And did von Weichs order the shooting of General Roncaglia?
A I have already said that I do not remember anything about this. I don't remember that I ever received any order to this effect from Field Marshal von Weichs or that I ever discussed anything like this with him, and I would like to state that such order would not have been issued at all but the order would have run, "This man is to be shot if he cannot be taken away", and it has been proved that he was taken away.
Q Did Field Marshal von Weichs order the shooting of officers belonging to the Bergamo Division?
A No, never.
Q And now with regard to the evacuations; did the Army Group order the evacuation Panther?
A No, the Army Group had no knowledge at all of this operation, but it could only have learned about the fact that the operation had been carried out by reason of a daily report.
Q General, do you agree with the Army Group, that is Field Marshal von Weichs, that there was a military necessity to evacuate the Dalmatian Islands?
A This was such a matter of course that there could not be the slightest difference of opinion.
Q And now a few questions of another nature; did the Army Group issue orders for the deportation of Balkan inhabitants to the Reich?
A I don't know any single order about this at all.
Q Did you receive orders from the Army Group with regard to concentration camps or collection camps?
A No. I do not remember any order at all with regard to this matter.
Q And with regard to the treatment of Jews in the Balkans?
A Certainly no order came and could not come about this, because there were scarcely any Jews in my area.
Q And did the Commander in chief Southeast worry very much about details in the command situation of the 2nd Panzer -Army?
A No, Field Marshal von Weichs did not intervene in these matters on principle. He was of much too generous a nature for this.
Q And now one final question, General; in the field of reprisal meatures, treatment of Italians, Commando Orders, evacuations, did the Army Group ever issue more stringent measures that is more stringent measures than the OKW ordered?
A The Army Group never passed on an OKW order in marmorerstringent way.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
JUDGE BURKE: Are there further questions by defense counsel?
DR. GROSS: Gross, deputizing for Dr. Tipp, for the defendant von Leyser.
BY DR. GROSS:
Q General, I have just one very short question to put to you, which merely concerns a correction in the record. The Prosecution on the 6th of August when offering the 14th Document Book, Document Book 14, submitted Document NOKW-788, Exhibit 390; this is a teletype of the 15th Mountain Corps to the 69th Reserve Corps, the contents of which are of no interest here, and during the submission of this document, as can be seen from the record -- I am referring to page 1510 in the English and page 1514 in the German Document Book -- the Prosecution stated the following: "This is a teletype from the 15th Mountain Corps to the 69th Reserve Corps, one of the units subordinate to it" and with regard to this I would like to ask this question: Was the 69th Reserve Corps ever subordinate to the 15th Mountain Corps?
A No, the 69th Reserve Corps was never subordinate to the 15th Mountain Corps. The two corps were on absolutely the same level.
Q On the part of the Commanding General of the 15th Mountain Corps there can therefore never have existed any responsibility for events in the 69th Reserve Corps General, if I understand you correctly?
A No, such a responsibility can never have existed.
DR. GROSS: I have no further questions.
MR. RAPP: If Your Honor, please, I understood defense counsel making reference to Document Book XIV, NOKW-788. Just in order to set the record straight he also referred, I "believe, to Document Exhibit 390; unfortunately, I don't find this reference in Document Book XIY. It seems to me that Exhibit 390 would bring us up around Document Book 15 or 16. I would like to have defense counsel check that, please.
It is Document Book 16, Your Honor. It is Document Book 16, Exhibit 390.
JUDGE BURKE: What is the exhibit number, please?
DR. GROSS: 390.
JUDGE BURKE: Very well. The record is straight. Any further questions on the part of defense counsel? If not, you may proceed, Mr. Rapp, with the cross-examination.
MR. RAPP: Thank you, Your Honor.
