A. Yes, I think one must assume it was. This Daily Report includes the Daily Report from the XXIst Mountain Corps. The first paragraph mentions partisan attacks and attacks on disarmed Italian soldiers. In the second paragraph the report from the 118th Jaeger Division is passed on, which mentions the intention to shoot the Italian General Roncaglia if he continued to offer resistance.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q I want to interpolate another question which might possibly be significant. Did the army and the corps have to pass on any other reports apart from the daily reports?
A Yes, there were also morning reports and noontime reports.
Q Did you at that time read that report which we were just discussing?
A From the report itself, one cannot see that I read it but I must have read it or at least I must have heard about its contents because I issued an order in connection with this report, on account of it.
Q What picture did you gather from this report concerning the situation of the 118th Jaeger Division?
A I visualized the situation which prevailed with the 118th Jaeger Division--that is, the situation which had given rise to this report. I knew that until then there had been no difficulties with any Italian unit. I knew that everywhere the terms of the surrender had been carried out with the exception of the Bergamo Division which was offering resistance in Split and there was the exception of temporary friction in Ragusa and with the staff of the 14th Army Corps commanded by General Roncaglia. Roncaglia refused to acknowledge the order from his superior Commander in Chief concerning the surrender. He refused to conduct any negotiations for the carrying out of the surrender terms.
The staff was located in Podgoriza, a small place in Northern Albania. In that place and in the vicinity there was also stationed the Tavrinense Division. That division too refused to conduct negotiations and refused to acknowledge the surrender terms. It made excuses by saying that it was waiting for orders from Roncaglia. The German troops in the area of Podgoriza were too weak to enforce the surrender being acknowledged.
Q What consequences might have arisen for you from the conduct of General Roncaglia?
A The conduct, the attitude of General Roncaglia might have had Court No. V, Case No. VII.
extremely dangerous consequences. It had become known that, for example, the Second Italian Army which was stationed to the North of my area had taken prisoners the German unit which had asked them to surrender. From Greece, news was received on the 12th that the resistance--no, I should like to say the attitude of the Italians was stiffening. The evacuation of the Italians on their march to the railroad stations had not yet started. They and with their weapons were all in the coastal region. The situation around Split had not yet been cleared up. Gradually, they must have found out how weak we were. In that situation there was an extreme danger and threat that under Roncaglia's influence there might be a change of heart with the Italians, all the more so as Roncaglia was supported by the Tavrinense Division. That was the best division which the Italians had at their disposal. If such change of heart were to take place, it would have meant the destruction of my forces in the Italian area and furthermore an entirely changed situation in the coastal region.
The enemy bridgehead in the Balkans which we feared so much in that case would have been established, and the entire situation in the Balkans might have become untenable.
Q And what decision did you make?
A Of necessity, there could only be one decision and that decision was in all circumstances to eliminate General Roncaglia.
Q In other words, you approved of the division's decision, is that correct?
A Yes, but with one very important reservation. The decision of the division was in accordance with the Fuehrer's order. It also corresponded with an absolute military necessity. It was a fact for me that Roncaglia had to be eliminated at all costs. To me that was a perfect example of military necessity, but I did not approve of the division's decision in the form in which it had been reported. Roncaglia's conduct did mean great danger but it had not as yet led to any bloodshed. Therefore, I wanted to have a guaranty that extreme methods would only be Court No, V, Case No, VII.
resorted to if all other means had been exhausted.
Q In this connection, General, would you please open Volume 13 on page 28 in the German text--that is page 40 in the English text. It is Document NOKW-727, the exhibit number being 322. This is the order for the elimination of Roncaglia.
A Yes.
Q. Please will you tell us your views on the matter?
A I will say yes, this is my order. An order was given for Roncaglia, should he continue his resistance, to be shot as a franctireur but with the very important reservation if there is no guaranty for his immediate evacuation to Belgrade. The decision as to which of the two alternatives was to be chosen I had to leave to the division commander on the spot. I myself could not decide on that. I was 500 kilometers away from Potgorica. At any rate, the Divisional Commander was in no doubt about that clause of reservation in my order.
Q Do you know what was Roncaglia's fate after that, do you know what became of him?
A I don't remember from the time of the war but I know from entries made in the diaries of the 21st Corps with which I became acquainted here, the entries made on the 15th and 17th of September, that Roncaglia was taken to Belgrade quite safely.
