Q Witness, what was the judgment reached higher up as to General Felmy's conduct?
AAt the supreme authority General Felmy's conduct was regarded as soft and the destructions as inadequate, that was the final verdict reached about General Felmy. He had to leave the LXVIII corps which he had been in charge of for sometime and take over the XXXIV corps for special tasks, which had been a loss tenacious corps. The reason for this was that technically speaking, he had been correct, prudent, responsible and human.
Q What was the tactical success of this soft conduct, as it was called, on the part of General Felmy?
A The Russians intended in their operations to cross the Danube and push forward to Zagreb, thus to cut off all the elements there in the southeast and that had been frustrated. The Russian offensive was always intercepted and it was halted at the southeast corner of the Platten Lake and our own front was not broken through at that point.
Q A final question, witness, what is your explanation why you still remember all these things so clearly?
AAt that time I was chief of the general staff of the corps and of course I had to think quite a lot about these matters. I often discussed them with General Felmy and as a rule we agreed about the measures, which were about to be taken down there.
Q Thank you very much, I have no further questions.
JUDGE CARTER: Any other questions for the defense? You may cross examine.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. RAPP:
Q Witness, from what period on did the allies commence to reenforce by air or otherwise the partisans with uniforms, weapons and the like?
AAs far as I can remember in the winter of 1943 to 1944.
Q And from that time on the appearance of more uniforms amongst the partisan soldiers was apparent, is that right?
A That is correct up to a point. The most important thing which the partisans needed for their battles were not the uniforms, but ammunition, arms and food. These things in relatively small quantities reached them by air and this was easier than to supply them with uniforms. I don't think that uniforms -- or at least I think that uniforms, which the bands received by air, came in very slowly, and I do not think this changed the appearance of the partisans.
Q Witness, during the time that you were operations officer down there with General Rendulic, what kind or type of warfare was down there; I mean by that usually speaking how far were the troops apart from the enemy, the distance approximately when they had contact when the fire fight commenced?
A well when the firing commenced and if one succeeded in committing the hands to a battle in order to disperse them, what as a rule happened was that one man could see the whites of the eyes of the other man.
Q Could you give us an approximate distance, Colonel?
A He would step across the other man, there would be close combat fighting and one of them would survive.
Q During this period that the partisans were reenforced with uniforms and ammunitions, etc., did they also get automatic weapons from the Allies?
A Certainly.
Q What kind of automatic weapons do you mean?
A By that I mean light automatic weapons such as Temmie guns and machine guns. We ourselves sometimes captured things like that.
Q Colonel, can you carry machine guns or machine pistols under your coats?
AA machine pistol I could hide under a wide coat. As far as a machine gun is concerned, it is more difficult at least if it were all put together and already to be used, then I don*t think it would be practical.
Q In any event, it is a little cumbersome to walk around with these things hanging around your neck, isn't it?
A Yes, it is not very pleasant.
Q And when you talk about machine pistols, you of course mean a German Schmeiser version, you are not talking about the British Sten gun or American Thompson gun, which are a little larger, do you?
A No, as far as I remember the British machine pistols are not much bigger than the German.
A November-M-IL-4-1-Meehan (Int.Kurtz)
Q The American ones you don't know; is that right?
A No, I don't know the details of the American ones.
Q Witness, will you tell us who executed the hostages in the area of the 2nd Panzer Army once they were selected to be executed?
A I could not say that under oath, I was not present, therefore I do not know.
Q There was never any talk about it at your headquarters who possibly could carry out these executions?
A Of course it was discussed occasionally perhaps, but I cannot recall it.
Q Could you take a guess?
A I could guess of course, but not under oath.
Q Who selected the hostages, witness?
A The hostages were selected on the whole in collaboration and on the suggestion of the Croatian authorities.
Q Now let's first understand each other that I am not only talking about Croatia but the entire area which the 2nd Panzer Army occupied, so please do not confine your answers only about Croatians but the entire area of the 2nd Panzer Army.
