A. They were members of the Gergamo division and without doubt had been found guilty for the illegal conduct of that division, which had caused us many losses.
Q. Now look again at Exhibit 237, the last page showed - it is on page 80 in the English book and 63 in the German, this is the written message by the 7th SS Division, addressed to the XV Mountain army corps - these 45 officers.
A. Here they report that another 45 Italian officers were shot after a summary Courts Martial. This term, "another 45" or "an additional 45" refers to the three mentioned before. It should be stated here that three officers were sentenced to death in absentia.
Q. witness, in volume 25 there is exhibit 579, NOKW 1747 on page 8 of the German and page 9 of the English. I have just handed you this document and there once again reference is made to three officers sentenced to death in absentia: are these the same three or are they other officers?
A. They are the same officers, who were mentioned in the earlier document and this becomes quiet unmistakable from the documents.
Q. And once again in volume 13 on page 53 there is in exhibits 326 and 328 on page 82 of the English book and in exhibit 331 on page 98 of the English book, reference is made to a figure of 45 officers; are these the same officers again?
A. They are all the same ones.
Q. Will you please look at page 64 in volume 13, which is on page 82 in the English book, this is exhibit 328. This exhibit deals with the final report on the legal aspects of the Split matter in paragraph 3 of that report the sentence of 9 additional officers in mentioned; what is the background of that?
A. I cannot remember anything at all about that. It can only have been a similar affair as the others, bearing in mind the limitations which I had ordered. The report also quotes a daily report which I have not found in the documents, therefore I am not able to say anything about those nine.
Q. In paragraph 5 of this report of the XV Army Corps .. who at that time was commanded by General Lueters; the Headquarters of 2nd Panzer Army is asked and I quote: "To confirm this verdict of the Summary Courts Martial." Did you have the possibility of confirming a sentence in that manner?
A. No, this request is entirely incorrect because sentences reached by Court Martials are to be confirmed by the division commander, according to the regulations and I, myself, would have been in no position to confirm a sentence because it would not have been my business. The report also shows that this final report is submitted after the sentences had been carried out, therefore they must have become legally valid previously.
Q. Let me interpolate a question here; what sort of sentences did you have to confirm?
A. Only those sentences were to be confirmed which had been reached by normal Courts Martial. A Court Martial existed with the army and with every division. Sentences reached by Courts Martial of the divisions had to be confirmed by the divisional commander unless they entailed sentences of more than five years hard labor, sentences entailing higher sentences had to be confirmed by the commander in chief of the army. He had also to confirm those sentences reached by the Courts Martial of the Army.
Q. General, here we are concerned with an SS division?
A. Yes.
Q. Were there any special complications arising therefrom?
A. Special complications would have been possible because of the fact that the SS units were not under my judicial or disciplinary authority; the SS was entirely outside my authority of confirmation.
Q. Did you read that report?
A. Yes, of course. I am quite sure I did but you cannot see any indication for that in the report itself.
Q. What did you regard as the most important element in this report?
A. I thought the most important fact there was as far as I was concerned that it showed so clearly that it was not 300 officers that had been shot, but at the most one fifth of that figure. Of course, I would have much preferred if the hatio had still been less, but to interfere still more in this business, particularly because this was an SS division was quite impossible. I had to take into consideration what the mood of the troops was. They had suffered many losses, but from the documents I had refreshed my memory. There were four to five motorized divisions used in this operation. This amounts to about 2,000 to 2,500 men. Losses reported in the documents had included 90 killed, 80 missing, who had to be regarded as dead, according to our experiences and more than 500 wounded, a detail of more than one third of the total strength. These are losses suffered infrequently even in big battles and the main guilt for these losses lay with the officers who had been sentenced.
Q. Were steps taken against other Italian officers as well at that time, apart from those you have mentioned?
A. Yes, in a few cases on the basis of the Fuehrer orders.
Q. Were measures taken against all Italian officers captured during the fighting and can you tell us who these officers were, if there were any?
A. Against the Fuehrer order, measures were taken not against all officers but only against those whose guilt was proven unequivocally and those we regarded and I am still of that conviction today as franc-tireurs.
Q. Now the second armored army, did they do anything in order to influence the Italians to discontinue the fight?
A. Of course, all means at our disposal were used in order to bring this about. Pamphlets were dropped in large numbers from aircraft over the partisan area, pamphlets were brought into the partisan area by confidence agents. All Italians, including officers, were premised an absolute general pardon and we could rely on the fact that every Italian knew of this invitation.