Q Your Honors, those entries in the diary I shall submit but beyond that I am in the position on account of the cooperation of the American Military Attache at the American Embassy in Rome to prove that Roncaglia at the present time lives in Verona and is well.
General, we are still dealing with Book 13. Would you please take a look at Exhibit 321? It is on page 27 and on page 39 in the English book. The Commander-in-Chief Southeast ordered that General Roncaglia be shot in case of there being no guaranty of his being taken to Belgrade. Now, what do you have to say about that alleged order from the Commander-in-Chief Southeast?
A The Commander-in-Chief Southeast at that time was Fieldmarshal Court No. V, Case No. VII.
von Weichs. I can state that I do not remember that I ever discussed the affair of Roncaglia with Fieldmarshal von Weichs nor can I remember having received an order from him.
Q Is it possible that you spoke to his chief of staff General Foertsch?
A I am certain that I did not discuss this matter with him, nor did he have the position in which he might have given me advice. All he might have done was to say to me, "I shall report on this matter to the Commander-in-Chief and then I shall inform you of his decision." I am certain I did not talk to him about it. Foertsch no doubt would have been surprised if I had rung him up about this affair.
Q General, we are now coming to the events that occurred near Split. You told us that of the Battalions which were employed by the Italians on the 9th of September, all reached their destination with the exception of the one stationed near Split.
According to what you told us there were strong partisan units who blocked that battalion. Before we will discuss details, I should like you to tell us briefly what were the developments of the situation there.
A That battalion belonged to the 7th SS Mountain Division. Soon, the battalion reported that it was completely encircled by Italians and that the situation was in danger.
Q Did you take any steps?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A In Serbia around about that time there arrived a motorized infantry regiment. That regiment I immediately ordered in the direction of Split. That meant they had to march across Serbia, Albania, and they had to go up the coastal roads northward, roads which were very difficult. It was a march of considerably more than a thousand kilometers. Furthermore, other parts of the 7th SS Division, were withdrawn from the fighting against the partisans and also were sent towards Split.
Q And was that successful in the way you expected?
A Yes, at least in part. We succeeded in setting free the battalion. The considerable partisan forces were thrown back closer to Split. The Italians of the Bergamo Division joined in the fighting against us. They supported the partisans with weapons and with ammunition. We had very heavy looses in the fighting. When further elements of the 7th SS Division arrived, the partisans withdrew to the mountains and the town of Split was taken by the SS Division. The Bergamo Division was taken prisoner. About 300 officers and 9000 men, Part of the division had escaped to Italy on vessels.
Q Can you tell us the date when Split was taken, General?
A On the 27th of September.
Q Would you please look at Book XIII, page 41? It is 74 in the English text of thus Exhibit, 327. This is the Document NOKW-910which has been mentioned a great many times. Why was that inquiry made?
A That inquiry was made because the division did not know what orders were valid concerning the treatment of the Italians. I merely wanted to point out that the last sentence, last order re-treatment of Italians has been mistranslated in the English book.
Q May I ask you to translate that last sentence?
THE PRESIDENT: What page will you find that on?
DR. FRITSCH: Page 55 in the English text, your Honor. I beg your pardon, your Honor, the English page is 74. The German page is 58.
THE INTERPRETER: "Wie letzter Befehl Behandlung Italiener." is Court No. V, Case No. VII.
"The last order concerning the treatment of Italians."
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q General, would you now in the same exhibit please turn to page 59, the English page is 75. This is the reply from the Corps. Was that answer in accordance with the orders that had been given?
A Yes, it was in accordance with them.
Q The document shows that the corps had also informed the Second Panzer Army of its reply. Did you, General, also receive that reply?
A You cannot tell that from the document but in any case it must have been so, for I remember that I did not agree with the decision of the Corps. I rang up General Leuters who unfortunately has died since, and I told him that the shooting of all officers was out of the question, a demand which had been made in the Fuehrer's order, but that one could only consider shooting those officers who were guilty in connection with the resistance.
Q Would you now turn to Exhibit 326 please? This is also contained in Book 13. It is Document NOKW-830. It is on page 36; in the English text it is or page 53. These are extracts from the Diary of the 15th A.K. (Army Corps). Would you please look at the entry made on the 27th of September, 1943?
A That entry which was made on the 27th of September reveals that the Corps which had issued orders to the 7th Division to apply the Fuehrer's order must have changed its intentions, for in the last paragraph of the entry made on that day it says: "The Commanding General has instituted investigations to ascertain who are the guilty officers." This entry mentions 202 officers. The true number of 300 probably at that time hadn't arrived yet.
