Q Just a minute, witness. I am not interested in your conclusions or in your opinions. I am only interested in facts, all I ask you is where these orders came from and you said they came from the Heeresgruppe E; is that right?
A Yes, that is right.
Q Where they got them from, if from any other place, you don't know: is that right?
A Yes, I do know it quite well.
Q Now just how do you know that?
A I know that because these orders had the corresponding reference order from OK.W. It would for instance refer to the O.K.W. number and then some special code number and then came either the verbal order fro passing on at least the meaning of the order.
Q Now since you claim that you have seen possibly both the original order as issued by the O.K.W. and passed on to you from the Meeresgruppe or a reissued order from the Heeresgruppe based on an order received by them from the O.K.W., you ought to beable to tell us how the contents of these orders made it obligatory for the Commanding General Serbia to carry out these reprisal measures. You said you saw all the documents so maybe you can describe some of them.
A May I ask you to begin with whether I understood you correctly. Your introduction was a bit long and you said at one time "on the basis of the orders which we received immediately from the O.K.W."; did you not?
Q. No, you just stated that you got two types of orders from the Neeresgruppe, one of them may have been the original order as received from the O.K.W. and the other type may have been one which the Neeresgruppe rewrote; now describe the contents of such orders which forced the Commanding General Serbia to carry out execution measures.
A. In order to exclude any misunderstanding, I have to refer back to what I said. I did not say we received two types of orders, instead I said we received a number of orders, if I may add at this point, where there was almost always, possibley sometimes not, but almost always a reference number of the O.K.W. According to the contents of the order it could be assumed that generally it concerned or was based on the literal text of an O.K.W. order. However, it might have been possible that such an order was passed on only in accordance with the meaning of its contents. I cannot state that in detail now.
Q. All right now describe the contents of such typical orders, inasmuch as you have said you have seen all of them in connection with your job?
A. Yes indeed. The contents according to the meaning of all these orders was always that in all cases concerning terror acts where members of our own or allied troops were concerned where harm had been done to the installation of the armed forces, a certain number of reprisal prisoners were to be shot and that the official concerned, which was in our case the Commanding General and Commander personally, that is General Bader, was responsible for the carrying out of the order. There was no doubt that it was to the effect that otherwise the official concerned could expect to be punished, whether it was actually expressed in the order I am not in a position to tell you today with absolute certainty. The whole way in which the orders were worded left no doubts open.
Q. Do you remember off hand any of the quotas of some of the typical orders you have seen?
A. I believe that for instance for one killed German found the ratio of 50 was mentioned.
Q. Now, witness, you were telling us something about mock or shadow killings and in connection with that you stated that it was only able, your headquarters was only able, to carry out such shadow executions in the event no outside agency knew of any act of sabotage; is that right?
A. No, it is not quite correct.
Q. Allright, well then will you correct me please?
A. In the event that an outside agency had no knowledge of the terror act concerned, it was even possible to keep the whole incident secret and to crush every reprisal measure so that nothing at all happened in return for the sabotage act. In the endeavor to keep the reprisal figure of those actually shot as low as possible, one, after a certain period, turned to the following measures, in the cases where it was unavoidable to take any measures in return, one turned to so-called mock shooting, - the concept of shadow shooting turned up later. Such mock shootings were then carried out.
Q. Very well, now you said and gave us an example of an act of sabotage in the coal mines and as a result of the fact that it was carried on in a coal mine, you presumed Neubacher would have had knowledge of such a sabotage act; is that right?
A. Neuhausen is that name, Neubacher was the envoy.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes, Neuhausen that is correct.
Q. Now what was the adequate reprisal which was used in connection with sabotage acts in coal mines?
A. I do not remember the exact figure.
Q. Can you describe the nature of the sabotage?
A. Sabotage acts happened quite frequently in coal mines, it happen that the cables were cut and mines were even blown up.
Q. Allright, then you say for these acts a certain number of people had to be executed; is that right?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Now witness, coming back to these mock reports; you reported to a higher headquarters as having actually taken place while as a matter of fact only a certain number were killed; is that right?
