A. First of all I would like to correct an error on your part. I did not enter the political sphere at all. From May, 1932, for thirteen months, I was a member of the Party, and I did not do anything particular, and I did not have any achievement in that sphere.
Q. Will you permit me to interrupt you one minute to explain to you what I meant by "political activities" to possibly forestall that you answer differently than what I intended to ask you. I meant your arguments you had with well-known political figures of Germany - Kasche, Terboven, and Koch. In other words, activities which are usually not part of the mission or assignment of a General charged with a tactical mission. That is what I had reference to.
A. Yes, of course I can explain that. My assignments were always in the border areas of the Reich, beginning with the Balkans up to the extreme North of Lappland. I did not go there because of my own will, make contact with the political representatives of the Reich, I was forced to oppose them, and I had to oppose them because, on principle, I had to counter the excesses of the political functionaries there. These excesses invaded my own sphere. For instance, if Kasche had not made difficulties for me with the Croatian Government, when I endeavored to deter this government from the persecution of the Pravoslavs, then I would possibly have visited him once or twice, and that would have been the end of my contact with Kasche. If the Reich Commissar Terboven would not have denounced the Army because they had not carried out the first evacuation order, and if he had not interfered in Army affairs, if he had not been an impediment for me through his policy, if he had not prevented me from getting into good relations with the Norwegian population, then I would have had no differences of opinion with Terboven. And the same applies to all the other instances. Therefore, I was forced to this opposition against them people because of my tasks, because I would never stand for anybody's preventing me from carrying out my tasks.
Q. Witness, could it be possible that your education, your background, your vocation which you chose yourself -- I am talking about that of an attorney --, your Austrian extraction, and the fact that you were especially chosen to solve such questions like the political affairs in the Balkans, being familiar with them and being a student of history -rather than telling us that these tasks were given to you without taking any of these elements into consideration?
Could you tell us something about that?
A. That is out of the question because on the occasion of my assignment, let us say in the Balkans or in Norway, nobody, not even myself, knew or could know that I would see myself forced to deal with the political functionaries in these areas and to oppose them. When I was assigned there, undoubtedly only the military tasks were considered.
Q. In other words, Witness, you state that your success, if one can call it that way, was based entirely on your achievements as a soldier, but that any political considerations were merely of an incidental nature, and you were merely concerned with doing your duty as a soldier. Am I correct in understanding you that way?
A. Yes, that is a matter of course, What I say myself forced to do because of my military tasks I did only in order to be in a better position to fulfill my tasks and to eliminate everything that prevented me from fulfilling my tasks.
Q. Witness, did you consider yourself a politically minded individual?
A. Well, I would have to know what you mean by this term.
Q. Very well. Were you a General whose hobby was to daub around in politics?
A. No, on the contrary. In my assignments, just because they had to be carried out in these difficult situations, I found so much work that I considered this political battle an unpleasant addition, and it was certainly not out of pleasure that I waged this political battle. You may well imagine that if I had no difficulties in Croatia with Kasche or in other countries through the other functionaries, that it would have been a much better and easier life, if I had not had to use my efforts and my time on these tasks which were actually outside my sphere.
Q. Witness, from what time on did you come into conflict -- I mean did you oppose the Nazi philosophy and the way it was carried out in the Reich? From what year on approximately?
A. I was in no position to fight and oppose the ideology as such. How could I have done that? Then, I would have to have the press at my disposal or would have had to be able to influence the public in some other form.
Q. I presume my question was not clear. What I wanted to say was, from what time on were you not any longer personally in agreement with what Hitler was doing? That is what I meant.
A. That should have been as of the year 1936 and the last jolt was given by experiencing the party in Austria.
Q. In judging officers under your command what guide rule did you affix. In other words, what were the points that these officers had to have to be considered good officers in your judgment?
A. First of all they had to have military ability and the corresponding character. But also they had to be in a position to counter exaggerated ideas with which their people might have been approached, and they must be able to guide them properly, because our men were, after all, constantly exposed to exaggerated comments on the part of the National Socialists.
Q. Witness, did you ever sponsor this National Socialistic doctrine in connection in instituting a National Socialistic leadership course in your Army?
A. I did not support these officers beyond the extent which was ordered by the OKW. I tried to influence the spirit of these officers to the effect that in the education of the men they should, by no means, leave the ground of moderation. And for this reason, of course, I was interested in them, as I had to be interested in every installation of the Army.