Q In other documents the figure of 300 Italians officers is men tioned again. You know all documents. Do all those figures refer to the same case or are there other cases?
A Well, in all these documents in which three hundred officers Court No. V, Case No. VII.
are mentioned, only those same 300 officers who were taken prisoner at Split are referred to. Exhibit 332, 360, and 447 makes mention of that figure.
Q Would you now in Book 13 please turn to page 84? It is page 111 in the English text. It is Exhibit 332 which we have just mentioned, NOKW-053. This is the daily report from the XV A.K. dated 28 September. Would you please look at the passage which speaks of the shooting of the 300 officers?
A In this daily report from the XV Corps, it says in the last sentence of the first paragraph, 300 Italian officers will be shot according to the Fuehrer's orders after summary court martial. Again a very serious translating mistake has occurred. In the English text it says not "will be shot" as this interpreter translated it now quite correctly, but it stales merely "shot." That makes it look as if these 300 officers had already been shot at the time the entry was made.
Q Your Honor, may I point out that the passage in question occurred on page 111 of the English document. It is the fourth line from the top. It is the first paragraph -
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: We will take our morning recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The court will be in recess until 11:15.
(A recess was taken.)
Q. General, before the recess we discussed the question of the 300 Italian officers. Will you please look at Volume VIII the same Exhibit 332 which we discussed before the recess. It is Document NOKW 053, and look at the daily report by the 2nd Panzer Army; what can one conclude from that?
A. In this daily report the Army says, "300 officers and 900 men of the Bergamo Division have been captured." They are dealt with in accordance with the Fuehrer Order. Nothing is said here of any shooting.
Q. I want to clarify this matter altogether, and I shall therefore give you. the photostat copy of the original. Will you give us your comments about the passage with which we have dealt just now, and tell us what you can see therefrom?
A. From this report it becomes clear that a sentence has been crossed out. As far as it is possible to read it still reads as follows: "Officers will be shot after summary Courtmartial in accordance with the Fuehrer Order." This has teen crossed out and above it it says: "The treatment of those prisoners has been initiated in accordance with the Fuehrer Order."
DR. FRITSCH: I submit this photostat copy to the Tribunal, and I would appreciate it if the Tribunal takes notice of this change in the order. May I ask whether I should have the crossed out part translated, the sentence which the witness has just read. It has been translated as the witness read it, of course.
JUDGE CARTER: I assume that is a matter up to you, Dr. Fritsch.
DR. FRITSCH: Then might I ask to hand the document to the interpreter, who could then read out the sentence which has been crossed out.
May I point out once again that in the English Document Book it is on page 118.
THE INTERPRETER: There are actually two sentences which have been crossed out. I am not quite clear whether counsel wants me to read both of these sentences.
DR. FRITSCH: Might I ask you also to read the passage which has been substituted for the crossed out part.
THE INTERPRETER: The sentence is as follows: "300 officers and 900 men of the Bergamo Division have been captured." And there is one word crossed out which is illegible, and "have been shot after summary courtmartial in accordance with the Fuehrer Order." And the sentence goes on to say "and have been sent away for labor allocation," and the words crossed out in that sentence are "shot after summary courtmartial and sent away for labor allocation," and they have been crossed out and substituted with "And their treatment in accordance with the Fuehrer Order has been initiated."
DR. FRITSCH: Thank you.
Q. General, now what caused you to take these more mitigating measures as compared with the Fuehrer Orders?
A. When the capture of Split, the Italian crises was over, and when we interrogated many comrades of the Italian officers we learned that a large number of officers were opposed to continuing the fight on the part of the partisans, and also opposed to the idea of supplying them with arms. The same people who had once been their enemy. It seemed to me to be a matter of course that the Fuehrer Order no longer applied to all officers, but only to those who were really guilty.
Q. In the same document in Volume XIII on page 35 of the German and page 53 of the English, there is an entry "30th of September 1943 Banja Luka," and a statement is contained "Three generals shot to death in Split by virtue of summary courtmartial," what generals were those?
A. They were members of the Gergamo division and without doubt had been found guilty for the illegal conduct of that division, which had caused us many losses.
Q. Now look again at Exhibit 237, the last page showed - it is on page 80 in the English book and 63 in the German, this is the written message by the 7th SS Division, addressed to the XV Mountain army corps - these 45 officers.
A. Here they report that another 45 Italian officers were shot after a summary Courts Martial. This term, "another 45" or "an additional 45" refers to the three mentioned before. It should be stated here that three officers were sentenced to death in absentia.