A. Yes, it is correct.
Q. Now how long were you in the German army?
A. Do you mean all the time, or do you mean up to what time?
Q. Totally in years?
A. Six and one half years approximately.
Q. Now is it common use in the German army for a lower headquarters to make fraudulent reports to a Higher headquarters in the line of official business?
A. No, it was not a general custom, on the contrary, the German armed forces above all is a model example for the delivering of correct information.
Q. Just a moment, witness. This example you have given us is not such a shining example, is it, of such honesty and integrity and reliability; is it?
A. One can say to a certain extent it is not a shining example for the character of a report, but will you please take into account from which point of view these reports were deliberately reported incorrectly.
Q. Well that's a matter which we cannot decide at this time, I am merely trying to establish the fact that the German army of which you were a member at that time, according to your own testimony, relied on fraudulent reports in its conduct of warfare; is that right?
A. I do not think one can say in the conduct of war, it was merely done in the reporting to a higher headquarters in order to pacify and calm down the people on top in order to deceive them on the measures which they ordered and which we considered much too harsh. We wanted to leave them in the happy state of thinking that these orders were carried out. After all we did not want to openly oppose.
Q. I imagine not. I want to ask you now, you were asked in connection with the war diary whether or not these entries in the daily reports or in the war diaries referring to reprisal measures represent an accurate picture of what happened at that time, and I believe you stated there again that was done for the purpose of reporting to higher headquarters the fact that they had taken more prisoners than they actually did, that they had executed more people in connection with the reprisal measures than they actually did and that the losses of the enemy were higher than they actually were; is that right?
A. We will have to distinguish here between the figures which apply to the prisoners and the figures which apply to the men killed in combat on one hand, and on the other hand between the figures which applied to those shot in reprisal measures, the figures which apply to the activities of a unit in combat and which had to serve as a standard were received by us from lower units. They were incorporated unaltered into our daily reports and that is also in the war diary.
We had no cause to change anything. On the contrary, it was our endeavor, as far as possible, to report correctly so that the proper information was kept for the later history of war. The, of course, the units would tell us they had, say a thousand prisoners if they had 959. I think that is a custom in almost all armies and the same accounts for the dead who were killed in combat. I have already said before it was impossible to count them anyway and they could mostly be just estimated. That this estimate was made too high rather than too low is only too understandable and I think it was usual to do that in other armies as well.
Q. Just a minute, witness. I presume you have served in a lot of other armies, is that right, so you draw this conclusion?
A. No, that hasn't anything to do with it. I have not served in any other armies, Mr. Prosecutor. The men shot as reprisal show a different picture. The figures for men shot at in reprisal were deliberately described incorrectly and reported to higher headquarters by our agency just in order to keep the people on top pacified.
Q. I am afraid I can't pursue this question any further because the testimony you are giving now and the testimony you gave then, as far as I can make out, are somewhat contradictory so we will just drop that question and I will withdraw it.
Now, maybe you can answer this question: was there any reason that these troops who were fighting the partisans tried to give bigger report or bigger figures then actually occurred? What do you think was the reason behind that?
A. Could I ask you to please put the question a little more plainly? You were talking about the units which fought the partisans?
Q. In their reports of the casualties they inflicted on the enemy, you told us they exaggerated. Is there any reason why they exaggerated, or do you know the reason why they exaggerated?
A. They were not exaggerated. They were certainly frequently ju rounded up to the next higher round figure. There is a difference bet exaggerating and just rounding up to the next higher round figure.
Q. Just give us the answer -- just give us the answer to what you believe is not an exaggeration but which I believe is not an accurate report.
A. If a unit reports 1,000 enemy prisoners and if one counts them exactly which is not possible on the field of combat -- and one finds there is only 959 -- then I would consider that rounding up to the next higher round figure and every agency will concede that and, in case it was possible for the agency to ascertain the actual figure of 959 it would consider this just a minor detail.
