Q Now was Herr von Geitner competent at all as far as this Semlin camp was concerned, in his capacity as chief of staff of the Commander in Chief in Serbia?
A Of course Herr von Geitner could not decide whether or not the camp should be dissolved or whether any fundamental changes were to be effected in the camp, that, for instance, it should be transferred to a different locality; but equally or just as much to the Commanding General was the Commander in Chief in Serbia, and as such the top man in Serbia, in the same way he was the responsible medical officer who at the same time held the position of corps physician, was competent for all hygienic arrangements which became problems in Serbia.
Q I have understood you, Witness.
A But I must explain in greater detail; otherwise nobody can understand me. Geitner, as I said before, was very much interested in anything that occurred in Serbia, and it was his endeavor to help the Serbian people wherever he could, which is the reason why, at least through that channel, he was in a position to avail himself of the opportunity to help. This was how I observed it myself with my own eyes. To give a detailed opinion as to the question how far Geitner as Chief of General Staff could do anything at all in the respect, I a little Ist Lieutenant, am in no position to do.
Q Well, I have only a few small formal questions to conclude this examination. We have reports and we have orders which show Herr von Geitner's initials as "G". ("G" for George).
A Yes.
Q You know conditions on your staff. What do these initials mean? What do they amount to, particularly concerning the question whether or not Herr von Geitner, had knowledge of such documents before he signed or after he signed. Do you understand what I mean?
A Yes, I do.
Q All right, go ahead.
A The question whether Herr von Geitner's initials were added before or after the Commanding General signed the document cannot be answered very easily.
You cannot see it from the document itself. The significance of the initials, as far as I know, is not laid down in any regulation, nor has it been ordered, as a matter of principle where on the document the Chief of Staff should put his initials. There are several places where he could put his initials.
Q Well, I'm anxious to know the following: Is it true that Herr von Geitner would once every week look again at all the documents in order to keep himself well informed and up to date? Do you know that from your own observations?
A Yes, that was so. As I was entrusted with superior of the files, I was the officer who was responsible to the Chief of Staff that he could not overlook anything.
Q Is it correct that when the documents were filed that it frequently occurred that Herr von Geitner would add his "G"? In other words, on documents which had been dealt with long since?
A That happened, yes.
Q I see.
A Yes, it happened that the Chief of Staff, in cases in which he saw a document subsequently and would have had to sign somewhere in the right-hand corner on top, as he did with all in-coming documents. That in such cases Herr von Geitner by mistake would add his initials at the bottom i.e. at the end of the text, although in general initials were added only before the signature by the man in charge of the office.
Q And, Witness, a final point: I shall have to read from what is known as the so-called War Diary. Are you familiar with the War Diary?
A Yes.
Q Did you yourself keep it?
A Yes, I did at certain periods.
Q In these entries in the War Diary there is a certain system of subdivisions.
A Yes.
Q If I can put it this way, it depends on what subject matter is being dealt with, and you frequently -- regularly in fact-saw the expression "Chief".
A Yes.
Q Does that mean Chief of General Staff?
A Yes, it does.
Q And that, at your time, was Herr von Geitner? I see. Now, if under the heading Chief, retaliation orders, for instance, or retaliation reports appeared what conclusion should one arrive at there from concerning what the chief of staff did?
AAll it means is that Chief would tell the aide-de-campe who was in charge of keeping the War Diary and who at regular intervals would see the Chief of Staff and the General in order to make notes and obtain directives for the War Diary, that aide-de-camp would be told by the Chief, in this case, that such and such a retaliation order, to take an example, had to be entered into the War Diary.
Q Let me specify my question in conclusion in order to get a very clear answer. If under the heading "Chief", in the War Diary it says something concerning retaliation measures ordered or carried out, is that supposed to mean that the Chief of Staff had ordered the measures, or at least suggested them? What did it mean?
A It cannot mean that because the Chief of Staff had nothing to do with that.
Q But why does it say so under the heading Chief of Staff?
A Well, after all the Chief of Staff was responsible that the War Diary would be kept correctly by his office and, therefore, he had to take care that matters would be entered with which he himself was connected. After all it's not a personal War Diary. It's the War Diary of the Department Ia.
