A. There is no distribution list. I assume that it went inside the police area but at any rate it didn't go to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, and also don't think it went to military offices ad thin the sphere of the Commander Southeast. I have never seen such reports.
Q. Exhibit 84, German Document Book, page 19, English page 22 ---this is an order of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia. It is an execution order to the Boehme order of the 10th Of October. Did you know this Boehm order of the 10th of October?
A. From the 19th?
Q. This is an order from the 19th, an execution order, but the question concerns Boehm's order dated the 10th of October and it is Exhibit No. 88, German Document Book page 27 and the English Document Book, page 34. That is Boehme's order of the 10th of October 1941 about the crushing of the Communist insurgent movement which is referred to in Exhibit 84 which has just been mentioned. I ask you, did you know the Boehme order of the 10th of October? That is Exhibit 88.
A. I can't say with certainty -- probably.
Q. In the first paragraph it says: "In Serbia it is necessary on the basis of the Balkan mentality and the groat expansion of communist insurgent movements to carry out the orders of the AKW in the most severe form." Can you tell me which order of the AKW is referred to here?
A. The order of the 16th of the 9th which ordered reprisal ratios. This can be seen from the heading of this letter which states expressly: "Supplement of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia to the order of the 16th of the 9th." Then, also, the order of the 28th of the 9th was the basis for figure "2".
Q. And is the order of the 28th of the 9th the order which we were speaking about before the recess, which ordered that a hostage supply should be preserved?
A. Yes, that's the order.
Q. New, these from the AKW orders, -- the forst one at least is considerably earlier. How did it happen that Boehme only issued his order on the 10th of October?
Doesn't that go back to the initiative of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A. No, in no way at all on the initiative of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. I don't know the reason for the order. I can only made an assumption, and this is that the events in Topola caused Boehme to issue this order.
Q. Did the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast at that time or at any other time order himself a reprisal ratio?
A. No, in my time, at least, he didn't for the reasons which I have already stated because he didn't have sufficient insight into the individual incidents and circumstances.
Q. And sis you think Boehme was authorized by reason of the OAK order mentioned to issue such an order as this one of the 1-th of October?
A. Yes, as far as I can see from the heading of the letter, his corps judicial official had helped him work out the order, this is show quite clearly by the figure, Roman 3, at the beginning of the reference number. The figure 3, in the judicial department.
Q. Now back again to Exhibit No. 54, this document concerns the ordering of reprisal measures for the German soldiers attacked in Valjevo and partly killed and partly wounded. This document belongs in your view to those which you saw for the first time here in this trial. Is that correct?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. Was this surprise attack on the German soldiers reported to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A. Probably it was reported. I can't check this.
Q. Did the report perhaps take place when Field Marshal List was no longer there and before the post was taken over by General Kuntze?
A. In any case after Field Marshal List had become sick, probably also during the time before General Kuntze arrived.
Q. The how was the deputizing for Field Marshal List regulated?
A. When it became clear that Field Marshal List had to have an operation, I reported to the OKW and asked for regulations for somebody to deputize for Field Marshal List. I still remember exactly that I received a telephone call about this question during the night from. I think it was, General Warlimont. It was very difficult to understand. It was a long distance call. The OKW had the intention that the Commander-in-Chief of the 12th Army and the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast should each receive one deputy. There-upon, I asked that this should not be done because this would only cause complications.
Q. And then what happened in the end?
A. On the next morning -- that is, it must have been about the 18th came the decision that General Kuntze had been commissioned deputy. Then I asked what should happen with regard to the deputizing until General Kuntze arrived and I received the answer that it could only be a question of two or three days and until then -- that is, until General Kuntze arrived -- the commanders within their own sheres should take over the the deputizing -- that is, they should independant. The reports however, should continue through the old channels because we had to cound on General Kuntze's arriving any day, and because the communication apparatus ran smoothly.
Q. Did General Kuntze arrive quickly?
A. No, it was prolonged until the 26th of October in the afternoon.
Q. And in the meantime were orders issued by the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A. Individual orders from the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast could not be issued because during these days there was no Wehrmacht Commander, but only a staff.
Q. Why couldn't you take over the deputizing?
A. I was a colonel and the commanders were long-standing generals, and in addition I had no authority to issue orders.
Q. And then why did the reports go through your staff?
A. Because the reports always went that way, and because we expected General Kuntze to arrive at any moment.
Q. And to whom did you report during this period then?
A. I reported to nobody. I didn't have anybody to report to.
Q. And what would have happened if decisions had been necessary?
A. Then I would have had to apply for these myself from the OKW direct.
Q. We now come to Exhibit 85, in German Document Book Page 20, and in the English Document Book 23. This is the War Diary of the Higher Command for Special Employment, No. 65. This contains an entry on the 18th of October, that the 717th Infantry Division for losses received on the 15 of October had in return shot altogether 1736 men, and 19 Communist women.
Q. Does this report also fall within the period when there was no Commander-in-Chief, and no deputy present?
A. Yes.
Q. On the third page of this document there is an entry under 30 October, "Wehrmacht Commander Southeast is in agreement with the intentions of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General for the employment of the troops.
The formations of the troops under the command of the Higher Command 65 can be carried out." To what does this note refer? (It's on the 3rd page of exhibit 85 at the top, on the 3rd page of the English too. Entry for the 30th of October. The English page at the be ginning of the document was 23.)