Q. Now, you don't pursue that these reports were dressed up in such a way as you testified here because it made a pretty good impression at higher headquarters?
A. I didn't say before that they deliberately added five men. All I said was that such figures would generally be reported a little higher than too low. I think they would rather report a thousand than nine hundred in that particular instance. After all, we are here considering prisoners of war or enemy dead which were made in combat and that is something completely different from shot reprisal prisoners which are reported to higher headquarters.
Q. All right. Now, explain to me this: obviously, everybody in the Southeast, particularly anybody connected with your headquarters who was serving under your headquarters; knew about these mock executions. Is that right?
A. I wouldn't put it that way. I wouldn't say that is quite correct
Q. Now just a minute, witness, you told us the troops reported them as mock executions to you. You reported them to higher headquarters, At least you know that the executions which were carried out by the troops and reported to you were not correct. Don't you think that includes pretty much everybody serving down there?
A. No, the situation wasn't quite like that. It was not the units which did not report the 45 if I may go back to the old figure but in the case concerned of the Commanding General the mock shootings were generally carried out with the help of tho SD.
Q. Now, just a minute; this gets very interesting now. Now tho SD knows about these mock executions, too, is that right?
A. Yes, I think so.
Q. They wore under Himmler, weren't they?
A. I don't mean the Higher SS and Police leader personally. I don't mean Meissner.
Q. I assume he didn't shoot all the people himself, did he?
A. No, there were certain experts and the matter was discussed with them personally.
Q. Just a minute witness. This is getting rather interesting. Now, we just learned that the SD was also called, so to speak, into this conspiracy to only carry on mock executions, is that right -certain key officials?
A. Not the SD in its entirety but there wore people with the SD who knew about it.
Q. That is exactly what I said, witness; I said,"key officials."
A. "Key officials" is saying too much.
Q. All right have it your way. There were certain officials who knew about it. Is that right?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Now, you have already told us just now that only Meissner, as far as his person was concerned, was directly subordinate to the Military Commander Serbia.
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Now, who carried out these executions?
A. That was done in various ways. There was a time when the troops, carried out the executions and there was a certain period when police units carried out the executions.
Q. Now, those executions which wore carried out by the troops we will continue later on. Let us for the time being just concentrate on those which were carried out with the help of the SD.
They were subordinate to Himmler, were they not?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Now, those SD people who executed or carried out these executi served also under Himmler; that is, the actual trigger men?
A. The actual trigger man was not necessarily a man of the SD. I don't believe it was ever a man of the SD. After all, you must make a difference between the security service and the police. There were certain police formations and these police formations did by no means have to be part of the SD.
Q. Witness, let's not at this time inject into this conversation a third issue before we have cleared up the first one. I don't in any way try to restrain your testimony but just let's confine ourselves to one thing first. Now, did the SD in many cases carry out these executions or not?
A. Whether the SD or members of the SD actually carried out the executions, whether they actually pulled the trigger, as you put it before, I don't know. I don't believe they did. I think you will understand me in a minute if you will just lot mo continue for a minute.
Q. All right. Go ahead. I haven't interrupted you as yet.
A. The situation was this. There were certain camps, the socalled collection camps, which were under the police authorities or under the SD authorities. I am not quite clear to whom they were subordinate. I believe a few of these camps were later called retaliation prisoner camps and the selection of the prisoners to be shot from these camps was a matter of an SD official. The actual execution could certainly be carried out by a police unit. I know that it is not very easy to understand the conditions which were a bit complicated but that is how it happened to be.
Q. That is not too difficult. Now, just why were these SD people called in to the confidence of the commanding general as far as these mock executions were concerned?
A. Well, I can only voice an assumption here. After all, I did not participate in the discussions which the Commander had with the SD man concerned.
Q. You know a lot and you have seen a lot. You have testified to even more. Now, maybe at this particular time you could give us an answer if you know the fact, since you made the allegation before hand that the SD was called into the confidence, since you know that, it seems obvious that you ought to know why they were called in.
