AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE BURKE: (Presiding) You may proceed, Dr. Rauschenbach.
BY DR. Rauschenbach:
Q. Witness, before the luncheon recess we had discussed exhibit 317 in document book 13, which is contained on page 18 of the German and on page 27 of the English text and then we had reached the question of the Italian capitulation. You had already mentioned that during the second half of August the O.K.W had issued an order according to which the Italian forces in the Southeastern area, in the event of their independant surrender should be disarmed in as peaceful a manner as possible. Were measures provided in this order concerning those Italian units who would not voluntarily succumb to disarmament?
A. As far as I remember there was nothing layed down concerning specific measures. All that was said was that if necessary disarmament had to be forced.
Q. Were there any provisions concerning punishment in case disarmament was refused?
A. As far as I remember no.
Q. And why was disarmament demanded?
A. For one reason because the whole situation, as I had indicated previously, was a very dangerous one. I might almost call it the hour of fate of the southeast and maybe even of Germany. The second reason was that we had already had the experience that the Italian frequently let their arms fall into the hands of bands either because they did not defend themselves adequately or even by selling or giving away their arms and ammunition. We knew though the surveyance of the bands through our Intelligence service that the bands attached great importance to those Italian weapons.
Q. Did you get any particular information concerning the fact that the bands prepared for the expected treason of the Italians?
A. A directive of Mihajlovic was known to us, according to which, in the event of the anticipated insurrection or treason or whatever one wants to call it, the disarmament of the Italians by the Mihajlovic bands was intended.
Q. How was this order of the O. K. W., the code name of which was "Exis" carried out?
A. It was carried out through the conclusion of the capitulation with the competent Italian officers.
Q. Were there difficulties in that respect?
A. In the earlier stages there were certain difficulties which however eventually were overcome in a peaceful manner. I remember that on the evening of 9 September I had the impression that really everything had gone off well and without trouble, with the exception of Rhodes. We were very anxious however as to whether there might not be parts of Italian units which would attach themselves to the bands or fight against us. During the first days of the capitulation, there was no doubt whatever regarding its successful conclusion.
Q. And now we turn to the exhibit 317, but first I shall put these preparatory questions to you. What was the connection of this order with the total action of the disarmament of the Italians?
A. On the 9th of September the order which we have before us here was issued. According to this order Italian soldiers who were not prepared to continue the battle on the German side were to be treated as Prisoners of War after they had been disarmed.
Q. Was this order of the O.K.W. passed on to subordinate commands by the Commander in Chief Southeast?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. What further orders came from the O.K.W.?
A. On the 11th of September an order arrived concerning the treatment of those Italian units which were fighting against us.
Q. And this order of the O.K.W. is also contained in the documents of the prosecution?
A. Yes, it is. This order is reproduced in exhibit 323 in a summary and again in 327 as the individual order.
Q. Will you then please look at exhibit 327, it is on page 41 of the German and 55 of the English document book. This is an order of the 2nd Panzer Army, addressed to the 15th Army Corps and it says?
"O.K.W. has ordered:
"Wherever Italian Troops or other Italian bearer of arms are still offering resistance at this time, they are to be given a short term ultimatum which is the express that the Commanders responsible for the resistance will be shot to death as franc tireurs unless they order their troops by the time stated to surrender their arms to the German units."
Is that the O.K.W. order which you mean?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Were there any further orders issued by the O.K.W.?
A. Later on 12 September another order was issued concerning those Italians who after the capitulation had let arms fall into the hands of bands or supported the bands in any other way. I beg your pardon that was on the 13th, not on the 12th. This order is contained in this same exhibit on page 8 of that document. I am afraid I don't know the page number.
Q. It is page 8 of exhibit 327 and since the exhibit starts on page 55, it should be on page 63. This is a teletype message to the 2nd Panzer Army, which again starts:
"OKW has ordered: Subject: treatment of Italian Troop Units."
It is contained on page 62 of the English document book. Was this teletype also passed on by the Commander in Chief Southeast?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. This teletype that concerns treatment of Italian troop units reads as follows:
"Italian troop-units that deliver up arms to insurgents and/or negotiate with insurgents by order of the Fuehrer, the following procedure is to be applied with respect to any captured Italian Troops Units which have permitted their arms to fall into the hands of insurgents or who have cooperated with insurgents at all:
"1.) The officers are to be shot to death by summary court martial procedure.