CROSS -EXAMINATION BY MR. RAPP:
Q Witness, you told us that you joined the Nazi Party in May 1932 and remained a member of that party until 1933, is that correct?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q Will you tell us now whether or not you left the Nazi Party voluntarily, or was your separation from the Nazi Party dictated by the fact that the Austrian Nazi Party was to be considered illegal and was dissolved at that time?
A Yes, I was relieved of this decision because the party was dissolved and as a result the voluntariness or non-voluntariness of it did not come into the question.
Q Witness, I asked you very plainly whether you left it voluntarily or whether your separation from that party coincided with the dissolvement of that party; there can only be one answer to that question.
A Yes, of course, the separation from the party coincided with its dissolution.
Q Thank you, witness. Will you tell us whether or not you would have left the Nazi Party at that time already had it not been dissolved?
A Perhaps not at this time, but later on certainly. I would like to repeal that then there was no reason to turn away from the Party.
Q. As reason for joining the Nazi Party you cited the fact that this party was based on the principles of positive Christianity. At least, you mentioned this particular point as one of the main reasons of your joining. Am I correct?
A. No, it isn't correct in that sense. The reasons for my joining the Party were different and I have already stated them. There was the doubt in possibility of existence for Austria and then the excesses of the Dollfuss dictator regime. I only mentioned the provisions of the Party Program, that the Party stood on the basis of positive Christianity as a reason for my being reassured with regard to the carrying out of Party ideas that did not find my approval. I mentioned these provisions of the Party Program, the fact that the Party stood on the basis of Party Christianity, as a guarantee for the fact that when the program was carried out not very much could happen which was in opposition to those fundamentals.
Q. Now, witness, in your testimony on the 28th of October 1947 before this Tribunal you stated that the cardinal point for your joining the Nazi Party was because the Party Program or the Party as such represented positive Christianity. Did you make that statement or not?
A. No, that is an error. I stated that I was of course not in agreement with all points of the Party Program but for me -- that is, in reference to the judgment of the Party Program -- this point was the cardinal point. This really must be seen from the text of this statement.
Q. Very well, witness, that is the very fact which I have asked you. Now, I have before me the program of the National Socialistic German Labor Party, the NSDAP, and in this particular program the party is quoting the famous 25 points. You have heard of these 25 points have you not?
A. Yes, but I don't remember them all.
Q. But you have heard of them?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, I will read to you two points from this program. I will read thorn to you in German. "A citizen, a member of the state, can only be a Volksgenosse, a Volksgenosse can only be a man who is of German blood without any regard to his religion. No Jew, therefore, can be a Volksgenosse." And the second quotation: "We demand the liberty of all religions within the state as far as they do not endanger it or as far as they do not oppose the feelings of decency or feelings of morals of the German people."
Witness, will you now explain to us how those two aforementioned authentic quotations from the Party program are compatible with your statement that the Party represented positive Christianity?
A. The first point which you mentioned deals with the so--called Jewish problem. Nobody thought that this problem could come to any kind of complete carrying out, at any rate not in the year 1933, and least of all could one think of all of the ways in which this matter was finally carried out.
The question of how far this compatible with Christianity did not arise but the Provisions of the Party Program with regard to Christianity I regarded as a reason for the Christian execution of the Party Program, because these provisions do not contradict the first provision at all , I mean, do you think there is anything definite unchristian in a point if it says: "Only a Volksgenosse can be a citizen--"? This is political non sense, but it isn't unchristian. It hasn't anything to do with religious questions.
Q. Now, witness, I won't pursue this point any longer. I just wanted to get your point of view into the record.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: That is where all testimony goes ultimately.
Q. Witness, defense counsel asked you whether or not you rejoined the Nazi Party at a later time when it was supposedly desired that officers join the Nazi Party.
Will you tell us which well known officers of the German Army when you, know have joined the Nazi Party as a result of this alleged desire by the German government that they join the Party.
A. I can't tell you any names.
Q. Witness, you told us a lot about your fights, if one can call then that, you had with such well known Nazis as Kasche, Terbo ven, Koch and others. Will you tell us now which other general of equal or higher rank than yours known to you dared at any time to oppose Nazi bigwigs of that caliber in the political field?
