I would have had to order that one or the other order, one or the other regulation is no,longer valid for the 2nd Panzer Army, or forbid compliance with the Fuehrer Order regarding my own Army."
The troops would not have understood such an order at all which prevented them from complying orders and regulations made by Hitler. Furthermore, they would have been justifiably under the impression that their own military commander attacked them and knifed them in the back in this difficult struggle in which they found themselves, and they would have thus been under the impression that they deprived of the application of one last urgent means. I am convinced that such an order given by me certainly would not have been followed by men and I would have never been in a position to force anybody to follow such an order of mine.
Q. Did you have any proof for this attitude of the troops what can you tell us about the life of the men, in partisan warfare?
A. I knew very well that everybody in my troops, from the General down to the last man, was very unhappy in the Balkans. There were hundreds of requests concerning a transfer to Russia, although there were all the time the most fierce battles in force. One has to understand that the life of the men in the Balkans bordered to almost unbearable conditions. First of all their activity was not properly esteemed from the military point of view, and secondly they lived in a constant danger, which besides was superfluous.
(INTERPRETER KURTZ)
It is hardly pleasant to assume that behind every bush there is an enemy and expect everybody to fire on you. I myself experienced what the troops felt. To give you one example, on one occasion I dined with the Battalion and the room looked out to the garden. I noted just outside the window that there was a sentry, and I asked why a sentry was there all the time. The Battalion Commander told me we have to have him there because otherwise we can never be certain that somebody will not throw a hand grenade into our lunch, possibly by the people who live next door, who otherwise live quite loyally, but nobody knows what they have up their sleeves. We have had sufficient proof in that respect, and the troops felt most unhappy. That was the impression one had to gather.
Q. General, on this occasion I would like to ask you something; what were the means at your disposal to see that your orders were carried out?
A. I mentioned before that it would have been quite impossible to force anyone to carry out my orders, an order which would rescind a Fuehrer order. The means to force anyone to carry out an order of mine were first disciplinary punishment, where you could appeal in certain cases right up to Hitler. You could appeal, you could put men before a courtmartial. I had to ask myself whether a courtmartial would have been in a position to sentence a defendant because he had not followed my order, but had followed an order given by the Fuehrer.
In that procedure a sentence by the courtmartial in that respect would have lacked any legal basis to have my order carried into affect. It was entirely impossible to invalidate a Fuehrer order which was in force. There was no means at my disposal at all.
Q. General, let me ask you now a question which is not immediately connected with this; according to the regulations of the German Army is the Commander in Chief responsible for what his troops do?
A. Yes, he is responsible, but only for those acts which the troops committed because of an order issued by him on his own initiative. Under no circumstances can he be held responsible for acts committed by his troops which lack the basis in the orders given by an agency which is above him. To give you an example, if my troops on the basis of orders mentioned which had been issued without my interference before I took over my command, and which were with the troops and I was powerless to do anything against them, if in other words the troops acted on the basis of those orders I find it quite impossible to regard myself responsible for those acts and after I think this over, there is in the field of reprisal measures no act committed by my troops which was not based on those orders.
Q. When you looked at the orders which existed at that time would it not have been possible for you at that time to devise a scheme entirely different from the procedure suggested until then in the fight against the partisans?
A. No, that would have been impossible. I had a large number of troops under me, quite adequate for my tasks, but in an order to initiate an entirely now procedure I would have needed so many troops that I would have been in a position to protect every single one of the general objects on roads, on railways, -- that I would have rendered it impossible for the partisans to do anything at all. For that I would have needed so many troops that the highest military leadership would never have given me all those troops, even if they had them, because in that case the aim of the enemy who supported the partisans would have achieved more than they had already, namely to tie down as many forces as possible by the partisans.
In other words, there was little hope of-a not very happy expression, - there was no hope at all to initiate any other procedure.
Q. Now, this opinion, General, applies particularly to the Balkans area, does it not? Now, could you give us any examples by which you could support your opinion?
