A Yes.
Q Were those reprisal measures ordered before Herr von Geitner arrived there or were they ordered after he arrived?
A Reprisal measures had been ordered before Herr von Geitner arrived, The reprisal measures had been ordered even before I myself arrived and then circumstances existed when I appeared.
Q Did Herr von Geitner introduce that system there?
A It was not Herr von Geitner who introduced the system.
Q From your association with Herr von Geitner or other people, did you form the impression that defendant von Geitner wanted to intensify this system of reprisal measures when he held office?
A No, he did not want to do that.
Q Well, what conviction did you form in that direction?
A It was always my impression that Herr von Geitner wanted to put on the breaks as much as he could and he wanted to save as many Serbian lives as possible; advocating a constructive policy of reconstruction or some term like that about which I am not quite clear.
Q Did you hear from his own mouth whether or not he approved orders concerning reprisal measures which came down to him from the superior authorities, did he make any remarks about this to you in your circle?
AAs far as the basic orders were concerned concerning reprisal measures and similar, let me say extreme orders, which came down from above, he expressed himself in a manner and he commented on them in such a manner that I had no doubt myself that Herr von Geitner disapproved of these measures because of his innermost convictions.
Q Can you give us more details about how he expressed himself perhaps he used certain terms which you might tell us?
A I remember precisely that in that connection the expression was used. "They must be crazy" and ho meant the highest leadership
Q You mean the highest leadership; who?
A Hitler above all and even some of his closest collaborators he meant.
I cannot say who it was because he did not mention any names.
Q On the basis of your observations and experience, did you form the impression that those measures of retaliation wore necessary or did you regard these measures as completely or partially superfluous?
A They were necessary inasmuch as after the autumn of 1941 the partisan warfare at first a nuisance, later abanding everywhere called for counter measures.
Q What do you think, bearing in mind what you heard and observed that the aim was that von Geitner considered with regard to these measures of retaliation; what was perhaps on his mind in that respect?
A Now in the final analysis it was a method of presenting the insurgents and those who sympathized with them from further acts of terror. In that respect the country was to be pacified and law and order was to be re-established.
Q It has been alleged that somebody had pursued the aim to decimate the Serbian people and exterminate them; did you hear anything of a plan of that sort?
A Of any such plan, I never heard anything and I can hardly imagine it. On the contrary the German leadership had to endeavor at the time to preserve the Serbian people as a going concern so to speak. As far as we were concerned, t he Serbia was important to us at least for the duration of the war in the much as they supplied us with raw materials. I would only like to mention here the copper mines of Bor which in the spring of 1941 had been destroyed almost completely, the installations, etc., with great expenditure, they were made to run again, a road was built and as far as I remember there was even a new railway line, which was to be constructed. I cannot remember where it was to go, but it was near the main line near Nish. The other line was somewhat devastated and for that reason a new railway was to be constructed, which was to do the work and which would run from Bor to the west toward the main line to Belgrade.
Q Witness, any plan to exterminate or disseminate the Serbian people remained unknown at least to you and the circle of the Wehrmacht?
A We never heard anything about that.
Q Well, I am anxious to know whether you knew anything about whether Herr von Geitner made efforts that more German troops and better German troops should be transferred to Serbia so that in that way the terror acts could be stopped and retaliation acts would be superfluous; do you know anything about that from your own observations.
A I know that very well from my own observations. Not only was it said in almost every situation report and these situation reports were somewhat extensive, the average being about 6 to 8 pages at the time, which went out every ten days to the superior agencies, in other words in almost all these situation report he said that the existing forces were entirely inadequate to pacify the country. Apart from that, in a number of these reports it was suggested that new and better forces should be sent there. Apart from that, on frequent occasions special applications were made that new troops should be sent down.
Q There were applications in other words, if I understand you correctly, which pursued the aim to get more German troops and better German troops to Serbia.
A Yes, that is so.
Q So that through them further acts of sabotage could be prevented?