"2) Officers and men are immediately...." and then I leave out a good bit, "are to be committed for labor employment." Did the Commander in Chief make any supplement to this teletype and if so which ones?
A. I cannot recollect any supplement.
Q Was there by any chance a supplement which demanded the shooting of one officer to fifty men or one officer to ten men regarding these Italians?
A I cannot recall any such supplement.
Q Witness, I have already asked you in this morning's session; you received an indictment, didn't you? In this indictment under figure "1" under the letter "I", did you read there that you, as Chief of Staff of Army Group F, issued such an order?
A That is what is says in the indictment but I was in no position to issue such an order, and I do not remember such an order, and I have found no proof in the Prosecution documents that I issued such an orders.
Q Concerning the orders of the OKW and especially regarding the very last one concerning the shooting of Italian officers, did you have any misgivings?
A No.
Q And why not?
A For one thing, I assumed on principle that such orders as this one which came from the OKW and were channeled to the Commander in Chief Southeast had been clearly examined regarding their international validity and, secondly, I was fully aware of the fact that after the concluded capitulation every soldier who used his arms against us was to be regarded as a franc--tireur.
Q That was your own personal opinion.
A Yes.
Q What I mean is, you did not simply rely on the opinion of the OKW?
A No. This was my personal opinion. It was the opinion of my Commander in Chief and I believe it was the generally accepted opinion.
Q In the teletype of the Second Panzer Army which records this OKW order another thing is mentioned: Measures for instance, the shooting of officers, are to be carried out against such units which let their arms fall into the hands of the insurgents. Did this apply also to those who before the capitulation allowed their arms to fall into the hands of bands?
A No, it would not even have been possible to ascertain that. Meant were those who after the capitulation had been concluded up until the actual practical disarmament on the basis of that capitulation allowed their arms to fall into the hands of bands.
Q Were the mentioned orders by the OKW actually carried out?
A Yes. However, today I am not in a position to state "whether the order which was discussed last -- that is the order concerning the Italians who allowed their arms to fall into the hands of bands -whether that order was actually carried out. I am not today in a position to say it with certainty.
Q Would you be able to gather it from the reports which are contained in this document, Exhibit 327, in the pages following this OKW order?
A No, I am afraid I did not find any certain proofs for this fact.
Q There is, for instance, a report of the 18th of September which was made by the SS Division, Prinz Eugen, to the High Command of the 15th Mountain Corps. That is the report on page 11 of this document. "The Division reports execution 7 officers." It is on page 11 of the document.
A Yes, I have it. This means the shooting of 7 officers.
Q Did you receive the teletype at the time?
A I am fairly sure that I did not receive that particular teletype. It was addressed to the High Command of the 15th Corps. Whether and how this specific case was reported to the Commander in Chief Southeast I am not today in a position to establish.
Q We will nowturn to the documents which concern the Italian General Roncaglia. These are Exhibit 320, 321 and 322. These documents start in the German text on page 25 and in the English document book on page 36. There we read the following:
It is a report from the 118th Mountain Jaeger Division. "Arrest and eventual execution of the Commanding General of the Italian 14th Army Corps. General Roncaglia, is intended in case of further insubordination."
And then in Exhibit 321 we have a report of the 13th of September where it says: "The Commander in Chief Southeast orders the execution of General Roncaglia in case depotation to Belgrade is not guaranteed."
A Excuse me if I interrupt. This is not a report but it is an entry in the War Diary.
Q All right, War Diary entry. Then we have Exhibit 322 and it says there: "General Roncaglia is to be shot without delay as a franc-tireur on the basis of his illegal conduct reported in the daily report of the 15th Mountain Corps of the 13th September 1943 in the event immediate transport to Belgrade is not fully guaranteed."
Do you recall this case of General Roncaglia?
A I merely recollect the name but no details and, on the basis of the documents which have been quoted here, I am still unable to see the connection. It is rather striking that on the same day, that on the 13th of September, a daily report of the Second Panzer Army, which is Exhibit 326, and a War Diary entry of the 21st Corps, which is Exhibit 321 an order and the report of an intention should coincide and it is strange and unusual that the 21st Mountain Corps writes here "the Commander in Southeast orders" when, after all, the immediate superior authority is not even the Commander in Chief Southeast.