A. Not the SD in its entirety, but only the individual SD official
Q. That's what I'm referring to.
THE PRESIDENT: We will interrupt at this time and take our noon recess.
(A recess was taken)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The herring reconvened at 1330 hours, 22 Oct.
1947)
THE MARSHAL: The persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
DR. TIPP: Dr. Tipp for von Leyser. If the Tribunal please, would it be possible to excuse von Leyser from tomorrow's session, both the morning and afternoon so that he could prepare his defense?
THE PRESIDENT: There will be no objection on the part of the Tribunal.
DR. TIPP: Thank you very much.
MR. RAPP: If your Honors please, at this time I would like to inquire from defense counsel the sequence of presentation in their case. If I understand it correctly, after Dr. Sauter has finished up with the defendant Geitner, the defendant Weichs will be the next defendant we are concerning ourselves with. Is that correct, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER: If the Tribunal please, it is correct as far as the sequence is concerned what Mr. Rapp has just said but Fieldmarxhal von Weichs is still in the hospital. I saw him last night and my impression of his health was an extremely bad one. When I was there he had an attack with the result that at that particular moment I had grave fears for him. It is, therefore, my suggestion that Field marshal von Weichs should remain for some more time in the hospital and that his case be deferred to a later place. This is my motion to the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Any further statement from you, Mr. Rapp?
MR. RAPP: Not at this time, your Honor. I felt that perhaps the Court would make a comment in this respect, however.
THE PRESIDENT: We have no objection as to the order in which the defendants present their case. I think it should be understood, however, that any delay or any absence of the defendant Weichs is without prejudice to either the prosecution or the defense and I believe that has been previously understood.
Is that your understanding, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I have understood, you, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. Who is to be the next defendant called then?
DR. LATERNSER: If Fieldmarshal von Weichs should be left out, General Rendulic would be the next one to be called.
THE PRESIDENT: And is his counsel prepared to follow immediately?
DR. LATERNSER: If the Tribunal please, I am not in a position to comment on that because the attorney is not here but I don't know the contrary; as far as I am informed, he is quite prepared to open the case.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. The thing that we are interested in is that the case go on without any interruption. We do not care as to who presents their case or the sequence of them, just so that there is no interruption.
DR. LATERNSER: The defense counsel are aware of this, your Honor, and we shall see to it that there will be no delay.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. Very, well, you may proceed then.
CROSS EXAMINATION
WITNESS: Dr. Heinrich Bub BY MR. RAPP:
Q. Witness, will you tell us which individuals and what units knew of the so-called mock executions?
A. Do you mean apart from those which I mentioned before or outside of our agency?
Q. Well, let's be, in this particular case, repetitious and tell me the whole scope, in your headquarters and those units or organizations or individuals outside of your headquarters who knew about such mock executions.
A. Who apart from the Commander and apart from the ADC who worked on the case direct and apart from the individuals who because of the entries in the War Diary usually to the Field Ia, who knew about these things inside of the headquarters, I do not know. As far as people outside our headquarters are concerned, the SD official whom I mentioned this morning had such knowledge.
Q. Anybody within the subordinate units subordinate to the Commanding General of Serbia?
A. I am afraid I cannot answer that.
Q. How about the police units?
A. That question gain I should not like to judge on.
Q. Is it known to you that the SD had their own way of reporting events to their headquarters?
A. Of course they had that -- I never saw a report of that sort but I take it for granted that they had that.
Q. Now, do you know whether or not there was any care taken to avoid possible discrepancies in these reports as far as the number of people killed were concerned?
A. Discrepancies had to be avoided. Otherwise, attention higher up would have been caught.
Q. So what you want to say is that this fraudulent reporting was not only engaged into by headquarters of the German army in the Southeast, but also by members serving at the headquarters of the SD in the SD in the Southeast. Is that right?
A. Meissner himself, the Higher SS and Police Leader, I don't think that he knew anything about those discrepancies in figures.
