One has to demand a distance such as is used as a rule to open fire so that one should not be surprised. That is as laid down in all regulations, a distance of 800 to 1000 meters. There can be no question that such a star could be seen or recognized at this distance, not even the considerably larger stars as we have seen on some photographs. White stars might have been seen possibly at a distance of 300 to 400 meters as a kind of blurred spot but red stars could never even be recognized as that, and the insignia which were worn on the sleeves and which were only worn by every fiftieth or sixtieth man could undoubtedly have been recognized with even more difficulty than the stars.
Q. And what did you ascertain concerning the open carrying of arms?
A. The fact that the partisans did not wear their arms openly was a further reason not to recognize them as proper military units. In most instances they had hidden their weapons and even if they did carry them on their person they carried them in a hidden manner.
It happened, for instance -- and that was at a time before the German troops were versed in this partisan method -- that a number of German soldiers went along a road and met a number of farmers who were carrying agricultural tools. They had hardly passed when they were attacked from the rear from these very people by machine guns. Or it might have happened that a bridge sentry of two soldiers would be posted at the entrance of a bridge; then three or four women would approach carrying agricultural tools. When they would reach these two soldiers they would suddenly draw their pistols and shoot the sentries.
Q. General, could not these things be designated as strategy of war?
A. No, such a surprise attack is obviously of a cunning nature and it preproposes that no uniform is worn and that the weapons are not carried openly.
Q. This method of fighting which you have described to us, was that a rule or was that an exception?
A. Such methods were applied in all possible manners. They were applied whenever the partisans appeared either individually or in small groups. That was how they appeared as a rule. The partisan warfare is significant for its cunning methods and for the fact that partisans will disappear after the action has been carried out. The partisans only very rarely confronted the German soldiers in larger units. They did that only when they had to defend the area which they occupied and when they had to protect their depots. It might have happened when they saw an opportunity to attack weaker German or Croatian units. Apart from this, we had almost to apply tactics which amounted to art, to get the partisans for an open combat operation. Such operations of a larger scale were, for instance, carried out by the Army in Eastern Bosnia or on the occasion of the attack on Tito's headquarters where one could count with certainty on the partisans appearing for an open combat operation.
Q. We were and are talking of the rules of warfare, witness. With regard to other measures used by the partisans, did you see any violation of the lawful rules or war, if I may call them that?
A. Yes, there was, for instance, the case of the treatment of prisoners of war. These prisoners were as a rule shot except for a number which they reserved for purposed of exchange. The officers were almost always shot. Besides, there were dozens of reports coming in which contained cruelties of a most incredible manner. At the time we had whole collections concerning these reports and then we passed on these reports to the Geneva Red Cross. That is a further reason -- I mean this disregard of usages of war -- not to consider the partisans regular or legal military units.
Q. General, in a document the prosecution concludes the regular character of the partisan units from the fact that German troops on occasions negotiated with the partisans concerning the exchange of prisoners. Do you know anything about that?
A. Yes, I do know about that. We had quite a number of negotiations of a local nature concerning the exchange of prisoners. That was done for the reasons of expediency. The fact that this negotiation took place does not allow us to conclude that the band units were regular military units.
Q. Is it know to you that Tito called his forces the "Jugoslav Army of Liberation?"
A. Yes, that is known to me and it was known. But we also realized that merely through this designation he could never make his troops a legal and regular military unit.
Q. Besides these Tito partisans and besides the independent groups of partisans which worked with them upon occasion, were there any other partisans?
A. Yes, there were also the Cetniks. They were recruited from the Serbian minority which resided in Croatia. They were sworn enemies of Tito and they were sworn enemies of the Ustascha of the Poglavnik. The Cetniks fought against us until about the end of October -- beginning of November -- of 1943 and then they discontinued their fights. Apparently that was done on order of Mihajlovic in Serbia. They depended on him. The fights between Tito and the Cetniks which were carried out in those areas where no German units were stationed were waged in the most cruel and bestial manner and under mutual extermination; in a similar manner the fights between the Cetniks and Ustascha were waged.