Q. What was the effect; was anything to be observed?
A. Yes, many thousands surrendered including their officers.
Q. General, will you please once more take up document book VIII and look at page 102, which is page 131 in the English. This is a NOKW document, No. 951 and it is submitted by the Prosecution Exhibit 334. Here we have an excerpt from the war diary of the 21st Mountain Army with the entry that against 2 Italian Colonels reprisal measures had been taken by the 100 Infantry division. This is the case, which the Indictment lists under count 3, paragraph 121; can you tell us what the incidents are here?
A Of course without the documents I would not have remembered this incident, but now I think I know what the facts behind this were.
Q Will you please tell us briefly?
A In October of 1343, greater numbers of partisans concentrated southeast of Tirana, among them were a great number of Italians. From there, there were constant surprise attacks on the roads in Albania, our own troops suffered considerable losses and many cruelities were reported from that area. The situation became quite unsufferable and a large operation had to be started. That operation led to the result that partisan groups, including the Italians, were dispersed and a great number of Italians were captured, including fifteen or twenty officers. The leader of this operation was the commanding officer of the 100th Infantry division. The captured 15 or 20 officers would have been shot, according to the Fuehrer order, all of them, but the commander of the division moved to shoot only the ring leaders of the operation and put them before a Courts Martial first. That motion was sustained either by the Corps or by higher up quarters and this is how these two colonels were shot. As for the other 15 or 18 officers, nothing was done to them at all.
Q General, let us now conclude the Italian complex of questions and turn back to the fighting against Tito; you have stated that on the 26th of August you started your duty with the 2nd Panzer army; what was the first task of your staff?
A We were faced with entirely new conditions. The first task had to be to find out what these conditions were really like. Every commander and every staff has to do that.
Q And what was the result of your findings?
A Well, a great many oral reports were given me by my staff about the prevailing conditions, about the way the other side fought, the battle of supplies, retaliation measures, medical equipment, etc. A large number of orders were found and it was not quite clear, as far as we were concerned, whether or not they were in force. We had to realize that if we did not find orders quite clear, how less clear then they would be for the troops.
The various departments of the staff began to shift the various orders of their area and compiled them into orders given by themselves in order thus to bring systematic order into the whole question of orders.
Q Will you please take up volume XIV, turn to page 11 of the German and page 15 of the English, this is exhibit 340, it is document NOKW 509; is this then an order which was compiled in the manner which you have described?
A Yes, this order is this type of compiled order as it were. It is dated 15 September barely three weeks after we arrived in the Balkans.
Q You mentioned that these compiled orders did not contain any new regulations, but merely summed up those orders which already existed; is this entirely true of this order?
A Yes, it is completely true of this order, with the exception of one passage in paragraph II, which is a bit more extensive.
Q Will you please look at page 14 of volume XIV, which is page 13 of the English version? It is the OKW order of 18 August; do you mean this order which started the other thing off?
A Yes, in paragraph 3 of this order.
Q Will you please give us your comments about what it says in paragraph 3?
A I would first of all say this, until the 7th July 1943 there was the regulation that all bandits had to be shot in accordance with the regulations for warfare against the bandits. This regulation was rescinded by the order of 7 July 1943 and partisans were now to be captured. This had the consequence, as far as the troops were concerned, that they endeavored to capture as many people as possible and this soon led to a great many reverses. The partisans soon realized our attempts to take prisoners and therefore laid insidious traps for our troops. The result of such experiences thus met was no doubt figure 3 of the OKW order, because that provides for the fact that in the case of particularly malicious conduct no prisoners were to be taken.
Q General, please take up volume XV, exhibit 368. It is on page 38 of the German and also of the English book. There I have marked a few passages for you and would ask you to read those out loud.
A This is a typical example of malicious conduct in battle, the report reads as follows: "During their attacks the enemy frequently sends women and children forward, whom the kind German soldiers does not shoot at. At a whistle signal women and children throw themselves down as soon as the band is ready for the attack."
Q Now please take up volume 16, exhibit 375, page 54 of the German and page 34 of the English. I have also marked a passage there and would ask you to read it.
A This is what it says, "In the fighting near Kladanj, bandits in German uniform used combat method as reported previously in the daily report of 5 December, with the approach calling out, 'Do not Shoot, Deserters,' then they opened fire at short range."
Q Will you now tell us General if these passages, which you have just read, by way of example, were connected with your ideas when you introduced paragraph 3 of the OKW order into the order of the 15th of September?