A Yes, I realize that. I mention Croatia because it was by far the biggest area held by the Panzer Army. In Albania it was the Albanians and not the Croatian authorities.
Q Now I am understanding you right to say that the German occupation forces, that is the 2nd Panzer Army, would go to the Croatian Government or the office that was charged in the Croatian Government and say we need 17 hostages, let's have them and then they would go to their jail and pick out 17 or round up 17 and give them to you; is that the way it worked or just how did it work?
A November-M-IL-4-2-Meehan (Int.Kurtz)
A No, you must have misunderstood me. I am sorry if I have not been clear. That was not the method chosen at all, what was done was entirely local. The local commander, who needed the hostages for some reason or other, contacted the local authorities, the local Croatian authorities competent in these things and that was how hostages were named and apprehended. I cannot recall a single case and I think it is out of the question, at least as far as my agency, the operational department, was concerned, that on a single occasion ever we would make requests for hostages to Croatian, Montenegran or Albanian agencies.
Q Witness, do you consider the entire reprisal measure a tactical necessity.
A Yes, I consider that.
Q Now, you were the operations officer of the 2nd Panzer Army; is that right?
A No. I was the first officer on the general staff of the 2nd Panzer Army and in charge of the operational department.
Q Well, there is some liberal translation. When I talk about military operations I of course mean I-A, I am perfectly aware what that is. Now, since these reprisal measures as you stated were a tactical necessity within the area of the 2nd Panzer Army, then it must have fit into your field; is that right?
A No, I had nothing to do with reprisal measures. The one who worked on this was I-G, who was under me in the operational section, but in his capacity as a counter intelligence officer.
Q Witness, I am somewhat confused, if you were in charge of tactics and operations and you say that reprisal measures were part of the tactical necessity, I don't see how you can pass them on to somebody else.
Now, either they have been a tactical necessity, then they must fall within your domain, I don't care who actually did. it within your shop, or they are not a tactical necessity and then you don't have anything to do with them. Will you explain that to me, please?
A Well, that is a very complex question in your formulation and I would be grateful if you would specify what you want me to explain. Of course, I was responsible for everything that left the operational department, as such I was responsible for the men who worked on the reprisal measures in I-G inasmuch as the tactical side of reprisal measures was concerned. That is to say I was responsible as to whether or not reprisal measures were necessary or not, but not for the actual carrying out of adequate measures which was up to the I-G.
Q Well, you have answered the question already. Yes, that is what I wanted to know. Now then who was responsible that these measures were actually carried out; I understand that was the responsibility of the Ic/A.O?
A No.
Q Ic/AO?
A No, if you will put the question about the responsibility for the carrying out of reprisal measures, all I can say it was the local commander on the spot.
Q I did not mean that, witness. I mean that they were carried out once they were ordered by the local commander, who was responsible to see to it that the order was actually carried out, that the hostages were physically executed; whose responsibility was that?
A The local commander of the troops, as I said.
Q In other words the local troop commander, as I understand you, was both responsible as to the ordering of the reprisal measure as well as the execution of this order.
A I believe we are talking at cross purposes. The general order for the whole processing of reprisal problems came from above and that order was binding for the local commander. The necessity to order a reprisal measure in an individual case did not come from the army, nor even from the corps in many cases, but by the local troop commander and he was the man who within the scope of the orders, which had reached him from above, ordered reprisal measures which he deemed necessary.
Q Thank you witness, now will you clear up the last point for me; to whom did this local troop commander go to have these people actually executed?
A Well, that is the core of the problem which we mentioned before. I am not able to say anything about that. I was not present, I do not have the details, I cannot say anything under oath, I can guess or estimate but that would be just a guess.
Q. I do not want that. That troops did this local troop commander usually command, only his own?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he have command over police units or SD units or other units?
A. Not as a rule.
Q. Witness, did any of the units within the 2nd Panzer Army at any time maintain their own hostage camps? Now that may sound as a very big word, "Geisellager." It may have only been a shack with two dozen people in there but did they in any event keep such installations no matter what its size?