Q. witness, in volume 25 there is exhibit 579, NOKW 1747 on page 8 of the German and page 9 of the English. I have just handed you this document and there once again reference is made to three officers sentenced to death in absentia: are these the same three or are they other officers?
A. They are the same officers, who were mentioned in the earlier document and this becomes quiet unmistakable from the documents.
Q. And once again in volume 13 on page 53 there is in exhibits 326 and 328 on page 82 of the English book and in exhibit 331 on page 98 of the English book, reference is made to a figure of 45 officers; are these the same officers again?
A. They are all the same ones.
Q. Will you please look at page 64 in volume 13, which is on page 82 in the English book, this is exhibit 328. This exhibit deals with the final report on the legal aspects of the Split matter in paragraph 3 of that report the sentence of 9 additional officers in mentioned; what is the background of that?
A. I cannot remember anything at all about that. It can only have been a similar affair as the others, bearing in mind the limitations which I had ordered. The report also quotes a daily report which I have not found in the documents, therefore I am not able to say anything about those nine.
Q. In paragraph 5 of this report of the XV Army Corps .. who at that time was commanded by General Lueters; the Headquarters of 2nd Panzer Army is asked and I quote: "To confirm this verdict of the Summary Courts Martial." Did you have the possibility of confirming a sentence in that manner?
A. No, this request is entirely incorrect because sentences reached by Court Martials are to be confirmed by the division commander, according to the regulations and I, myself, would have been in no position to confirm a sentence because it would not have been my business. The report also shows that this final report is submitted after the sentences had been carried out, therefore they must have become legally valid previously.
Q. Let me interpolate a question here; what sort of sentences did you have to confirm?
A. Only those sentences were to be confirmed which had been reached by normal Courts Martial. A Court Martial existed with the army and with every division. Sentences reached by Courts Martial of the divisions had to be confirmed by the divisional commander unless they entailed sentences of more than five years hard labor, sentences entailing higher sentences had to be confirmed by the commander in chief of the army. He had also to confirm those sentences reached by the Courts Martial of the Army.
Q. General, here we are concerned with an SS division?
A. Yes.
Q. Were there any special complications arising therefrom?
A. Special complications would have been possible because of the fact that the SS units were not under my judicial or disciplinary authority; the SS was entirely outside my authority of confirmation.
Q. Did you read that report?
A. Yes, of course. I am quite sure I did but you cannot see any indication for that in the report itself.
Q. What did you regard as the most important element in this report?
A. I thought the most important fact there was as far as I was concerned that it showed so clearly that it was not 300 officers that had been shot, but at the most one fifth of that figure. Of course, I would have much preferred if the hatio had still been less, but to interfere still more in this business, particularly because this was an SS division was quite impossible. I had to take into consideration what the mood of the troops was. They had suffered many losses, but from the documents I had refreshed my memory. There were four to five motorized divisions used in this operation. This amounts to about 2,000 to 2,500 men. Losses reported in the documents had included 90 killed, 80 missing, who had to be regarded as dead, according to our experiences and more than 500 wounded, a detail of more than one third of the total strength. These are losses suffered infrequently even in big battles and the main guilt for these losses lay with the officers who had been sentenced.
Q. Were steps taken against other Italian officers as well at that time, apart from those you have mentioned?
A. Yes, in a few cases on the basis of the Fuehrer orders.
Q. Were measures taken against all Italian officers captured during the fighting and can you tell us who these officers were, if there were any?
A. Against the Fuehrer order, measures were taken not against all officers but only against those whose guilt was proven unequivocally and those we regarded and I am still of that conviction today as franc-tireurs.
Q. Now the second armored army, did they do anything in order to influence the Italians to discontinue the fight?
A. Of course, all means at our disposal were used in order to bring this about. Pamphlets were dropped in large numbers from aircraft over the partisan area, pamphlets were brought into the partisan area by confidence agents. All Italians, including officers, were premised an absolute general pardon and we could rely on the fact that every Italian knew of this invitation.
Q. What was the effect; was anything to be observed?
A. Yes, many thousands surrendered including their officers.
Q. General, will you please once more take up document book VIII and look at page 102, which is page 131 in the English. This is a NOKW document, No. 951 and it is submitted by the Prosecution Exhibit 334. Here we have an excerpt from the war diary of the 21st Mountain Army with the entry that against 2 Italian Colonels reprisal measures had been taken by the 100 Infantry division. This is the case, which the Indictment lists under count 3, paragraph 121; can you tell us what the incidents are here?