A Yes.
Q Do you know from your own observations that these efforts on the part of Herr von Geitner were often frustrated by other agencies in Belgrade, that is to say that his efforts were opposed by other agencies.
A I do not know that other German agencies were opposed to the transfer of new and better troops there.
Q Did it not occur that plans of Herr von Geitner were frustrated e.g. by the Higher SS and police leader or by the general plenipotentiary for economic affairs or by the plenipotentiary of the foreign office; do you know anything about that?
AAs far as the plans of Herr von Geitner or of the Commanding General were concerned were frustrated by the agencies you have mentioned happened on frequent occasions, but as far as I know that was not the case when the problem was to get more German troops into Serbia.
Q In what case did that happen?
A That mainly happened as far as I can remember, when the simplification of the whole channels of command in Serbia was concerned. The way the channels of command were run in Serbia was so complicated that as far as the commanding general was concerned, who after all was the commander in chief of Serbia at least it was quite impossible for him actually to have his intentions carried out.
In fact, he was commander in chief in Serbia in a very limited sense of the word, What happened frequently was that if something had been ordered, which other agencies did not like particularly I should name here the Higher SS and Police leader and the plenipotentiary for economic affairs, Neuhausen if those people did not like something which had been ordered by the commanding general, then they would either see their own superior agency first about this - that is to say the Reich Fuehrer SS on one hand and Goering. I believe was Neuhausen' superior agency, but I am not quite sure about that and then they received orders to a different effect from t heir own agency and the commanding general was in no position to do anything about it.
Q Witness, do you know that the defendant von Geitner in many conversations and conferences always advocated that the situation of the Serbian people must be improved, that particularly the Serbian people should be bettor fed, etc.; can you tell us anything about conferences of that type and efforts made by Herr von Geitner in that direction?
A Herr von Geitner was, I might say, always making efforts to improve the conditions for the Serbian people in every respect. I remember very well a conference in a large circle where the men in charge of the more important agencies in Belgrade were present. I myself was present too and it was on that occasion that Herr von Geitner demanded with great emphasis better food supplies and I believe also that mention was made at the time that supplies of textiles and leather supplies should be improved.
Q Do you, from your own observations, witness, know that Herr von Geitner made special efforts in the direction of improving sanitary conditions and general conditions in Serbia; for instance did he try to combat typhus epidemics and things like that?
A Yes, that was the case too. In fact there was hardly any field where the commanding general was competent and where Herr von Geitner would not always time and again make new proposals and now suggestions. It was particularly in the field of hygiene that I remember now that he took very generous measures which were initiated on the occasion of the enormous movement of refugees, who came in from the eastern Bosnian area to Serbia when the typhus epidemic and other infections diseases were about to infest Serbia as well.
Q. And was it Herr von Geitner in particular who made efforts in that direction.
A. Herr von Geitner was most anxious in all these matters quite generally. He would take care of all things where he thought he could help the Serbian people. As far as the medical officer in charge, that is, the senior medical officer was concerned, the order was issued at the time to keep him always up to date and the senior medical officer would also report to him orally what could be done.
Q. Dr. Bub, I shall now go over to something else, i.e., to the whole chapter of retaliation measures. Let me ask you a preliminary question first. You as an ...D.C. -- did you have an insight into all files, orders, and documents by the Commander in Chief Serbia which were concerned with measures of retaliation?
A. Yes, certainly. I was in charge of filing documents all the time because, after all, the files which came in were large and extensive and the sergeant and no one could not and should not be in charge of it all by himself. Apart from that, perhaps late in 1942, I looked at all the files which had preceded the Commander in Chief Serbia and which we kept for him. and it was on that occasion that I saw the orders from these old files which had been closed. I took them out again and made them part of our own filing system, as far as they were still of importance. Therefore, I am in a position to say that in la there was not one order and no reports which in the course of my duties I did not at least see once.
