A Yes, for almost one year. In October of 1942 I took command of the 35th Army Corps on the Russian front and then on the 1st of December of 1942 I was promoted to general of the Infantry.
Q General, you know that the prosecution talks about a phenominal promotion in your case; were you actually promoted so extremely quickly?
A This statement is rather puzzling to me. There is certainly no General in the German Army who became, a generaloberst and who had such a poor line of promotions as I had. I had to wait as a colonel for six and one half years and was more than 42 years old when I became a Brigadier General. I remained a Brigadier General for two years, even though I know a lot of Generals who were Birgadier Generals for one year and many who were only Brigadier Generals for six months. For a whole year I remained a Major General, even though there were very many Generals who were Major Generals only for six months and sometimes there were some who only waited for two months while I had to wait a whole year. When in August of 1943 I was appointed commander in chief of the 2nd Panzer Army, I had to wait eight months for my promotion to General, even though in general principles one was promoted within at the most two months to that service rank, which corresponded to the position held. I had to wait eight months and the assertion of the prosecution is very puzzling to me, especially since I have explained these circumstances in detail and since the possibilities to compare can be found in the prosecution documents, themselves.
Q General, how long did you remain in Russia?
A I remained until 6 August, 1943 in Russia and then after the battle of Orel I was called to the Fuehrer's headquarters.
Q When were you given the command of the 2nd Panzer Army?
AAs I said, on 6 August 1943 I had to report to the Fuehrer's headquarters and there I learned either from Jodl or Warlimont that I was to receive the supreme command if an army, an army in the Balkans and nothing further was known about this at the time.
All that was known was that the troops of this army were to be stationed at first in parts of Croatia not occupied by the Italians and that the failling out of Italy was counted on and that if Italy fell out, the whole of Croatia, Montenegro and Albania would belong to the arny's sphere.
Q Well then was the commission which you received and who gave you this commission?
A The commission was given by Hitler personally and the commission was: pacify Croatia, use all the Croatian military forces, smash Tito, disarm if necessary the Italians, take them prisoners; occupy Dalmatia, Herzegowina, Montenegro and Albania and defend the coast.
At that time I spoke to Hitler for the first time in my life. I must say that the way in which this commission was given to me, the matter-of-factness in view of the forces available in which a commission which was almost impossible to take and this whole scene gave me the impression that one certainly could not arrive at the conclusion that this thing could possibly not be carried out or possibly could be carried out. To anything of that kind, one said "yes" and went away.
Then later I was told, first of all to wait in Vienna for the reorganization of the forces in the Balkans and to use the time acquaint myself with the conditions in the Balkans.
Q And did you do that?
A Yes, from Vienna I made many flights to Salonika to Army Group E, which at that time was in charge of the whole Balkan area. Afterwards I went to Belgrade to the commander of the German troops in Serbia and last of all I went to Zagreb to the Poglavnik, the head of the Croatian state, to the German ambassador in Zagreb to the Chief of the German Army in Croatia and to other German Offices there.
Q We were just talking about the fact that you also went to Pavelich and later on had to work with him in some way or other; what was your impression of him in this connection?
A Pavelich made a rather dignified impression, one saw in his appearances two great models, Hitler and Mussolini had left their mark on him and I was able to find out then it was much easier for him to imitate Mussolini then it was to imitate Hitler. This was my first and last meeting with Poglavnik in my ten months of service in the Balkans. Later on I got at boggerheads with all these circles so that a personal relationship would have been entirely undesirable on my part.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our morning recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 1:30 o'clock.
(A recess was taken.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, Your Honors, may I have permission to have the defendant General Lanz excused from tomorrow's session and the next day's session in order to prepare his defense?
THE PRESIDENT: That will be agreeable to the Tribunal.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
DR. FRITSCH:
Q. General, just before the recess we had discussed the commission which you had received from Hitler personally and you told us about your visit in Salonika, in Belgrade and in Zagreb. Among other things you told us about a discussion you had with the Poglavnik. I would like now to continue and I would like to ask you what was the picture you formed concerning the situation in the Balkans generally speaking on the occasion of these visits and what impressions did you gain?