Q. I didn't ask that question, witness. I merely talked about the headquarters as such.
A. The headquarters of the SS and Police Leader in its entirety did not know that these figures were not correct which were reported to the higher offices.
Q. Witness, you told the Court today that you were opposed to the carrying out of reprisal measures. Is that right?
A. It was my personal innermost conviction, yes.
Q. When did you gain that conviction -- then or now?
A. Then. Already at the time when I was transferred to the office and heard about it.
MR. RAPP: Thank you. I have no further questions, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any re-direct examination on behalf of counsel?
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Dr. Sauter for Herr von Geitner.
Witness, about the last point there is something I want to ask you. Did you know Meissner, the Higher SS and Police Leader personally?
A I saw him and I knew that he w s Meyssner. I was never introduced to him, at least I cannot remember that I was.
Q Did you also know the man in charge of the SD personally?
A I don't remember even who it was.
Q The man in charge of the SD was Dr. Schaefer.
A Oh yes, I knew Schaefer, but I did not know whether he was in charge or merely one of the officials of the SD.
Q I am talking now of the same Dr. Schaefer who was with the SD in Belgrade.
A Yes, I knew him.
Q And I leave it open whether he was in charge or an official?
A Yes, quite.
Q But you knew him personally, did you?
A Yes, I did.
Q What was his reputation with your office of the Higher SS and Police Leader Meissner? Just a moment, I am anxious about one thing, whether he was regarded as a moderate or as a very violent man?
A He was known as a man of violent principles.
Q Do you know what the reputation was which Dr. Schaefer of the Sd had?
A Dr. Schaefer was an extremely moderste man if I remember rightly. I believe there were even controversies between him and Meyssner.
Q How do you know the latter fact?
A If I remember correctly, I believe some mention was made of this amongst us ADC's.
Q Witness, you spoke this morning of the War Diary which you knew so well. The War Diary by the Commander of Serbia.
A Yes, I know it very well as far as I have kept it.
Q I read through this War Diary and I have found an entry which I would like to read to you to refresh your memory. It is a document which I shall submit as Document Geitner No. 93 eventually. I have not offered it yet but when the Document Book Geitner No. 4 will be ready, I shall submit it as Document No. 93. I give this number already now for later indentification. This document is a page from the War Diary of the Commanding Ceneral and Commander in Serbia and the date is 28 of May 1943, and this is what it says on that page. Heading: "Commander--Conference with Chief, Standartenfuehrer Dr. Schaefer and 0-1 about new arrangements in carrying our reprisal measures." And then it continues:
"1. Keep up present ratio. Should there not be enough retaliation prisoners, uniformly to be executed by the SD. (Shom) shootings."
Witness, I shall give you a copy now from the War Diary. Will you please look at it and tell me whether this confirms what you have testified to so far and whether this note in the War Diary gives you a reason to supplement what you said about the Shom shootings?
A Yes well this was the same Dr. Schaefer who was needed in order to protect the Commander from any unpleasant consequences concerning the wrong figures reported to above. Meyssner without doubt would have been opposed to the idea of having shom shootings, but somehow or other through the SD channels, the same figures had to be used as were reported by us to higher up. We had to report them because of the ratio which had been ordered; and therefore this conforms to what I wanted to express at the end of the morning's session, namely that this affair was discussed with Dr. Schaefer who was regarded as an extremely moderate man.
Q Could you perhaps give us an example with figures how this was handled in actual fact so that we understand it fully and clearly? Let us assume, for instance, the case that the Commander of your office has ordered that 50 retaliation prisoners rust be shot but less were intended to be shot, and how was it done in actual practice with Dr. Schaefer's assistance? Will you tell us that, please?
A Retaliation prisoners -- they were sometimes located in the SD camps, mostly in Semlin. How far it went in detail, I am unable to tell you---at least I cannot tell it to you any more, but there is one thing correct without dobut, namely that the SD for instance would select five and they were actually shot. The names were reported to us--I must correct myself here. I don't know whether the names were reported to us but possibly they might have been, and then we would report to higher up: 50 prisoners were shot. Schaefer no doubt made such a report. I couldn't observe It but it is my opinion that he reported through his SD channels that 50 people had been shot and that is how these reports tallied.