Q. Very well, witness; so, therefore, you can tell us now, who was it in the staff of the Commander in Chief Serbia who worked on retaliation measures?
A. Would you please ask that question in a different way?
Q. All right, let me ask you first: who was competent under the Commander in Chief to order retaliation measures? Who could order them, I mean?
A. The man authorized to order retaliation measures was only and exclusively the Commander in Chief himself in his capacity as the holder of executive power.
Q. And who was that Commander in Chief?
A.- When I was there it was General Bader, General of the artillery Bader.
Q. Bader, you mean?
A. Yes.
Q. And after him was it General Felber by any chance?
A That was after I left.
Q. I see.
A. I left at the same time with General Bader and I joined the 21st Mountain Corps.
Q. Witness, as far as these orders for retaliation are concerned, did they come from the Commanding General himself? Were they so to say an invention on the part of the Commanding General or who was it that was at the bottom of these orders?
A. The orders did not come from General Bader. They were basic orders which originated in the Supreme command.
Q. What do you mean "Supreme command"? Who is that?
A. Well, I suppose OKH or perhaps even OKW; in the last analysis, Hitler probably.
Q. So you e.re telling us this: they were basic orders from Hitler, the OKW and OKH?
A. Yes.
Q. How is it that you know that for the issuance of retaliation orders the Commanding General was only and solely responsible? How do you know that?
A. To order retaliation measures is a task within the sphere of executive power and the executive power in this specific case was invested in General Bader. It was he alone who was in a position to order measures of that sort.
Q. Did the Chief of General Staff with the Commanding General Serbia, which in this case was General von Geitner, not have anything to do with executive power?
A. No, he was only responsible for the field of general staff work; that is to say, all questions concerning administration and supplying troops.
Q. Now, you tell us that these basic orders came down from higher up. Did these basic orders contain letters, directives in the direction that the execution of retaliation measures would be supervised by these supreme agencies?
A. The carrying out of these measures was always supervised from higher up.
Q. How?
A. It had been ordered that, together with the report of a terror act, it should be reported also what measures had been taken in return or at least what plans existed in that respect. The confirmation that such measures had actually been carried out had also to be reported.
Q. Was the observation of those directives controlled from higher up and supervised in any way or was that a directive which was more or less on paper?
A. There was somebody higher up, undoubtedly, who watched extremely carefully whether in retaliation for a certain act of terror which had been reported on a certain day there would also be reports about the measures taken in return and about the way they were carried out.
Q. Has it ever happened, witness, that superior agencies actually complained if there were no reports about execution of retaliation measures or could you hope that the people higher up would overlook such an omission.
A. I don't think you could hope for that and there were complaints of that sort. I should say there were complaints.
Q. Witness, do you know from your own observations whether it was usual for the Commander in Chief Serbia to observe these instructions very strictly or whether efforts were made to circumvent and by pass or at least modify these orders?
A. As far as it was possible efforts were made to by pass the order.
Q. How was that done?
A. Well, for instance, it happened on numerous occasions that an act of terror was not reported to higher up at all and, therefore, no measures had to be taken in return nor was there any need to report them.
Q. Now, just a moment about that point; was it not reported intentionally, you mean, or was it not reported simply out of negligence?
A. It was deliberately not reported in order to bypass the retaliation measures; to keep these things dark and not pass them on could only be done if you wanted to do it successfully in cases where one did not need to fear that the act of terror would reach the higher agency through the channels of another agency. These other agencies had their own channels how to report to their own superior agencies; and to give you a general example in order to make this quite clear, if, for instance, in a big coal mine an act of sabotage occurred with the result that production in this plant would be interrupted for weeks or perhaps months, the General Plenipotentiary for Economic Affairs, of course, had to report this to higher up through his own channels. In a case of that sort there would have been no hope of success if our agency would have attempted to keep this act of sabotage a secret; but if, for instance, a Serbian official was murdered, it was, generally speaking, not to be assumed that some other agency to would report that their superior agencies because there was also a directive that an act of terror committed against Serbians should also be answered with retaliation measures so that persons of that sort should have a certain amount of protection; because even those people were constantly exposed to attacks by insurgents.