A. I don't know. I never say any.
Q. Have you ever seen any references in letters or daily reports?
A. I think it is possible but I can't remember for certain. You must understand that these things go gar back.
Q. Witness, do you know if within the 2nd Panzer Army hostages were ever taken because people refused to give the whereabouts of their relatives in connection with partisan warfare?
A. I don't know of any such special case.
Q. Or because they even could not give the information because they simply didn't know and were still taken hostage?
A. I can't tell you anything about that. That might have been a local occurrence. One would have to ask the local commander. I was not present.
Q. Let's look at Document Book XIV. I am putting to you now the same document which Dr. Fritsch showed you yesterday, the very same one, and you will find it on page 15.
MR. RAPP: It is on page 21 in English, your Honors, in Document Book XIV, NOKW-509, Exhibit 340. Did your Honors follow that -- Document Book XIV, Exhibit 340, page 21 in the English?
Q. Now, you have seen this report before, have you not, witness?
A. Yes, quite.
Q. You say it yesterday, as a matter of fact here in court?
A. I think so, yes.
Q. Now, do you notice that it says down there way at the bottom of Paragraph II: "As ordered previously only such persons as are political suspect or whose relatives are proved to have joined the bands or those who cannot or do not wish to give any information as to where their relatives are, are to be taken as hostages." Did you follow me in that citation, witness?
A. Yes, I have the text in front of me. The translations was not quite literally the same but on the whole I followed it.
MR. RAPP: Well, did the interpreters have the German document book? It is on page 21 in the English, on page 15 in the German. It is Paragraph II at the bottom. It starts out: "As ordered previously," in English. I will read it again. You have the German document book before you.
Is it all right, your Honors, if I read it again to be sure there is no misunderstanding?
"As ordered previously only such persons as are political suspect or whose relatives are proved to have joined the bands or those who cannot or do not wish to give any information as to where their relatives are, are to be taken as hostages."
Q. Now have you seen this letter before, you said, and it is quite apparent from this that there were no hostages taken from people who either could not or would not give any information as to the whereabouts of their relatives. Is that right?
A. No. It is not apparent that it happened. All we can see here is that an order to that effect exists, an order by the LXIX Reserve Corps.
Q. All right. Thank you, Witness, You told us yesterday that the war diaries were usually kept by young officers who did not receive special training for this particular task and who sometimes were over enthusiastic and embroidered, so to speak, on the facts they reported. Did you make such a statement?
A. Yes, roughly, that.
Q. I want to ask you now, witness, whether you meant to say by that statement that these diaries were inaccurate and, therefore, one cannot or could not rely on them. Is that what you wanted to say?
A. What I wanted to say was that those diaries cannot claim complete historic objectivity.
Q. Would you say that they are generally true?
A. I am sure they contain many correct things.
Q. During the time that you were Ia of the 2nd Panzer Army did anybody -- that is General Grolman, your Chief of Staff, or the defendant Rendulic -- any time complain because these diaries were kept in a, shall I call it, "sloppy" way?
A. Between General von Grolman and myself it was always regarded as a sad event when I submitted to him these piles of War Diaries and had to tell him that I did not have the time to check them. Other few copies of that sort were already on his desk.
Q. Did your staff nevertheless rely on the contents of these war diaries during the conduct of the war?
A. We did not have the opportunity to look back on our war diaries. We had so much to do with current and future affairs that we were longing for the moment when we could file away into the archives our war diaries.
Q. has the historical value to be derived from these war diaries the only value or were there other reasons why a war diary was kept?
A. Needless to say, apart from the historic value, other necessities could make us look up things in the war diaries.
Q. Colonel, could you mention a few or one?
A. It might happen, for instance, that a certain occurrence would be of importance for certain political or other reasons and would have been gone into again. Therefore, for that purpose one had reference to the war diaries. After all, these war diaries, apart from their actual text, consisted mainly of a number of appendixes, documents, and so forth, such as is well known to the prosecution. From those documents one could reconstruct certain situations quite easily.
Q. But if for other than historical reasons you had to fall back on the war diaries you had to assume that they would be correct at that time?