A. Above all I was naturally interested in the forces which were to be at my disposal. I could ascertain at that time I would have at my disposal seven infantry divisions, among them two reserve divisions, apart from that I would have one Croatian corps and 8 Brigades, altogether about six to seven thousand men. These forces were subordinate to the commander of the German troops in Croatia. Besides there were in Croatia the so-called Ustascha. These were units consisting of fanatical followers of the Poglavnik, the so-called body guard division. In Zagreb and surroundings there were about 10,000 men, then there were a number of battalions dispersed over all the country. The Ustascha units, which I mentioned, were not subordinate to the commander of the German troops in Croatia.
Q. Did your own troops seem sufficient to you?
A. For the tasks, which were restricted, according to the situation, to Croatia alone, these troops seemed completely sufficient to me.
Q. You talked about the various possibilities which could be seen in this situation. If for instance in the event of an Italian crisis were you promised any further forces?
A. Yes, that also happened on 6 August when I took over my command, in the headquarters. At that time I was promised forces in the case that Italy would fall out, however, it was not mentioned at the time how strong these forces were to be. Possibly the O.K.W. did not know it itself, they did not know what they might have at their disposal at the proper time.
Q. I would like you to anticipate the answer to the following: How many forces did you actually get after Italy fell out?
A. At that time I got two further Infantry division, then I had altogether nine divisions.
Q. Were these forces then sufficient?
A. These forces were small in view of the fact that in the event of Italy's treason the army area had to be doubled. They were almost ridiculously small in view of the crisis which had to arise through Italian treason. But I have never in my many assignments had the feeling that I really had sufficient forces at my disposal. In spite of this fact all tasks were always solved.
Q. When the Italian crisis was concluded were the available forces sufficient?
A. Immediately after the conclusion of the Italian crisis, I got two further divisions and then I had altogether eleven divisions and these forces under all circumstances had to suffice in the fight against the bands. They were inadequate for the defense of the coast.
Q. What was at that time the situation in Croatia compared with Germany, I mean in a general direction and as a state?
A. Croatia was an independent state, which had a friendly pact with Germany.
Q. Was the opinion known to you that the Croatian government was allegedly a puppet government?
A. I have heard that opinion voiced at times, but undoubtedly it is not a correct opinion. The Croatian government was a puppet government, but only as far as Hitler and his personal wishes and requests were concerned. These wishes and demands of Hitler had to be always complied with by the Croatian government and in this sense it might be called a puppet government. Where all other German agencies were concerned, the Croatians were jealously concerned with their independance and sovereignty, which was possibly caused by an inferiority complex with regard to the stronger ally. These endeavors on the part of the Croatians were especially supported and sponsored by the Reich Foreign Minister and by the German envoy in Zagreb, Mr. Kasche. If the Croatian government had been a puppet government in every respect, then I would not have seen myself forced to wage such a strong and slightly dangerous battle against the Poglavnik and his circles and against the German envoy.
Q. General, we will discuss this question in more detail at a later point. At the moment, I would be interested to hear from you what you can tell us concerning one of your main problems, that is the question of the partisans; what was it that you established concerning this problem on the occasion of your visits in the Balkans?
A. The focal point of the problems, which were discussed in Zagreb, was the fight against Tito's partisans. I was above all interested in the slightly mysterious personality of the partisan leader, because I believed I would find a few basic facts here about the spirit and the meaning of this movement. I learned in Zagreb that allegedly Tito was really called Jos ip Broz, and that he was a non-commissioned officer in a royal and imperial infantry regiment in the 1st World War, that he was captured in Russia and that very soon he became a follower of the Bolsheviks, that for several years he was trained and studied at an academy in Moscow. Then I learned that in 1941, soon after the occupation of Yugoslavika by the German troops, he was sent from Moscow to the Balkans in order to make difficulties there for the German occupation forces by fights and combat actions in a partisan manner.
Since the summer of 1943 he was organizing his forces in units, maybe he started doing that already as early as the spring of 1943. It was important to me to establish here and also later that the main difficulties in the future organization of his units consisted in the lack of munitions and arms.