A. An example about the use of troops which I have just described as impossible for a belligerent state, existed in modern military history on the occasion of the occupation of Bosnia and the Hercegovina by the Austrian troops in 1878. The troops, who at the very beginning were not very strong, had to face heavy fighting against the partisans. These partisans were hunted all over the country, were fought, but it soon became clear with the means which had been employed no early pacification of the country would have been possible. For that reason it was decided, to send Infantry divisions to Bosnia and Hergegovina. These divisions had four regiments each, and amounted to 22,000 men. In other words, twice the strength of the German divisions in 1943. These strong forces in Austria were employed because Austria was not at war at the time. Now, if you were to take the proportion between Bosnia and the whole of any area on the one hand, and the strength of the troops you would have had in the whole area, of the second Panzer Army had to have 150 German divisions in order to equal the Austrian forces. That would have actually amounted to the strength of the whole of the German Army in the East in 1943. With those forces there was peace and quiet very quickly, and then the Austrians were withdrawn and the strength of five or six German divisions were left in the country until the outbreak of World War No. 1. In other words, the country was entirely pacified and the occupation forces were very strong, nevertheless, this strong occupation force was in no position to prevent that on June 28, 1914, that the Crown Prince and his wife were shot at, nor could they prevent attempts on soldiers and railways the possibility of the attacks, and the necessity for reprisal measures are based on the fact that the perpetrators usually could not be apprehended is out of all proportion.
I mean the necessity for reprisal measures does not become surperfluous, even if the occupying power is very strong.
Q. General, one question which as meant quite generally; was the development taken by partisan warfare, which you encountered in the Balkans, a surprise to you, and how far had this development been influenced by the military situation as such?
A. The development of partisan warfare in the Balkans was a complete surprise. This development can only be explained by the development of military technique. Without the airforce, supply of the Balkans from abroad would not have been possible, and that, of course, was an essential source for them to spread their organizations. Without the effective weapons such as tommy guns, the highly effective military condition of certain small units would not have been feasible. Without wireless technic partisans would not have been directed and lead by Tito in this last area. It was only through the development of military technique that partisan warfare spread so vastly as it did. It was my observation that together with the spreading of partisan warfare counter-measures equally developed and grew. In the views held concerning those countermeasures, which are based on concepts of international law going back 40 or 50 years, perhaps have also overcome development and if, as we have heard recently here, we find that other armies also adopted this intensified form of reprisal measures I think I am justified in saying that even in the field of reprisal measures the development of international law is a very general one, and is not only limited to German views.
Q. General, now let us discuss the position in your area; you yourself said that it was not only possible to keep the ratio of reprisals lower and lower and to limit them to a greater extent; can that be true that a new element cropped up in this problem, and if so what element was that?
A. No entirely new element cropped up suddenly. I mentioned the condition of combat which had been pursued also by the partisans. I, with the utmost energy, insisted that the partisans be combatted in a strictly military sense, and in actual fact this was carried out. These forces were fighting all the time. I sometimes would receive very strong forces, even if only temporary. The army itself went out on operations. Time and again we had the necessity that we must get the partisans to come out and fight and to disclose their forces, so that they could be deflected from any other operations, and that was done successfully.
THE PRESIDENT: May I interrupt just a minute?
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. General, in your answer to an inquiry, the one just previous to the one you just made, you commented on the necessity for reprisals and also commented on the fact that possibly there had been some use of reprisals by other armies than the Germans. Without in any way indicating my personal attitude and in no way binding the other members of the Tribunal, but merely by way of inquiry, if we were to carry on the matter of reprisals that had been carried on to the degree as shown by the evidence here and to the degree it is intimated was carried on by other armies, warfare would become merely a brutal kind of barbarism. Now somewhere along the way there has got to be a stop to that kind of warfare, hasn't there?