A. Yes, I know that, for instance, General Reinhardt, when ho gave over the Army Group North to mo, told me that he had continual differences with Gauleiter Koch but that up until then he hadn't been able to cope with him and, therefore, there was always disputes between those two. When I took over Army Group South from General Woehler he told me that he was also in a state of hostility with the Gauleiters in that area then and that they made great difficulties. My predecessor in Norway, von Falkenhorst, was on quite good terms with Gerboven but he also didn't give in to him in all respects. The way in which the struggle was carried out is of course a matter of temperament. I, on principle handled those people as they deserved it and in away conformative with their own nature; that is, I handled these people sometimes in a rather brutal manner. And that gives you the cue for your next question.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The Tribunal will stand adjourned until one-thirty this afternoon.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will recess until 1330 hours.
(THE TRIBUNAL ADJOURNED UNTIL 1330 HOURS.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours 31 October 1947)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may continue, Mr. Rapp.
LOTHAR RENDULIC - Resumed CROSS EXAMINATION - Continued BY MR. RAPP:
Q. Witness, before the recess you told us in answer to my question that on several occasions you dared even in a brutal way, to quote your own words, opposing certain German Nazi leaders. Did anything happen to you as a result of your attitude in Germany with the exception of the one time that you lost your assignment in Norway on account of Terboven?
A. No, I expected at any moment that some measure would be taken against me, especially at the time when the whole affair in Croatia started. I remarked to this effect to surrounding officers. I told them come what may my luggage is always ready for me to take off. I would have welcomed it if I had been in a position to retire to my country estate. However, it never got that far.
Q. Looking at it from a time factor you got bigger and better assignments all the time as the years went on, did you not? For instance, when you left Norway you had an army and you were an Armed Forces Commander. You had several army groups after that. When you got to Croatia in 1943 you told us you were nothing else but a Three Star General despite the fact that the Four Star General rank should have been given to you at least within thirty days from the day that you received the command over the 2nd Panzer Army. You started a quarrel with Kasche right away but you were promoted anyhow, were you not? Will you please explain to us some of these things?
A. I have in actual fact had quite a number of high ranking assignments. I have commanded in my time three army groups but you mustn't think that this was awarded to me. It was nothing but a particular burden because I received all these new assignments under the most difficult conditions.
So that I was finally convinced that I was tried in difficult situations and therefore was used when the situations became difficult, for reasons of expediency.
I would like to give you a few examples. When I took over the Army Group in East Prussia the order read: "The Army Group has for weeks been on retreat. It can no longer be stopped. It is not unified; one army has been separated from the rest. Koenigsberg is in extreme danger." The order read: "Stop the retreat of the Army Group and hold Koenigsberg." Such an order in such a situation could only be given only to somebody of whom one could be sure that he would be able to solve the problems at hand, In time I became convinced that, in spite of my opposition against the Party and its functionaries, I was only kept in my position because I was needed there.
I know of one remark that Hitler made which I do not want to state here, however, because the man who told me about it is no longer alive and, therefore, I cannot prove that this remark was actually made. But I did gain the conviction that I was only kept in my position because I was suitable for all the tasks that were at hand at the time. I did not enjoy all privileges which usually go together with great achievements. Commander in Chief, who was in special favor of the Party, got for a battle that was almost lost, the diamonds to the Oak leaves and besides he was promoted. I was neither promoted in all those assignments nor did I get more than one decoration which was awarded to me immediately at the beginning. Nothing else was awarded to me. I was merely made use of because I was suitable and I was needed and I never received any thanks from anybody. All I had were the disadvantages which I began to feel here in Nurnberg.
Q. Witness, neverless, you did, as a matter of fact, enjoy the Fuehrer's confidence. Hitler's motives why he best owed you with such confidence may be for any reason you cite. Is that correct?