A Not these incidents directly because they come from a later period of time, but similar incidents were very frequently reported in great detail.
A The pointer which is contained in paragraph 3 seemed to me to be all the more necessary as it was in the very first days of September when an extremely annoying incident took place which was again to be explained by the fact that our own troops were not equal to the craft and cunning of the bandits.
Q Will you please tell us this incident:
AAt the beginning of September on the occasion of a combing-out action in Bosnia a company on the flank of a battalion went forward and after some time it encountered about 70 or 80 partisans who after a very few first shots had been exchanged surrendered. The company led these prisoners immediately behind them, guarded by a platoon consisting of about 25 men, and continued its operation. After a short period of time the company was ambushed by heavy shooting. Everybody fell flat own on their faces and the prisoners who were numerically superior took advantage of this confusion, threw themselves on their guards and killed all of them on the spot. Using the arms, machine guns and rifles, they attacked the company from the rear and this whole company was wiped out with the exception of two or three men.
This incident impressed me somewhat and the necessity of protecting our own troops against the cunning of the partisans became a matter of logic to me.
Q Was this regulation frequently used at all?
A This regulation, as far as I know, was scarcely used at all. The troops were merely being more captious. We made many thousands of prisoners.
DR. FRITSCH: On this occasion I beg to draw the court's attention to Exhibit 570. It is in Volume XXV on page 56 of the English and 44 of the German. This is a letter by the Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Panzer Army to the Commanding General of the XV Army Corps. In paragraph 7 of that letter it is stated that in the area of the 2nd Panzer Army between 1 September and 31 December 1943 12,000 prisoners were taken.
Q General, before leaving page 15 I would like to draw your attention to the provision confirmed in paragraph 1 on that page.
It says there that the troops used for guerilla warfare should not only chase the bands away but should endeavor to exterminate the bands or at least part of the bands. What was meant by that?
A In any tactical manual and in any tactical regulation I know -the German, American, British, French and Italian regulations -- there is contained always the fundamental principle that the aim of fighting is the destruction of the enemy. It is the art of leadership to bring this off. In the big battles neither the one or the other side succeeded entirely in this but if the enemy succeeds in escaping that decision -- that is, destruction -- then he has not been beaten and then it is our duty to expect him to come back. To get the partisans to fight at all was a particularly difficult problem because it was their principle to evade open combat and, therefore, I regarded this regulation as indispensable; namely, that you should not simply chase them away but it should be their objective to destroy the enemy.
Q General, in paragraph 3 there is a passage which apparently aims at an attempt at different means. Is that correct?
A Yes, it is ordered here that propaganda should be started in order to get as many deserters as possible and to desist fighting altogether. This attempt, of course, was also made.
Q Then please look at paragraph 4 of the order. It is on page 10 in the English version. It is document book XIV still. What order does paragraph 4 contain?
A This paragraph 4 comes verbatim from two different orders. The first paragraph comes from Exhibit 306 in Volume XII, page 94, and 113 of the English, the third paragraph of that document, paragraph 3 of that order. The second paragraph is a verbatim adoption from Exhibit 205 in Volume XII on page 52 of the German and 60 of the English version.
Q Now, what about point 5? What old orders does that paragraph come from?
A Paragraph 5 -- the first paragraph comes verbatim from Exhibit 306 which I have just mentioned, in Volume XII on page 95, 113 of the English.
It comes from paragraph 3, numeral 3, of that order.
Q What about the second paragraph of number 5 which brings us to the rehabilition ratio? Did this amount to a new order on your part?
A No, that again is the very old order which had been in force for some time which here, however, has been made more moderate as far as was possible. Here the highest limit was the lowest as contained in the OKW order and, apart from that, it was left open completely by not actually ordering that ratio but it was put in the following way; as a rule it should apply. Everybody was in a position to make exception from the rule and the whole order could be adjusted to local conditions.
Q Were you, General, convinced that this was how the troops understood it and what indication did you have to that effect?
A I felt quite sure that the troops understood the order in that way. The reports which came in in the course of the next month showed this quite clearly.
Q Will you please look at Exhibit 349 which is on page 80 of the English version and page 58 of the German? Have you got it?
A Yes.
Q This is an order which comes from the 369th Infantry Division. Was that division under the 2nd Panzer Army?