A. If I may give you my answer, this after all is not what warfare is about, namely to adapt brutal measures. We ourselves always described them as the ultimate and most extreme methods, and these methods are used only in order to protect and ward off unjustified attacks against which otherwise you have no possibility of protection. I am convinced that if the Russians in Berlin had not decreed that for every Russian soldier shot 50 Germans must be shot, that a great many Russian soldiers would have been shot in Berlin. The Russians did not have at their disposal another method to protect their soldiers, however, strong as the forces in Berlin might have been, because it could never have prevented that someone might shoot from a cellar or window and that somebody might throw a hand grenade after dark. If I have said reprisal measures are a necessity and the development in the whole type of warfare which became so intense in the Balkans, other Armies also availed themselves of that type of warfare, but I only was referring to those methods which are indespensable to protect ones own troops against attacks against which no other type of protection exists.
Q. I appreciate that you had to deal with an extraordinary and unusual condition and with individuals and bands and troops, who apparently had no reason or didn't use it and were extremely difficult to handle.
The thing that disturbs me is that if we are to carry on that type of fighting or punishment against them our whole civilization becomes a barbaric civilization?
A. I don't think that this danger exist, because conditions of that sort where units might be forced to protect themselves only by reprisals are highly exceptional cases.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Doctor.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. General, perhaps I might in this connection ask you to look at Volume 25; I am talking about Exhibit 570 of the Prosecution, which is on page 53 of your Honor's book, and on page 42 of the German text. It is Document NOKW 1772. This is a letter addressed to the Commanding General of the 15th Mountain Corps; does this letter represent your own views?
A. Yes, the Commanding General had just arrived in the Balkans and made a few suggestions as to how to change our procedure. The changes were mainly concerned with the idea to make an aim to pacify the occupied areas and to give them proper administrations. These suggestions coincided entirely with the view I had myself. But he, from his point of view, could not realize that all prerequisites for the carrying out of these measures did not exist. These prerequisites were to have a large number of forces. Therefore nothing remained to do but to hunt partisans as much as possible and to fight them as much as you could and to disperse their forces all the time. In that respect the letter named gives an insight into principles of warfare pursued at that time.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. General, in your copy you have marked a few passages with red pencil. Would you please read those passages?
A. This is under I to III, the third paragraph on page 54 in the English copy and it reads as follows:
"The present conduct of the war to eliminate the threat of bands is primarily dependent on the strength of available forces. The main target of the fighting must be the armed forces of the enemy. Accordingly, operations must be conducted in such a manner that the armed forces of the enemy are caught, destroyed or at least seriously damaged."
Then in paragraph V on page 55 of the English Document Book:
"It is not necessary to discuss in detail the proposed conduct of the war which aims essentially at 'a conquest by sectors' of sections of terrain and their occupation and pacification because the forces necessary for this are not available. The situation as regards forces necessary for this are not available. The situation as regards forces does not permit the employment of divisions exclusively for occupation and pacification without drawing upon them for other missions."
Q. General, did you want to express here that you by your measures wanted to eliminate reprisal measures bye and bye?
A. The purpose of this constant battle was to keep the partisans on the jump all the time. This letter is an extremely frank one. It refers only to the fight of the partisans against the armed forces. Not one word is said here or reprisal measures or that reprisal measures, for instances, was weakening national strength or to decrease the civilian population, as has been asserted in this trial. Not one word is mentioned here. Had this been intended you may rest assured that in this highly confidential letter this would have been expressed without any doubt.
Q. Let me leave this complex now and go over to something else. This is the question of the Italians. You have already pointed out that the Italian question was an important one to you, and I am sure that at that time you worried about the problem which was imminent. May I ask you first to tell us something about that? First of all, how from a military point of view was the territory which was occupied by the Italians?
A. The mountains which separates the interior of the Balkans from the Coast was entirely in Italian hands. These mountains were a savage country full of rocks and in some cases you had veritable jungles there. The only two roads led to Albania and from Bosnia to the Coast there was a new one and one good road from Croatia to the Coast; and otherwise there were few roads of any value. In the mountain area these roads were extremely difficult to negotiate for a driver.
I want to mention only one instance. The main road to Albania which leads from Southern Serbia to Skutari -that road goes through the mountains with so many bends that at a stretch of 60 kilometers you have 1,200 bends and there is only one read which leads to the Coast along the whole coastal front of 1000 kilometers. This is the small track railroad that leads through Bosnia. Otherwise, in the whole of Dalmatia there is one road that leads up the coast a distance of 170 kilometers and from the Albanian coast the nearest railroad is at a distance of 400 kilometers; but the most important factor in this area was that even with modest means you could block it extremely easily.