A Of course without the documents I would not have remembered this incident, but now I think I know what the facts behind this were.
Q Will you please tell us briefly?
A In October of 1343, greater numbers of partisans concentrated southeast of Tirana, among them were a great number of Italians. From there, there were constant surprise attacks on the roads in Albania, our own troops suffered considerable losses and many cruelities were reported from that area. The situation became quite unsufferable and a large operation had to be started. That operation led to the result that partisan groups, including the Italians, were dispersed and a great number of Italians were captured, including fifteen or twenty officers. The leader of this operation was the commanding officer of the 100th Infantry division. The captured 15 or 20 officers would have been shot, according to the Fuehrer order, all of them, but the commander of the division moved to shoot only the ring leaders of the operation and put them before a Courts Martial first. That motion was sustained either by the Corps or by higher up quarters and this is how these two colonels were shot. As for the other 15 or 18 officers, nothing was done to them at all.
Q General, let us now conclude the Italian complex of questions and turn back to the fighting against Tito; you have stated that on the 26th of August you started your duty with the 2nd Panzer army; what was the first task of your staff?
A We were faced with entirely new conditions. The first task had to be to find out what these conditions were really like. Every commander and every staff has to do that.
Q And what was the result of your findings?
A Well, a great many oral reports were given me by my staff about the prevailing conditions, about the way the other side fought, the battle of supplies, retaliation measures, medical equipment, etc. A large number of orders were found and it was not quite clear, as far as we were concerned, whether or not they were in force. We had to realize that if we did not find orders quite clear, how less clear then they would be for the troops.
The various departments of the staff began to shift the various orders of their area and compiled them into orders given by themselves in order thus to bring systematic order into the whole question of orders.
Q Will you please take up volume XIV, turn to page 11 of the German and page 15 of the English, this is exhibit 340, it is document NOKW 509; is this then an order which was compiled in the manner which you have described?
A Yes, this order is this type of compiled order as it were. It is dated 15 September barely three weeks after we arrived in the Balkans.
Q You mentioned that these compiled orders did not contain any new regulations, but merely summed up those orders which already existed; is this entirely true of this order?
A Yes, it is completely true of this order, with the exception of one passage in paragraph II, which is a bit more extensive.
Q Will you please look at page 14 of volume XIV, which is page 13 of the English version? It is the OKW order of 18 August; do you mean this order which started the other thing off?
A Yes, in paragraph 3 of this order.
Q Will you please give us your comments about what it says in paragraph 3?
A I would first of all say this, until the 7th July 1943 there was the regulation that all bandits had to be shot in accordance with the regulations for warfare against the bandits. This regulation was rescinded by the order of 7 July 1943 and partisans were now to be captured. This had the consequence, as far as the troops were concerned, that they endeavored to capture as many people as possible and this soon led to a great many reverses. The partisans soon realized our attempts to take prisoners and therefore laid insidious traps for our troops. The result of such experiences thus met was no doubt figure 3 of the OKW order, because that provides for the fact that in the case of particularly malicious conduct no prisoners were to be taken.
Q General, please take up volume XV, exhibit 368. It is on page 38 of the German and also of the English book. There I have marked a few passages for you and would ask you to read those out loud.
A This is a typical example of malicious conduct in battle, the report reads as follows: "During their attacks the enemy frequently sends women and children forward, whom the kind German soldiers does not shoot at. At a whistle signal women and children throw themselves down as soon as the band is ready for the attack."
Q Now please take up volume 16, exhibit 375, page 54 of the German and page 34 of the English. I have also marked a passage there and would ask you to read it.
A This is what it says, "In the fighting near Kladanj, bandits in German uniform used combat method as reported previously in the daily report of 5 December, with the approach calling out, 'Do not Shoot, Deserters,' then they opened fire at short range."
Q Will you now tell us General if these passages, which you have just read, by way of example, were connected with your ideas when you introduced paragraph 3 of the OKW order into the order of the 15th of September?
A Not these incidents directly because they come from a later period of time, but similar incidents were very frequently reported in great detail.
A The pointer which is contained in paragraph 3 seemed to me to be all the more necessary as it was in the very first days of September when an extremely annoying incident took place which was again to be explained by the fact that our own troops were not equal to the craft and cunning of the bandits.