A. Well we did not have to refer back to them but if reference had been made to them later on the historian who would do so would first of all have to test the reliability of these war diaries by checking back with the persons concerned and so forth. I do not believe that a war diary can be regarded quite so easily as a fully objective document.
MR. RAPP: Did that come over your translation, your Honor?
Q. Flat you mean to say, witness -- am I right -- is the fact that the war diary is full of human errors as happen in connection with any type of office work we are performing daily but there is no deliberate attempt to falsify them.
A. Of course, a falsifying of the war diaries was not intended.
Q. Witness, I would like to come now to the so-called "Frisierte Berichte."
MR. RAPP: May I inquire from the interpreter how that is being translated?
Q. Fill you first tell us the reason for having these so-called "Frisierte Berichte": ("dressed up reports")
A. There were matters which the troops had to carry out without having had the permission of their superior agency. For instance, a corps had been ordered to defend a certain line. It was quite obvious that this was not possible without sacrificing the majority of the troops. Any motion in that direction was hopeless from the very beginning. It had been frequently turned down so all they could do was to say in the face of a superior enemy attack: "The corps using all it available means held this or that line and the enemy offensive was intercepted." That is a matter which amounts to a dressed up report.
Q. Has this any application as far as reprisal measures is concerned?
A. Yes, you can up to a point connect it with reprisal measures because after all these reprisal measures had been ordered by the Supreme authority at that and with great emphasis and I can quite easily imagine that the indignation higher up concerning the permanent disturbances along the railway line and the damage inflicted on a number of things thereby would use them to inquire from us, "What did you do in this affair?" The troops therefore had to report something. I can easily imagine that they then would send up a "dressed up" report.
I know, for instance, that the army itself would send up reports concerning British prisoners of war which were phony. It had been ordered that Commando units were to be killed in combat. That order was not executed in the area of the 2nd Panzer Army but then in the Ia reports the figures of British prisoners of war appeared. That caused automatically the higher agency to ask from us "What type of British prisoners of war are they? Are they members of commando units?" For that reason the report was dressed up to the effect that the British prisoners of war did not appear in it. It was in fact dressed up to such, an extent that it had to be camouflaged even as far as the Quartermaster General was concerned. Otherwise, the inquiry would come: "How is it that in the prisoner of war camp a certain number of prisoners of war have been reported to the Quartermaster General which have not been reported along the Ia channel. I can remember what an enormous amount of work was caused by this trifle of camouflaging these things.
Q. Witness, will you first tell me why the lower units that you are speaking about did not want to take any reprisal measures and resort to this type of reporting?
A. Well, perhaps it would not have been proper in certain cases to take reprisal measures of that sort but at the same time they had to answer something to the inquiry from higher up: "What has been done?"
Q. Let's for a minute define two particular issues we are talking about to get them clear in our mind.
When you talk about "unten", that is "down there"; just what units do you include -- divisions, regiments, corps, armies or what, from your point where you sat in the headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Army. What was "down there"?
A. I am speaking of the units subordinate to the army.
Q. And when you speak from "oben" -- that is "up there" -- what do you talk about then?
A. Then I mean those agencies superior to the army; that is to say, OKW and so on.
Q. And just what is the army itself?
A. Us.
Q. You mean you are in between. In other words, isn't it true that if you are a division the army is classified as being way up there?
A. Quite.
Q. And when you are in the army it is the OKW which is classified as being "way up there", isn't that right?
A. Yes.
Q. How, just who did the snooping if "down there" -- that is at divisions -- something happened; who was the one that put the pressure on the division to find out what retaliation measure was taken?
A. These inquiries, if I refer to the army as ourselves, came from above and would reach through us the units lower down as we had to pass back in answer to above.
Q. In other words, if I understand you correctly, whether you are "up there" or whether you were "down there," you never put any pressure on anybody. Is that right?
