Q And is this a basic order?
A Yes.
Q Witness, at the beginning of this trial you received an indictment in which the charges against you were set down; amongst these charges was there a reference to these orders?
A The indictment asserts that the Chief of Staff Army Group E issued on the 10 of August, or about the 10th of August 1943, and carried out an order according too etc., and then there are passages from this order quoted.
Q Now, did you issue this order?
A I neither issued nor carried out this order.
Q And could you have issued and carried out this order?
A No.
Q I now submit to you the original, -- are your initials on the original?
A No, I don't find my initials on it.
Q Now, witness, at the beginning of the trial you said,-at the beginning of your examination, and it can also be seen in the daily reports where your initial was; that this order must have been initialed by you if you had anything to do with it?
A Yes, that was the custom, it was usual.
Q But in any case you must have signed it if, as the prosecution asserts, you issued this order and carried it out?
A I repeat that I never issued or carried out this order.
Q I now come to Figure I of this order, It states: "Treatment of Brisoners of Deserters. Execution of Reprisal Measures, and executions are not matters of administration, but rather measures of combat and of combat preparation and of security." What was meant by that?
A This introduction was supposed to mean at that time that the territories mentioned here were to be left in the hands of the responsible commanders and not in the hands of the police, and of administrative officers.
Q One can also see from the order that captured insurgents are no longer simply to he shot, but are to he treated as prisoners; did this originate in a directive of the OKW?
A Yes, it was based on the OKW order which was mentioned a few minutes ago the order of the 7th of July.
Q The order?
A Yes, Keitel's order.
Q The order to which Himmler made the supplement?
A Yes, Exhibit 302.
Q And then how did you take this new regulation at that time?
A Well, we were very pleased about it, because at least in one small area a request frequently made by the Commander-in-Chief Southeast was now fulfilled.
Q And for what reasons had you been fighting up to then for this regulations?
A I repeat for reasons of expediency, not for any kind of a legal attitude.
Q And not because now the prisoners were from then onward to be regarded as members of a regular Army?
A No, of the fact that all kinds of the bands were illegal there was no do but whatsoever.
Q Not even after this Order?
A No.
Q And do you perhaps assume from this that the insurgents were still to be called bandits?
A That is an outward symptom.
Q In Figure 4 of this Order of the Commander-in-ChiefSoutheast from the 10th of August 1943, there is mention of an evacuation of particularly important areas; why was it thought at that time that an evacuation was necessary?
A For purely military reasons, because under Figure 4 it states "In the territories especially valuable for the conduct of battle," and then these areas are described in the couse of this Paragraph 4, and then stretches of the coast are mentioned, which are especially suitable for landings, pass heights and pass lands, strips of terrain, along especially entangled railway lines.
Q And was this evacuation carried out?
A No, evacuations were only carried out to a very small extent, and in those cases where they were necessary from a military point of view.
Q And were these evacuations planned on a larger scale by the OKW?
A Hitler wanted at the time to evacuate the whole Dalmation coast.
Q. Were Hitler's intentions carried out?
A. No, as far as I know from my work, there were isolated local evacuations, perhaps on a few islands, but a large scale evacuation was never experienced by me.
Q. And then it seems on the whole as if this order again didn't bring anything new, anything important?
A. No, this order is a summary of measures which had already previously been ordered, and the aim of this summary is, I would like to say a summary up of orders as I have already mentioned in regard to Figure.
Q. Now, at the end of Figure 3, the last paragraph of Figure 3, the following is stated: "Reprisal measures are to be ordered by the divisional commanders and or in dependent regimantal commander in order to avoid encroachments of subordinate offices, and individual soldiers and to prevent a wrong and unjust treatment of the population." Why was that expressly stressed, the fact that the reprisal measures are to be ordered by the divisional commanders?
A. I wish to point to the other order of Generaloberst Loehr which was mentioned today about the preparation for a possible enemy landing; at that time in that order from July the authority for reprisal measures was also given to lower commanders for the reason I have already stated when discussing the order.
Q. Now, in this paragraph of Figure 3, there is also mention of the fact that encroachments of subordinate offices and individual soldiers is to be avoided. Was there a special reason for this?
A. No, I don't think so, but it was always a good thing to put a sentence like this, and to point out to the troops that they had to take care of this matter. In the orders one wanted to do everything what was possible.
