A. I found myself in many a tight corner in the last war but the position which faced me then was among the very difficult ones. When Italy deserted us it appeared likely that a new enemy would fade us who might be twice or three times as strong as all my forces together and it had to be taken into consideration that a large part of those forces were tied down by their fight against the partisans. Then in addition, there was the fact that the mountain area which I mentioned before was part of the Italian area and could easily be blocked. If it should not be possible to eliminate Italian forces swiftly then one had to expect that a powerful enemy bridgehead might be established in the Balkans under whose protection any landing could be effected without interference. It was quite clear to me that situation could only be mastered by showing the utmost energy and boldness.
Q. Why did you assume that the Italians might turn enemy on you? Was it not merely to be assumed that they would simply not continue to fight on Germany's side?
A. I had to assume or at least anticipate that the Italians would turn against us. In July Mussolini was overthrown. Badoglio was regarded as anti-German. We had no idea what orders the Italian army group would receive in the event of Italy's leaving the alliance. You must always assume that the enemy is a reasonable man which is an old principle. It simply could not be understood why the enemy's leaders should let this enormous chance slip by, to have whole armies stationed in the Balkans and not make the fullest use of them and you could simply not expect that would occur. I had to anticipate at least the possibility of the Italians turning hostile on us.
Q. Now, General, the prosecution has charged you in connection with what you did against the Italians. Before dealing with these things in detail, I would like to ask you a few preliminary questions in order to make the situation appear quite clear before this Tribunal.
DR. FRITSCH: If the Tribunal please, I have had a little sketch drawn which, unfortunately, cannot be submitted today because the translation is not complete but the prosecution has expressed their agreement with my offering this for identification purposes. I offer this sketch as Rendulic Document No. 2 and for identification I offer it as 2-a.
MR. RAPP: If your Honors please, merely to straighten out the record, I would like to state that my personal concurrence, or the concurrence of the prosecution, is not necessary, if anything is being submitted for identification only. I am merely mentioning that because we ourselves may sometime be in a position where we are submitting anything only for identification without first consulting defense counsel.
DR. FRITSCH: I only thought it was my duty to consult the prosecution before this about this and communicate this to the Court.
This is a sketch which shows what the situation was on 9 September 1943 in the evening. I might point out that it does not claim to be completely correct as to measurements.
Q. General, do you have this sketch? Now you have got it, have you not? I might point out that the enlargement which I have submitted to the Court and the prosecution is unhappily reversed as far as the color scheme in concerned. On those maps the Italians are white whereas on yours they are black.
Now, would you, General, perhaps tell me how it was that the situation held on this sketch came about and what you had to do on 9 September and afterwards?
A: As has been mentioned before, this map describes what the situation was on 9 September 1943 in the evening and this is how the situation came about. On the 8th of September Italy declared that she would leave the Axis. The 2nd Panzer Army had made our preparations for this event. One battalion from each division had to be motorized and these six battalions were to drive into the Italian positions and occupy the five ports of Zara, Split, Ragusa, and then Durazzo and Valona. And also they were to occupy Podgorica in Northern Albania. In other words, these battalions had to drive into Italian positions and act as though they represented stronger forces simply ask the Italians to surrender. The divisions were to fill up on food. They were at a distance of about 400 to 900 KM behind the battalions. Some of them needed weeks in order to reach the coastal areas. All battalions reached their destination with the exception of the battalion which was to reach Split. That battalion was faced by extremely strong partisan units.
Q: Do you want to say by that, General, that your battallions found themselves in a precarious situation?
A: Well "precarious" is not strong enough for this situation, but it was inevitable. The map shows the proportion of strength between the German and the Italian troops. In the Zara area, for instance, the Italian superiority is at a proportion of 80 times. In the Tirana area and Durazzo area 40 times. And the partisans are not part of this calculation at all.
Q: And what did this situation lead to in the end and what were the methods you had to employ?
A: From the reports which reached, me it became clear to me that several local arrangements had been made, and that many Italian troops were tired of the war. Only the Commander in Chief of the Italian Army Group did want to have several days time to think over the invitation to surrender.
