discovery or fear which may result if such dressed up reports should be discovered by higher headquarters as being untrue because the SD has reported something different.
A. As I said, I can't exclude that possibility. I don't know, however, what the SD reported through its own official channels and I don't know to what extent the SD was informed about what our corps for example reported to us. If I consider these possibilities now, I can just make a guess but I quite admit that the possibility might have existed.
Q. Witness, you were asked whether the police district leaders were subordinate to the German army, "das Heer", and you said no. Is that right?
A. Yes, that is correct, because I know which troops were subordinate to us.
Q. When you talk about "we," who do you mean?
A. I mean the army and in this particular case I also mean the troops subordinate to the army. Not only the troops immediately subordinate to the troops but even the other units under the corps which were indirectly subordinate to the army. Every month we had to make quite a large sketch of all the troops subordinate to us and that included all those units. We had to compile this sketch, to draw it up, and therefore I recall those which were on it.
Q. If I understand you correctly, now, you say that this answer "no" which you gave refers to the Second Panzer Army only but not to the German army as such. Is that what you want to say?
A. You now mean by "army" the OKH? Do you?
Q. Yes, that is what I mean. Witness, you were specifically asked by defense counsel whether police district leaders were subordinate to the German army, and you said no and I asked you how you obtained or what sources you can give to give that information, that it was not subordinate to the German army, and you then talked about the Second Panzer Army only.
I am now merely trying to clear up that, you are not talking about the German army, is that right? You are talking only about the Second Panzer Army?
A. Yes, that is correct. Of course, I cannot say anything about the total organization of the German army and I understood the question of defense counsel to the effect that he was only driving at those spheres of competency which were known to me and which I can talk about.
Q. Regarding the operation "Kammerhofer", you stated that you know that Kammerhofer was subordinate to Himmler only. Is that right?
A. I said that to the best of my knowledge he was immediately subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer SS.
Q. As far as his person was concerned, wasn't he subordinate to Glaise-Horstenau?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. Now, this action Kammerhofer which was after all an operation of some dimension, didn't that have to be cleared with the respective corps or the Second Panzer Army before it would be launched?
A. You are quite right there. That should have really been done but it was regrettable that in many instances it was not done. Of course, the army had the endeavor to keep all forces together but it never succeeded in doing that.
Q. And in this particular case I understand you to say that General Rendulic was not successful in putting, so to speak, kammerhofer in his place, that he would cooperate in these matters with him?
A. As a rule, General Rendulic of course endeavored to direct Kammerhofer in the sense that was best for the army but he did not have the possibility to order him to do anything. Kammerhofer himself was a very active man and that is how such operations occurred without our knowledge and without our participation in them.
Q Just one more question on this phase, Witness. You throw knowledge and participation into one pot, so to speak. Now, are you also saying now that you derived knowledge of the Operation Kammerhofer only when it actually took place? You got up one day and saw the Operation Kammerhofer going around or something?
A No, I beg your pardon. I believe there is a misunderstanding between us here. I believe concerning this action Kammerhofer to which the document referred, which was submitted to me before, was known to us, but I said that where operations such as the Operation of Kammerhofer were concerned we did not always know about them before they took place, and that is what I said before.
Q But in this particular instance the Operation Kammerhofer to which we have reference, you knew about it in advance? Is that right?
A It can be assumed that where such a large-scale and long-lasting operation was concerned that we were informed about it.
Q Witness, you stated that you knew for a fact that Croatians which were recruited for labor purposes were not deported to Germany for slave labor. Will you tell us how you obtained this knowledge?
A It had been the intention of the Army and, as far as I remember-and I can say only what I remember, the Army caused no such deportations to the Reich or had them carried out.
Q Did that also hold true for Non-Croatian territory which the Army commanded?
A I would say that it applies in that area too.
Q Are you familiar with a certain Hitler Order of 1943 which made it mandatory that labor was to be transported to Germany? Can you recall that order or the contents?
A I can recall such an order. That is, I can recall its general contents.
Q Well, how did you go about to circumvent a Hitler Order in that particular case?
A I'm afraid I cannot tell you this now in detail. It's too far back.
These matters I believe were directed from case to case. The Army was particularly interested in keeping the country pacified, and I believe that that is quite obvious and clear to everybody. A deportation of civilian labor to the Reich was, without doubt, of a disadvantage for these interests of the Army; therefore, the interests of the Army could only be directed towards avoiding to transport civilian labor to the Reich. In what way in this or that case the deportation was prevented or not carried out I'm afraid I'm in no position to tell you. These matters were more the task of the Quartermaster-General. I was the Ia, and as such represented the opinion and attitude of the Army in tactical respects.