Q. Now, what was your situation, General, when you took over this supreme command concerning a potential quitting on the part of the Italians?
A. I found myself in many a tight corner in the last war but the position which faced me then was among the very difficult ones. When Italy deserted us it appeared likely that a new enemy would fade us who might be twice or three times as strong as all my forces together and it had to be taken into consideration that a large part of those forces were tied down by their fight against the partisans. Then in addition, there was the fact that the mountain area which I mentioned before was part of the Italian area and could easily be blocked. If it should not be possible to eliminate Italian forces swiftly then one had to expect that a powerful enemy bridgehead might be established in the Balkans under whose protection any landing could be effected without interference. It was quite clear to me that situation could only be mastered by showing the utmost energy and boldness.
Q. Why did you assume that the Italians might turn enemy on you? Was it not merely to be assumed that they would simply not continue to fight on Germany's side?
A. I had to assume or at least anticipate that the Italians would turn against us. In July Mussolini was overthrown. Badoglio was regarded as anti-German. We had no idea what orders the Italian army group would receive in the event of Italy's leaving the alliance. You must always assume that the enemy is a reasonable man which is an old principle. It simply could not be understood why the enemy's leaders should let this enormous chance slip by, to have whole armies stationed in the Balkans and not make the fullest use of them and you could simply not expect that would occur. I had to anticipate at least the possibility of the Italians turning hostile on us.
Q. Now, General, the prosecution has charged you in connection with what you did against the Italians. Before dealing with these things in detail, I would like to ask you a few preliminary questions in order to make the situation appear quite clear before this Tribunal.
DR. FRITSCH: If the Tribunal please, I have had a little sketch drawn which, unfortunately, cannot be submitted today because the translation is not complete but the prosecution has expressed their agreement with my offering this for identification purposes. I offer this sketch as Rendulic Document No. 2 and for identification I offer it as 2-a.
MR. RAPP: If your Honors please, merely to straighten out the record, I would like to state that my personal concurrence, or the concurrence of the prosecution, is not necessary, if anything is being submitted for identification only. I am merely mentioning that because we ourselves may sometime be in a position where we are submitting anything only for identification without first consulting defense counsel.
DR. FRITSCH: I only thought it was my duty to consult the prosecution before this about this and communicate this to the Court.
This is a sketch which shows what the situation was on 9 September 1943 in the evening. I might point out that it does not claim to be completely correct as to measurements.
Q. General, do you have this sketch? Now you have got it, have you not? I might point out that the enlargement which I have submitted to the Court and the prosecution is unhappily reversed as far as the color scheme in concerned. On those maps the Italians are white whereas on yours they are black.
Now, would you, General, perhaps tell me how it was that the situation held on this sketch came about and what you had to do on 9 September and afterwards?
A: As has been mentioned before, this map describes what the situation was on 9 September 1943 in the evening and this is how the situation came about. On the 8th of September Italy declared that she would leave the Axis. The 2nd Panzer Army had made our preparations for this event. One battalion from each division had to be motorized and these six battalions were to drive into the Italian positions and occupy the five ports of Zara, Split, Ragusa, and then Durazzo and Valona. And also they were to occupy Podgorica in Northern Albania. In other words, these battalions had to drive into Italian positions and act as though they represented stronger forces simply ask the Italians to surrender. The divisions were to fill up on food. They were at a distance of about 400 to 900 KM behind the battalions. Some of them needed weeks in order to reach the coastal areas. All battalions reached their destination with the exception of the battalion which was to reach Split. That battalion was faced by extremely strong partisan units.
Q: Do you want to say by that, General, that your battallions found themselves in a precarious situation?
A: Well "precarious" is not strong enough for this situation, but it was inevitable. The map shows the proportion of strength between the German and the Italian troops. In the Zara area, for instance, the Italian superiority is at a proportion of 80 times. In the Tirana area and Durazzo area 40 times. And the partisans are not part of this calculation at all.