Q. General, you were talking about units and about organizations, were these regular military units?
A. I learned then and established later from my own experiences that not all these units were all the time kept together but only those which he concentrated in those areas where there were no German units. In those areas Tito had his supply depots and he had units under arms there which had the assignment to defend that area. However, the other units were dismissed to their home villages and home towns and they were only called up and gathered together for special tasks.
Q. With this latter remark you mean the so-called house partisans?
A. No, I don't. The house partisans were yet another group of partisans. They were those who did not belong to any units at all. They remained unrecognized in the villages as residents. They followed Tito for the most part and they were the ones that carried out the majority of the attacks against isolated soldiers, isolated vehicles, also railroad lines, et cetera. They also carried out sabotage acts on depots, trucks, et cetera. The units which had been dismissed to their homes also lived unrecognized in the villages. They continued with their daily work and thus it happened that a German military unit without knowing it could find itself right in the middle of a Tito Division, as they were called, and this unit would only gain knowledge of this fact when the Tito Division was called together by some secret order and attacked the military unit concerned.
Q. You are talking about divisions here, General, and we have also heard the expression "brigade" mentioned here. Does not that conclude that these were regular military units?
A. No, from the name and the designation alone that cannot follow that fact conclusively. The OKW were actually forbade to use that designation because it would lead to error. It would be misleading because these Tito units were, after all, not regular military units.
Q. And how were they officially designated?
A. They had to be called "large bands", "medium sized bands" and "small bands". I want to say right away we did not approve of this designation. In inter-office communications we always called them "brigades", "divisions", et cetera because we could thus make the difference clearer; but we did realize that by calling them this inter-office communications we only wanted to make the distinction clearer; this designation was never intended to recognize these units as regular military units.
Q. If you are talking about an interoffice designation of these units do you mean just a German circle?
A. What I mean is, if my officers reported the situation to me on the occasion of situation reports then they would not talk about a "Large Band 22", but they would call it the "Tito Division 22".
Q. And what seemed to you the reason, General, not to recognize Tito's band as regular units?
A. One reason was that the basis of Tito's fight was undoubtedly illegal because after the capitulation of the Jugoslav Army had been concluded and after the country had been occupied nobody was justified to raise arms against the occupation forces. Further, we could ascertain that the leadership of the partisans was not a unified one. There cannot be any question at all about uniformity if I consider the partisans in my entire area because there were several groups even apart from Tito about, which I shall talk later, which were not only not led uniformly but even fought each other at swords' point and waged a struggle of extermination against each other; but even these partisans which we designated as Communists because they fought under Tito's badge, even those partisans were not led in a uniform manner. For one, the so-called house partisans, only followed Tito to a certain extent. There were certain small groups which developed into robber bands. At one time they did not follow Tito and at other times they did. But even the larger units did not always follow every operation of Tito's. We intercepted all of Tito's radio communications.
We knew all his reports day by day. We knew the reports and messages which he received. We were even in a position to ascertain that one or the other division would refuse to participate in one or the other operations, with the reason which the leader gave that he was not in a position to get all his people to attend.
The next reason which prevented us from calling the partisans regular military units was that they wore no uniform. They would wear German or Italian or Croatian pieces of uniforms and later even pieces of a British uniform. There were many pieces of German uniforms amongst them and also many pieces of the very similar Croatian uniform. That went so far that even during the first weeks of my stay in the Balkans some troops demanded to give the German and the Croatian units, in addition to their uniform, some recognizable insignia so that they could be distinguished from the partisans. This type of uniform which was used amongst the partisans sometimes made them recognizable as enemies only when the battle had already started. This type of uniform caused us many losses.
Q. Witness, now we'll deal with the house partisans. Did they wear uniforms?
A. No. the house partisans couldn't wear any uniform because they lived amongst the population unrecognized but even the units which had been dismissed to their homes, even those did not wear any uniform when they lived in their villages, sometimes right in the middle of our own units.