Q Do you know anything about the facts -- was General Roncaglia actually shot?
A I cannot say that with certainty. I seem to remember that he was flown away as was ordered here.
Q Exhibit 323, which is on page 29 of the German and page 42 of the English Text -- we find a basic policy of the OKW concerning the treatment of soldiers of the Italian Armed Forces and Militia. Now are these directives anything new concerning the treatment of the Italian soldiers compared with the already mentioned orders?
A Essentially, they are a written summary of the three important teletypes which we have discussed just now. Beyond that some individual instructions are given here regarding selecting people, et cetera, which are not material.
Q We will now again concern ourselves with Exhibit 327 which is on page 41 of the German and page 55 of the English document book. In this document we find expressed the attitude of the Second Panzer Army which is contained in a teletype by the 15th Army Corps. It regards as "guilty amongst the Italians, generally speaking, senior commanders and general staff officers." Were you of the same opinion? I am talking about the teletype contained on page 21 of the document.
A Yes.
Q Did you find it?
A Yes, I have got it here.
Q Were you of the same opinion that one should regard senior commanders and general staff officers as accomplices generally speaking if the disarmament was not properly carried out?
A I am not sure whether that was actually the opinion of the Second Panzer Army. I personally was of the opinion that it had to be established in every individual case who was guilty.
Q Was it known to you that pioneer battalions and other units were supposed to be created from Italian PW's?
A Yes, that was known to me.
Q Were such units actually established?
A Yes, they were.
Q And how were the PW's selected?
A On the basis of voluntary offers from the camps and, as it happened, people liked to volunteer for this commitment because on the whole they were better supplied with food.
Q Now, let's come to Exhibit 332. It is on page 108 of the English text. These again are daily reports. Did you know them?
A You mean Exhibit 332?
Q Yes, 332.
A It is probable that I knew these daily reports.
Q And what about the reports in Exhibit 333?
A It is likely that I know those reports, too, excepting days when I was absent which was during the beginning of October.
Q Did you also know the report of the 5th of October that is contained on page 22 of the original and of page 3 of the document here? That is a daily report of the 5th of October 1943 where, amongst other things, it is reported towards the end: "As reprisal for the murder of the Regimental Commander, a village north of the Phillippias destroyed and the inhabitants were shot." Did you get that report of the 5th of October?
A I am fairly sure I did not see it because on the 5th I went on a reconnaissance flight over the Albanian and Croatian Coast for a few days.
Q Who issued that report?
A The report, as we see it here, is from the Commander in Chief Southeast to the OKW and made on the basis of the reports which the Commander in Chief Southeast received.
Q Now, we have to turn to Document Book XIV. This book, according to tho survey which we discussed at the beginning of your examination, are only a few documents contains which you knew prior to this trial. Therefore, we will here apply the reverse procedure and I will mention to you those exhibits which you did know prior to this trial and these are the following, all contained in Document Book XIV: 340, 350, 351.
A Yes, those were the ones I know.
Q Those, then were the ones you knew and you didn't know any of the others contained in this document book?
A No, I didn't -- not at the time.
Q We will then turn to Exhibit 340. This we find on page 10 of the German text and on page 13 in the English text. It is an order of the High Command of the 59th Reserve Corps, concerning the combatting of bands, etc. It is dated the 23rd of September 1943. In this exhibit 340 there are some further orders contained on page 14 of the German document book, which is page 4 of the original, and this is probably on page 17 of the English document book. We have an order by the OKW of the 18th of August 1943. It is a Keitel order. Did you know that order?
A Yes, I did know that Keitel order.
Q What is this order concerned with?
A It is a kind of an interpretation. It interprets the OKW order which was mentioned this morning. This order was issued at the beginning of July and concerned the treatment of band members as prisoners of war.
Q This order of the 18th of August 1943, was it ever submitted or reported to the Commander in Chief Southeast?
A I am sure it was.
Q Was it passed on?
A Yes, it was passed on.
Q Did the Commander in Chief issue supplements to this order?
A No factual supplements but, as the document shows, merely an indication concerning the interpretation of figure "4". It is merely a technical supplement intended to make it easier for the recipient to find the corresponding order in a previous order.