Q That, you say, guaranteed that both the Commander Serbia and the SD or the Higher SS and Police Leader would report the shooting of 50, although five had only been shot? Have I under stood you correctly?
A Yes, I think it must have been that way.
DR. SAUTER: I have no further questions, your Honors.
MR. RAPP: I have no further questions, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: I take it there is no further examination on behalf of the defense counsel. The witness may be excused.
DR. SAUTER: With the Court's permission, I should like to call defendant Curt, Knight von Geitner to the witness stand. If the Tribunal please, I have submitted three document books so far and I would like to ask you to look in the first document book, in the index for Document No. 1--and I would like to correct a mistake in the index.
In the index regarding Document No. 1, there is a mistake in the translation. Herr von Geitner is described as an SS Leader. In the original it says SA Leader, and I would be grateful if this correction be made so that it is quite clear that my client was never a member of the SS, because after all the SS would he a criminal organization, with the result that he would have to he punished for that reason alone.
THE PRESIDENT: As I understand, Dr. Sauter, it is my understanding that you wish the index to read as follows: "Confirmation by 6 former members of the Steel Helmet Association of dismissal from office of v. Geitner as a Fuehrer?"
DR. SAUTER: SA Leader, yes, not SS Leader.
THE PRESIDENT: With the SS deleted?
DR. SAUTER: Yes please, and should be substituted by "SA".
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, "SA", Very well.
CURT RITTER VON GEITNER, a defendant, took the stand and testified as follows:
THE PRESIDENT: The Witness will raise his hand and be sworn: "I swear by God the Almighty and Omniscient that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing."
(The witness repeated the oath.)
You may be seated.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Witness, how old are you today?
A Sixty-three years of age.
Q Are you a professional officer?
A No, not any more. I was a professional soldier once upon a time, from 1902 until 1919.
Q What did you do after the end of the First World War?
Herr von Geitner, will you please make a small pause after each question?
AAfter the First World War I resigned. It was my intention to join a small factory, which was owned by my family and which was located in Schneeberg, Saxony. For that purpose I studied chemistry for a few terms at the technical college of Munich in order to be prepared for that vocation.
Q And after that what was your position in that factory?
A In 1921 I joined the firm. At first I worked in the plant. After the death of my oldest cousin in 1926 I took over the management of this small enterprise.
Q In the First World War, Herr von Geitner, what was your last rank as an officer?
A By the end of the war I was a captain on the General Staff. I was first the adjutant of an artillery detachment, and later on I had a mounted battery with the Baden Artillery Division, and in September, 1916 I was transferred to the General Staff.
Q What was your rank when you resigned in 1918-1919?
A When I resigned I was a Major.
Q And after that you were in the factory as you told us.
A Yes, quite.
Q And you directed it?
A Yes.
Q Did you, in the time between the two wars--between 1919 and 1939--work actively, politicaly in any sense.
A I was a member of a number of political parties. When I stayed in Munich after the First World War I was a member of the Bavarian People's Party.
Q What sort of a party was that? Please don't forget the pause, Sir.
A It was a middle-class party, on a Christian basis.
Q How long were you a member of that party?
A Until I moved to Schneeberg.
Q When?
A In 1921.
Q And did you leave the party then? If so, why?
A Yes, because in Schneeberg there was no Bavarian People's Party and I, therefore, joined the German National People's Party, the Deuthsch-Nationale Volkspartei, at that time.
Q What sort of a party was that?
AAgain it was a middle-class party, of a conservative and religious type.
Q What is your attitude towards the Christian religion?
AAt all times I was a follower of the Christian Church, and even after 1933 I said so and emphasized it openly. I was not on the side of the German Christians, as they were called. I was a follower of the old Protestant Church.
Q How long did you remain a member of the German National People's Party?