Q. And now did this not remain pure theory, wasn't it so that the population had to suffer injustice.
A. That is a question about which I thought quite a lot of that time, and at that time I arrived at the idea that a modern war is a total war, and that the whole population of the belligerent states are concerned with this, and this was true for the active fighting as well as for the passive suffering. In a normal way the population of a belligerent country through work and production of all kinds is incorporated into the war machine, and it cannot escape the other side; the passive side; and if a population, such as in the Southeast there although it wasn't necessary, and although in my opinion that were obliged to remain calm, took an active part then it is bound to encounter passive suffering, a modern war taken its course according to its own laws, and I think that the individual cannot achieve very much in this inevitable course of events, but nevertheless each commander in an occupied territory conscious of his responsibility will do his best to prevent unnecessary suffering, and for this reason, at any rate, it seemed to me correct and necessary always to point out again these sentences, these passages which were the reason for your question.
Q. Now, please take Exhibit 309, page 101 of the German Document Book and page 121 of the English Document book -- page 121. These are again daily reports; did you know these reports?
A. Yes, I probably knew the reports, but also in the complete form as they were sent out at the time.
Q. In Exhibit 310, page 134 in the German Document Book, page 160 in the English Document book; this is a new regulation of the command in the Southeast area, dated 15 August 1943. This is the announcement of a new organization; what was the reason and what was the essential content of this new organization?
A. The essential content was the incorporation of the military commander Southeast with the subordinate offices, as was set down in the plan which used to hang up here, ( indicating wall of courtroom), but in my opinion with also a few necessary alterations. The reasons were that the commander in Chief Southeast had to be relieved of some of the work, because it was no longer possible for this enormous area, and the numerous offices which were directly subordinate to manage and to be supervised.
Therefore, the new organization was created, which made the Commander in Chief Southeast one rank higher and incorporated underneath as new staffs, the commander in chief of the 2nd Panzer Army, and Army Group E, which was already in existence.
Q Did you think this new organization was expedient?
A It had its advantages also its disadvantages. It relieved the Commander in Chief Southeast of some of his work, mainly by the fact that the executive power and the territorial authority were now taken from him, but the new organization also complicated conditions by the fact that the two channels or even more channels of the area become even more predominant fore.
Q I think the last answer, the two channels, was not fully understandable; can you explain it a little more so that it will be easier to interpret.
A By that I meant that the numerous commands and communication conditions which were beside each other. The dualism of the Commander in Chief Southeast and Commander Southeast ran parallel to each other and in the further course the dualism of organizations which was very difficult to see through in various spheres of command in this Southeastern area.
Q Witness, what was the importance of this organization of command for your own personal state; did you now have any prospect of getting out of your post as Commander in Chief?
AAt that time I was almost successful, but the decision then was different and at that time I was then told that from about the end of the year I would receive a different assignment.
Q Witness, now we continue with document book 13 of the prosecution. I submit to you first of all the exhibits which you saw for the first time in this trial. These are all documents which you did not know at that time when you were chief of staff. These are exhibits 318, 319, 324, 325, 326, 328, 329, 330, 334, 335 and 336; is that correct?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q Please come to exhibit 317, this is on page 18 of the German and on page 27 of the English document book. This is the order from the Wehrmacht Operational Staff from Keitel, dated 9 September, Court No. V, Case No. 7.1943, which deals with the treatment of Italian soldiers in the sphere of the command of the Southeast after the Italian capitulation.
First of all a few general questions with regard to the Italian detection. How was the situation judged in the staff of the Commander in Chief Southeast after the overthrow of Mussolini?
A One regarded Mussolini's overthrow as the first step toward Italy leaving the alliance.
Q And what was the reason for this judgment?
A This opinion was founded on the observations and experiences which were made with Italian offices in the Southeastern area?
Q And how was that explained?
A In various ways. In general by the fact that we had the impression that the Higher Italian Command Offices in the Southeast no longer followed in general Mussolini's orders.
Q Now are you thinking of special instances in this case?
A This was especially plain in the field of the band combatting. This was shown in the non complying with our wishes regarding exchange of information in all possible spheres and it was mainly shown in the internal resistance which one always felt when matters of subordination and cooperation of the German and Italian troops were discussed.
Q And did the combating of the bands play an important part in the area occupied by the Italians?
A I have just said that also there the orders of the "Commando Supreme" of the Italians were often not followed by the Italian officers.
Q Were you afraid the Italians would go over to the bands?
A When Mussolini was overthrown we did not count on that at that time, but we certainly counted on the Italians leaving the alliance. On the other side, we knew that while the greatest crisis of the whole Southeastern area and the whole Southeastern period was to be expected, because we had to assume, according to numerous reports which had been issued, that if perhaps the Italians fell out at the same time an Allied landing would take place and that would have been a very complicated situation indeed.
Q Now, by reason of your observations were you able to make proposals to the O.K.W.?