Q You say, witness, in other words, if there was a possibility not to report an act of terror, that was done frequently so that retaliation measures might be avoided. Is that correct?
A Yes, that is quite correct.
Q Now, who was the person who made efforts in that direction? Who was the man who was at the bottom of this? Was it Herr von Geitner specifically who made efforts of that sort or was it other officials who did this?
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, I certainly don't want to make it a practice to object to the defense's direct examination of the witness merely not to interrupt the progress of the trials but occasionally it becomes incumbent to do so when Dr. Sauter steps entirely outside of the direct examination by not only suggesting and leading the witness but by giving him the answer on a silver platter. I object to that kind of questioning by Dr. Sauter.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness was asked as to his knowledge of certain facts. If he knows he may answer it; otherwise, of course, he cannot answer. The objection to that extent will be overruled.
Q Witness, what I asked you was, what official, what officer was the man who was at the bottom of these efforts to report terror acts as infrequently as possible to higher up?
A I could not say that it was only one officer who was at the bottom of these efforts but I know from my personal experience that Herr von Geitner was mainly the man who took part in that an act of terror would not be reported. I might perhaps, in order to make it quite clear for the uninitiated, say briefly how these things were handled quite generally. Whenever such an act of terror had occurred-
THE PRESIDENT: I believe the witness has answered the question and I do not believe it is necessary for him to make a further explanation. You may proceed to some other questioning, Dr. Sauter.
Q Witness, do you know whether Herr von Geitner ever had discussed with the Commanding General at the time, that as little as possible should be reported to higher up?
A Yes.
Q How do you know that?
A I know that from my own experiences.
Q Were you present?
A Yes, on frequent occasions -- also quite a few times.
Q Witness, do you know also of other methods used by your agency in order to limit the retaliation measures as much as possible?
A Other methods to keep retaliation measures as low as possible in order to save Serbian blood were e.g. the following: for instance, whenever in a certain area an act of terror had occurred, then all men killed on the side of the enemy, if one can call it "enemy" in this general way -- I mean the bandits of both parties -- in other words, all the enemy dead left behind by the enemy in that area at the time -- they were first of all gathered and listed as part of the quota of the ratio or retaliation. That happened on thos occasions that thereby the ration orders had nearly been met. However, later on the practice was started to have what was known as sham shooting.
Q What do you mean by sham shooting?
A In the case of those shootings, sham shootings, the situation was that from the ratio ordered of perhaps 50 retaliation prisoners, who should have been shot, only some of them were shot. That is to say, 5 or 10, whereas the others were not shot at all.
Q But what was it that was reported to higher up?
A What we reported was "50 retaliation prisoners have been shot."
Q Witness, how was it done in the case of these posters? Is it true that all these retaliation measures were always announced by public posters to the population?
A Most of them, yes, were announced to the population by public posters.
Q Why was that done?
A In order to deter the population from further acts of terror.
Q But now when these sham shootings had occured if in your case, witness, only 5 were actually shot and not 50, what were the names which were listed on these public posters?
A The names of the five who had actually been shot were listed. It said, for instande: for this or that attack "the following persons have been shot" and the names of the five who were actually shot would be listed and then it would be, say "another 45".
Q Those names were not given?
A No, they were not given because they had not been shot.
Q You told us that to order the retaliation measures was up to the commanding general.
A Yes.
Q Now, who actually worked on the retaliation measures? Who worked out the details? Who was that on your staff?
A That was an A.D.C. who had this duty assigned to him.
Q What was his profession?
A He was a legal expert.
Q A legal expert? I see. I believe he was a 1st Lieutenant, wasn't he?
A Yes.
Q Did Herr von Geitner have anything to do with working out the details and preparation of retaliation measures and orders as far as you could see?