Q This order is concerned with the fact that all band members who surrendered in battle either in enemy uniform or in civilian clothing are in principle to be treated as prisoners of war and it is further said that it is within the discretion of the troop commander concerned to also treat such people as PW's who cannot be charged with any combat acts but who are to be regarded as band members. Witness, on the whole, this procedure is totally different from any procedure in the previous years. Now, more and more band members and band accomplices are to be treated as prisoners of war and not shot as was earlier the custom.
A Yes.
Q This again brings me to the question: is that the beginning of recognition of the bands as regular beligerants?
A No, now, too, it is valid what I said this morning. These were merely reasons of expediency and they were no legal reasons.
Q Witness, the first order which is contained in this exhibit 340 -- on the first page is an order by the High Command of the 69th Reserve Corps of the 23rd of September. Is this order known to you? It concerns the combating of bands, reprisals, and evacuation measures.
A No, this order was not known to me.
Q Did you know the order regarding the combating of bands, of reprisal evacuation measures of this same 69th Corps which is dated the 6th of October 1943? This is on page 5 of the original document?
A No, from this document I only knew the order by the OKW which you have just mentioned. This order was dated the 18th of August.
Q In the same exhibit further back -- to be exact, on page 13 of the original and on page 23 of the German document book and on pages 26 to 29 of the English text -- we have a compilation of excesses on the part of the Cossacks. To what unit did these Cossacks belong?
A They were part of the so-called 1st Cossack Division which was committed in the Southeast.
Q And as of what date was this Cossack Division committed in the Southeast?
AAs far as I recollect, as of Fall 1943.
Q Did you know this division on the basis of your own experiences?
A No.
Q How did you -- or rather, the Commander in Chief Southeast -- judge this Cossack Division.
A We had rejected it. We did not want it.
Q Why not?
A For a number of reasons. For one thing, we were anxious because of their reliability. Then we had misgivings concerning their morale and discipline.
Q With this last anxiety did you refer to misgivings which you can have if you read the list of excesses of the 20th of November?
A Yes, that's it, I remember exactly that we laid down our worries in a memorandum. The third misgiving which we had concerned the fact that we could not do with this Cossack Division, which was purely a cavalry division, in the mountain area where it was committed -- at least, we could only use it to a certain extent; but our rejection was not considered.
Q Who did not consider it?
A The OKW.
Q. Did the responsible Commander in Chief take steps against these excesses on the part of the Cossacks? After all there were quite a number of plunderings, rapes, the hanging of the German Vice Mayor, etc. All of this is contained in the list.
A.- It was not necessary for the Commander in Chief Southeast to invervene because the subordinate authorities had already intervened, and General von Galise, on the occasion of on oral discussion had stated that he would deal with these things immediately and would put it to rights with the 2nd Panzer Army and other subordinate commands.
Q.- Exhibit 350, on page 61 of the German Document Book, and page 84 of the English Document Book, is one of those documents which you knew at the time?
A.- Yes, it is.
Q.- Did you know all the individual reports? There is, for instance, a report on the first page of this Exhibit 350 of the 2nd Croatian Corps, "as reprisal measures for the attacks on the railroad base SE of Kasanica, one village was burned down and one hundred bandits were shot to death."
A.- I would assume that these reports were known to me, with the exception of those which fell, in the period of my absence. No, I bed your pardon.
Q.- I'm talking about Exhibit 350. There are Daily Reports from the 2nd Panzer Army and they are dated the 14th of October 1943.
A.- As these are reports of the 2nd Panzer Army to the Commander in Chief Southeast, it is very probable that I knew them. However, Daily Reports by the Corps to the Panzer Army were, of course, not known to me.
Q.- And are these reports complete the way these are reproduced here?
A.- No, these reports too are very incomplete. They contain only very brief excerpts.
Q.- No, we will turn to Exhibit 351. It is on Page 65 of the German book and page 89 of the English text. This is an accompanying letter when passing on the draft of basic order regarding the command authority in the Southeast area, and this exhibit also contains the order itself. What is concerned in this draft of the basic order regarding the command authority in the Southeast area?
A.- This is a draft; it is not in itself the final formulation here. It is a draft of the new regulation of the command authority in the Southeast area, as it was to be valid as of the 26th of August for the Southeast area.