Q I have no further questions, if your Honors please.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our morning recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any defense counsel who wish to interrogate the witness?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: (Mueller Torgow for General Felmy) CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q Witness, before the recess you said that for some period you were in charge of the War Diary?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q Will you tell me, please, to whom was the War Diary of an agency directed, let's say for instance the War Diary of a Division, was it reported to higher headquarters, or what was the case?
A The War Diary, for instance of a Division, was after a certain period delivered to an archieve.
Q For what time or for what period was the War Diary kept before it was delivered?
A I don't believe there were any binding regulations in that respect, at least our agency did not have any. If I remember correctly we delivered it after three months.
Q You kept it for three months?
A Yes, it was concluded after every three months and delivered.
Q You mean to say then that the Division kept its War Diary and did not deliver it to the superior corps?
A That was not done on principle.
Q I see.
A It might have happened in some individual cases, that the delivering of the War Diary to the Army Archives was done through official channels, but that would only be an exception. It was the usual custom, and our agency always pursued it, to deliver the concluded War Diary immediately to the archives, so that the superior headquarters would not gain any knowledge of the contents of the War Diary.
Q Did this same apply to your activity reports which are supplement to the War Diary?
A In my opinion the activity report is not necessarily supplement to the War Diary. I believe I am correct in stating that a War Diary, in the Strictest sense of the term, had only to be kept by troop units and staffs who were committed before the enemy.
Q Yes, I know that, witness. I believe we don't have to discuss that. These units called it a War Diary?
A Yes.
Q And whether it complied with the prerequisites of the German regulations or whether it was in actual fact an activity report, is not the question we are interested in here. I only wanted to know whether the so called activity report, which was made, let us say, by a division, apart from the War Diary, whether the same applied to the activity report with respect to its passing on as was valid for the War Diary; that was my question?
A I don't know the concept "activity report" as a supplement to the War Diary; we did not handle it that way, but in my opinion if a War Diary had as a supplement an activity report, then this activity report would not have been treated in any detail defferent than the War Diary itself.
Q That is enough. I have now another question to put to you; how did you get your information for your War Diary, from which sources?
A The officer who was in charge of keeping the War Diary, had so to speak outside his official activity, knowledge of all events, all files, he knew all telephone calls, etc., and through this he had a kind of skeleton information which he could use. Now, our agencyhad the custom, and I believe that all other agencies had the same custom that the officer concerned with daily or from time to time, went to see his superior officer, be it the 1-A of the Chief of Staff, or be it the Commanding General or the Military Commander or the Commander in Chief, or whatever, it was and got certain information from him for the keeping of the War Diary.
Such statements or information would, generally refer to oral discussions which the concerned had, and might also refer to telephone conversations of which the official concerned could not necessarily know. On this occasion quite frequently the officer concerned would point out the important orders and regulations which were to be incorporated into the War Diary. However, that was generally just a matter of emphasis, because the ADC would, in any case, have all written instructions available, and during the course of time he would have a certain intuition concerning which material should be incorporated into the War Diary, or which material should not be used.
Q Am I correct in understanding you to the effect that the other men in the Corps staff to whom you then went in the war got their information from subordinate units through some channel or other, written reports, telephone conversations, oral discussion etc?
AAs far as what their own decision are concerned, that is correct.
Q Was the paper information which you received for your War Diary according to your experiences and opinion, all factually correct, or was it possible that there were mistakes and errors?
A It was possible that there were errors. Mistakes were even very probable.
Q And how do you account for that?
A I mean mistakes regarding the figures which were mentioned.
Q To which figures are you referring?
A Every unit attempted to exaggerate its successes, to put it generally, and tried to make its successes appear in a favorable light. No group that has had any successes in the past will in any report deny these successes, in fact they will be inclined to exaggerate them.
Q Do you refer in that answer as to whether successes refer to the prisoners or enemy dead?
A It will always be the same.
Q When you talk about enemy dead, you mean enemy killed in combat or reprisal prisoners shot to death?
A I am talking generally. I am talking about enemy killed in combat, and other enemy dead. It is difficult to count enemy killed in combat, and it is even impossible if your own troops do not completely occupy the terrain where the combat took place after the fight was finished, because in that case it would not be possible to cout the dead.