A No, not at that time. Previously numerous letters were written about the attitude of the Italian offices and also about the attitude of individual Italian commanders.
Q And what knowledge had you at that time about the attitude later on from the judgment of the situation which was held by the O.K.W.?
A Of course we could not see this on the whole, therefore we could not make any proposals ourselves, but we had the impression that the O.K.A. could not see or did not want to see the conditions at that time as we saw them,
Q Did you yourself ever speak with members of the O.K.W. about these problems.
A Yes, that was the second personal oral report which I made during the war to Field Marshal Keitel.
Q And what was the result of this report?
A Exactly the same completely negative result as in the case of the first report.
Q And now did the O.K.W. change its attitude as time went on?
A Yes, gradually their eyes were opened.
Q And what was ordered in case the Italians should detect?
A About the middle of August an order was issued under the slogan "Axis", according to which if the Italians left the alliance, the Italian forces in the Southeast were to be disarmed immediately.
Q And was it also intended that the Italians who wanted to fight on should be kept on the German side?
A The order dated about the middle of August said nothing about this question, but only told about the preparations for disarming in case the Italians left the alliance. This disarming should if possible be achieved in the most friendly and peaceful means by negotiations with the Italian officers, but if necessary the disarming should also be forced.
JUDGE BURKE: (Presiding) The Tribunal will be in recess until 1:30 this afternoon.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 1:30 o'clock.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE BURKE: (Presiding) You may proceed, Dr. Rauschenbach.
BY DR. Rauschenbach:
Q. Witness, before the luncheon recess we had discussed exhibit 317 in document book 13, which is contained on page 18 of the German and on page 27 of the English text and then we had reached the question of the Italian capitulation. You had already mentioned that during the second half of August the O.K.W had issued an order according to which the Italian forces in the Southeastern area, in the event of their independant surrender should be disarmed in as peaceful a manner as possible. Were measures provided in this order concerning those Italian units who would not voluntarily succumb to disarmament?
A. As far as I remember there was nothing layed down concerning specific measures. All that was said was that if necessary disarmament had to be forced.
Q. Were there any provisions concerning punishment in case disarmament was refused?
A. As far as I remember no.
Q. And why was disarmament demanded?
A. For one reason because the whole situation, as I had indicated previously, was a very dangerous one. I might almost call it the hour of fate of the southeast and maybe even of Germany. The second reason was that we had already had the experience that the Italian frequently let their arms fall into the hands of bands either because they did not defend themselves adequately or even by selling or giving away their arms and ammunition. We knew though the surveyance of the bands through our Intelligence service that the bands attached great importance to those Italian weapons.
Q. Did you get any particular information concerning the fact that the bands prepared for the expected treason of the Italians?
A. A directive of Mihajlovic was known to us, according to which, in the event of the anticipated insurrection or treason or whatever one wants to call it, the disarmament of the Italians by the Mihajlovic bands was intended.
Q. How was this order of the O. K. W., the code name of which was "Exis" carried out?
A. It was carried out through the conclusion of the capitulation with the competent Italian officers.
Q. Were there difficulties in that respect?
A. In the earlier stages there were certain difficulties which however eventually were overcome in a peaceful manner. I remember that on the evening of 9 September I had the impression that really everything had gone off well and without trouble, with the exception of Rhodes. We were very anxious however as to whether there might not be parts of Italian units which would attach themselves to the bands or fight against us. During the first days of the capitulation, there was no doubt whatever regarding its successful conclusion.
Q. And now we turn to the exhibit 317, but first I shall put these preparatory questions to you. What was the connection of this order with the total action of the disarmament of the Italians?
A. On the 9th of September the order which we have before us here was issued. According to this order Italian soldiers who were not prepared to continue the battle on the German side were to be treated as Prisoners of War after they had been disarmed.
Q. Was this order of the O.K.W. passed on to subordinate commands by the Commander in Chief Southeast?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. What further orders came from the O.K.W.?
A. On the 11th of September an order arrived concerning the treatment of those Italian units which were fighting against us.
Q. And this order of the O.K.W. is also contained in the documents of the prosecution?
A. Yes, it is. This order is reproduced in exhibit 323 in a summary and again in 327 as the individual order.
Q. Will you then please look at exhibit 327, it is on page 41 of the German and 55 of the English document book. This is an order of the 2nd Panzer Army, addressed to the 15th Army Corps and it says?
"O.K.W. has ordered:
"Wherever Italian Troops or other Italian bearer of arms are still offering resistance at this time, they are to be given a short term ultimatum which is the express that the Commanders responsible for the resistance will be shot to death as franc tireurs unless they order their troops by the time stated to surrender their arms to the German units."