Q. Did you assume basically that the Cetniks were legal units?
A. No, the Cetniks were on exactly the same level as Tito's partisans where legality is concerned and for the very same reason.
Q. General, we will now turn to another problem which again is connected with the partisans. Could one say that the Croatian area was dominated by our troops?
A. Yes, one could say that without a doubt. The occupation and domination of Croatia and of the other areas of the Army was an effective one.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. It is in the nature of such an occupation that there would not be in every village and every valley and every neighborhood German units. But we were at all times in a position to send units and to reach any area of Montenegro, Albania or Croatia which we intended and wanted to enter. The numerous operations which were carried out had as their purpose not only to smash the partisans again and again but also to prove this fact. There was no operation which did not achieve the intended aim.
Q. I believe at an earlier date you mentioned that the Cetniks were recruited from the Pravoslavian circle. Will you just briefly define this conception, "Pravoslavian Circle"?
A. The Croatians and the Serbians are two different peoples. The bulk of the Croatians is of Roman Catholic faith.
The Serbian minority living in Croatia is of a Greek Catholic faith and this Greek Catholic Serbian minority calls itself, and is called, "Pravoslaves."
Q. We will first of all talk about the distinction between nationalities in that area. Were there any other groups of the population in Croatia nationally seen?
A. Nationally seen, there were no other groups of the population but there were some in a religious respect. There were the Moslems of Bosnia. They were partly Croatians, partly Serbians, and centuries ago they became Moslems -- when the Turks -- entered the area. Bosnia had been a Turkish province, up to 1878.
Q. Now, concerning this separation in a religious respect, did that have any particular significance in the Balkans?
A. I know of no area where the fact that the population was split up with regard to religion has a greater significance than it had in the Balkans. The contrast between the various groups of the population is sharp, particularly in the religious sphere, and there they are, they are fought over fanatically.
Q. On the occasion of your first visits in the Balkans was this contrast between Croatians and Provoslaves pointed out?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And in what manner was that done?
A. Amy Group E in Saloniki and also the two commanders of the German troops, particularly pointed out that there were some cruel mass persecutions of the Pravoslaves by Poglavnik's Regime. I heard that particularly during the first time, in areas where there were no German troops as many as 500,000-700,000 Pravoslaves had been killed. I discussed this matter in Zagreb, and I met a man there whom I had known from an earlier period. He belonged to the immediate surroundings of the Poglarnik. I asked this man, "How is it possible that such acts can be committed. How is it possible to kill 500,000 - 700,000 people merely because of religious or racial antagonism?" This "kind" person answered me the following, - and this is significant for the Balkan mentality: "700,000? That is slander. It couldn't have been more than 220,000". When I learned from discussions, especially with people who belonged to the closest circle of the Pogeovnik, that it was intended to start a now big wave of persecutions of Pravoslaves I told the German envoy that would be in contradiction with the tasks of pacification of the country which I had been given, and Kasche answered, "It is impossible to do anything against it. That is an internal Croatian affairs." I had not left the man any doubt that I would never permit that such a new persecution was carried out under my own eyes, and I requested him to tell this with all emphasis to Poglavnik -MJ and his people.
Q. General, were there really only religious reasons which caused this hatred and antagonism, and this persecution, or were there other reasons as well, and if so which ones?
A. There was an antagonism which is bordered on hatred, between the Catholic -- and the Greek Catholic circles. And that had always been the case. Even forty years ago when I first visited the Balkans I could find that was so. This hatred and antagonism led to bloody struggles between individual localities and that was constantly the case. That this antagonism could lead to larger waves of persecutions and to large struggles had to include one other factor and those were the political conditions. These political reasons did exist for the last generation through the creation of the Yugoslav kingdom. The men who created this State approached the problem from a wrong assumption. They thought that Croatians and Serbians were both parts of a Yugoslav nation. The Belgrade Government, which consisted of about 90% Serbians endeavored to have the Croatians and the Serbians adapted to each other. They regarded the Croatians with distrust. Maybe they did it because the Croatians were on a higher cultural level than the Serbians. They had never been under Turkish domination, and they had always been close to the Middle European culture while the Serbians had been under Trukish domination until the year 1805. Then the Croatians were reproached with the fact that they had been the best soldiers for the Austrian-Hungarian Army and that they had fought against the Serbians during the First World War. On the other hand the Serbians felt depressed because a Croatian person could not get on in Ygoslavian public life or in the Yugoslav Army. Everything concerning banks and credits was in purely Serbian hands. Numerous Serbians settled in Croatia and under the protection of Belgrade they proceeded to plunder the country. I know that Tito once expressed himself to the effect that the Ygoslav kingdom represented a typical country of suppressed people.