A That division was subordinate to the 2nd Panzer Army, yes, and the order by that division contained in this document which was issued on the basis of the army order of 15 September. If we look at paragraph 7 of that order it becomes clear that there was a modification of a yet greater extent. The division says there: "As reprisal prisoners there may be" and so, and it says: "up to 50 hostages." Of course, I never saw that order because divisional orders you do not see with an army staff. I merely remembered that when I saw this order here and read it that the men of my staff who worked on this and who also worked on the order of 15 March and who quite obviously also endeavored to make the existing order as moderate as possible that that man was not sufficiently skillful as was the man who was with the division.
DR. FRITSCH: If the Tribunal please, might I suggest that this would be a good moment to make the recess?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I will agree with you. We will recess until one-thirty.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 1330 hours.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 29 October 1947)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
LOTHAR RENDULIC - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. FRITSCH (Counsel for Defendant Rendulic):Q.- General, we were discussing the order of the 15th of September and in particular we spoke of its origin and we had been speaking of details to show that the order was a summary of former orders.
We had already discussed some points and now I want to ask you to look at paragraph 3 of numeral 5.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honors, I am speaking of Document Volume XIV. The exhibit number is 340. It is on page 10 in the German book and on page 13 in the English book.
Q.- Have you found it?
A.- Yes, I have.
Q.- Would you look at the third paragraph of numeral 5, please? Are the rules contained in it taken from a previous order and if so which?
A.- The very nature of the order reveals that it represents a summary of previous orders. It has been impossible for me among the documents to find an order for the Croat area which would be in accordance with paragraph 2, but I have found that this paragraph 3 in the last sentence of the paragraph is entirely identical with Exhibit 263 in Volume X, page 77 in the German and page 101 in the English text. This is an order from the Commander of the German troops in Serbia issued in the Spring of 1943. There must have been an identical order for Croatia for otherwise I don't know how that passage in the order of the 15th of September could have been reproduced verbatim.
Q.- Please don't go into further detail concerning these matters but would you now have a look at numeral 6 of the order and would you tell us, please, with what previous order it is identical?
A.- Numeral 6 was taken verbatim from Exhibit No. 295 in Volume XII, page 53; that is page 60 in the English text, i.e. from numeral 7 of that order. The second paragraph of numeral 6 has been verbatim from numeral 4 of the order which I have just mentioned from the Commander of the German troops in Croatia.
Q.- We now come to numeral 7 of the order dated 15 September. Would you please take a look at Volume XII and would you open the book, please, on page 95. In the English text, it is page 113. The exhibit number is 306. The document has the number NOKW-155. Please have a look at numeral 4 and please compare it with numeral 7 of the order of the 15th of September. This concerns the evacuation of areas infested with partisans and the concentration of evacuated people in labor camps. General, would you tell us, please, whether in this case, too, we are concerned with a former order, an earlier order?
A.- I can say that numeral 7 of this order is entirely identical with numeral 4 of the Army group order contained in Volume VII and which we have just looked at, but there are two exceptions which I have found. In the first paragraph of numeral 7 of the army order it says that the evacuated people are to be concentrated in labor camps while in the order which was used it says further, "and as far as they are able to work they are to be moved to the Reich." That ruling was not incorporated in the Army order.
Q.- For what reason was that provision not included in the army order?
A.- The army was against transferring any manpower to the Reich. We did not know at all that in Germany labor might be regarded as slave labor. That was not the reason, therefore; but the reason was that in Croatia for the Croat government as well as for military purposes there was not enough manpower available.
Q.- You said that you needed manpower for military purposes. Do you know the provisions from the Hague Land Warfare Convention and did you know it at the time, according to which the employment of the civilian population for military purposes is not admissible?
A.- Naturally, I know and I do know now the provisions of the Hague Land Warfare Convention in this sphere but those provisions could not possibly be applied to the population of Croatia. Croatia was a state which was friendly to us and which was allied to us. The enemies of Croatia were our enemies, too, and vice versa. If, therefore, the Croat civilian population was used for work for military purposes it meant that they worked for the defense of their own country against the common enemy and work of that type cannot be regarded as inadmissable within the meaning of the Hague Land Warfare Convention.
Q.- Would you turn to the second paragraph of numerals 4 and 7, please? The first paragraph we have just discussed. Are these identical?
A.- They are entirely identical with the exception of the order concerning the areas to be evacuated where it says in the Army Group Order that strips along the Coast are also to be evacuated. That clause was not incorporated in the Army order and it was not incorporated for tho reason that we were faced with the immediate task of erecting defenses along the coastline and the evacuations which were connected with that defense work were such a complicated affair that it could not be settled in a few words, but a separate order was required.