Q Will you please tell us this incident:
AAt the beginning of September on the occasion of a combing-out action in Bosnia a company on the flank of a battalion went forward and after some time it encountered about 70 or 80 partisans who after a very few first shots had been exchanged surrendered. The company led these prisoners immediately behind them, guarded by a platoon consisting of about 25 men, and continued its operation. After a short period of time the company was ambushed by heavy shooting. Everybody fell flat own on their faces and the prisoners who were numerically superior took advantage of this confusion, threw themselves on their guards and killed all of them on the spot. Using the arms, machine guns and rifles, they attacked the company from the rear and this whole company was wiped out with the exception of two or three men.
This incident impressed me somewhat and the necessity of protecting our own troops against the cunning of the partisans became a matter of logic to me.
Q Was this regulation frequently used at all?
A This regulation, as far as I know, was scarcely used at all. The troops were merely being more captious. We made many thousands of prisoners.
DR. FRITSCH: On this occasion I beg to draw the court's attention to Exhibit 570. It is in Volume XXV on page 56 of the English and 44 of the German. This is a letter by the Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Panzer Army to the Commanding General of the XV Army Corps. In paragraph 7 of that letter it is stated that in the area of the 2nd Panzer Army between 1 September and 31 December 1943 12,000 prisoners were taken.
Q General, before leaving page 15 I would like to draw your attention to the provision confirmed in paragraph 1 on that page.
It says there that the troops used for guerilla warfare should not only chase the bands away but should endeavor to exterminate the bands or at least part of the bands. What was meant by that?
A In any tactical manual and in any tactical regulation I know -the German, American, British, French and Italian regulations -- there is contained always the fundamental principle that the aim of fighting is the destruction of the enemy. It is the art of leadership to bring this off. In the big battles neither the one or the other side succeeded entirely in this but if the enemy succeeds in escaping that decision -- that is, destruction -- then he has not been beaten and then it is our duty to expect him to come back. To get the partisans to fight at all was a particularly difficult problem because it was their principle to evade open combat and, therefore, I regarded this regulation as indispensable; namely, that you should not simply chase them away but it should be their objective to destroy the enemy.
Q General, in paragraph 3 there is a passage which apparently aims at an attempt at different means. Is that correct?
A Yes, it is ordered here that propaganda should be started in order to get as many deserters as possible and to desist fighting altogether. This attempt, of course, was also made.
Q Then please look at paragraph 4 of the order. It is on page 10 in the English version. It is document book XIV still. What order does paragraph 4 contain?
A This paragraph 4 comes verbatim from two different orders. The first paragraph comes from Exhibit 306 in Volume XII, page 94, and 113 of the English, the third paragraph of that document, paragraph 3 of that order. The second paragraph is a verbatim adoption from Exhibit 205 in Volume XII on page 52 of the German and 60 of the English version.
Q Now, what about point 5? What old orders does that paragraph come from?
A Paragraph 5 -- the first paragraph comes verbatim from Exhibit 306 which I have just mentioned, in Volume XII on page 95, 113 of the English.
It comes from paragraph 3, numeral 3, of that order.
Q What about the second paragraph of number 5 which brings us to the rehabilition ratio? Did this amount to a new order on your part?
A No, that again is the very old order which had been in force for some time which here, however, has been made more moderate as far as was possible. Here the highest limit was the lowest as contained in the OKW order and, apart from that, it was left open completely by not actually ordering that ratio but it was put in the following way; as a rule it should apply. Everybody was in a position to make exception from the rule and the whole order could be adjusted to local conditions.
Q Were you, General, convinced that this was how the troops understood it and what indication did you have to that effect?
A I felt quite sure that the troops understood the order in that way. The reports which came in in the course of the next month showed this quite clearly.
Q Will you please look at Exhibit 349 which is on page 80 of the English version and page 58 of the German? Have you got it?
A Yes.
Q This is an order which comes from the 369th Infantry Division. Was that division under the 2nd Panzer Army?
A That division was subordinate to the 2nd Panzer Army, yes, and the order by that division contained in this document which was issued on the basis of the army order of 15 September. If we look at paragraph 7 of that order it becomes clear that there was a modification of a yet greater extent. The division says there: "As reprisal prisoners there may be" and so, and it says: "up to 50 hostages." Of course, I never saw that order because divisional orders you do not see with an army staff. I merely remembered that when I saw this order here and read it that the men of my staff who worked on this and who also worked on the order of 15 March and who quite obviously also endeavored to make the existing order as moderate as possible that that man was not sufficiently skillful as was the man who was with the division.