King Alexander I was a viction of the accumulated hatred of the Croatians in 1934 in Marseilles.
Q. General, you have told us that the Serbians felt depressed, I believe--
A. No, I didn't mean the Serbians. I meant the Croatians. They were depressed because they couldn't get along.
Q. And if I now consider the conditions the way you have described them here, what was the part played by this suppression for the further development in the Balkans at the time of the German occupation?
A. That played a large and decisive part. In 1941 Croatia was declared an independent state. And now the Croatians turned against their former actual or imagined suppressors by persecuting all Pravoslaves. A further consequence which was particularly important for the situation was the fact that the Croatians saw in the smashing of Yugoslavia, the liberation of their own country. And that the German soldiers were regarded as liberators and welcomed as such. The Prosecution says in their Opening Statement that the Croatians gave very little resistance and were soon demanded independence. If ever at any time the creation of an independent state had complied with the wish of the vast majority of its people, then that was at that time the creation of that Croatian State.
Q. General, new in this connection I shall again come back to a question which I have put to you once before, namely, whether there was any justification for Tito to call his units "Yugoslav Army of Liberation."
A. The fight of the partisans could, for the reasons mentioned, never be considered a fight of liberation against us. Tito's fight against us was outside of Croatia's interests. Tito waged his fight in the service of an ideology which did not originate in the Crotian people.
Q. But Tito had quite a number of followers didn't he?
A. Yes, there was undoubtedly quite a number of followers. Compared, however, with the size of the population and the forces which he established the number of his followers could not be regarded very considerable.
Q What was the reason, according to your experiences, for this following? Can the reason be found especially in the behavior of the Germans?
A No, by no means. The situation is this: Part of the population was against the terror policy of the Ustascha of the Poglavnik, especially the Pravoslaves and, as far as they did not join the Cetniks (that depended on the local situation) they would go over to Tito's forces in order to be secured against the Ustascha forces. Then, we ascertained that the partisans exercised a certain amount of pressure on the population and actually forced the people to join their ranks. They had compulsory recruitments. Only very few people were enthusiastic. The bulk of the people only followed them because they were afraid of reprisal measures.
Q Those people who did not want to join the ranks of the partisans, could they save themselves by escaping to other areas and thus escape recruitment in the ranks of the partisans?
AA lot of people tried that and actually did it, but their families would then be exposed to the reprisal measures taken by the partisans. They would be driven away from their homes and sometimes their property would even be burned down. So that after a while nobody dared any longer to escape and thus avoid being recruitted. On the occasion of my very first discussion in Zagreg members of the Croatian Government described this situation to me, and they emphasized particularly that the mass of people never really wants to fight and certainly therefore, not with Tito. They requested that on the occasion of operations in areas which we did not occupy and which we intended to give up after the operation had taken place, we evacuate everybody from these areas because, for one reason that would please the people and for another the partisans would thus see no cause to take any compulsory measures against the families of these people.
Q This statement was made to you by representatives of the Croatian Government?
A Yes, simultaneously with the request.
Q I shall then briefly return to the problem of the Pravoslaves. You were talking about the fact that you saw yourself in opposition to Kasche and Pravoslaves. Was the conclusion of this problem of especial significance to you as Commander in Chief, and did you succeed in restricting or even preventing the prosecution of the Pravoslaves.