Q: And what did this situation lead to in the end and what were the methods you had to employ?
A: From the reports which reached, me it became clear to me that several local arrangements had been made, and that many Italian troops were tired of the war. Only the Commander in Chief of the Italian Army Group did want to have several days time to think over the invitation to surrender.
He was to be regarded as a stumbling block for this profitable development in the situation. This is the reason why we simply captured him among his own troops. And then I contacted the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Dalmazzo, and invited him to attend the negotiations concerning capitulation.
Q: Now, was General Dalmazzo authorized to negotiate in that sense?
A: He most certainly was, as the Commander in Chief of an Army.
Q: What were the troops under his command?
A: All Italian troops in my area were under him. Only as regards the XVIIIth Corps in Zara conditions were not quite clear.
Q: Was he also in charge of the Bergamo Division in Split and also the XIVth Army Corps in Podgorica?
A: Those two were certainly under him. The area of the Italian Army streched from the Greek Frontier as far as Zara in Northern Dalmatia.
Q: Was General Dalmazzo put under any duress?
A: Not in the slightest. He wasn't even forced from the point of view of the whole situation. To show you what conditions were really like I would like to say when I had flown to Tirana and we were about to capture the Italian Commander in Chief, my Ia, who was with me, remarked, "Are we going to capture anybody or are we going to be captured by somebody?
Q: Who was present on the German side in these negotiations?
A: The first General Staff officer, my Ia; then the Adjutant 2a, a Colonel von Kettelhod; then the Commanding General of the XXIst Corps, who died in the meanwhile; then General Utz, who was the Commanding General of the 100th Rifle Division, then possible General of the Luftwaffe Klamm; and my aide-de-camp.
Q: Who was your Ia at the time, General?
A: Colonel von Fahrenbuehler.
Q: How did the negotiations proceed?
A: Terms for the surrender had been circulated in three copies in the German language. I gave one copy to the Italian general, and I had every single sentence translated and checked by his interpreter. He accepted the terms and signed them. He only wanted to be assured that he would be given a period of time where he could still be in charge of his wireless station so that he could contact his troops.
Q: What were the terms of the surrender, as much as they are of importance to us here?
A: As far as I can remember all Italian troops are the prisoners of the Wehrmacht. Their entire ammunition, weapons, supplies, vehicles, stores, etc. are to be surrendered. They were not allowed to hand over any arms to the partisans. They were to make themselves ready to march to the railway stations which were at a considerable distance. They had to direct their march and only small German units were to supervise this operation. The troops were allowed to keep their light weapons, their light machine guns, etc. in order to protect themselves against the bands.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritsch, the Tribunal will adjourn at this time until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
(THE TRIBUNAL ADJOURNED AT 1630 to RESUME AT 0950 29 October 1947)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 29 October 1947, 0930, Justice Carter presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain as to whether or not all the defendants are present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors, all defendants are present in the courtroom except the defendants Felmy and Lanz who have been excused and von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed, Dr. Fritsch.
LOTHAR RENDULIC - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. FRITSCH (Counsel for defendant Rendulic):
Q. General, yesterday before the recess we stopped at the question concerning the treatment of the Italians. Concerning the terns of the surrender you said that you left the Italians their weapons. Is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. I now want to ask you for what reason you left them their weapons and whether that was not rather dangerous.
A. To leave the Italians their weapons, that was a very dangerous affair in view of their numerical superiority and in view of the ****sibility that they might have a change of heart any moment; but I ****t them their weapons in their own interest because the Italians ***** to march across the area of the partisans up to a distance of ***** kilometers. The partisans would have stopped the Italians if *****y had been unarmed down to the very last and they would have killed most of them for the partisans hated the Italians.
As for the German escort personnel all I could do was to give the various Italian divisions just a few officers and men for supervision but not enough men to protect them. You can see here how unique conditions were in the Balkans that one actually had to leave the prisoners their weapons. I believe that this has not ever happened before anywhere in the world.