Q One last specific question, witness; how do you explain the fact that the figures of the reprisal prisoners shot to death would have been too high in some cases?
A Undoubtedly in many cases they were reported too high.
Previously when I was examined by Dr. Sauter I talked about the so-called mock shootings.
Q Are you meaning to say that an important part would have been played by the fact that the units knew of the very high reprisal measures which were ordered from superior headquarters?
A No doubt that was known to the troops, because it was always contained in orders passed on to the lower units.
Q And taking into account the mentality of the German soldiers in general what would you say?
A Taking into account the mentality of the German soldier, it can be assumed that he would usually feel inclined to shoot rather fewer soldiers than were ordered to be shot and which were then reported. That was the meaning of my answer.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other defense counsel which wish to interogate this witness? Apparently not. Mr. Rapp you may crossexamine if you so desire.
CROSS EXAMINATION.
BY MR. RAPP:
Q Witness, you joined the Nazi party in 1933; is that right?
A Yes, that is correct, on May 1, 1933.
Q Did I understand you to say you had to join it; is that right?
A I was asked by my defense counsel why I joined, whether I did it because of professional reasons. I answered, yes, professional reasons may have played a part since in the dental press at that time it said something like: "The German dentist belonged in the party or something like that. I did not say I had to enter the party, and then there were some other reasons which made me join the party.
Q Just a moment, witness, I am just trying to establish the fact whether you were forced or whether you joined it voluntarily, your motives I care very little about; now you joined it voluntarily; is that right?
A Voluntarily is too large-scale a conception.
Q Now, just what word would you select without making a speech?
A The situation was at the time that a certain pressure was exerted on us, but pressure does not mean we were forced. From the circumstances of 1933, one could not see how matters would actually turn out; and at that time, I was quite young, about twenty five years of age.
Being nationally inclined, which in my eyes is no crime and since the party promised a better future for the German nation and because there were general proclamations, I eventually found myself persuaded to join the party.
Q Very well. Now, witness, you have quoted yourself, if I am not mistaken, during your time that you were in the southeastern theater, a first lieutenant; is that right?
A I was promoted a 1st lieutenant during my stay in the Balkans.
Q Now, witness, were you opposed to these reprisal methods which were carried out down there?
A I personally was not favorably inclined toward those measures.
Q But you were not opposed?
A I, for my own self, did object to them, but I could not do it officially. If I was asked about my personal opinion, I would say that I datest them, I detest a mess, I cannot think of the proper words, I detest collective measures.
Q Now, you got the impression, at least that is what you told the court, that the defendant von Geitner was opposed to these measures too; is that right?
A Yes, I had that impression. I believe we were entirely of the same opinion concerning this.
Q Now were other people opposed to the reprisal measures at headquarters of the military commander Serbia?
AAs far as I could gather a picture of this situation, in the whole staff of the Commanding General, no one who worked on these measures prompted or advocated them.
Q Nevertheless they were carried out; is that right?
A Well, after all they had to be carried out.
Q Very well, then how did the Commanding General himself feel about it?
A I know for certain that even the Commanding General was actually opposed to these measures and he suffered personally over the fact that he had to put his men under these detestable measures, as he put it himself.
Q Now did you ever witness or observe a friction between the defendant Geitner and the Commanding General as far as reprisal measures are concerned?
A No, I did not do that. I cannot imagine such a difference of opinion between the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff. The chief of staff had nothing to do with ordering reprisal reasons, but that does not exclude the fact that the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General discussed such measures in principle of course. In the final analysis they were of the same opinion, they both rejected them.
Q You're sure that you know that?
A I am quite certain
Q Now you told us that von Gertner was interested in everything that took place down there, is that right, including the welfare of hospital, medical treatment, etc?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q Was that his immediate concern?
A Herr von Geitner was chiefly concerned with the tasks of a Chief of Staff. A Chief of Staff is the first advisor of his commanding officer in all questions of tactical leadership and supplies for the troops and that always remained von Geitner's main task.