A I did everything possible to counter the endeavors from Zagreb which intended to start a new persecution of the Pravoslaves. In various communications I pointed out to the Poglavnik that I would consider such an action as in contradiction of my task of pacification. I made it clear to all Croatian agencies, that, if necessary, I would use force against these persecutions. And so my troops were instructed, especially in the Pravoslave areas to liberate arrested Pravoslaves if necessary by force. I forbade that newspapers contained proclamations for the persecution of the Pravoslaves, and I had such papers confiscated. The Croatian Ministry of Propaganda no longer dared to take any steps openly in this direction. The later on distributed leaflets. The particularly active Branch of the Propaganda Ministry at Split was warned by me to the effect that I would have it transferred to Zagreb if it went on in this direction and that I might even have it closed down. That caused a storn of indignation on the part of Kasche and the Poglavnik. And even the Reich Foreign Minister who felt himself to be the protector of Croatian sovereignty opposed me and all of them together complained about me. However, since nothing was undertaken against me I consequently stuck to my line of action until the time when I left the Balkans. During my time there was no such thing as persecution of the Pravoslaves, although in many cases the attempts existed for such persecution. On the basis of my knowledge of the situation I am convinced that I saved the lives of many thousands of people.
Q Now, General, let us see. When did Tito start his fight in Croatia?
A Tito started his fight in Croatia as late as the fall of 1941.
Until that date there was peace in Croatia except for small sabotage acts which occurred. When in the summer and fall of 1941 the insurrection in Serbia was smashed, numerous Cetniks and Communists, bands, etc escaped to Bosnia. There they attacked the Croatian garrisons. The German troops stationed there soon intervened in this fight and quite soon after that the first, still very small bands of Tito, appeared. And that was the beginning.
Q What significance did you as German Troop Commander see in Mihajlovic?
A Mihajlovic had an immediate significance because the Cetniks who were in my area were obedient to him. Besides the communication lines through Serbia served my troops which were stationed in Albania. When Mihajlovic under the pressure of German reprisals--it might have been around October or November, 1943--ceased his fights, we knew that his attitude was only one of waiting and that he, as soon as an occasion arose where we found ourselves in difficulty, as for instance the event of landing of the allies in the Balkans would start fights immediately. Therefore, I had to count on a flare-up of a new insurrection in Serbia and that in the rear of part of my Army.
Q General, if I contrast these two people -- Tito and Mihajlovic-and if I may refer back to your statement that Mihajlovic was influenced by the German counter-measures and partically ceased all fights, why did these counter-measures have effect on Mihajlovic but obviously did not have any great effect on Tito?
A To begin with, I must state that in Croatia reprisal measures were only carried out to a very small extent. The reasons why that was possible I would like to enlarge upon on a later occasion. At this time I would like to answer your question to the effect that we knew that the effect of reprisal measures on a nationally minded leader, who considers his own people, would have to be totally different from the effect on a Communist leader who did not have these considerations. The German counter-measures in Croatia did not have a large effect on the highest leadership on the partisans.
They were rather effective concerning the subordinate leaders, the executive agencies, and those parts of the population which supported the partisans. And as such they achieved their aim without doubt.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q General, I now for the moment would like to leave this particular problem, which I would like to designate as the problem of the partisans. I would like now to approach the Italian problem seen from the territorial point of view. In the balance of the area outside of Croatia, which was subordinate to you, the Italians were stationed. Would you briefly describe the situation, please?
A The Italians had occupied in Croatia the coast in a width of from 150 to 200 kilometers, apart from that they occupied the area of Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania. In Tirana, the capital of Albania the headquarters of the Italian 9th Army Group EST was stationed and so was the Headquarters of the Italian 9th Army. This 9th Army was subordinate to Army Group EST and besides the 2nd Army, stationed in the north, partially outside of my area, but above the area of Trieste, etc. Up to the summer of 1943, also the 11th Army in Greece had been subordinate to this army group. In view of the possibility of landings on the part of the Allies, this 11th army was withdrawn from the army group EST and was subordinated to the German Army Group E in Salonika. It is important for my area that the 9th Army in Tirana had subordinate to it all Italian groups in my area with the exception of the 18th Corps in Zarai. The subordination of this Corps has never been quite clear to us.