Is that the O.K.W. order which you mean?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Were there any further orders issued by the O.K.W.?
A. Later on 12 September another order was issued concerning those Italians who after the capitulation had let arms fall into the hands of bands or supported the bands in any other way. I beg your pardon that was on the 13th, not on the 12th. This order is contained in this same exhibit on page 8 of that document. I am afraid I don't know the page number.
Q. It is page 8 of exhibit 327 and since the exhibit starts on page 55, it should be on page 63. This is a teletype message to the 2nd Panzer Army, which again starts:
"OKW has ordered: Subject: treatment of Italian Troop Units."
It is contained on page 62 of the English document book. Was this teletype also passed on by the Commander in Chief Southeast?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. This teletype that concerns treatment of Italian troop units reads as follows:
"Italian troop-units that deliver up arms to insurgents and/or negotiate with insurgents by order of the Fuehrer, the following procedure is to be applied with respect to any captured Italian Troops Units which have permitted their arms to fall into the hands of insurgents or who have cooperated with insurgents at all:
"1.) The officers are to be shot to death by summary court martial procedure.
"2) Officers and men are immediately...." and then I leave out a good bit, "are to be committed for labor employment." Did the Commander in Chief make any supplement to this teletype and if so which ones?
A. I cannot recollect any supplement.
Q Was there by any chance a supplement which demanded the shooting of one officer to fifty men or one officer to ten men regarding these Italians?
A I cannot recall any such supplement.
Q Witness, I have already asked you in this morning's session; you received an indictment, didn't you? In this indictment under figure "1" under the letter "I", did you read there that you, as Chief of Staff of Army Group F, issued such an order?
A That is what is says in the indictment but I was in no position to issue such an order, and I do not remember such an order, and I have found no proof in the Prosecution documents that I issued such an orders.
Q Concerning the orders of the OKW and especially regarding the very last one concerning the shooting of Italian officers, did you have any misgivings?
A No.
Q And why not?
A For one thing, I assumed on principle that such orders as this one which came from the OKW and were channeled to the Commander in Chief Southeast had been clearly examined regarding their international validity and, secondly, I was fully aware of the fact that after the concluded capitulation every soldier who used his arms against us was to be regarded as a franc--tireur.
Q That was your own personal opinion.
A Yes.
Q What I mean is, you did not simply rely on the opinion of the OKW?
A No. This was my personal opinion. It was the opinion of my Commander in Chief and I believe it was the generally accepted opinion.
Q In the teletype of the Second Panzer Army which records this OKW order another thing is mentioned: Measures for instance, the shooting of officers, are to be carried out against such units which let their arms fall into the hands of the insurgents. Did this apply also to those who before the capitulation allowed their arms to fall into the hands of bands?
A No, it would not even have been possible to ascertain that. Meant were those who after the capitulation had been concluded up until the actual practical disarmament on the basis of that capitulation allowed their arms to fall into the hands of bands.
Q Were the mentioned orders by the OKW actually carried out?
A Yes. However, today I am not in a position to state "whether the order which was discussed last -- that is the order concerning the Italians who allowed their arms to fall into the hands of bands -whether that order was actually carried out. I am not today in a position to say it with certainty.
Q Would you be able to gather it from the reports which are contained in this document, Exhibit 327, in the pages following this OKW order?
A No, I am afraid I did not find any certain proofs for this fact.
Q There is, for instance, a report of the 18th of September which was made by the SS Division, Prinz Eugen, to the High Command of the 15th Mountain Corps. That is the report on page 11 of this document. "The Division reports execution 7 officers." It is on page 11 of the document.
A Yes, I have it. This means the shooting of 7 officers.
Q Did you receive the teletype at the time?
A I am fairly sure that I did not receive that particular teletype. It was addressed to the High Command of the 15th Corps. Whether and how this specific case was reported to the Commander in Chief Southeast I am not today in a position to establish.
Q We will nowturn to the documents which concern the Italian General Roncaglia. These are Exhibit 320, 321 and 322. These documents start in the German text on page 25 and in the English document book on page 36. There we read the following:
It is a report from the 118th Mountain Jaeger Division. "Arrest and eventual execution of the Commanding General of the Italian 14th Army Corps. General Roncaglia, is intended in case of further insubordination."
And then in Exhibit 321 we have a report of the 13th of September where it says: "The Commander in Chief Southeast orders the execution of General Roncaglia in case depotation to Belgrade is not guaranteed."
A Excuse me if I interrupt. This is not a report but it is an entry in the War Diary.