Q Isn't it true that the OKW and Hitler had the same interest at heart as the Second Panzer Army, or were they working at odds?
A I wouldn't say that they worked at cross purposes, but it is possible that the OKW and Hitler had other interests and saw other necessities beyond the interest of the Army, which we, in turn, could not be certain about.
Q And since you could not quore such interests, which one do you think should task precedence?
A This, again, would be merely a theoretical guess of mine if I answered this question, and I have to emphasize this before I answer it. I can imagine that somewhere it was very important to have labor forces available.
Q Were s-called "Hitler Orders" binding?
A Yes, they were.
Q Under all circumstances?
A Yes.
Q With the exception of this case?
A In this case they were also binding.
Q But you didn't deport any labor to Germany?
A If, in spite of the fact that this Fuehrer Order which you discussed before was valid all the time and if it had not been replaced by other orders of the Fuehrer or the OKW, then this Fuehrer Order would be binding to us; it was not carried out, then the Commander in Chief concerned would be responsible for the non-carrying out of the order.
But, as I mentioned before, the whole question of the labor assignment does not apply to my own sphere of work and, therefore, I'm informed only about the Fuehrer Order which you quoted before in general lines, but I don't know whether other orders came in afterwards. The Quartermaster-General was the man who worked on these matters.
Q I have no further questions, Your Honor.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q Colonel, I have only a very few questions to ask you, which arose from the cross-examination, and I would like to start backwards. I'm afraid we'll have to again deal with the question of who dressed up what reports. May I anticipate one statement? Yesterday we discussed the question of objectiveness in general. I don't have to repeat your testimony of yesterday because you have just repeated now, and from that discussion we came down to the question of dressing up reports and generally camouflaging messages. I would like to give you an example. Let us assume that the original order for reprisal measures of 1 to 50 and 1 to 100 existed; then, somewhere in some locality--let us call this place Potgorica--we have a surprise attack and sabotage acts accumulate. Now, reprisal measures are being carried out. Let us say a loss of about 10 German soldiers is retaliated by 20 hostages. How would the report of this event go to Higher Headquarters? Let us assume that the report was made by the Regiment.
A This report, I believe, would go to superior headquarters as follows: It would go to superior headquarters in the same way as the incident took place. The Regiment would see no cause to dress up this incident to the Army in reporting it to the Army. If, in this example, it would have become necessary to dress up this report, then the reason for this could only have been that from Higher Headquarters--what I mean is the OKW--an inquiry would have come down from the Army asking how it came about that for 10 German soldiers such a comparatively small number of reprisal hostages had been apprehended and made responsible.
And in order to forestall this inquiry the Army could report to Higher Headquarters that for excesses in Potgorica 20 hostages had been shot as a reprisal measure.
Q By this are you telling us that the Regiment would not see itself forced to dress up reports to the Corps and to the Army?
A Generally speaking, this statement of yours is perfectly correct.
Q What then was the agency which dressed up reports?
AAs a rule that would be the Army.
Q Am I understanding you correctly by saying that that was because you were in direct contact with the OKW?
A Yes, that is entirely correct.
Q Colonel, I still have a few questions.
Mr. Rapp talked about the distance in battles, and you said in your answer that sometimes the distance could be so short that you could see the whites of your opponent's eyes, and what you said is that it was hand to hand fighting. I would like to go a little further back. Colonel, when the battle started what was the distance normally between the two opponents?
A. I would say it was a distance of a few hundred meters.
Q. In considering this distance of a few hundred meters was it possible to recognize insignia which were not seen on a green uniform such as were well known to the opponent?
A. I can imagine that if such insignia were striking that it could have been recognized in a distance of a few hundred meters with binoculars, but such striking insignia would make the battle difficult because at the same time it would give the aim for the opponent.
Q. Is it known to you that the partisans partly were socalled Soviet Stars?
A. That was repeatedly reported.
Q. Did you yourself ever see such insignia?
A. I myself saw Soviet Stars.
Q. And in what distance were those Soviet Stars recognizable?
A. They were only visible in a very short distance, a few meters.
Q. Mr. Rapp then asked you as of what date airplanes supplied the Balkans with weapons, etc. In this connection he touched upon the question of the hiding of arms, you remember that?
A. Yes, I was asked whether one could carry a machine gun or machine pistol under one's coat.
Q. I see. That is correct. Can you tell us anything about the number of arms that the partisans were supplied with at that time?
A. The quantity was quite considerable as far as we were concerned.
Q. I shall put my question a little more clearer; could each partisan count upon having an American or British machine pistol?