A. No, that is not correct, nor did I say that or mean it.
Q. Well, now, witness, are you trying to tell me that if an act of sabotage occurred at the 118th Division you are going to got a telegram from the OKW asking you: "What reprisal measures did the Commanding General of the 118th Division order in retaliation for the attack?" and then if they didn' t -
A. Quite. It is quite possible that such an inquiry from the OKW would come down. I don't think it is very probable and it is entirely possible that in a case like that the army would inquire what has boon done by the corps or the division in this case, and then the answer would come up. Whether the answer was a phony one or not was up to the local situation --lower down, I beg your pardon, to the corps.
Q. In other words, there was somebody sitting up there at the OKW, as you say, who was looking after the fact that these reprisal measures are actually being carried out in retaliation of acts of sabotage against German troops. That is all that the person or these persons had to do all day long because it must have occupied then around the clock if so many acts of sabotage occurred all over the Southeast theater as you have told us; just reams of paper and telegrams must have been sent down there from the OKW telling you just what retaliation measures you took.
A. No, Mr, Rapp; we started from different assumptions. We started from the phony reports and the necessity for them. I did not assert that for each reprisal measure, there was always inquiry on the part of the OKW. I must, it is true, state that reports from the Southeastern area were in the Fuehrer's headquarters read with the greatest attention and that we were receiving inquiries very often. In the final analysis the OKW regarded the Balkans as an OKW theater of war and it was the ultimate responsible agency for this theater.
Q. Now , witness, since you told us that you received dressed up reports from below and you sent dressed up reports up was there anybody who could got a true picture of the situation down there which, after all, is a prerequisite to conduct any military engagement or any military encounter. Somebody must have been in a position to got a true and accurate picture of what is happening. Did anybody have that?
A. It certainly wasn't easy to evaluable these phony reports, at least as far as tactical matters were concerned, they became so numerous and frequent only in the later stages of the war and it was very often difficult to form a clear picture of the tactical situation unless you yourself want to the spot in order to find out how the land lay and that man would then be in a position to say, "This is the situation."
JUDGE CARTER: We shall take our recess at this time.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
BY MR. RAPP:
Q. Colonel, will you please tell us which other reports or official documents besides the War Diary and the daily reports one cannot rely on because they are either full of errors or have been intentionally changed? Are there any others we should know about?
A. I believe that, in spite of the fact that we have discussed the question of reports for quite some time here, I did not succeed in making my points clear. It is not so, that the daily reports and War Diaries, etc. are full of errors or intentionally changed, dressed up. Dressed up reports were in the period under discussion now clearly an exception, They would only be considered and were applied after considerable conflicts of conscience when the person concerned believed that he had no other way out of it, if he wanted to achieve something which he believed he had to achieve because of his own conscience and belief, Generally speaking, I don't think one can say that the reports which were submitted were false and that the War Diaries were full of mistakes and errors. I have tried to make it clear also yesterday of what kind those mistakes were which occurred in the War Diaries and I don't believe it is necessary that I repeat it here again.
Q. If you feel that it was add to your testimony that possibly it will be clearer, go ahead and do it. If it is merely what you have said before we won't need it.
A. No, and I don't think it is necessary that I repeat what I said. I talked about the youthful exuberance of the officers who tried to emphasize the achievements of their own troops and to emphasize the difficulties of their area as well as to stress the achievements of their own units in that manner, and I talked about the lack of training which these officers had.
I said that in the final analysis, these reports and Diaries.... the historical value of the documents is not quite certain.
Q. Now, witness, to summarize your testimony in regard to these daily reports and War Diaries, would you-
A. I beg your pardon. Carry on. There is a slight danger in mixing up the War Diaries and daily reports because the War Diaries are the task of the ADC and the daily reports are not his task. They are merely drafted by him but they are daily checked again and every word is evaluated. I don't know what your question is driving at; therefore, excuse my interrupting you.
Q. I am talking about the unreliability that is common to both. That is what I was driving at. Would you now say, witness, that the daily reports and the War Diaries are, generally speaking, true and correct or not?
A. In War Diaries, we find those weaknesses which I explained yesterday and which I repeated again today. As a rule, in spite of this fact, they can be used as a basis because as I have said before, not only the text is to be considered but also the many enclosures and annexes which consist of documents, communications, maps, sketches, etc.