A. Yes. I was under the impression that I enjoyed Hitler's confidence because of the fact that I was suitable for certain assignments and because of my achievements in the sphere of military leadership.
That became even more important and significant because the Reich, around that time, found itself in increasingly difficult military situations which sometimes were quite hopeless.
Q. Witness, you say that these advancements or assignments were based according to your own impression, on your technical ability and knowledge of warfare. Isn't it true that there were a great number of people in the German army who were as good soldiers as you were -- some of them even held higher ranks -- who already were retired in 1942 never be called back and, in addition to this, men who had never ventured to step outside their military role into the political field as you did? Will you explain that?
A. First of all I would like to correct an error on your part. I did not enter the political sphere at all. From May, 1932, for thirteen months, I was a member of the Party, and I did not do anything particular, and I did not have any achievement in that sphere.
Q. Will you permit me to interrupt you one minute to explain to you what I meant by "political activities" to possibly forestall that you answer differently than what I intended to ask you. I meant your arguments you had with well-known political figures of Germany - Kasche, Terboven, and Koch. In other words, activities which are usually not part of the mission or assignment of a General charged with a tactical mission. That is what I had reference to.
A. Yes, of course I can explain that. My assignments were always in the border areas of the Reich, beginning with the Balkans up to the extreme North of Lappland. I did not go there because of my own will, make contact with the political representatives of the Reich, I was forced to oppose them, and I had to oppose them because, on principle, I had to counter the excesses of the political functionaries there. These excesses invaded my own sphere. For instance, if Kasche had not made difficulties for me with the Croatian Government, when I endeavored to deter this government from the persecution of the Pravoslavs, then I would possibly have visited him once or twice, and that would have been the end of my contact with Kasche. If the Reich Commissar Terboven would not have denounced the Army because they had not carried out the first evacuation order, and if he had not interfered in Army affairs, if he had not been an impediment for me through his policy, if he had not prevented me from getting into good relations with the Norwegian population, then I would have had no differences of opinion with Terboven. And the same applies to all the other instances. Therefore, I was forced to this opposition against them people because of my tasks, because I would never stand for anybody's preventing me from carrying out my tasks.
Q. Witness, could it be possible that your education, your background, your vocation which you chose yourself -- I am talking about that of an attorney --, your Austrian extraction, and the fact that you were especially chosen to solve such questions like the political affairs in the Balkans, being familiar with them and being a student of history -rather than telling us that these tasks were given to you without taking any of these elements into consideration?
Could you tell us something about that?
A. That is out of the question because on the occasion of my assignment, let us say in the Balkans or in Norway, nobody, not even myself, knew or could know that I would see myself forced to deal with the political functionaries in these areas and to oppose them. When I was assigned there, undoubtedly only the military tasks were considered.
Q. In other words, Witness, you state that your success, if one can call it that way, was based entirely on your achievements as a soldier, but that any political considerations were merely of an incidental nature, and you were merely concerned with doing your duty as a soldier. Am I correct in understanding you that way?
A. Yes, that is a matter of course, What I say myself forced to do because of my military tasks I did only in order to be in a better position to fulfill my tasks and to eliminate everything that prevented me from fulfilling my tasks.
Q. Witness, did you consider yourself a politically minded individual?
A. Well, I would have to know what you mean by this term.
Q. Very well. Were you a General whose hobby was to daub around in politics?
A. No, on the contrary. In my assignments, just because they had to be carried out in these difficult situations, I found so much work that I considered this political battle an unpleasant addition, and it was certainly not out of pleasure that I waged this political battle. You may well imagine that if I had no difficulties in Croatia with Kasche or in other countries through the other functionaries, that it would have been a much better and easier life, if I had not had to use my efforts and my time on these tasks which were actually outside my sphere.
Q. Witness, from what time on did you come into conflict -- I mean did you oppose the Nazi philosophy and the way it was carried out in the Reich? From what year on approximately?