Q. Witness, was it, in your opinion, essential that your officers were inbued with proper Nazi philosophy to carry on successfully against the enemy? 5377
A. Every soldier has to be imbued in the one ideology. That was a conviction which I gained when I was still a young officer. When in 1914 we went to war we were lucky enough not to need any political ideoloy, because everything that filled us -- every political ideal -- was summarized in the one word "Emperor." The whole Army had been educated in this sense, as well in Austria and Hungary,--the Army to which I belonged--as in Germany, and as far as I know in Italy. And this idea filled the soldiers of the Austria-Hungarian Army which was comprised of eleven nations. It kept this Army together during a four-year war, without Himmler and without anything like a Gestapo and without any Party. When this ideal was no longer there, something else had to take its place, and these were ideologies. My second great experience in this respect was during the war in Russia. Only the education in the Bolshevist meaning, which was able to make the people fanatics and which was particularly represented by the Commissar, this ideology saved, in 1941, the Russian Army from destruction. In Russia the Commissar was created, and this was the greatest achievement which Bolshevism achieved up to the year 1941. And this, --which is not only my opinion,--supports the conviction that every soldier needs an ideology in order to be able to see any meaning in a difficult struggle. He needs something to fall back on ideologically in difficult situations. It does not matter what kind of an ideology it is. Ideologies come and go, but if one has to be used, then only the very one which is at hand can be used. A new one cannot be created.
Q. Now, Witness, since you have put patriotism and Nazi ideology on the same denominator let us look at a document to see how you expressed that in words at the time. I would now like to offer Document NOKW-021 as Prosecution Exhibit 601. Let me read some of these parts to you, witness. First of all, you were the Commander in Chief, which this document has reference to were you not?
A. Yes, I was. Commander-in-Chief attends the lecture by Captain Rinck on sea war, air war and foreign politics. After that he himself once again instructed the people attending the course as to their tasks and prepares them for the fact that their sphere of duties soon will extend to an entirely different area.
Starting with the great significance of the Commissar in the Russian Army who essentially can be made responsible for the fighting strength and the endurance of the Russians, the Commander-in-Chief indicates that in the near future the so-called "maintenance of the troops" (Truppenbetreuung) will also move in this direction. The resistance and striking power of the troops is derived not only from their weapons but it is at least to an equal extent derived from a psychological attitude toward the fight. A correct attitude can be achieved only by educating each individual to National Socialism."
Q. Witness, first of all, you told us that sometime in 1938, I believe after the annexation of Austria, you, for yourself, at least, broke with National Socialism. The least I could ask you now is whether, in the light of that statement, you have made, it was necessary to lecture your troops rather eloquently in 1943 on these subjects. And will you please explain that?
A. I can do that very easily. I said that I had broken with the Party. What I mean is that I was not even in a position to break with it. I was opposed to the Party. I was opposed to its functionaries. That has nothing to do with National Socialism. Secondly, whether I was for or against National Socialism has, again, nothing to do with this document which we are referring to. This document shows quite clearly and explicitly that this ideology was used in order to strengthen the fighting spirit of the troops. It says here that the fighting spirit and the endurance of the troops is to be strengthened. I was convinced,--and I see again from the document, that I carried out this task at the time--that the Communist ideology had a terrific effect on the Russian soldiers. Since I was under the impression that an ideology is of extreme importance for the fighting strength of the soldier, then I had to use that ideology which was available at the time and which, besides, was the dominating ideology in Germany at that time, irrespective whether I am in favor of it or not.
In order to give you a trite example in another sphere: there were commanders who were opposed to the mortar, though they were in no position to replace the mortar by something else. Therefore, they could not take this instrument away from the troops but had to leave it with them. To conclude from this fact that they were particularly enthusiastic themselves about National Socialism, I don't think, would be justified. This ideology to me was merely a means to strengthen the fighting spirit of my men. And I would like to ask you here, could the German Army have endured these circumstances for four years if it had not been born by this ideology to a great extent? I believe that is quite clear and obvious. That has nothing to do with the question whether the ideology is a good one or a bad one. It is merely a question of expediency.
Q. Witness, I don't get it quite straight now, whether you are an opportunist or whether you still believe in the Nazi philosophy. Will you please straighten me out?
A. I don't think you can call it opportunism because only a person can be an opportunist who changes his mind with the situation as his own advantage demands it. In this case it was purely a question of expediency. I myself, if you ask for my opinion, today, have to say that there are some provisions in the program which are good without any doubt and which today are still in existence. But that, on the other hand, there is a large number of provisions which have to be objected to under all circumstances. There is one thing more I would like to say. If today I would become a General in Russia I would use all energy, to spread Communist ideology amongst my soldiers, and I would sponsor that ideology amongst them. Although today I am an open enemy of Communism, to give my troops the best ideology available, in the same way as, their loader. I had to give them the best weapons available.