Q And what about the strength of the Italians in their future area?
AAs far as I remember the strength of the Italians in my area was five to six army corps with twelve to fourteen divisions, besides there were a number of Panzer units and Black Shirt battalions.
Q The prosecution has stated in the opening statement in the territory of Army Group EST there were 51 Italian divisions; is that in contradiction to your statements here?
A Yes, it is. I cannot say whether or not this statement is correct, but if in the sphere of Army Group East there had been 51 Italian divisions, then there would have been in my area more than half Court No. V, Case No. VII.
of this, approximately 28 to 30 divisions. Then one could conclude more clearly the difficulties which were presented to us by the Italian.
Q General, I would now like to deal with the actual taking over of the commandership in Croatia by you. Up to now, you have told us that on 6 August you received Hitler's orders, which have been much discussed here and as a consequence you analyzed the situation there. When did you actually take over the commander in chief's post?
A In the second half of August the staff of the 2nd Panzer Army was transferred from Russia to the Balkans. It was gathered together on the 25th of August and at twelve o'clock on the 26th of August I received the command to take over this new 2nd Panzer Army. I transferred the headquarters to Vrujacka Banja, 200 kilometers south of Belgrade in southern Serbia.
Q May it please the Tribunal, unfortunately I did not succeed in submitting document book I at the proper time. I was promised that that would be the case and I started submitting my documents at the beginning of October, but I believe that due to the fact that photostat copies became necessary for the copies sent from Washington, matters have been delayed. I have been told today that the translations have been completed, but unfortunately I am not in a position to submit all documents today. For purposes of orientation, I would like to submit my document Rendulic No. 1 in order to clarify the channels of command. This is a sketch which I have given to Mr. Rapp at an earlier date and which later on will get its proper exhibit number. Mr. Rapp was kind enough to say he had no objections to this. May I then in connection with this subject put the appropriate questions. I am now showing you document No. 1, which will be submitted later. Thus is a sketch drawn up by you, which shows the channels of command in the Balkans. On this sketch you can see a vertical line; will you give us a short explanation to this sketch?
A This sketch shows the organization of the strength of the forces in the Balkans and it also shows the organization of the administration.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Down there on the left hand side of the line, which is drawn from Belgrade down, we find Army Group F. The sketch shows that the 2nd Panzer Army was subordinate to this Army Group. The sketch further shows that tha 2nd Panzer Army consisted of the 69th Army Corps, of the 15th Mountain Army Corps, of the 5th SS Mountain Army Corps and of the 21st Mountain Army Corps.
Q I thank you, General.
A The 3rd SS Panzer Corps marked down here, was in the Balkans only for a short period. The 2nd Croatian Corps which is also marked here was always subordinated to a German Corps depending on the situation. That is all I have to say in general.
Q I am interested particularly in the line which I have marked vertically.
A This line shows the separation between the troops and the operational departments and the administrative departments. This separation was a complete one seen from my point of view at the 2nd Panzer Army.
Q May it please the Tribunal, may I mark this sketch for identification as 1-A?
THE PRESIDENT: It is agreeable to the Tribunal.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q General, we will now turn to the fighting situation down there; what was this situation right at the time when you took over the post of the commander in chief?
A The fights in Croatia had naturally not been touched by the change of the channels of command. In many areas they were being carried out and surprise attacks, etc., were carried out also. I cannot remember any large scale operations during the first time of my stay there.
Q How did you approach your own task?