Q.- Was this draft ever made into a proper order?
A.- Yes, that was done.
Q.- Did the final version contain any amendments compared with the draft?
A.- I would not suppose that the final version shows any material amendments because it had been ordered essentially from the OKN, and it was laid down accordingly in this order.
Q.- Did you find the order itself amongst the documents of the Prosecution?
A.- I did not see the final version.
Q.- Who signed the accompanying letter which enclosed the draft to the agencies mentioned in the distribution?
A.- The cover letter, which passed on the draft to various departments of my staff, was, of course, signed by me.
Q.- What was the reason for the new regulation of the command authority in the Southeast?
A.- As I have stated, this morning the regulation of command which existed up until then had become too difficult for this one staff; therefore, the Commander in Chief Southeast was to rank higher, and the 2nd Panzer Army and Army Group E were inserted.
Besides through the introduction of a Military Commander Southeast, the Commander in Chief Southeast was to be relieved of all tasks of executive power, of all territorial tasks, of all administrative tasks, and he was only to con centrate on the operational problems of the area.
Q.- Was the situation this: These two offices, Commander in Chief Southeast and Military Commander Southeast, existed next to each other and were on an equal level, or was there a relation of subordination?
A.- They were parallel. They were on the same level, but there were two exceptions. The Military Commander Southeast was simultaneously Commander of Serbia. He combined these two offices in his person. And as Commander of Serbia he was subordinate to the Commander in Chief Southeast, in questions concerning the security of the country -- that is, Serbia.
Q.- And who was the Military Commander Southeast subordinate to for all other matters?
A.- For all other matters he was immediately subordinate to the Chief of the OKW.
Q.- You've just mentioned that the Military Commander-Southeast was subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast regarding territorial questions.
A.- I shall try to explain it. If, for instance, there it was necessary to combat a band or a group of bands in on particular area of Serbia, then that would be a task which fell within the scope of the securing of a country. The Military Commander was, concerning this particular problem, subordinate to the Commander in Chief Southeast, who gave him the necessary troops for this purpose. However, if, for instance, the question of harvesting in the country of Serbia was concerned, or shall we say the securing of the harvest, then that would be a task of the Military Commander Southeast in his capacity as a territorial com mander, quite independent of the Commander in Chief Southeast.
Q.- And how about police tasks? I am not talking about the military combatting of bands for the securing of the country. I am talking about police tasks.
A.- Police tasks again did not touch the Commander in Chief Southeast, but here again the situation is doubly complicated. The High SS and Police Leader is only subordinate to the Military Commander Southcast regarding his own person, and he received directives concerning his scope of work directly from Himmler. I did not want to give this example, as it makes things even more complicated.
Q.- Now regarding what you said previously. The Military Commander Southeast was subordinate to the Commander in Chief Southeast regarding the securing of the country. In what parts of the order or rather in the draft was this established?
A.- That is laid down in Figure 4 of the draft of the order. That is on the second page of the draft. It says there after Figure 3 where the main tasks of the Commander in Chief are described -
Q.- What were the main tasks?
A.- They were the defense of the Southeast area against Anglo-American landing attempts from the sea, from the air. I shall repeat. After this main task was laid down, it says the following, under Figure 4. "In addition the Commander in Chief Southeast is responsible for the security in the interior of the country, as well as for the combatting of bands and for counter intelligence measures against sabotage. In all questions regarding the security of the country, a) the Military Commander Southeast, in his capacity as Military Commander Serbia, is directly subordinate to the Commander in Chief Southeast."
Q.- This passage from which you just quoted contains six figures in this document book. The sixth figure concerns the Air forces, and we are not interested in that, but then it goes on: "Territorial channels of command," And we find there, under Figure 1: "The Military Commander Southeast exercises the territorial authority and the executive power in the Southeast area.
In this respect ho is subordinate to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command." Is that passage the one you meant at the beginning, which said that the Military Commander Southeast was immediately subordinate to the OKW?
A.- Yes, that is what I meant.
Q And what did you understand under territorial authority and executive power when the draft came out and later the order, according to which, the Military Commander Southeast exercises independence of the OKW?