A May I, Mr. Counsel, say something about the 1st Lieutenant, perhaps first?
Q Yes, by all means.
A I think I said something which might be misunderstood.
Q You want to make a correction?
A I want to add something.
Q Yes, please do.
A The 1st Lieutenant worked out the details and dealt with the retaliation orders in the sense that when an act of terror had occurred and had been reported to us -- and if the act of terror had been reported to us -- and if the act of terror had been reported to the higher agency in the daily report -- then this 1st Lieutenant would go to General Bader and report to him orally what had occurred. The channel then, in other words, did not as was usual otherwise, go to the First General Staff officer and the Chief of Staff, but in these cases and only in these cases the extraordinary thing would be done that a simple 1st Lieutenant or A.D.C. would go to the Commanding General directly to report to him orally. The Commanding General would then decide whether or not retaliation prisoners should be shot because there again, despite these rigid orders from higher up, cases occurred where retaliation measures could be avoided, although the case had been reported to higher up.
Q Did, in cases of that sort whenever an act of terror had been reported, the Chief of Staff ever make a certain suggestion to the Commanding General -- namely, to have this or that retaliation measure applied -- or was it the Commanding General who decided independently without taking the Chief of Staff into consultation?
A The Chief of Staff did not make any suggestion in that direction. The Commanding General acted entirely independently after he had heard the oral report by the A.D.C.
Q If the Commanding General was not present, if he happened to be on leave for instance, who was it that deputized for the Commanding General on your staff in the question of retaliation measures?
A Should the Commanding General be absent for a longer period of time -- that is, let us say, for more than two or three days -or if he was absent on leave, then in these cases a deputy was officially appointed. This was at least usually the most senior Troup Commander. The Chief of Staff was on no occasion the deputy of the Commanding General; he could deputize in other matters, of course.
Q Ho could deputize for him in other matters? In what matters could he deputize for him?
A In current official business which was not of fundamental importance.
Q What about retaliation measures?
A Never at all.
Q I see. Witness, did you over see any orders concerning retaliation measures which had been signed by Herr von Geitner?
A I saw orders for retaliation on which the name of von Geitner appeared.
Q How do you explain that in view of your knowledge of the organization of your staff?
A Well, that's quite simple. There were cases where the Commanding General for one or two days was absent on an official trip. He was somewhere in Serbia and one always knew where he was to be found. And in cases of that sort it was not usual to appoint an official deputy for so short a period; the Commanding General was contacted on the telephone. He was told all about the cases, and the Commanding General would then, over the telephone, give his decision and his order to our office in Belgrade. Now, since a retaliation order, as a matter of principle, must always be sent in writing or at least on a teletype to the person concerned, who had to carry it out, because otherwise he would not have carried it out at all, there had to be somebody who would then confirm by his signature that this order in writing or in teletype was actually an expression of the will of the Commanding General.
Q And who was that? I mean the one who confirmed that by his signature?
A Well, that, of course, was the Chief of Staff. In other words quite generally Herr von Goitner.
I could imagine also, but it never happened, although it might have happened theoretically, that if and when Herr von Geitner had to go on an official trip and General Bader had to make an important official trip that the deputy of General Geitner had to put his name there.
Q Now, if a retaliation order of that sort was signed on behalf of the absent Commanding General by the Chief of Staff, Herr von Geitner, or by another officer entrusted with it by the Commanding General, what did you see on a letter of that sort? You as officer? Was it, in your opinion, an order by the man who had signed it, or what was expressed by these orders?
AAs I saw it, it was an order from the Commanding General, and I do not think that any German officer who is familiar with the manner in which orders are issued in higher staffs could look upon it differently.
Q Who was it, in your opinion, who was responsible for an order of that sort?
A The responsibility in these cases was indubitably of the man who held executive power, and in this case it was General Bader. Or perhaps if an official deputy had been appointed, it would have been the deputy.