Q. Witness, let's look now at NOKW 917, Exhibit 602. Witness, I have before me the service record of a certain General Josef Kuebler; said Kuebler served under your command twice. I have deliberately chosen this record because not less than 15 other general officers, excluding yourself, appraised the qualifications, efficiency, and character of this particular individual during a period from April 1942 to May 1945. Only one officer, besides yourself, has made any reference as to this officer's attitude towards National Socialism. You had the opportunity to appraise this officer twice within six months and you were the only one, with the exception, I believe, of General Konrad, way back in 1943, in January, who gave any rating as to Kuebler's Nazi attitude. Nobody did it after you, and only one officer did it one year before you. Will you explain that?
A. Of course I cannot explain why the others didn't do it but I can explain why I did it.
Q. That is all I want to know.
A. It had been ordered at the end of the year 1943 that into the record of every officer was to be entered his attitude towards the Party and State. The Party could have endorsed and did endorse such a demand. The purpose was to especially mark those officers who were not in sympathy with the Party. There was to be a distinction in the files between those officers who were Party sympathizers besides those who weren't. It had been ordered that this attitude should be expressed in the service record and it was done for that reason; but, not only those were considered National Socialist officers in their records, who did sympathize with the Party, but all got this mark because one would have harmed an officer by not adding this note to his service record. This was to prevent discrimination against persons who were not Party sympathizers. I have entered this remark into the service record of all officers without consideration of the fact whether or not I knew their attitude at all. I entered this note into the service record of an officer even if I was convinced that the contrary was the case.
Now, concerning this General Josef Kuebler, I was 100% convinced of the contrary and, everybody who knew Kuebler, knew that he grumbled and critized the Party. It was know through out the Army and in spite of this knowledge I entered that note into his service record. I further want to add that the service record was to express -- and especially -the so-called yearly certificates of service, dated 1 March -- the fact that these people were National Socialist followers. This certificate here is dated the 1st of March. All other remarks and notes which we see here are brief remarks which were made on the occasion of a transfer of the person concerned. For instance, we can see from this document Kuebler was a member of the 5th SS Corps on the 1st of March '44 and was then transferred to the 21st Corps with this division. His record had to contain a note as to the period between the last certificate and the date when he was transferred, but these notes did not necessarily have to contain any remark about the attitude towards Party and State. It was only necessary, as I have explained, in those certificates which were made out yearly and on the 1st of March of every year, irrespective of the fact whether the officer concerned remained with his unit or was transferred. All the certificates which you have here are so called interrim certificates; -- as they were called, -- and I can thus explain why the other certificates did not contain the remark about National Socialist attitude and the one dated the 1st of March did.
Q. Witness, will you now just tell me whether or not this document is another case where the reader cannot get the true meaning of the contents of this paper unless a double meaning has been properly explained. Is that another case of these documents?
A. I didn't quite understand what your question was driving at.
Q. Well, you told us that despite the fact that Kuebler was a well known Anti-Nazi, you bent over backwards to put down that he was a Nazi to not jeopardize his possible promotion or standing in the German Army and thus summarizing your statements you have made I am merely asking you whether or not this document is another case where the reader, like myself, cannot get the true meaning of the contents unless somebody who knows, like yourself, explains it to him.
A. Yes, you are quite right. Where this NS (National Socialism) entrance is concerned. By entering this remark into everybody's rating we countered the intent of the Party to split up the officer's corps in two groups and to discriminate against one of the groups and that was the only purpose of making notes to that effect.
Q. Witness, you stated during your direct examination that the OKW forbade you explicitly to use the military technical terms of Divisions, corps, and the like while referring to the Tito or Mikajlovic forces. You made that statement, didn't you?
A. Yes, and we also have an order to this effect amongst the documents.
Q. I am not doubting this. I merely want you to follow me.
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. You further stated, did you not, that the OKW wanted you to call them bands of bandits and the more fact that your headquarters for matters of local convenience referred to them, amongst yourselves, as divisions and corps, would not make them de facto or de jure divisions or corps. You made a statement to that effect, didn't you?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q Let me first ask you if it isn't just as well possible that the OKW ordered you to call these units bands and bandits to first of all avoid having to give to these forces a belligerent status. Couldn't that be also possible?