A. I was in no position to fight and oppose the ideology as such. How could I have done that? Then, I would have to have the press at my disposal or would have had to be able to influence the public in some other form.
Q. I presume my question was not clear. What I wanted to say was, from what time on were you not any longer personally in agreement with what Hitler was doing? That is what I meant.
A. That should have been as of the year 1936 and the last jolt was given by experiencing the party in Austria.
Q. In judging officers under your command what guide rule did you affix. In other words, what were the points that these officers had to have to be considered good officers in your judgment?
A. First of all they had to have military ability and the corresponding character. But also they had to be in a position to counter exaggerated ideas with which their people might have been approached, and they must be able to guide them properly, because our men were, after all, constantly exposed to exaggerated comments on the part of the National Socialists.
Q. Witness, did you ever sponsor this National Socialistic doctrine in connection in instituting a National Socialistic leadership course in your Army?
A. I did not support these officers beyond the extent which was ordered by the OKW. I tried to influence the spirit of these officers to the effect that in the education of the men they should, by no means, leave the ground of moderation. And for this reason, of course, I was interested in them, as I had to be interested in every installation of the Army.
Q. Witness, was it, in your opinion, essential that your officers were inbued with proper Nazi philosophy to carry on successfully against the enemy? 5377
A. Every soldier has to be imbued in the one ideology. That was a conviction which I gained when I was still a young officer. When in 1914 we went to war we were lucky enough not to need any political ideoloy, because everything that filled us -- every political ideal -- was summarized in the one word "Emperor." The whole Army had been educated in this sense, as well in Austria and Hungary,--the Army to which I belonged--as in Germany, and as far as I know in Italy. And this idea filled the soldiers of the Austria-Hungarian Army which was comprised of eleven nations. It kept this Army together during a four-year war, without Himmler and without anything like a Gestapo and without any Party. When this ideal was no longer there, something else had to take its place, and these were ideologies. My second great experience in this respect was during the war in Russia. Only the education in the Bolshevist meaning, which was able to make the people fanatics and which was particularly represented by the Commissar, this ideology saved, in 1941, the Russian Army from destruction. In Russia the Commissar was created, and this was the greatest achievement which Bolshevism achieved up to the year 1941. And this, --which is not only my opinion,--supports the conviction that every soldier needs an ideology in order to be able to see any meaning in a difficult struggle. He needs something to fall back on ideologically in difficult situations. It does not matter what kind of an ideology it is. Ideologies come and go, but if one has to be used, then only the very one which is at hand can be used. A new one cannot be created.
Q. Now, Witness, since you have put patriotism and Nazi ideology on the same denominator let us look at a document to see how you expressed that in words at the time. I would now like to offer Document NOKW-021 as Prosecution Exhibit 601. Let me read some of these parts to you, witness. First of all, you were the Commander in Chief, which this document has reference to were you not?
A. Yes, I was. Commander-in-Chief attends the lecture by Captain Rinck on sea war, air war and foreign politics. After that he himself once again instructed the people attending the course as to their tasks and prepares them for the fact that their sphere of duties soon will extend to an entirely different area.
Starting with the great significance of the Commissar in the Russian Army who essentially can be made responsible for the fighting strength and the endurance of the Russians, the Commander-in-Chief indicates that in the near future the so-called "maintenance of the troops" (Truppenbetreuung) will also move in this direction. The resistance and striking power of the troops is derived not only from their weapons but it is at least to an equal extent derived from a psychological attitude toward the fight. A correct attitude can be achieved only by educating each individual to National Socialism."
Q. Witness, first of all, you told us that sometime in 1938, I believe after the annexation of Austria, you, for yourself, at least, broke with National Socialism. The least I could ask you now is whether, in the light of that statement, you have made, it was necessary to lecture your troops rather eloquently in 1943 on these subjects. And will you please explain that?