Q Now, witness you also stated that these orders which forced the Commanding General Serbia to carry out these reprisal measures were received from above? Now just what do you mean by above, will you specify that?
A Or agency received orders at the time while I was with the staff from our immediate superior agency, that was the Comnander of Army Group E, which was at the same time the agency of the Commander in Chief Southeast, and which was stationed in Salonika. There was no doubt that the orders did not originate there, but I would have said....
Q Just a minute, witness. I am not interested in your conclusions or in your opinions. I am only interested in facts, all I ask you is where these orders came from and you said they came from the Heeresgruppe E; is that right?
A Yes, that is right.
Q Where they got them from, if from any other place, you don't know: is that right?
A Yes, I do know it quite well.
Q Now just how do you know that?
A I know that because these orders had the corresponding reference order from OK.W. It would for instance refer to the O.K.W. number and then some special code number and then came either the verbal order fro passing on at least the meaning of the order.
Q Now since you claim that you have seen possibly both the original order as issued by the O.K.W. and passed on to you from the Meeresgruppe or a reissued order from the Heeresgruppe based on an order received by them from the O.K.W., you ought to beable to tell us how the contents of these orders made it obligatory for the Commanding General Serbia to carry out these reprisal measures. You said you saw all the documents so maybe you can describe some of them.
A May I ask you to begin with whether I understood you correctly. Your introduction was a bit long and you said at one time "on the basis of the orders which we received immediately from the O.K.W."; did you not?
Q. No, you just stated that you got two types of orders from the Neeresgruppe, one of them may have been the original order as received from the O.K.W. and the other type may have been one which the Neeresgruppe rewrote; now describe the contents of such orders which forced the Commanding General Serbia to carry out execution measures.
A. In order to exclude any misunderstanding, I have to refer back to what I said. I did not say we received two types of orders, instead I said we received a number of orders, if I may add at this point, where there was almost always, possibley sometimes not, but almost always a reference number of the O.K.W. According to the contents of the order it could be assumed that generally it concerned or was based on the literal text of an O.K.W. order. However, it might have been possible that such an order was passed on only in accordance with the meaning of its contents. I cannot state that in detail now.
Q. All right now describe the contents of such typical orders, inasmuch as you have said you have seen all of them in connection with your job?
A. Yes indeed. The contents according to the meaning of all these orders was always that in all cases concerning terror acts where members of our own or allied troops were concerned where harm had been done to the installation of the armed forces, a certain number of reprisal prisoners were to be shot and that the official concerned, which was in our case the Commanding General and Commander personally, that is General Bader, was responsible for the carrying out of the order. There was no doubt that it was to the effect that otherwise the official concerned could expect to be punished, whether it was actually expressed in the order I am not in a position to tell you today with absolute certainty. The whole way in which the orders were worded left no doubts open.
Q. Do you remember off hand any of the quotas of some of the typical orders you have seen?
A. I believe that for instance for one killed German found the ratio of 50 was mentioned.
Q. Now, witness, you were telling us something about mock or shadow killings and in connection with that you stated that it was only able, your headquarters was only able, to carry out such shadow executions in the event no outside agency knew of any act of sabotage; is that right?
A. No, it is not quite correct.
Q. Allright, well then will you correct me please?
A. In the event that an outside agency had no knowledge of the terror act concerned, it was even possible to keep the whole incident secret and to crush every reprisal measure so that nothing at all happened in return for the sabotage act. In the endeavor to keep the reprisal figure of those actually shot as low as possible, one, after a certain period, turned to the following measures, in the cases where it was unavoidable to take any measures in return, one turned to so-called mock shooting, - the concept of shadow shooting turned up later. Such mock shootings were then carried out.
Q. Very well, now you said and gave us an example of an act of sabotage in the coal mines and as a result of the fact that it was carried on in a coal mine, you presumed Neubacher would have had knowledge of such a sabotage act; is that right?
A. Neuhausen is that name, Neubacher was the envoy.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes, Neuhausen that is correct.
Q. Now what was the adequate reprisal which was used in connection with sabotage acts in coal mines?
A. I do not remember the exact figure.
Q. Can you describe the nature of the sabotage?
A. Sabotage acts happened quite frequently in coal mines, it happen that the cables were cut and mines were even blown up.