Q.- General, were any changes made later on in this order?
A.- Yes, there were, In January of 1944 the directives were rescinded the directives concerning reprisals ratios.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honors, in connection herewith may I refer you to an entry in the Diary of the LXIIXth Corps? This document has been submitted as Exhibit 377. It is contained in Document Book XVI. In the German text the page number is 95; and in the English text it is 43. The English page is 95. In this order it says, and I quote: "The reprisal ratio orderd in the Army order of 15 September is revoked with immediate effect." It was Document Book XVI, Your Honors, the page number is 43.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. General, would there have been an changes in the situation if that order of the 15th of September had not been issued by the Army?
A. If that order had not been issued the situation would not have been changed, as that order did not contain a single novel ruling. At the utmost the ameliorations mentioned in the order would not have put into effect. For the troops the order amounted to a simplification, and that simplification showed itself even here in this Courtroom. I am convinced that Generals Leyser and Dehner in just figuring and explaining happenings in their areas will invoke that order and will have to invoke that order. For them, too, it is simpler to invoke merely that one rather than a large number of orders.
Q. I'm reverting once again to that question of transferring manpower to the Reich. You have given us a reason as to why you were against the transfer of man-power to the Reich. Will you now please turn to Document Book XIV again, and will you open it on page 15, please? In the English text it is Page 21; the Exhibit No. is 340, and the document No. is NOKW-509.
General, would you please tell me in connection with this document to what extent your ideas concerning that transfer of man-power to the Reich were meant to be expressed?
A. This document is an order from the LXIXth Corps, dated the 6th of October 1943. In paragraph 1, that is in the last sentence of that paragraph, it is stated expressly that the Army has ordered that captured members of bands, hostages, and evacuees, until further notice, are not to be transferred.
That order was not part of the Army order of 15th of September. Therefore, there must have been another order in this connection, and it is regreatable that order is not to be found among the documents. I would point out in particular that the Army itself ordered, contrary to the OKW order of 7 June 1943, not to transfer captured members of bands. In paragraph 2 i.e. in the third paragraph of this numeral 2, it becomes quite evident that the evacuees who were given work were regarded as free workers. From that, one has to conclude that even though evacuees were employed as workers their work was not considered compulsory labor in the bad moaning of the word.
Q. Would you now please take Document Book XVI and would you open it please to Page 143? In the English text it is Page 97; it is Exhibit No. 394. The document No. is NOKW-1418. Isn't it true that this document shows that branches of the Army did transfer man-power?
A. Yes, this document shows that captured members of bands were transferred, and that this according to the meaning of the OKW order probably took place in some cases. But the XVth Corps was against that are prohibited any further transfers in accordance with the ideas which the Army also upheld in the same respect. The date is noticeable--the date of this order. It was issued on the 20th of June 1944. That is to say, it was issued three days before I left the Balkans. And if we take a look at the order of the 6th of October, the order of the LXIXth Corps, the time when I arrived in the Balkans, those orders cover almost the whole time of my stay in the Balkans, and they show that all the time I adhered to my policy of not transferring man-power to the Reich.
Q. I now want to turn to a specific case. That is the operation which has been called the "Panther Operation," P-A-N-T-H-E-R. It is mentioned under Count 4 of the Indictment, numeral 14-f. Would you please turn to Document. Book XIV and would you please first open it to Page 109? The English page number is 137. This is part of the Exhibit No. 361.
Tho document number is NOKW-1258. In the lower half of the page you find a teletype message. How did that operation come about?
A. The XVth Corps had made a request to carry out an operation to smash the bands, to destroy their supply bases, and to deport these people who were able to bear arms. The area concerned was the so-called Samarica. That was an area notorious for band activities which for sometime had not been entered by German troops. The most important place was Glina.
Q. General, in the same Document Book would you please turn to Page 114? The English page is 142. This is part of Exhibit 363. The document No. is NOKW-074. It refers to the report from the Corps about the smashing of bands?
A. Yes, in Paragraph 2, under numeral I as a further purpose of the operation it says that it was intended to establish greater security for Zagreb, Sisak, and Novska, the main railroad line.
Q. General, what interests me is whether the corps needed permission to carry out their operations.
A. In principle, no. As a rule the corps just reported what they intended to do and then reported their results; otherwise, everybody had to be independent. But in this case the forces of the corps were not adequate, and the last document indicates that it was intended that troops should participate in this operation which did not belong to the corps, as, for instance, the Cossack and the 37th Division, which was there temporarily.