AAbove all I was under the impression that I had been put into completely new circumstances and conditions. I did not find it easy to adapt myself. It was all the more difficult to adapt myself on account Court No, V, Case No. VII.
of these conditions having developed without my contribution. I had not been down there to participate in this development. I was under the impression that I had sufficient forces for my task in the area of occupied Croatia. The expected treason of Italy was like a shadow over all my plans and considerations, because in that event a possible new enemy would appear. In any case the area of the army would be doubled. At that time I did not know what forces I would get in that event, but considering the total situation I realized there would not be very many.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The court will recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal had this unofficial information concerning the condition of the beat situation in the prison. An effort is being made to keep the cells warm, but there is not sufficient heat there to keep it from being chilly. Apparently it is. There are some boilers being replaced, and they should be repaired and in condition within a week, and if and when these repairs are made it is reported that the cells will be warm. At the present of the ce;;s were fully heated there would not be enough heat for the kitchens and baths. Certain members of the Tribunal have had difficulty themselves in getting repairs for their homes and furnaces, and can appreciate the situation which confronts the defendants, and the heating of the cells in the prison. We hope they will be repaired more promptly than they were for certain members of this Tribunal. If the repairs are not promptly made within a reasonable time may I suggest you make a further report to the Tribunal, and although we have no control over the matter we shall make an effort to see it is remedied, at least as far as any influence we may have can be brought to the attention of the proper authorities.
You may proceed.
LOTHAR RENDULIC DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. BRITISH:
Q General, before the recess we had stopped at the discussion of your actually taking over the command of the 2nd Panzer Army and you told us that you had been put into already completed circumstances; what was the consequence of this situation?
A The consequence could above all be seen in the manner in which the troops combatted the partisans. That was a situation which was already established. The troops had for a long time become adapted to this situation.
Another part of the already established facts is the orders and directives which had already been valid at that time for a certain period. There are only two of these orders and directives that I would like to mention, one is the OKW order concerning reprisal measures dated September 1941, and the regulation concerning band warfare dated December 1942. These orders and directives had been with the troops long before I arrived in the balkans.
DR. FRITSCH: May I point out to the Tribunal that this OKW order is Exhibit 53. It is contained in Document Book II. This is Document NOKW 258.
Q General, you did mean this reprisal order, didn't you, the one that talked about ratio figures; may I anticipate this problem and put the following question to you, the reprisal order of one to 50 to a hundred, -- was it ever applied in full?
A No, I do not know of any single instance where this order was ever applied to its full extent. The reprisal measures did only take place very occasionally and then they were kept in far lower bounds.
Q General, may I interrupt you for one moment. I believe the Tribunal is looking for this document. It is Exhibit 53, contained on page 67 of the English version of Document Book II. Will you please continue now?
A If we consider the extent of the area and the intensity of the attacks on the part of the Balkans, and if we also consider the fact that as a rule 12 or more division were constantly engaged in battles then we have to realize, or at least I had to realize when I was under these impressions at the time, -- that these reprisal measures were kept in low and limited bounds, and it was not possible to take any even less measures. Reprisal measures against human lives became fewer until the end they wore applied on very rare occasions.
Q Now, concerning the regulation for band warfare, may I assume that you know this regulation and may I ask you the following; did this regulation of combating the bands have any largo significance?
A For the battle of the troops this regulation was of a decisive significance. All measures are provided in this regulation, in tactical respect, as well as with respect to reprisals. Up until the 7 July 1943 the provision of the regulation had been in force that all captured bandits were to be shot. On the 7 July, that is one month before the 2nd Panzer Army arrived in the balkans, this regulation had been rescinded.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I that point may I mention that the Fuehrer Order which has just been mentioned, and which is dated July 7, 1943, is the order which the prosecution has presented in Document Book XII, as Exhibit 302 on page 98 of the English text as a photostat. This is Document 744 PS.
Q General, did all the other regulations remain valid?
A Yes, all the other provisions of the regulation remained valid.
Q You had further told us that certain orders and regulations had already been in force with your troops before you got there that is before August 1943. What is it that you mean to tell us with that statement?
AA certain theory has been set up here that a Military Commander is co-responsible for those orders, which he passed on in accordance with his duty. What I wanted to emphasize is that these orders and regulations which were of a decisive significance for all events in the Balkans had already been with the military units before I got there.
Q Was it not possible for you rescind these orders and regulations?
A No, that would have been impossible for me. How could one imagine that a commander chief rescinds a Fuehrer order?