He was to be regarded as a stumbling block for this profitable development in the situation. This is the reason why we simply captured him among his own troops. And then I contacted the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Dalmazzo, and invited him to attend the negotiations concerning capitulation.
Q: Now, was General Dalmazzo authorized to negotiate in that sense?
A: He most certainly was, as the Commander in Chief of an Army.
Q: What were the troops under his command?
A: All Italian troops in my area were under him. Only as regards the XVIIIth Corps in Zara conditions were not quite clear.
Q: Was he also in charge of the Bergamo Division in Split and also the XIVth Army Corps in Podgorica?
A: Those two were certainly under him. The area of the Italian Army streched from the Greek Frontier as far as Zara in Northern Dalmatia.
Q: Was General Dalmazzo put under any duress?
A: Not in the slightest. He wasn't even forced from the point of view of the whole situation. To show you what conditions were really like I would like to say when I had flown to Tirana and we were about to capture the Italian Commander in Chief, my Ia, who was with me, remarked, "Are we going to capture anybody or are we going to be captured by somebody?
Q: Who was present on the German side in these negotiations?
A: The first General Staff officer, my Ia; then the Adjutant 2a, a Colonel von Kettelhod; then the Commanding General of the XXIst Corps, who died in the meanwhile; then General Utz, who was the Commanding General of the 100th Rifle Division, then possible General of the Luftwaffe Klamm; and my aide-de-camp.
Q: Who was your Ia at the time, General?
A: Colonel von Fahrenbuehler.
Q: How did the negotiations proceed?
A: Terms for the surrender had been circulated in three copies in the German language. I gave one copy to the Italian general, and I had every single sentence translated and checked by his interpreter. He accepted the terms and signed them. He only wanted to be assured that he would be given a period of time where he could still be in charge of his wireless station so that he could contact his troops.
Q: What were the terms of the surrender, as much as they are of importance to us here?
A: As far as I can remember all Italian troops are the prisoners of the Wehrmacht. Their entire ammunition, weapons, supplies, vehicles, stores, etc. are to be surrendered. They were not allowed to hand over any arms to the partisans. They were to make themselves ready to march to the railway stations which were at a considerable distance. They had to direct their march and only small German units were to supervise this operation. The troops were allowed to keep their light weapons, their light machine guns, etc. in order to protect themselves against the bands.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritsch, the Tribunal will adjourn at this time until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
(THE TRIBUNAL ADJOURNED AT 1630 to RESUME AT 0950 29 October 1947)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 29 October 1947, 0930, Justice Carter presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain as to whether or not all the defendants are present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors, all defendants are present in the courtroom except the defendants Felmy and Lanz who have been excused and von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed, Dr. Fritsch.
LOTHAR RENDULIC - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. FRITSCH (Counsel for defendant Rendulic):
Q. General, yesterday before the recess we stopped at the question concerning the treatment of the Italians. Concerning the terns of the surrender you said that you left the Italians their weapons. Is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. I now want to ask you for what reason you left them their weapons and whether that was not rather dangerous.
A. To leave the Italians their weapons, that was a very dangerous affair in view of their numerical superiority and in view of the ****sibility that they might have a change of heart any moment; but I ****t them their weapons in their own interest because the Italians ***** to march across the area of the partisans up to a distance of ***** kilometers. The partisans would have stopped the Italians if *****y had been unarmed down to the very last and they would have killed most of them for the partisans hated the Italians.
As for the German escort personnel all I could do was to give the various Italian divisions just a few officers and men for supervision but not enough men to protect them. You can see here how unique conditions were in the Balkans that one actually had to leave the prisoners their weapons. I believe that this has not ever happened before anywhere in the world.
Q. In the surrender terms was there penalties included if the terms were not adhered to?
A. Well, there were sanctions and these sanctions were aimed at the psychology of the Italians with which I was very well familiar. The sanctions were intended to prevent material from being destroyed and, in particular, arms reaching the partisans.
Q. Would you please briefly give us your view of these sanctions?
A. As far as I can recall, the sanctions said about the following: If in a unit vehicles or any other equipment is destroyed one officer and ten men of the unit will be shot; a division supplies the partisans with weapons of that division, out of such a division, one officer and 50 men will be shot. Every man was told that he would be shot if on arrival at the railroad station he did not hand in his weapons that had been left to him.