A. I can do that very easily. I said that I had broken with the Party. What I mean is that I was not even in a position to break with it. I was opposed to the Party. I was opposed to its functionaries. That has nothing to do with National Socialism. Secondly, whether I was for or against National Socialism has, again, nothing to do with this document which we are referring to. This document shows quite clearly and explicitly that this ideology was used in order to strengthen the fighting spirit of the troops. It says here that the fighting spirit and the endurance of the troops is to be strengthened. I was convinced,--and I see again from the document, that I carried out this task at the time--that the Communist ideology had a terrific effect on the Russian soldiers. Since I was under the impression that an ideology is of extreme importance for the fighting strength of the soldier, then I had to use that ideology which was available at the time and which, besides, was the dominating ideology in Germany at that time, irrespective whether I am in favor of it or not.
In order to give you a trite example in another sphere: there were commanders who were opposed to the mortar, though they were in no position to replace the mortar by something else. Therefore, they could not take this instrument away from the troops but had to leave it with them. To conclude from this fact that they were particularly enthusiastic themselves about National Socialism, I don't think, would be justified. This ideology to me was merely a means to strengthen the fighting spirit of my men. And I would like to ask you here, could the German Army have endured these circumstances for four years if it had not been born by this ideology to a great extent? I believe that is quite clear and obvious. That has nothing to do with the question whether the ideology is a good one or a bad one. It is merely a question of expediency.
Q. Witness, I don't get it quite straight now, whether you are an opportunist or whether you still believe in the Nazi philosophy. Will you please straighten me out?
A. I don't think you can call it opportunism because only a person can be an opportunist who changes his mind with the situation as his own advantage demands it. In this case it was purely a question of expediency. I myself, if you ask for my opinion, today, have to say that there are some provisions in the program which are good without any doubt and which today are still in existence. But that, on the other hand, there is a large number of provisions which have to be objected to under all circumstances. There is one thing more I would like to say. If today I would become a General in Russia I would use all energy, to spread Communist ideology amongst my soldiers, and I would sponsor that ideology amongst them. Although today I am an open enemy of Communism, to give my troops the best ideology available, in the same way as, their loader. I had to give them the best weapons available.
Q. Witness, let's look now at NOKW 917, Exhibit 602. Witness, I have before me the service record of a certain General Josef Kuebler; said Kuebler served under your command twice. I have deliberately chosen this record because not less than 15 other general officers, excluding yourself, appraised the qualifications, efficiency, and character of this particular individual during a period from April 1942 to May 1945. Only one officer, besides yourself, has made any reference as to this officer's attitude towards National Socialism. You had the opportunity to appraise this officer twice within six months and you were the only one, with the exception, I believe, of General Konrad, way back in 1943, in January, who gave any rating as to Kuebler's Nazi attitude. Nobody did it after you, and only one officer did it one year before you. Will you explain that?
A. Of course I cannot explain why the others didn't do it but I can explain why I did it.
Q. That is all I want to know.
A. It had been ordered at the end of the year 1943 that into the record of every officer was to be entered his attitude towards the Party and State. The Party could have endorsed and did endorse such a demand. The purpose was to especially mark those officers who were not in sympathy with the Party. There was to be a distinction in the files between those officers who were Party sympathizers besides those who weren't. It had been ordered that this attitude should be expressed in the service record and it was done for that reason; but, not only those were considered National Socialist officers in their records, who did sympathize with the Party, but all got this mark because one would have harmed an officer by not adding this note to his service record. This was to prevent discrimination against persons who were not Party sympathizers. I have entered this remark into the service record of all officers without consideration of the fact whether or not I knew their attitude at all. I entered this note into the service record of an officer even if I was convinced that the contrary was the case.