Q. Allright, then you say for these acts a certain number of people had to be executed; is that right?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Now witness, coming back to these mock reports; you reported to a higher headquarters as having actually taken place while as a matter of fact only a certain number were killed; is that right?
A. Yes, it is correct.
Q. Now how long were you in the German army?
A. Do you mean all the time, or do you mean up to what time?
Q. Totally in years?
A. Six and one half years approximately.
Q. Now is it common use in the German army for a lower headquarters to make fraudulent reports to a Higher headquarters in the line of official business?
A. No, it was not a general custom, on the contrary, the German armed forces above all is a model example for the delivering of correct information.
Q. Just a moment, witness. This example you have given us is not such a shining example, is it, of such honesty and integrity and reliability; is it?
A. One can say to a certain extent it is not a shining example for the character of a report, but will you please take into account from which point of view these reports were deliberately reported incorrectly.
Q. Well that's a matter which we cannot decide at this time, I am merely trying to establish the fact that the German army of which you were a member at that time, according to your own testimony, relied on fraudulent reports in its conduct of warfare; is that right?
A. I do not think one can say in the conduct of war, it was merely done in the reporting to a higher headquarters in order to pacify and calm down the people on top in order to deceive them on the measures which they ordered and which we considered much too harsh. We wanted to leave them in the happy state of thinking that these orders were carried out. After all we did not want to openly oppose.
Q. I imagine not. I want to ask you now, you were asked in connection with the war diary whether or not these entries in the daily reports or in the war diaries referring to reprisal measures represent an accurate picture of what happened at that time, and I believe you stated there again that was done for the purpose of reporting to higher headquarters the fact that they had taken more prisoners than they actually did, that they had executed more people in connection with the reprisal measures than they actually did and that the losses of the enemy were higher than they actually were; is that right?
A. We will have to distinguish here between the figures which apply to the prisoners and the figures which apply to the men killed in combat on one hand, and on the other hand between the figures which applied to those shot in reprisal measures, the figures which apply to the activities of a unit in combat and which had to serve as a standard were received by us from lower units. They were incorporated unaltered into our daily reports and that is also in the war diary.
We had no cause to change anything. On the contrary, it was our endeavor, as far as possible, to report correctly so that the proper information was kept for the later history of war. The, of course, the units would tell us they had, say a thousand prisoners if they had 959. I think that is a custom in almost all armies and the same accounts for the dead who were killed in combat. I have already said before it was impossible to count them anyway and they could mostly be just estimated. That this estimate was made too high rather than too low is only too understandable and I think it was usual to do that in other armies as well.
Q. Just a minute, witness. I presume you have served in a lot of other armies, is that right, so you draw this conclusion?
A. No, that hasn't anything to do with it. I have not served in any other armies, Mr. Prosecutor. The men shot as reprisal show a different picture. The figures for men shot at in reprisal were deliberately described incorrectly and reported to higher headquarters by our agency just in order to keep the people on top pacified.
Q. I am afraid I can't pursue this question any further because the testimony you are giving now and the testimony you gave then, as far as I can make out, are somewhat contradictory so we will just drop that question and I will withdraw it.
Now, maybe you can answer this question: was there any reason that these troops who were fighting the partisans tried to give bigger report or bigger figures then actually occurred? What do you think was the reason behind that?
A. Could I ask you to please put the question a little more plainly? You were talking about the units which fought the partisans?
Q. In their reports of the casualties they inflicted on the enemy, you told us they exaggerated. Is there any reason why they exaggerated, or do you know the reason why they exaggerated?
A. They were not exaggerated. They were certainly frequently ju rounded up to the next higher round figure. There is a difference bet exaggerating and just rounding up to the next higher round figure.
Q. Just give us the answer -- just give us the answer to what you believe is not an exaggeration but which I believe is not an accurate report.
A. If a unit reports 1,000 enemy prisoners and if one counts them exactly which is not possible on the field of combat -- and one finds there is only 959 -- then I would consider that rounding up to the next higher round figure and every agency will concede that and, in case it was possible for the agency to ascertain the actual figure of 959 it would consider this just a minor detail.