Q. Well, I want to ask you a question. This handing over weapons to partisans, that was of particular importance for you, was it not? Would you tell us, please, for what reason that was so?
A. For us that was of vital importance that the partisans should not receive any weapons for we knew beyond all doubt that the development of the organization of the partisans was hampered mainly by their lack of weapons and ammunition. It was known that the partisans did everything to obtain possession of arms and ammunition.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honors, on this opportunity may I draw the attention of the Tribunal to the Document NOKM-1439, Exhibit No. 295.
That is the Volume XII and it is page 49 and 50 in the English version. Concerning the weapons in the possession of the partisans it says on page 49 that the 5,500 men of the 2nd Croat Partisan Corps had only 3,500 rifles, and on page 45 it says that a third of the 21st Brigade had no weapons whatsoever.
Q. General, may I now ask you to tell us whether that threat of those sanctions had any effect?
A. No doubt they were effective. We had all the equipment of the Italians vehicles or weapons or supplies or stores and we received them in perfect condition. Only a few coastal batteries on distant islands had been destroyed. The occupation had fled to Italy on fishing boats. The weapons of the Italians, too, which reached the railroad station were handed over in total. The Bergamo Division in Split was the only exception.
Q. Would you please tell us now whether the sanctions with which the Italians were being threatened were carried out?
A. The sanctions were never carried out nor would it have been possible to do so in effect as an order concerning those sanctions and the carrying out of those sanctions was never issued to a German unit. That threat of sanctions was directed exclusively to the Italians.
Q. What was the reason for the action taken against the Bergamo Division in Split?
A Those steps were only taken during the last days of September and they were not taken in connection with the sanctions which were a clause in the surrender terms. The steps were taken exclusively in view of the Fuehrer Orders of the 11th and 13th of September, the texts of which were entirely different.
Q. General, I shall revert later to the question of the Bergamo Division in Split. For the moment I should like to know whether similar cases of threatening sanctions in surrender terms are known to you?
A. I can remember the fact that as a rule surrender terms contain a clause for sanctions. I remember that from history but I cannot recall any details. From my own experience I know that I concluded a surrender agreement, however, when the situation was reversed. That was with the American Third Army, for the Army Group South which I led, and that was on the 7th of May 1945. In Article 10 of that agreement there is contained a general clause saying that if the terms are not adhered to steps will be taken according to the clause, and the usages of war. I also know that in the surrender terms which the Allied High Command on the 23rd of September 1943 concluded with the Italian Marshal Badoglio. There was also amended a clause threatening sanctions to the effect that if the terms are not adhered to further Italian territories would be occupied or that punitive expediencies by the air force would be made on Italian cities.
Once again I emphasize that sanctions which form a clause of the Tirana capitulation were directed exclusively at Italians. I emphasize that they were never carried out. They never could be carried out because they were never contained in an order addressed to the German troops, that is to say, an order to carry out the sanctions.
Q. One more question, General, concerning the terms of surrender; were the Italians being treated in a deragatory manner while the terms were being discussed?
A. No, in no way. We had adhered to correct forms and we took all steps to save the feelings of the Italians because we had understanding for their situation.
Q. I now come to the so-called Fuehrer Order, General. Would you please take Book XIII, and would you open the book on page 29, please? In the English text it is on page 42. This is prosecution Exhibit 323. It says: "The written order from the OKW of the 15th of September concerning the treatment of the Italians."
Would you please look on page 31. In the English text it is page 45. Would you please look at the provisions in this order, one of which substantially says that the officers of the units which allow their weapons to reach the partisans and who may common cause with the partisans are to be shot under martial law.
The other clause says that if the Italians continue to offer resistance the officers who are responsible for such resistance are to be shot as franc-tireurs.
Now, there is something I want to ask you, General. That order from the OKW, has that come as a new thing to you now? Has it surprised you?