Now, concerning this General Josef Kuebler, I was 100% convinced of the contrary and, everybody who knew Kuebler, knew that he grumbled and critized the Party. It was know through out the Army and in spite of this knowledge I entered that note into his service record. I further want to add that the service record was to express -- and especially -the so-called yearly certificates of service, dated 1 March -- the fact that these people were National Socialist followers. This certificate here is dated the 1st of March. All other remarks and notes which we see here are brief remarks which were made on the occasion of a transfer of the person concerned. For instance, we can see from this document Kuebler was a member of the 5th SS Corps on the 1st of March '44 and was then transferred to the 21st Corps with this division. His record had to contain a note as to the period between the last certificate and the date when he was transferred, but these notes did not necessarily have to contain any remark about the attitude towards Party and State. It was only necessary, as I have explained, in those certificates which were made out yearly and on the 1st of March of every year, irrespective of the fact whether the officer concerned remained with his unit or was transferred. All the certificates which you have here are so called interrim certificates; -- as they were called, -- and I can thus explain why the other certificates did not contain the remark about National Socialist attitude and the one dated the 1st of March did.
Q. Witness, will you now just tell me whether or not this document is another case where the reader cannot get the true meaning of the contents of this paper unless a double meaning has been properly explained. Is that another case of these documents?
A. I didn't quite understand what your question was driving at.
Q. Well, you told us that despite the fact that Kuebler was a well known Anti-Nazi, you bent over backwards to put down that he was a Nazi to not jeopardize his possible promotion or standing in the German Army and thus summarizing your statements you have made I am merely asking you whether or not this document is another case where the reader, like myself, cannot get the true meaning of the contents unless somebody who knows, like yourself, explains it to him.
A. Yes, you are quite right. Where this NS (National Socialism) entrance is concerned. By entering this remark into everybody's rating we countered the intent of the Party to split up the officer's corps in two groups and to discriminate against one of the groups and that was the only purpose of making notes to that effect.
Q. Witness, you stated during your direct examination that the OKW forbade you explicitly to use the military technical terms of Divisions, corps, and the like while referring to the Tito or Mikajlovic forces. You made that statement, didn't you?
A. Yes, and we also have an order to this effect amongst the documents.
Q. I am not doubting this. I merely want you to follow me.
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. You further stated, did you not, that the OKW wanted you to call them bands of bandits and the more fact that your headquarters for matters of local convenience referred to them, amongst yourselves, as divisions and corps, would not make them de facto or de jure divisions or corps. You made a statement to that effect, didn't you?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q Let me first ask you if it isn't just as well possible that the OKW ordered you to call these units bands and bandits to first of all avoid having to give to these forces a belligerent status. Couldn't that be also possible?
A No, I believe I can explain that from the development of the whole matter. I believe that Tito towards the beginning of 1943 started calling his units Divisions and Brigades and this designation was then taken over by our troops. It was used by them as well. It is the same, as for instance, if we consider the conditions in the regular army today we always use the expressions that the enemy uses. I would not say the Tenth Infantry Regiment is facing me but I would say instead, if the opponent designates this regiment as a rifle regiment, I would also say the Tenth Enemy Rifle Regiment, although in our meaning it would be an infantry regiment. Or where the Russians are concerned who had no infantry divisions but designated their infantry divisions as rifle divisions, we would say the Tenth or Twelfth Rifle Division is in a certain locality. It is a customary usage with the Army to apply the terms of the enemy and that is why we used the terms Divisions and Brigades when we were talking about the Partisans. That is what the OKW did not wait us to do and forbade us to use these terms. That I should think that it was forbidden because there should be no idea about these units being regular belligerents is too far-fetched and quite out of the question. The irregular status of these bands was sufficiently proved by other circumstances and it can never be eliminated by a mere designation and turned into a regular status. In any case I did not worry about these things at all from that point of view. The only reason why I did worry was because the OKW wanted to take away from these illegal formations the designations "divisions", and "brigades", etc. In any case the designations did not actually apply because what Tito called a division was about a body consisting of men using guns and machine guns, about 3,000 men strong.