Q. The prosecution has asserted here that the partisans frequently wore Soviet Stars on their headgear and that their leaders had corresponding insignia on their sleeves. Is that correct?
A. There are some orders of Tito's which we captured and which order to wear Soviet Stars as described. But not all actually wore them. Then we have to consider the fact that in accordance with Tito's order the Soviet Stars were to have the diameter of two inches, that is exactly as long as a match. These very small stars can by no means be recognized from any distance and certainly not from a distance as can be demanded from such insignia.
One has to demand a distance such as is used as a rule to open fire so that one should not be surprised. That is as laid down in all regulations, a distance of 800 to 1000 meters. There can be no question that such a star could be seen or recognized at this distance, not even the considerably larger stars as we have seen on some photographs. White stars might have been seen possibly at a distance of 300 to 400 meters as a kind of blurred spot but red stars could never even be recognized as that, and the insignia which were worn on the sleeves and which were only worn by every fiftieth or sixtieth man could undoubtedly have been recognized with even more difficulty than the stars.
Q. And what did you ascertain concerning the open carrying of arms?
A. The fact that the partisans did not wear their arms openly was a further reason not to recognize them as proper military units. In most instances they had hidden their weapons and even if they did carry them on their person they carried them in a hidden manner.
It happened, for instance -- and that was at a time before the German troops were versed in this partisan method -- that a number of German soldiers went along a road and met a number of farmers who were carrying agricultural tools. They had hardly passed when they were attacked from the rear from these very people by machine guns. Or it might have happened that a bridge sentry of two soldiers would be posted at the entrance of a bridge; then three or four women would approach carrying agricultural tools. When they would reach these two soldiers they would suddenly draw their pistols and shoot the sentries.
Q. General, could not these things be designated as strategy of war?
A. No, such a surprise attack is obviously of a cunning nature and it preproposes that no uniform is worn and that the weapons are not carried openly.
Q. This method of fighting which you have described to us, was that a rule or was that an exception?
A. Such methods were applied in all possible manners. They were applied whenever the partisans appeared either individually or in small groups. That was how they appeared as a rule. The partisan warfare is significant for its cunning methods and for the fact that partisans will disappear after the action has been carried out. The partisans only very rarely confronted the German soldiers in larger units. They did that only when they had to defend the area which they occupied and when they had to protect their depots. It might have happened when they saw an opportunity to attack weaker German or Croatian units. Apart from this, we had almost to apply tactics which amounted to art, to get the partisans for an open combat operation. Such operations of a larger scale were, for instance, carried out by the Army in Eastern Bosnia or on the occasion of the attack on Tito's headquarters where one could count with certainty on the partisans appearing for an open combat operation.
Q. We were and are talking of the rules of warfare, witness. With regard to other measures used by the partisans, did you see any violation of the lawful rules or war, if I may call them that?
A. Yes, there was, for instance, the case of the treatment of prisoners of war. These prisoners were as a rule shot except for a number which they reserved for purposed of exchange. The officers were almost always shot. Besides, there were dozens of reports coming in which contained cruelties of a most incredible manner. At the time we had whole collections concerning these reports and then we passed on these reports to the Geneva Red Cross. That is a further reason -- I mean this disregard of usages of war -- not to consider the partisans regular or legal military units.
Q. General, in a document the prosecution concludes the regular character of the partisan units from the fact that German troops on occasions negotiated with the partisans concerning the exchange of prisoners. Do you know anything about that?
A. Yes, I do know about that. We had quite a number of negotiations of a local nature concerning the exchange of prisoners. That was done for the reasons of expediency. The fact that this negotiation took place does not allow us to conclude that the band units were regular military units.
Q. Is it know to you that Tito called his forces the "Jugoslav Army of Liberation?"
A. Yes, that is known to me and it was known. But we also realized that merely through this designation he could never make his troops a legal and regular military unit.
Q. Besides these Tito partisans and besides the independent groups of partisans which worked with them upon occasion, were there any other partisans?