Q Witness, did you and Colonel von Geitner, as he was at the time, or did you and the 1st Lieutenant, the legal expert man, discuss the question whether or not these retaliation measures were permissible under International Law? Or did you talk with General Bader himself perhaps about that?
A No, I do not think that General Bader and I or the Chief of Staff and I ever discussed that.
Q Did you and tho legal man discuss that problem? Did you discuss retaliation measures with the legal man directly -- that is, the 1st Lieutenant?
A Retaliation measures? Yes, of course. Although I myself was not connected with retaliation measures our two desks were facing each other.
Q Your desk and tho 1st Lieutenant's desk you mean?
A Yes, and, of course, we could scarcely avoid, in most cases, whenever a retaliation order was issued to know about it because I knew when the first aide-de-camp would formulate what the Commanding General wanted to have done, in words, and I heard him when he dictated these things to the typist. It also happened that the first aide-de-camp had let me know of tho fact that the Commanding General had refused to have any retaliation measures carried out. And in that sense, of course, I have discussed retaliation measures.
Q Did this legal man who shared your office over express any doubt as to whether these retaliation measures violated International Law?
A I could not finish what I wanted to say before because you started on a new question.
Q Well, you can do so now.
A What I wanted to say was that was the extent to which I discussed retaliation measures with the first aidede-camp. That was your question, was it not?
QQuite. Dr. Bub, I have now asked you -- this 1st Lieutenant was a legal expert, wasn't he?
A Yes, he was.
Q And that's why he was entrusted with this task, because he was a legal man?
A I suppose that must have been the reason why he was entrusted with these duties.
Q Did this legal man ever discuss the question with you whether or not retaliation measures were compatible with International Law?
A I don't think so. I can't say so with certainty because I am not a legal man, and I never dealt with any matters relating to International Law. As an officer I did not have the opportunity to do so, and, therefore, I would hardly have been a suitable partner in a conversation of that sort, unless I wanted to learn from the first aide-de-camp and be enlightened on these matters, and, of course, we didn't have the time for that.
Q Did you not think in your own mind about these retaliation measures and whether they violated International Law?
A I assumed, personally speaking, that orders of so far-reaching effect, at least far-reaching for individual human lives, which came from the highest agency would have been examined by the highest agency concerning their connection with International Law.
Q Well, let us talk about something else, Witness. Did Herr von Geitner, as far as you know conditions, have anything to do with concentration camps, as we understand the term nowadays.
A Concentration camps, as we understand the term today, did not exist in Serbia at that time. There were places where Serbians were kept as prisoners. This was mainly the prisoner camp in Semlin, under the Higher SS and Police Leader.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me. The Witness has said that he -- the witness has said that the Defendant von Geitner had no knowledge or was not responsible for or connected with any of the concentration camps, and I believe that should limit the nature of the questions and the answers, unless it could be briefly handled.
I don't want to limit you, but I don't see any necessity for any lengthy discussion of the question.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Witness, do you know that General von Geitner wanted improvement of certain conditions in the Semlin camp, although it was not part of his competence, in the interest and for the benefit of the inmates?
A Yes, that I know. When a medical officer came and called one day -- it might have been the aide-de-camp of the senior medical officer or of one of his experts under him -- when this officer visited the Semlin camp certain faults in the hygienic arrangements were reported to our agency. The Chief of Staff was highly interested in these reports and he discussed them with Department IV-B as to how these faults could be remedied.
Q Was he at all responsible for what Department IV-B did as Chief of Staff?
A Yes, he was.
Q What is Department IV-B?
A Department IV-B is the department of the senior medical officer.
Q Medical Department you mean?
A Yes, quite.
Q What did he do -von Geitner- in order to have these faults remedied?
A He discussed the problem, with Department IV-B -- I believe it was the senior medical officer himself with whom von Geitner talked.
This was Colonel Doctor Hammer at the time. And he discussed ad to how these things could be remedied. Having heard the opinion of the Department, von Geitner ordered it to do all they could, and the details were entirely up to Department IV-B.