Q All right, War Diary entry. Then we have Exhibit 322 and it says there: "General Roncaglia is to be shot without delay as a franc-tireur on the basis of his illegal conduct reported in the daily report of the 15th Mountain Corps of the 13th September 1943 in the event immediate transport to Belgrade is not fully guaranteed."
Do you recall this case of General Roncaglia?
A I merely recollect the name but no details and, on the basis of the documents which have been quoted here, I am still unable to see the connection. It is rather striking that on the same day, that on the 13th of September, a daily report of the Second Panzer Army, which is Exhibit 326, and a War Diary entry of the 21st Corps, which is Exhibit 321 an order and the report of an intention should coincide and it is strange and unusual that the 21st Mountain Corps writes here "the Commander in Southeast orders" when, after all, the immediate superior authority is not even the Commander in Chief Southeast.
Q Do you know anything about the facts -- was General Roncaglia actually shot?
A I cannot say that with certainty. I seem to remember that he was flown away as was ordered here.
Q Exhibit 323, which is on page 29 of the German and page 42 of the English Text -- we find a basic policy of the OKW concerning the treatment of soldiers of the Italian Armed Forces and Militia. Now are these directives anything new concerning the treatment of the Italian soldiers compared with the already mentioned orders?
A Essentially, they are a written summary of the three important teletypes which we have discussed just now. Beyond that some individual instructions are given here regarding selecting people, et cetera, which are not material.
Q We will now again concern ourselves with Exhibit 327 which is on page 41 of the German and page 55 of the English document book. In this document we find expressed the attitude of the Second Panzer Army which is contained in a teletype by the 15th Army Corps. It regards as "guilty amongst the Italians, generally speaking, senior commanders and general staff officers." Were you of the same opinion? I am talking about the teletype contained on page 21 of the document.
A Yes.
Q Did you find it?
A Yes, I have got it here.
Q Were you of the same opinion that one should regard senior commanders and general staff officers as accomplices generally speaking if the disarmament was not properly carried out?
A I am not sure whether that was actually the opinion of the Second Panzer Army. I personally was of the opinion that it had to be established in every individual case who was guilty.
Q Was it known to you that pioneer battalions and other units were supposed to be created from Italian PW's?
A Yes, that was known to me.
Q Were such units actually established?
A Yes, they were.
Q And how were the PW's selected?
A On the basis of voluntary offers from the camps and, as it happened, people liked to volunteer for this commitment because on the whole they were better supplied with food.
Q Now, let's come to Exhibit 332. It is on page 108 of the English text. These again are daily reports. Did you know them?
A You mean Exhibit 332?
Q Yes, 332.
A It is probable that I knew these daily reports.
Q And what about the reports in Exhibit 333?
A It is likely that I know those reports, too, excepting days when I was absent which was during the beginning of October.
Q Did you also know the report of the 5th of October that is contained on page 22 of the original and of page 3 of the document here? That is a daily report of the 5th of October 1943 where, amongst other things, it is reported towards the end: "As reprisal for the murder of the Regimental Commander, a village north of the Phillippias destroyed and the inhabitants were shot." Did you get that report of the 5th of October?
A I am fairly sure I did not see it because on the 5th I went on a reconnaissance flight over the Albanian and Croatian Coast for a few days.
Q Who issued that report?
A The report, as we see it here, is from the Commander in Chief Southeast to the OKW and made on the basis of the reports which the Commander in Chief Southeast received.
Q Now, we have to turn to Document Book XIV. This book, according to tho survey which we discussed at the beginning of your examination, are only a few documents contains which you knew prior to this trial. Therefore, we will here apply the reverse procedure and I will mention to you those exhibits which you did know prior to this trial and these are the following, all contained in Document Book XIV: 340, 350, 351.
A Yes, those were the ones I know.
Q Those, then were the ones you knew and you didn't know any of the others contained in this document book?
A No, I didn't -- not at the time.
Q We will then turn to Exhibit 340. This we find on page 10 of the German text and on page 13 in the English text. It is an order of the High Command of the 59th Reserve Corps, concerning the combatting of bands, etc. It is dated the 23rd of September 1943. In this exhibit 340 there are some further orders contained on page 14 of the German document book, which is page 4 of the original, and this is probably on page 17 of the English document book. We have an order by the OKW of the 18th of August 1943. It is a Keitel order. Did you know that order?
A Yes, I did know that Keitel order.
Q What is this order concerned with?
A It is a kind of an interpretation. It interprets the OKW order which was mentioned this morning. This order was issued at the beginning of July and concerned the treatment of band members as prisoners of war.
Q This order of the 18th of August 1943, was it ever submitted or reported to the Commander in Chief Southeast?
A I am sure it was.
Q Was it passed on?
A Yes, it was passed on.