A. Yes, there were also the Cetniks. They were recruited from the Serbian minority which resided in Croatia. They were sworn enemies of Tito and they were sworn enemies of the Ustascha of the Poglavnik. The Cetniks fought against us until about the end of October -- beginning of November -- of 1943 and then they discontinued their fights. Apparently that was done on order of Mihajlovic in Serbia. They depended on him. The fights between Tito and the Cetniks which were carried out in those areas where no German units were stationed were waged in the most cruel and bestial manner and under mutual extermination; in a similar manner the fights between the Cetniks and Ustascha were waged.
Q. Did you assume basically that the Cetniks were legal units?
A. No, the Cetniks were on exactly the same level as Tito's partisans where legality is concerned and for the very same reason.
Q. General, we will now turn to another problem which again is connected with the partisans. Could one say that the Croatian area was dominated by our troops?
A. Yes, one could say that without a doubt. The occupation and domination of Croatia and of the other areas of the Army was an effective one.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. It is in the nature of such an occupation that there would not be in every village and every valley and every neighborhood German units. But we were at all times in a position to send units and to reach any area of Montenegro, Albania or Croatia which we intended and wanted to enter. The numerous operations which were carried out had as their purpose not only to smash the partisans again and again but also to prove this fact. There was no operation which did not achieve the intended aim.
Q. I believe at an earlier date you mentioned that the Cetniks were recruited from the Pravoslavian circle. Will you just briefly define this conception, "Pravoslavian Circle"?
A. The Croatians and the Serbians are two different peoples. The bulk of the Croatians is of Roman Catholic faith.
The Serbian minority living in Croatia is of a Greek Catholic faith and this Greek Catholic Serbian minority calls itself, and is called, "Pravoslaves."
Q. We will first of all talk about the distinction between nationalities in that area. Were there any other groups of the population in Croatia nationally seen?
A. Nationally seen, there were no other groups of the population but there were some in a religious respect. There were the Moslems of Bosnia. They were partly Croatians, partly Serbians, and centuries ago they became Moslems -- when the Turks -- entered the area. Bosnia had been a Turkish province, up to 1878.
Q. Now, concerning this separation in a religious respect, did that have any particular significance in the Balkans?
A. I know of no area where the fact that the population was split up with regard to religion has a greater significance than it had in the Balkans. The contrast between the various groups of the population is sharp, particularly in the religious sphere, and there they are, they are fought over fanatically.
Q. On the occasion of your first visits in the Balkans was this contrast between Croatians and Provoslaves pointed out?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And in what manner was that done?
A. Amy Group E in Saloniki and also the two commanders of the German troops, particularly pointed out that there were some cruel mass persecutions of the Pravoslaves by Poglavnik's Regime. I heard that particularly during the first time, in areas where there were no German troops as many as 500,000-700,000 Pravoslaves had been killed. I discussed this matter in Zagreb, and I met a man there whom I had known from an earlier period. He belonged to the immediate surroundings of the Poglarnik. I asked this man, "How is it possible that such acts can be committed. How is it possible to kill 500,000 - 700,000 people merely because of religious or racial antagonism?" This "kind" person answered me the following, - and this is significant for the Balkan mentality: "700,000? That is slander. It couldn't have been more than 220,000". When I learned from discussions, especially with people who belonged to the closest circle of the Pogeovnik, that it was intended to start a now big wave of persecutions of Pravoslaves I told the German envoy that would be in contradiction with the tasks of pacification of the country which I had been given, and Kasche answered, "It is impossible to do anything against it. That is an internal Croatian affairs." I had not left the man any doubt that I would never permit that such a new persecution was carried out under my own eyes, and I requested him to tell this with all emphasis to Poglavnik -MJ and his people.
Q. General, were there really only religious reasons which caused this hatred and antagonism, and this persecution, or were there other reasons as well, and if so which ones?