A This is a written order from the OKW. It bears the date of the 15th of September and the information only reached the Army a few days later. Concerning those most important clauses which you have just mentioned, it did not come as anything new for we had already those clauses in advance by teletype and that is the order mentioned under "a", page 45 in the English text. It was received on the 13th of September. The order under "b" we received as the 11th of September, which means that we knew about those orders before we had received the written order.
Q Would you now please turn to page 41 in the same document book XIII in the English version that is on page 55. This is document NOKW-910. The exhibit number is 327. This is the order from the OKW which we have just mentioned. It is the order concerning Italian units that were still offering resistance. When was this order received?
A The document shows that we received the order on the 11th of September and that it was passed on at 3 o'clock in the afternoon on the 11th of September to the 15th Corps which at that time had General Luetters as its Commander.
Q That order of the 11th of September -- did you write that out yourself and when was it passed on by the Army?
A Well, this order was passed on at 3 o'clock in the afternoon on the 11th of September, I don't think that on that day I was with the Army. I want to say about this order that the Chief of Staff of the Army wrote it out. I am not saying this to hold the Chief responsible for this action for concerning all the actions that occurred in the Army Staff I take full and exclusive responsibility. The Chief is responsible to me; but I am drawing your attention to this fact in order to make it clear, that important orders were passed on automatically without the Commander being involved if the Commander had not to make any decisions.
Q General, would you please now turn to page 48 in the English text, 62, that is part of the document. There you find the OKW order already mentioned concerning the treatment of the Italian troops who sent weapons to the partisans. This order, as you can tell from the document, had reached the Army on the 13th of September. Did you have any misgivings about these orders? Please also tell us what reflections you made about these orders at the time?
A I had no misgivings nor could I have had any misgivings. I told myself if people are away from their own state, their own country, and contrary to the terms, so to speak, as private individuals wage war against another state such fighting is illegal. I must emphasize that at that time was not in a state of war with Germany nor would that have been of decisive importance because the terms of surrender are valid to the warfare convention even if the commander in Chief concerned makes such an agreement the will of his own government. Men who under such conditions wage war could only be considered franc-tireurs. If, furthermore, Italians supplied the partisans with weapons that, too, had to be regarded as an illegal action for, in virtue of the terms of the surrender, the Italians were the prisoners of the Wehrmacht and according to the Geneva Convention, the prisoners are subordinate to the laws of the state which keeps them prisoners and under German law favoring the enemy, aiding and abetting the enemy, by supplying him with weapons was a crime demanding the death sentence.
Italians who for supplying the enemy with weapons were punished by death rightly and they were treated no differently from any German soldier who committed the same action.
Q May I ask you to tell us now what was understood, what was meant, by the expression, "shooting a person after summary court martial." Would you tell us, General?
A To shoot a person after summary court martial that is just an abbreviate expression. That means that the person has to be brought before a summary court martial and the prosecutor, if the defendant's guilt has been proved, has to ask for the death sentence. The verdict of the Court is and remains entirely independent and can be seen from the verdict passed actually by summary court martials on Italians.
Q How was a summary court martial composed?
AA summary court martial had three members of whom one whenever possible was supposed to be qualified for the office of judge. Only if that was impossible, that condition could be waived. I have to assume that in the case of the summary court martial which was established for the Bergabo Division one judge was a member of the court because it was the only summary court martial which had to be established by that German division at that time.
Q General, we are still discussing the prosecution Document NOKW-910, Exhibit 327. Would you please turn to page 42. In the English text it is page 56. This document -- may I ask you whether you found it?
A Yes, I have.
Q: This document was described by the Prosecution as an order given at your initiative to take reprisal measures against the Italians. Would you please give us your views?