A These two concepts which are not particularly simple are actually laid down. I cannot state them here by memory in a manner in which I can be responsible for their correctness. Even at the time I would have had to look at the directives in order to answer this question, so that I could gain a clear picture out of the chaos of all these channels of command. Essentially I would say it was thus: Executive power meant the authority for issuing emergency orders, the authority of eliminating laws and replacing them by corresponding decrees, the authority to intervene in all administrative matters of the country. Executive power findsits limitation, as it was expressed, in the will and wish of the Fuehrer. Then, there was a clause regarding the Reich authorities of the Party and the Reich Ministries. In my opinion this is only of theoretical significance. It said there, "The Reich authorities in the event that they issued orders or for such an area had to channel these orders through the man who held executive power," However, that never actually happened. At least it did not happen for the period when the Commander in Chief Southeast held executive power, which is the period immediately prior to this now regulation. And I believe it never happened afterwards either. At least I never experienced it that a Reich agency endeavored to channel any orders or directives via the Commander in Chief Southeast. They just ordered ad lib Himmler through his police channels, Goering through the Four-year plan and other Reich agencies in a similar manner.
Q Witness, under Figure 2 concerning the territorial regulation of command we have: "The Commander in Chief Southeast is issuing directives in the Military Command Southeast, as far as the affairs of troop leadership are concerned. He is authorized to intervene as far as it is necessary in essential questions in the interest of the tasks". Now, matters get even more complicated.
The Commander in Chief Southeast, concerning territorial authorities which before where only the authority of the Military Commander Southeast, now tine occasion and opportunity to intervene. When did that happen?
A He had the right to direct, but that right was restricted. It was restricted to the even that it concerned interests of the troops and, as we further read here, it was restricted to essential questions.
Q Can you enlarge on that?
A Yes, I'll try to clarify that with an example I have on hand. I would like to connect it up with the examples which I have mentioned previously. If, for instance, the vital railway line was threatened in a certain area through action of bands, then it was possible for the Commander in Chief Southeast on the basis of this Paragraph 2 tell the Military Commander Southeast, "These bands there in that particular spot have to be combatted as fast as possible because I, as Commander in Chief Southeast, for reasons of troop leadership have a special interest in the smooth running of this railway....
Q You're just giving an example now, Witness, because you yourself were never in that position?
A Yes, I am, of course, just giving an example. The example in which I said I, as Commander in Chief Southeast -- well fortunately I was not Commander in Chief.
Q How about reprisal measures?
A I would like to conclude this example which I started. For instance, let us remain with the example cf harvesting. If, for instance, the railway communication was interrupted for ten days or more, through the activity of bands, then the Commander in Chief Southeast would have been authorized and justified to tell the Military Commander Southeast, "You as Military Commander Southeast have for ten days to secure from the stocks of your country the food supply for the troops in Greece. Because the supply for these troops as a consequence of the destruction of time railway line cannot function properly."
Therefore, he can give him a directive in an administrative sphere in the interest of the troop leadership because this would be an essential question, that is, the food of the troops. But to connect up with the question which you put to me, the Commander in Chief Southeast could say and did say to the Military Commander Southeast, "Bands of Mihajlovic," let us say, "in the area of Lebanj have to be fought with priority because otherwise, "this is only an example, "we fear that the bands in this area might link up with bands which are approaching from Montenegro." That is a task concerning the security of the country which the Commander in Chief Southeast does not give to the Military Commander Southeast, but instead to the Military Commander Serbia, although in both cases he would be represented in the person of Felber. But the Commander in Chief Southeast would under no circumstances tell Felber, as Military Commander Southeast or as Military Commander for Serbia, and he did never do that, "You have to take certain reprisal measures for a sabotage act which happened yesterday," because that could be done by Felber, as Military Commander Southeast and simultaneously as Military Commander for Serbia, on his own initiative and on his own authority because he held executive powers and he also held territorial authority and he did it too. I must admit that these conditions are extremely difficult. We used to say at the time that "everything runs on several tracks in the Southeast; too bad that only the railway just runs on one track."
Q Could the Commander in Chief Southeast prevent the Military Commander South East from carrying out reprisal measures?
A Not in my opinion because on principle they were ordered by Hitler.
Q What about the individual incidents?
A In an individual case it would have been extremely difficult to prove. If one assumes that this question has to be fought to the bitter end bureaucratically that the Commander in Chief Southeast had an interest of troop leadership and in essential questions in such a vast area.