A. There was an antagonism which is bordered on hatred, between the Catholic -- and the Greek Catholic circles. And that had always been the case. Even forty years ago when I first visited the Balkans I could find that was so. This hatred and antagonism led to bloody struggles between individual localities and that was constantly the case. That this antagonism could lead to larger waves of persecutions and to large struggles had to include one other factor and those were the political conditions. These political reasons did exist for the last generation through the creation of the Yugoslav kingdom. The men who created this State approached the problem from a wrong assumption. They thought that Croatians and Serbians were both parts of a Yugoslav nation. The Belgrade Government, which consisted of about 90% Serbians endeavored to have the Croatians and the Serbians adapted to each other. They regarded the Croatians with distrust. Maybe they did it because the Croatians were on a higher cultural level than the Serbians. They had never been under Turkish domination, and they had always been close to the Middle European culture while the Serbians had been under Trukish domination until the year 1805. Then the Croatians were reproached with the fact that they had been the best soldiers for the Austrian-Hungarian Army and that they had fought against the Serbians during the First World War. On the other hand the Serbians felt depressed because a Croatian person could not get on in Ygoslavian public life or in the Yugoslav Army. Everything concerning banks and credits was in purely Serbian hands. Numerous Serbians settled in Croatia and under the protection of Belgrade they proceeded to plunder the country. I know that Tito once expressed himself to the effect that the Ygoslav kingdom represented a typical country of suppressed people.
King Alexander I was a viction of the accumulated hatred of the Croatians in 1934 in Marseilles.
Q. General, you have told us that the Serbians felt depressed, I believe--
A. No, I didn't mean the Serbians. I meant the Croatians. They were depressed because they couldn't get along.
Q. And if I now consider the conditions the way you have described them here, what was the part played by this suppression for the further development in the Balkans at the time of the German occupation?
A. That played a large and decisive part. In 1941 Croatia was declared an independent state. And now the Croatians turned against their former actual or imagined suppressors by persecuting all Pravoslaves. A further consequence which was particularly important for the situation was the fact that the Croatians saw in the smashing of Yugoslavia, the liberation of their own country. And that the German soldiers were regarded as liberators and welcomed as such. The Prosecution says in their Opening Statement that the Croatians gave very little resistance and were soon demanded independence. If ever at any time the creation of an independent state had complied with the wish of the vast majority of its people, then that was at that time the creation of that Croatian State.
Q. General, new in this connection I shall again come back to a question which I have put to you once before, namely, whether there was any justification for Tito to call his units "Yugoslav Army of Liberation."
A. The fight of the partisans could, for the reasons mentioned, never be considered a fight of liberation against us. Tito's fight against us was outside of Croatia's interests. Tito waged his fight in the service of an ideology which did not originate in the Crotian people.
Q. But Tito had quite a number of followers didn't he?
A. Yes, there was undoubtedly quite a number of followers. Compared, however, with the size of the population and the forces which he established the number of his followers could not be regarded very considerable.
Q What was the reason, according to your experiences, for this following? Can the reason be found especially in the behavior of the Germans?
A No, by no means. The situation is this: Part of the population was against the terror policy of the Ustascha of the Poglavnik, especially the Pravoslaves and, as far as they did not join the Cetniks (that depended on the local situation) they would go over to Tito's forces in order to be secured against the Ustascha forces. Then, we ascertained that the partisans exercised a certain amount of pressure on the population and actually forced the people to join their ranks. They had compulsory recruitments. Only very few people were enthusiastic. The bulk of the people only followed them because they were afraid of reprisal measures.
Q Those people who did not want to join the ranks of the partisans, could they save themselves by escaping to other areas and thus escape recruitment in the ranks of the partisans?
AA lot of people tried that and actually did it, but their families would then be exposed to the reprisal measures taken by the partisans. They would be driven away from their homes and sometimes their property would even be burned down. So that after a while nobody dared any longer to escape and thus avoid being recruitted. On the occasion of my very first discussion in Zagreg members of the Croatian Government described this situation to me, and they emphasized particularly that the mass of people never really wants to fight and certainly therefore, not with Tito. They requested that on the occasion of operations in areas which we did not occupy and which we intended to give up after the operation had taken place, we evacuate everybody from these areas because, for one reason that would please the people and for another the partisans would thus see no cause to take any compulsory measures against the families of these people.
Q This statement was made to you by representatives of the Croatian Government?