A: This document contained an order by the Second Panzer Army to the XVth Mountain Corps. At that time it was General Lueters who commanded that Corps. Well, the purpose of this order was to tell the XVth Corps about the terms which had been drawn up in Tirana for the Italians. It was always uncertain whether the XVIIIth Italian Army Corps, which was stationed in Zara, that is the Italian troops fartherest to the North was subordinate to the IXth Italian Army and whether that Corps was included in the surrender terms. Therefore, it was important to me that that Corps, which until then had made no difficulties and which had made its own arrangements with the XVth German Corps, should be informed about the Tirana terms. This order is nothing but an order to the German XVth Corps to tell the VIth and VIIIth Italian Corps which were the Corps within its area, about these terms and to inform them of these terms by way of an order. There is a dangerous translation error which makes it difficult to understand this order. May I read out the first sentence? It says: "The withdrawal of Italian troops within the area of the XVth Mountain Corps in accordance with instructions of the XVth Mountain Corps were in the hands of the Italian VIth and VIIIth Army Corps." That is to say, the two Italian Corps had to command the Italian withdrawal. And I continue: "The Commanding Generals of those Corps must be given orders, and they must be given orders in about the following sense". Now, may I say this? Certainly among all the documents here this is the most difficult sentence to be translated into the English language. The English language does not know any word to match this word "sinngemaess" (logical, reasonable). It is necessary to translate that word by a whole sentence.
In the original translation, such as appears in the English Document Book, no mention is made of the Commanding General. That is to say, only the singular is used; but in the original document I mean in the German context, there is the plural, and that plural itself reveals that those Commanding Generals were in fact the two Commanding Generals of the two Italian Corps.
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, possibly to clarify this issue Dr. Fritsch could hand the original document in question to the Interpreter and have him translate it, without having the Defendant comment about it. And then if the Defense is not satisfied with that interpretation further steps can be taken which we have taken in the past.
DR. FRITSCH: I agree with that procedure.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Of course you can do that if you want to, but I think the Witness has the right to put the interpretation on it that he gave to it. I think he had a right to testify to that if he cares to, irrespective of what the Translators might say up here. Of course we have no objection to the Translator's doing it if you care to have them do it.
DEFENDANT RENDULIC: Well, if I had given this order in English, what I would have said is this: (Speaking in English) "For this purpose the Commanding Generals of these Corps.....
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Pardon me. I wonder if we might get the exact page and place in the record where he is reading.
DR. FRITSCH: In the English text the page is 56, the first paragraph.
MR. RAPP: Page 56, Your Honor, Document Book XIII, the 6th and 7th lines from the top.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I don't seem to have those pages here. (Giving indication of having found the pages in question).
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q: Would you continue please?
A: Well, what I would say is this: (speaking in English): "The Commanding Generals of these Corps are to be given instructions, the meaning of which is indicated by the following."
BY DR. FRITSCH: Let me see I believe the translation is not correct.
A: This means that this order did not commit the people to whom it was given. It was not binding. The entire meaning of this sentence reveals that the German words "Auftraege" -"Instructions" -- which might in certain circumstances be translated into English "By orders," is so weak in its meaning here that it has the other English meaning; that is, it has the meaning of "instructions," - it must have that meaning. That is to say, we see that this order is an order to the XVth Corps. In Points 1 through 6 of this order there are provisions, rulings, which are to be passed on to the Italian Corps. Therefore, this is not an order to the German Corps, but these are instructions or directives passed on to the Italian Corps. You can see that too from the contents, of the various points. Under No. 1 the Italian Corps are informed of the terms of the surrender. Under No. 2 the Corps are instructed that in the future they would receive orders from the Commanding General of the XVth German Corps. Under No. 3 certain tasks are allotted to them concerning the organizations of their units. And now we come to No. 4, the incriminating point. Under No. 4 they are informed of the sanctions, the clauses in the Tirana agreement, in case the terms are not adhered to. I don't think I need to discuss the other points. That is the meaning of this order, and this was not a reprisal order to the Italians, but this order, apart from the various instructions concerning their different marching orders was nothing but a notification telling them of the Tirana sanctions.
This order was issued to the German troops by the German Commanding General to be passed on to the Italians as an instruction, but not to carry out the sanctions.
Q: Your Honors, in these circumstances I can do without having that passage translated again.
General, Article 3 of this order says in brackets, "SS Copy". That is the meaning of that addition?