A No, I believe I can explain that from the development of the whole matter. I believe that Tito towards the beginning of 1943 started calling his units Divisions and Brigades and this designation was then taken over by our troops. It was used by them as well. It is the same, as for instance, if we consider the conditions in the regular army today we always use the expressions that the enemy uses. I would not say the Tenth Infantry Regiment is facing me but I would say instead, if the opponent designates this regiment as a rifle regiment, I would also say the Tenth Enemy Rifle Regiment, although in our meaning it would be an infantry regiment. Or where the Russians are concerned who had no infantry divisions but designated their infantry divisions as rifle divisions, we would say the Tenth or Twelfth Rifle Division is in a certain locality. It is a customary usage with the Army to apply the terms of the enemy and that is why we used the terms Divisions and Brigades when we were talking about the Partisans. That is what the OKW did not wait us to do and forbade us to use these terms. That I should think that it was forbidden because there should be no idea about these units being regular belligerents is too far-fetched and quite out of the question. The irregular status of these bands was sufficiently proved by other circumstances and it can never be eliminated by a mere designation and turned into a regular status. In any case I did not worry about these things at all from that point of view. The only reason why I did worry was because the OKW wanted to take away from these illegal formations the designations "divisions", and "brigades", etc. In any case the designations did not actually apply because what Tito called a division was about a body consisting of men using guns and machine guns, about 3,000 men strong.
In actual divisions it was composed of all kinds of weapons and is at least 10,000 to 12,000 men strong.
Q Witness, there is, however, another way one could look at that and I would like to get your statement. The OKW in full realization of the illegality of reprisal measures against these forces deliberately tried to indoctrinate the troops and the words at large with the idea that these forces were mere bandits and the OKW did this for the explicit purpose to give pseudo-legal orders the basis they needed to carry out their criminal intent. Why wouldn't that be also an approach one could take.
A Well, it takes quite a lot to be able to follow that line of thought. I shall try to do it.
Q Witness, if you are not in a position to answer it, of course you don't have to; I may recall to you, however, that during the direct examination you made quite a few profound statements about international law, the Hague Convention, and other things, I presume not only because you are a General and ought to know about these things -
JUDGE BURKE: Are you asking a question or delivering an address?
MR. RAPP: I am merely telling the witness not to answer if he doesn't know.
JUDGE BURKE: Ask the question and if the witness refuses to answer the Tribunal will admonish him to do so.
BY MR. RAPP:
Q Can you answer that question?
A I am only surprised because of your assertion that the OKW could have ever had the opinion that Tito's forces were legal belligerent forces. Now you go even further and you say that the OKW should have applied a trick to rob these forces of their legality by giving them different designations. It is quite out of the question that the OKW could for one single instance regard these forces as legal belligerents and it is also quite out of the question that anybody who was in the Balkans could have considered these forces legal forces.
Q Witness, the conclusion which you drew is that a fact of your own knowledge. Have you been at the OKW when they told you that, or is that only your own opinion?
A When I took over my post on the 6th of August that was put to me very clearly and explicitly.
Q Witness, you were asked why you did not consider the Tito and DM partisans as regular troops, you said, in short, that after the capitulation of Yugoslavian Army to the Germans nobody in Yugoslavia was legally entitled to bear arms against Germany or German forces. Did you make that statement?
A Yes, I said that.
Q Witness, as an intelligent man, and a doctor of law, professional soldier, did it ever occur to you that Germany was the aggressor nation which invaded Yugoslavia and parenthetically I may mention without provocation and this step alone put Germany and its armed forces outside of her protection, according to international law, because her act was criminal ad initio; can you say something to that?
A May I answer you as a soldier, as a jurist, and to what extent it will be intelligent I don't know; you, yourself, will have to be the judge of that. Let us start from the fact that Germany attacked Yugoslavia and that German troops occupied the Yugoslavian area. From the point of view of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare it is irrelevant whether Germany's war against Yugoslavia was a justified war or whether it was an unjustified war. From the point of view of the occupation of the country there is only one criteria and that is if the occupartion was de facto an occupation or not, a question of whether it was a legal one; that question is not put by international law. The occupation of a country is seen by the international law only from the point of view of the actual facts but not from the point of view of law and if the occupation has in actual fact been carried out then the provisions of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare are binding for the population.