A. No, when I said that the quantities were not inconsiderable as far as we were concerned I meant that they were still not adequate to arm or uniform all partisans throughout the area.
At least that was not possible at the beginning.
Q. What kind of arms did the majority of the partisans actually have?
A. The majority merely had light arms such as rifles. There were a few machine guns and mortars.
Q. I am now talking about the individual partisans, Colonel.
A. The individual partisans only had small arms.
Q. What kind of arms were those?
A. They were rifles, guns, knives, hand grenades. All kinds of arms which they could work with their hands, rifles, etc.
Q. Were there common pistols amongst them?
A. Yes, of course there were.
Q. Colonel, you have been shown a document which I also submitted to you yesterday. This is in Document Book 14, and it is Exhibit 340. This document was submitted by me to you with reference to one particular passage. It is quite a voluminous document. Did you read through the whole document yesterday?
A. No, of course I couldn't do that. I only looked at the passage which you showed me and then I had a look at where that document originated, who signed it, etc.
Q. In answer to a question of Mr. Rapp about the necessity of reprisal measures, you mentioned the concept of tactical necessity. Is this concept identical with the concept of military necessity, or can you give me an explanation of these two concepts? May I put the question more clearly, this concept of tactical necessity, was that consciously contrasted by you with the concept of military necessity?
A. Military necessity to us is a very special term. A tactical necessity is something different. A tactical necessity is a means of achieving a certain military necessity.
Q. Now, according to this definition which you have issued, Colonel, when you talked about reprisal measures in this connection would you designate that a military or tactical necessity?
A. No, purely as tactical necessity.
Q. In this connection you were further talking about the Ic/AO, and you said in this connection that you were not informed about the reports of this Ic/AO; would you to begin by telling us what Ic/AO is?
A. The Ic/AO is the counter-intelligence officer.
Q. He was subordinate to the Ic, was he?
A. Yes, he was subordinate to the Ic.
Q. And the Ic in turn was subordinate to you, is that correct?
A. No, not quite. The Ic was only subordinate to me in his capacity as the man who worked on the enemy situation reports, but he was not subordinate to me in his capacity as counter-intelligence officer.
Q. To what agency would the channel of command of the counter-intelligence officer lead?
A. The directives to the counter-intelligence officer, as far as I know, wore channeled through a special channel from the counter-intelligence department of the OKW to the counter-intelligence department of the Army Group, and then down to the counterintelligence office of the Army.
Q. And what was the Supreme Agency in this respect?
A. That was the OKW.
Q. One more question about this affair Kammerhofer; was this operation, if I may call it that, in its essential parts a matter of the Army or was it police measures with which we are concerned with here?
A. In the very fact that this operation was called by us operation Kammerhof we can see that the Army disassociated itself from this operation.
Therefore, this is merely a private affair of Kammerhofer which he carried out with the units which were under his command.
Q. What kind of units were those?
A. They were police units.
Q. Colonel, then there was some talk here about the selecting of hostages; I think you will remember the longish discussions which you had on this point. Mr. Rapp was driving at the question of the executions. I understood your answer there not quite clearly. Do you know who it was that executed the hostages who had been selected, or don't you know who it was?
A. NO, I don't know who it was, and I believe that is what I said quite clearly before.
DR. FRITSCH:
I did not understand you before.
I have no further questions to put on redirect examination.
DR. LATERNSER: May it please the Tribunal, to begin with I would like to point out two errors in translation which I found out. Before the recess there was some mention about the supreme agency when we talked about the reprisal measures, and the translation was "a very high agency", but it is the highest agency, the supreme agency. Has the translation been corrected now?
Then further when the witness talked about the highest agencies this was translated with "higher agencies", and I would like to know from the interpreters whether this has been corrected now to "highest agencies". It is in this connection that I would like to put a question to the witness.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Colonel, if you talk about the supreme agency in this connection, if you said reprisal measures were ordered by the supreme agency, whom did you mean by that?
A. I meant Hitler himself.
Q. And if you talk about the highest agency, whom do you mean by that?
A. I mean the Fuehrer Headquarters or the OKW.
Q. Not the Army Group?
A. No.
Q. And then another point which I would like to discuss with you; if a country is occupied then the occupying troops exercise two kinds of authority, they have operational power, troop leadership, and they have territorial power, which includes executive power. Is this subdivision into two kinds of powers, into operational powers and territorial powers, known to you?
A. Yes, it is.
JUDGE CARTER: We will recess until 1:30.
THE MARSHAL: The Court will be in recess until 1330.
(Thereupon the noon recess was taken until 1330 hours.)