Q. In the surrender terms was there penalties included if the terms were not adhered to?
A. Well, there were sanctions and these sanctions were aimed at the psychology of the Italians with which I was very well familiar. The sanctions were intended to prevent material from being destroyed and, in particular, arms reaching the partisans.
Q. Would you please briefly give us your view of these sanctions?
A. As far as I can recall, the sanctions said about the following: If in a unit vehicles or any other equipment is destroyed one officer and ten men of the unit will be shot; a division supplies the partisans with weapons of that division, out of such a division, one officer and 50 men will be shot. Every man was told that he would be shot if on arrival at the railroad station he did not hand in his weapons that had been left to him.
Q. Well, I want to ask you a question. This handing over weapons to partisans, that was of particular importance for you, was it not? Would you tell us, please, for what reason that was so?
A. For us that was of vital importance that the partisans should not receive any weapons for we knew beyond all doubt that the development of the organization of the partisans was hampered mainly by their lack of weapons and ammunition. It was known that the partisans did everything to obtain possession of arms and ammunition.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honors, on this opportunity may I draw the attention of the Tribunal to the Document NOKM-1439, Exhibit No. 295.
That is the Volume XII and it is page 49 and 50 in the English version. Concerning the weapons in the possession of the partisans it says on page 49 that the 5,500 men of the 2nd Croat Partisan Corps had only 3,500 rifles, and on page 45 it says that a third of the 21st Brigade had no weapons whatsoever.
Q. General, may I now ask you to tell us whether that threat of those sanctions had any effect?
A. No doubt they were effective. We had all the equipment of the Italians vehicles or weapons or supplies or stores and we received them in perfect condition. Only a few coastal batteries on distant islands had been destroyed. The occupation had fled to Italy on fishing boats. The weapons of the Italians, too, which reached the railroad station were handed over in total. The Bergamo Division in Split was the only exception.
Q. Would you please tell us now whether the sanctions with which the Italians were being threatened were carried out?
A. The sanctions were never carried out nor would it have been possible to do so in effect as an order concerning those sanctions and the carrying out of those sanctions was never issued to a German unit. That threat of sanctions was directed exclusively to the Italians.
Q. What was the reason for the action taken against the Bergamo Division in Split?
A Those steps were only taken during the last days of September and they were not taken in connection with the sanctions which were a clause in the surrender terms. The steps were taken exclusively in view of the Fuehrer Orders of the 11th and 13th of September, the texts of which were entirely different.
Q. General, I shall revert later to the question of the Bergamo Division in Split. For the moment I should like to know whether similar cases of threatening sanctions in surrender terms are known to you?
A. I can remember the fact that as a rule surrender terms contain a clause for sanctions. I remember that from history but I cannot recall any details. From my own experience I know that I concluded a surrender agreement, however, when the situation was reversed. That was with the American Third Army, for the Army Group South which I led, and that was on the 7th of May 1945. In Article 10 of that agreement there is contained a general clause saying that if the terms are not adhered to steps will be taken according to the clause, and the usages of war. I also know that in the surrender terms which the Allied High Command on the 23rd of September 1943 concluded with the Italian Marshal Badoglio. There was also amended a clause threatening sanctions to the effect that if the terms are not adhered to further Italian territories would be occupied or that punitive expediencies by the air force would be made on Italian cities.
Once again I emphasize that sanctions which form a clause of the Tirana capitulation were directed exclusively at Italians. I emphasize that they were never carried out. They never could be carried out because they were never contained in an order addressed to the German troops, that is to say, an order to carry out the sanctions.
Q. One more question, General, concerning the terms of surrender; were the Italians being treated in a deragatory manner while the terms were being discussed?
A. No, in no way. We had adhered to correct forms and we took all steps to save the feelings of the Italians because we had understanding for their situation.
Q. I now come to the so-called Fuehrer Order, General. Would you please take Book XIII, and would you open the book on page 29, please? In the English text it is on page 42. This is prosecution Exhibit 323. It says: "The written order from the OKW of the 15th of September concerning the treatment of the Italians."