Q. Now, you don't pursue that these reports were dressed up in such a way as you testified here because it made a pretty good impression at higher headquarters?
A. I didn't say before that they deliberately added five men. All I said was that such figures would generally be reported a little higher than too low. I think they would rather report a thousand than nine hundred in that particular instance. After all, we are here considering prisoners of war or enemy dead which were made in combat and that is something completely different from shot reprisal prisoners which are reported to higher headquarters.
Q. All right. Now, explain to me this: obviously, everybody in the Southeast, particularly anybody connected with your headquarters who was serving under your headquarters; knew about these mock executions. Is that right?
A. I wouldn't put it that way. I wouldn't say that is quite correct
Q. Now just a minute, witness, you told us the troops reported them as mock executions to you. You reported them to higher headquarters, At least you know that the executions which were carried out by the troops and reported to you were not correct. Don't you think that includes pretty much everybody serving down there?
A. No, the situation wasn't quite like that. It was not the units which did not report the 45 if I may go back to the old figure but in the case concerned of the Commanding General the mock shootings were generally carried out with the help of tho SD.
Q. Now, just a minute; this gets very interesting now. Now tho SD knows about these mock executions, too, is that right?
A. Yes, I think so.
Q. They wore under Himmler, weren't they?
A. I don't mean the Higher SS and Police leader personally. I don't mean Meissner.
Q. I assume he didn't shoot all the people himself, did he?
A. No, there were certain experts and the matter was discussed with them personally.
Q. Just a minute witness. This is getting rather interesting. Now, we just learned that the SD was also called, so to speak, into this conspiracy to only carry on mock executions, is that right -certain key officials?
A. Not the SD in its entirety but there wore people with the SD who knew about it.
Q. That is exactly what I said, witness; I said,"key officials."
A. "Key officials" is saying too much.
Q. All right have it your way. There were certain officials who knew about it. Is that right?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Now, you have already told us just now that only Meissner, as far as his person was concerned, was directly subordinate to the Military Commander Serbia.
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Now, who carried out these executions?
A. That was done in various ways. There was a time when the troops, carried out the executions and there was a certain period when police units carried out the executions.
Q. Now, those executions which wore carried out by the troops we will continue later on. Let us for the time being just concentrate on those which were carried out with the help of the SD.
They were subordinate to Himmler, were they not?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Now, those SD people who executed or carried out these executi served also under Himmler; that is, the actual trigger men?
A. The actual trigger man was not necessarily a man of the SD. I don't believe it was ever a man of the SD. After all, you must make a difference between the security service and the police. There were certain police formations and these police formations did by no means have to be part of the SD.
Q. Witness, let's not at this time inject into this conversation a third issue before we have cleared up the first one. I don't in any way try to restrain your testimony but just let's confine ourselves to one thing first. Now, did the SD in many cases carry out these executions or not?
A. Whether the SD or members of the SD actually carried out the executions, whether they actually pulled the trigger, as you put it before, I don't know. I don't believe they did. I think you will understand me in a minute if you will just lot mo continue for a minute.
Q. All right. Go ahead. I haven't interrupted you as yet.
A. The situation was this. There were certain camps, the socalled collection camps, which were under the police authorities or under the SD authorities. I am not quite clear to whom they were subordinate. I believe a few of these camps were later called retaliation prisoner camps and the selection of the prisoners to be shot from these camps was a matter of an SD official. The actual execution could certainly be carried out by a police unit. I know that it is not very easy to understand the conditions which were a bit complicated but that is how it happened to be.
Q. That is not too difficult. Now, just why were these SD people called in to the confidence of the commanding general as far as these mock executions were concerned?
A. Well, I can only voice an assumption here. After all, I did not participate in the discussions which the Commander had with the SD man concerned.
Q. You know a lot and you have seen a lot. You have testified to even more. Now, maybe at this particular time you could give us an answer if you know the fact, since you made the allegation before hand that the SD was called into the confidence, since you know that, it seems obvious that you ought to know why they were called in.
A. Not the SD in its entirety, but only the individual SD official
Q. That's what I'm referring to.
THE PRESIDENT: We will interrupt at this time and take our noon recess.
(A recess was taken)