The daily reports with a probability of 99 per cent are reliable. The only exception here is if in a special case for some special reason a report is dressed up in some way and even then only with respect to one particular point contained in the document. The War Diaries were the work of the ADC's and the daily reports were the job of the general staff officers.
Q. You stated that these dressed-up reports increased or started--when? Could you tell us about when?
A. Yes, I can. I observed this increase during the last month of this war on the battlefields of East Prussia and near Berlin. At that time there were concerned mainly dressed up reports in respect to technical matters.
Q. Was there any SD operating in the Area of the Second Panzer Army?
A. Not that I remember, but looking back on it now I think it is quite probable that there were SD units there.
Q. Now, witness, you, as the Ia of the Second Panzer Army, only call it possible or probable that it was there but you can't recall it. Is that right?
A. Yes, I don't know it any more, whether an SD group was in that area, but I assume that it was present because in the normal course of events SD would be there and since I was the Ia of the Second Panzer Army I had nothing to do with the SD in that area.
Q. Now, witness, I didn't ask about SD groups. I talked about SD generally.
A. Yes, I am not very well informed about the organization of the SD. I don't know whether that is a special expression, this "SD groups". What I was talking about was that parts, units of the SD were probably present in that area at the time.
Q. Now wasn't there any possibility that the SD could report on you in regard to these dressed up reports and send to their headquarters different stories than you did through army channels?
A. I would not exclude that possibility but that is only an assumption of mine now. I do not remember any specific case.
Q. I am not referring to a specific case you know. I am merely speaking now of the element of possible discovery or fear which may result if such dressed up reports should be discovered by higher headquarters as being untrue because the SD has reported something different.
A. As I said, I can't exclude that possibility. I don't know, however, what the SD reported through its own official channels and I don't know to what extent the SD was informed about what our corps for example reported to us. If I consider these possibilities now, I can just make a guess but I quite admit that the possibility might have existed.
Q. Witness, you were asked whether the police district leaders were subordinate to the German army, "das Heer", and you said no. Is that right?
A. Yes, that is correct, because I know which troops were subordinate to us.
Q. When you talk about "we," who do you mean?
A. I mean the army and in this particular case I also mean the troops subordinate to the army. Not only the troops immediately subordinate to the troops but even the other units under the corps which were indirectly subordinate to the army. Every month we had to make quite a large sketch of all the troops subordinate to us and that included all those units. We had to compile this sketch, to draw it up, and therefore I recall those which were on it.
Q. If I understand you correctly, now, you say that this answer "no" which you gave refers to the Second Panzer Army only but not to the German army as such. Is that what you want to say?
A. You now mean by "army" the OKH? Do you?
Q. Yes, that is what I mean. Witness, you were specifically asked by defense counsel whether police district leaders were subordinate to the German army, and you said no and I asked you how you obtained or what sources you can give to give that information, that it was not subordinate to the German army, and you then talked about the Second Panzer Army only.
I am now merely trying to clear up that, you are not talking about the German army, is that right? You are talking only about the Second Panzer Army?
A. Yes, that is correct. Of course, I cannot say anything about the total organization of the German army and I understood the question of defense counsel to the effect that he was only driving at those spheres of competency which were known to me and which I can talk about.
Q. Regarding the operation "Kammerhofer", you stated that you know that Kammerhofer was subordinate to Himmler only. Is that right?
A. I said that to the best of my knowledge he was immediately subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer SS.
Q. As far as his person was concerned, wasn't he subordinate to Glaise-Horstenau?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. Now, this action Kammerhofer which was after all an operation of some dimension, didn't that have to be cleared with the respective corps or the Second Panzer Army before it would be launched?
A. You are quite right there. That should have really been done but it was regrettable that in many instances it was not done. Of course, the army had the endeavor to keep all forces together but it never succeeded in doing that.
Q. And in this particular case I understand you to say that General Rendulic was not successful in putting, so to speak, kammerhofer in his place, that he would cooperate in these matters with him?