Q. Did the Army agree with the operation, and if not why not?
A. Naturally the Army agreed with the operation. It agreed with the intentions. The reasons were the following: The Samarica area was an area which had caused insurmountable difficulties because of the fact that it was infested with bands and for a relatively long period it had not been entered. In that area there were large supply stores, there were work-shops. Furthermore, it was known that the partisans had recruited men from among the population who were able to bear arms. And when these men didn't come voluntarily reprisals were applied.
Furthermore, frequent surprise attacks were made from that area on the roads, and particularly on the railroad, and at that time it was very difficult to surmount these conditions. For that reason, one definitely had to approve of the operation.
Q. And what about the evacuation of the population that was able to carry arms?
A. That, too, was an exigency, for it was necessary to take away from the partisans their reserves of recruits and the evacuation of the population from the areas which were infested with bands was in accordance with the existing orders. All I can say here is that these orders were carried out only in very cases because, as you will see here, in the "Panther Operation" the actual carrying out of such measures was raced with insurmountable difficulties.
Q. I would now like to turn to the letter from the Second Panther Army to the General Plenipotentiary in Croatia. That is contained in Document Book XIV, Exhibit No. 362. The document No. is NOKW-022. The Page No. is 112 in the German text and in the English text it is 139. What was the purpose of that letter? And why did you have to contact the German General Plenipotentiary?
A The purpose of the letter was to inform the German Plenipotentiary General in Croatia concerning the operation that was planned. The most important part refers to evacuation, for the evacuation was purely a matter for the Territorial Commanders to deal with and for the Croatian authorities. In that sphere the Army could merely make applications, and this letter does not even constitute an application, but it is merely a suggestion. And you find that in the last sentence of the letter. The last sentence says. "The evacuation of the ablebodied population for forced labor," and there is an addition there, "to Germany is considered advisable." That is merely a suggestion. As to why that suggestion was added there, that I cannot explain to myself. After all, the previous statements show that the Army had always been against transferring man-power to the Reich. In trying to look for an explanation I can only imagine that the population in that notorious Samaritc area probably was working hand in hand with partisans, because that area, during the last eighteen months, prior to this period, has been cleaned up three times, and three times it had been quickly reorganized as a partisan area. And that would have been impossible without the help of the population. Perhaps that was the reason why one wanted to evacuate those people, just as the Greek Government finds it much easier today. Their unreliable elements are simply sent away to an island. We couldn't do anything of that kind at the time, but the last sentence, concerning the transfer of people intended to be put to work, is just a theory. Well, if that sentence had not been there, I mean it that sentence had not been added to this letter, that would not have changed the over-all situation in any way.
Q. General, under Numeral 2 of that teletype, the Plenipotentiary General is asked to keep the matter secret from the Croat authorities. Would you please tell us the reason for that?
A It was known that all Croat agencies, right up to the entourage of the Poglavnik, were infiltrated with Tito's followers. It was proved that what was imparted to the Croat authorities reached the partisans in no time. In that way the aim of many of those operations was frustrated, and, furthermore, those operations, as soon as the partisans had been warned, were always connected with mounting losses.
Q Do you mean to say by that that request to keep matters secret did not refer to the evacuation as such?
A Noo that was not the sole reason, but it referred to the operation as such. The evacuation was included. It was one of the purposes of the operation as such.
Q Have you had any proof to show that the Croat agencies did not keep matters secret?
A We had proofs for leakages for such a long time, until we established the principle not to notify the Croate agency of any matters that had to be kept secret at a time at which it might have resulted in danger.
Q General, would you now please turn to Document Book XV, Exhibit 371, Page 87 in the German text, and Page 61 in the English text.
A Yes, a teletype message from the XVth Corps, to the 2nd Panzer Army which says, "The search operation ordered for the 20th of January in the city area of Banja-Luka has had no particular result on account of a premature spreading of the news through the Croat authorities.
Q In this connection may I also refer to Exhibit 391, NOKW790, in Document Book XVI? The English page is No. 89; the German page is No. 139. The text refers to a similar matter as the one with which we have just dealt with. That is to say, matters of the same kind become known prematurely. General, would you please take Document Book XIV? We are talking of the "Panther Operation." It is Page 141 of the English and Page 112 of the German. The Exhibit No. is 363, NOKW-074. The Page No. is 141 in the English text. This is the reply from the General Plenipotentiary in Croatia to the teletype message which we have just discussed concerning the affair of evacuating able-bodied men. There are figures here. What was it that interested the Army?