This population is then obliged to keep quiet and peaceful and to obey the instructions and directives of the occupation powers, irrespective whether or not the occupation is a justified one or not. I can give you the reason for this because I have concerned myself a lot with these questions. International law to a large extent works with the conception "de facto" and not with the conception "de jure" because otherwise these provisions would get too uncertain. The conception of legality, the "de jure" conception, would constantly make difficulties and would constantly be open to discussion about its interpretation. If as a basis of a legal concept, as the mentioned rules for land warfare, I demand a mere fact, then the legal certainty of these provisions will be much higher.
Q. I will talk to you somewhat later about Article 42 of the Hague Convention which you have reference to. Right now I would like to talk to you merely about that part of the question which deals with the surrender of the Yugoslav Army, as it was actually historically; now, isn't it true that the forces which surrendered, or the individual which surrendered, on the part of the Yugoslavs was not the elected government of Yugoslavia, isn't that a fact? Maybe you know the person as well as I do who signed these agreements with the German invader?
A. Of all of these events I know nothing, except what I heard here during this trial. From earlier days all I know is the fact that the war took place, and that the Armistice was concluded. Everything else that took place around these facts I know nothing of.
Q. In other words, you are not prepared to answer that question?
A. I would be prepared and I would be delighted to answer it, but I don't know the facts.
Q. Witness, when you arrived in the Southeast Theater the order for reprisal measures against the Tito and Mihajlovic forces was already passed down, was it not?
A. Yes, that order was already with the troops.
Q. You said further during your testimony that it would be impossible for a Commander in Chief of an Army to cancel a Fuehrer Order or countermand it, I think would be a better word; did you make that statement?
A. It is impossible to render it invalid. To countermand it in a certain respect is possible in some instances.
Q. Witness, I would like you now to take a look at Document Book II, NOKW 258, Exhibit 53 ---
For your Honors convenience I repeat again, Document Book II, NOKW 258, Exhibit 53, page 67 in the English. I do not know the German page - German page 52.
JUDGE BURKE: Because of the number of the Document Books there may be a little time required between the reference and locating them.
MR. RAPP: Certainly, your Honor. I will take that into consideration.
Q. Witness, I have handed you a photostat copy of this particular NOKW Document 258, which we have reference to; now this is the Reprisal Order dated September 16, 1941. Will you explain to us, witness, why you referred to this order as a Fuehrer Order rather than a Keitel or an OKW order; in your direct examination you referred to this particular order as a Fuehrer Befehl. It doesn't seem to me to be a Fuehrer Befehl?
A. All these orders were Fuehrer orders because Keitel did not order these things from his own initiative. Furthermore we have the sentence here, "The Fuehrer has now ordered" that is the second sentence in the second paragraph. "The Fuehrer has now ordered that most stringent measures are to be applied everywhere in order to break down this movement in the shortest the possible, the following measures are to be applied." That is quite clearly and obviously a Fuehrer order.
Q. Now, witness we know that all orders in the German Army could be considered Fuehrer Orders, but you have seen during your service in the Army, and in this Court room, specific Fuehrer orders, for instance, the Commando Order signed by Hitler. This is an order which Keitel has signed, is it not?
A. Yes, according to the form Keitel has signed it, but according to the contents this order is a Hitler order. It can even be been from the test of the order. Keitel has issued dozens of orders, orders of an organizational nature, orders concerning the strength of some units; new leave regulations for the armed forces, and similar things. Those are orders which Keitel has signed, and of which Hitler didn't know anything but this one here is purely and clearly a Hitler order, and it was always regarded as such.
Q. Now, witness it is a fact, however, that Hitler in this particular instance did not sign the order, nor does the order state "By order of the Fuehrer, the following is to be done," the way, for instance, the Commando Order reads?
A. Yes, that is no longer necessary, because if it says in the text of the Order "the Fuehrer has now ordered", etc. etc., that there would also be an additional sentence "On order of the Fuehrer."
Q. In addition to this, witness, you referred also to the service regulation pertaining to the item against partisans which was published jointly by the WFST of the OKW, and the OPI of the OKW, and in that same sentence you tried to convoy the impression that this was also a binding Fuehrer Order which no Commander of an Army would cancel or countermand. Will you explain that, please?
A. That assertion is also correct. I know how this regulation devoloped. It was drawn up on Hitler's insistance. The regulation was submitted to Hitler. Hitler rejected it, and personally made changes. All the very strong sentences that are contained in this regulation are made by Hitler personally. Then he took the draft, gave it to Jodl and ordered him to issue it the way it was. Jodi signed it, and thus the regulation was issued. General Buttlar must be able to confirm this, because he helped on the draft.