A: The XVth Corps, at that time, had two divisions which were in contact with the Italians, the 114th Division and the 7th SS Mountain Division. Naturally those troops had to be informed about the instructions which had been given to the Italians within their area. On the last page there is the signature to this order, and below the signature it says, "Passed to 114th Division by Ia in person". We can explain that because the 114th Division was within the area of the Corps. The 7th SS Division was in Central Dalmatia. That is opposite Split, a long way from the Corps headquarters and, therefore, it received the information in writing or by teletype. That is the only meaning of this sentence.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. General, there is another question I should like to clear up. In the Indictment concerning Count 3, under 2 "i", you are charged with having issued an order to the effect that of every division in the Italian Army which had capitulated, which prior to its surrender had sold its weapons or had destroyed them or given them away, one officer and fifty men; furthermore, of every division one officer and ten men were to be shot, if before the surrender they had rendered them vehicles unusable. I have been unable to find any specific evidence concerning that Count, and therefore I have to assume that the Prosecution bases its charge on the order of the 12th of September, which we have just mentioned. May I ask you to state your views briefly?
A. I can't understand that Count in the Indictment either unless it refers to the order of which we have just spoken. And I believe I have proved that this order has been misunderstood. I believe I have proved that it is in no way an order for reprisals, but this order does not threaten sanctions for actions which were committed before the surrender.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: General, in your statement "misunderstood" is it possible that you may mean "mistranslated?"
DEFENDANT RENDULIC: Yes, I mean mistranslated, and probably because it was mistranslated it was also misunderstood and misinterpreted.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. General, you have just said that sanctions before the surrender are entirely out of the question, As a matter of fact no measures were taken.
A. No, never.
Q. I now come to the order organizing the withdrawal of the Italians.
It is the same Exhibit 327 in Document Book XIII. Would you please turn to Page 45 in the German text; the English page is 59. This order, General, deals with the evacuation of the Italians from the area of the XVth Corps to the railroad station at Bihac about 150 Km away. Would you please tell us something about that?
A. Yes, I will. The Italians had to march to the railway station of a distance of 150 to 400 Km. This march took them through partisan areas, and the Italians were afraid of that marching. They wanted to be taken away, to be evacuated, by sea, but there were no shipping space available. You can tell from this order, and you can see it from No. 3, that we persuaded the Italians by reason that it was absolutely necessary for them to be evacuated because of their food supply. At any rate, in view of the small number of German troops and in view of the ten-fold and more superiority in numbers of the Italians who also had their weapons, the situation was a very dangerous one in case they should offer resistance. And, therefore, it was a matter of course that very severe steps had to be taken against such resistance, and the necessary orders are given here.
Q. You didn't see anything extraordinary, anything unusual in this order did you?
A. No. No, not at all. I didn't see anything unusual in them. Under the rules which apply to German soldiers too everybody had to be shot who offered resistance in a dangerous situation, but I do not know of a single case where Italian resistance became so strong that one had to resort to such measures.
Q. General, you still have Document Book XIII before you haven't you? Will you now please turn to Page 23? It is Page 34 in the English Document Book. I am referring to Document No. 1403; the Exhibit No. is 319.
This is an order from the XVth Corps, the commander of which at that time was General Lueters. The order is dated the 11th of September. General, I ask you, has this order anything to do with the Army order of which we spoke earlier?
A. No, the Army order is dated the 12th of September, and this order is dated the 11th of September. It is interesting though to see that the Corps independently of the Army had reached the same conclusion that it might become necessary to take stringent measures. In the last paragraph of this Corps order it is expressly stated that any open or attempted resistance is to be broken by applying severe measures. The Corps too in the situation in which its troops found themselves did not feel very happy. And, therefore, it considered the possibly of taking severe measures in the case of resistance.
Q. Then, now, coming to a different matter, concerning the Italian problem. It is the so-called General Roncaglia case. General, would you please take Document Book XIII and open it to Page 26? In the English text it is Page 37. This is Document No. NOKW-037. The Exhibit No. is 320. This document contains a report from the Second Panzer Army of the 13th of September. It was sent over to the Army Group at a quarter past three in the afternoon. First, a preliminary question, General. How was it that such a daily report was made?
Q. These Daily Reports were written out every day in the afternoon, in connection with the Daily Reports we had been receiving during the day from the subordinate corps. The idea was to pass on the most important portions of the corps reports and incorporate them in the Army Report.
Q. General, and was that done in the Daily Report of the 13th of September?