Q. I presume you were there when Hitler did that?
A. No, I had nothing to do with the OKW at that time, but it was told to me in this way. This directive is under all conditions a socalled Hitler directive.
Q. But that is not apparent from the booklet as such is it, unless one knows the background which you have just given us?
A. Well, I can't say that at the moment whether you can see it from the booklet or not. I only believe that Jodi signed it, but this directive was never regarded as anything but a Hitler directive. It is quite impossible that Jodl, from his own initiative, would order things as are contained in this order, because that is the strongest regulation that one could possibly imagine. It is impossible that Jodl ordered: "Every captured bandit is to be shot."
THE PRESIDENT: General, may I interrupt? In your reference to Jodl are you referring to this Exhibit 53, which apparently was signed by Keitel, or are you mistaken in that?
THE WITNESS: No, I am no longer referring to this exhibit. I am referring to the service regulations against band warfare.
THE PRESIDENT: Some other exhibit?
THE WITNESS: Yes, that is a different exhibit. That is right.
JUDGE BURKE: We will take our usual recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: Court will be in recess for 15 minutes.
(Thereupon a 15-minute recess was taken.)
Q. Witness, prior to the recess we were talking about the service instructions pertaining to the fighting against partisans, and you stated that you are sure that this particular instruction is that amount to a Fuehrer Order; I would like to ask you now whether or not such statements on your part can be readily seen when one looks at this booklet, and for this purpose I have bought one with me now to refresh your memory, and will give it to you now. I would like you to tell me whether or not in this booklet there is any reference to Hitler, the Fuehrer?
DR. FRITSCH: If the Tribunal, please, may I ask first of all whether this booklet is submitted here as evidence or what the purpose of this is?
MR. RAPP: I am not offering this at all as evidence. I am merely trying to refresh the witnesses memory. He has made a statement under oath, and I am trying to protect him from possibly making an erroneous statement without the aid of the book I am making reference to. I am not intending putting in into evidence.
DR. FRITSCH: Then I might ask that this booklet be more closely described, so that the record will show what this booklet is about.
MR. RAPP: I intended to do that anyhow at the proper time.
JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed.
Q. Now, witness, will you, please, first read the title of this particular booklet, and the agency within the German Armed Forces which was responsible for its publication as printed on the cover of this booklet?
A. The regulation is called "Directives how to Fight the Bands in the East." The agency which issued it is the OKW, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
Q. I would like to ask you if this is the booklet you had reference to or not?
A. Yes, it is the same booklet.
Q. What is its date of publication, witness?
A. November 11, 1942.
Q. Now, do you still say that this booklet is a Fuehrer order?
A. From this booklet from the way it is in form here, it does not emerge definitely. But the OKW, the Supreme Command of the German forces, is not an agency which issued orders; it is simply Hitler's Staff, and that is the issuing agency of these regulations. This could not have done without Hitler's order, according to general German principles, and if we look at certain pecularities of the text, for instance on page 31, if I can read it rightly there. The pagination isn't here, but I shall read what I have:
"When treating with bandits and their voluntary helpers extreme harshness is indicated. Any sentimental considerations are to be spared in these decisive questions. They would be irresponsible. Even the harshness of the measures and fear of punishment to be expected must deter the population, etc."
That is not the language used by Jodl who is such a soft-hearted character. That is the sort of language which comes from Hitler. Should Buttlar tell you the history of how this book originated you will find that especially in the field of treatment of bandits the draft was full of deletions and additions, made by Hitler. He was deeply interested in these regulations. It goes without saying that this is a Hitler order and we never looked on it as anything else.
Q Witness, if I understand you right, firstly, inasmuch as Hitler was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Germany nothing could be done within the German Armed Forces which was not openly or by innuendo ordered by Hitler; secondly, nobody in Germany could use such strong language besides Hitler. Am I right in drawing that out of your statement?
A Well, both statements are certainly not correct because there are sufficient orders in the German Army which are not based on Hitler and I am sure there were people who in particularly critical moments would have spoken at least as strongly as that if not more strongly. I can easily imagine that.
Q Do you want to say, witness, that all the criminal orders go back to Hitler but all the orders which are not criminal they are issued by the officers corps?
A First you should state what order is being called criminal here. I do not know what I am to understand by a criminal order.
Q We will cover that during the afternoon if you want to save the answer to this particular question. How far do you go along by saying that nobody but Hitler could use such strong language which you had reference ot or wanted to prove -- rather, the fact that this is a Hitler order because this language was used?