A. There was an understanding with regard to the tactical employment of the troops, and this can be seen from the fact that it mentions "the formation of the subordinate troops can be carried out."
Q. I now come to the case of the shooting of 2300 Serbs in Kragujevac. This is Exhibit 87, in the German page 25 and in the English book page 31 of Document Book III. It contains the following note in the entry of the 20th October: "About 3200 men --there's obviously a mistake here, because underneath it says again 2300-age 16 to 50, from Kragujevac are being arrested. In the evening the Communists and Jews arrested on 18th October and 33 penal prisoners from the local prison of Kragujcvac were shot together behind the captured material depot." The next entry for 21 October "Concluded operations, a total of 2300 Serbs various ages and occupations have been shot to death." Did you know this document?
A. I didn't know this document.
Q. Did you know anything about the shooting of the 2300 Serbs in Kragujevac?
A. This shooting was contained, in a 10-day report dated 30th October, I can't say with certainty whether or when I read this report, because the original with my initial is not available here.
Q. And who issued the order for this shooting?
A. I don't know, but it did not come from the Wehrmacht commander.
Q. And were the further details about the carrying out of this shooting described by the prosecution, know to you?
A. No, they were not known to me.
Q. And now please take Exhibit 99, page 53 of the German, page 71 of the English Document Book. Beginning on the second page the report of the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters, 832; did you know about this report officially?
A. No, I did not know of the report.
Q. Did you learn anything about it unofficially?
A. Not unofficially either. I heard about it for the first time here in Nurnberg in jail.
Q. Would it have been impressed on your memory if you had seen the report?
A. Yes, I should think so, because if events had happened as described here, then I think I would certainly have intervened, because this could only have been a case of an infringement by a commander.
Q. You mean the way it was carried out?
A. Yes.
Q. Exhibit 97, the German Document Book page 51, and English Document Book page 67-- Exhibit 97 is a letter from the Commander in Serbia to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. What kind of a document is this?
A. This is a report from the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast with reference to the Keital order of 28 September.
Q. And what Keitel order was that?
A. About the taking of hostages.
Q. And did you know anything about this executive order?
A. Probably. I can't say with certainty, because I don't see my initials.
Q. Figure 2 reads as follows: "With", and then comes the authority, "It was further ordered in order to stop the transmission of the intelligence of the insurgents, the families relatives of the insurgents are to be seized." "This means male relatives, as well as the wives of the insurgents.
However, for shooting to death only the male relatives are to be considered." Did you think the seizing of the relatives of the insurgents was justified?
A. In view of the reason which Boehme gives regarding stopping the transmission of intelligence reports I think it was justified.
Q. Please look again at Exhibit 107. This is a report about sabotage on the telephone line of Obrenovac-Valjevo, and the request following this by Field Marshall List; did you know anything about this request?
A. Yes, I assume with certainty, although I can't see my initials.
Q. And did you know about the answer to the request?
A. Yes, I think so, but I can't say with definite certainty.
Q. And now Exhibit 111, the German page 96, the English page 140; this is an activity report for the 164th Infantry Division; in which area was this division?
A. The division was in the Solonika area.
Q. And was this area also threatened by insurgents?
A. Until September it was on the whole peaceful, but in September illegal activities started there too.
Q. And what was the cause of this?
A. As far as I remember it was partly a case of robber bands, but it was also the effect from outside as during this period, frequent reports came in about parachutists who were doubtless communist agents.
Q. This report of the 164th Infantry Division, there is also mention in it of retaliation measures, under whose orders were they carried out?
A. I should think by order of the Commander in Salonika-Agean, who was responsible in this area.
Q. And were the measures made known to you?
A. By the report afterwards.
Q. And were they justified? Were there any definite reasons?
A. According to the reports here I must assume that.
Q. And were they successful?
A. These meausres were absolutely successful, because after that up until 1943 in this area it was almost entirely peaceful, and after these measures I would like to say there was a sudden cessation of the landing of such parachutists.
Q. And could one drive around in this area without a guard?
A. Yes, I myself was stationed near Salonika from November 1941 until August 1943, and I drove around in my car without any kind of a gurard whatsoever.
Q. And what about the conditions in Southern Greece?
A. In Southern Greece, as far as I remember at this time it was quiet, individual acts of sabotage occurred.
Q. What was the attitude of the German troops towards the Greek population at that time?
A. At that time it was very good.
Q. And what was your own attitude towards the Greeks?
A. I only felt friendly towards the Greeks, and I enjoyed the culture of Ancient Greece with a special pleasure.
Q. And when did a change come about between the German troops and the Greek population?
A. It changed at the beginning of 1943.
Q. And what was the reason for the change?
A. The reason was the general, war situation, and in connection with this a strengthened influence on the population from outside.
Q. What kind of influence was this?
A. That was from the Allied side, as well as from Moscow.
Q. And did the bad food situation in Greece play a part in this?
A. Certainly, partly, but the food supply in the bulk of the Greek area was an Italian affair, above all in Athens.
Q. And what was the attitude of the Greeks toward Italy?
A. It was very tense from the very beginning.
Q. Why?
A. Old national hatred and above all the Greek soldiers by reason of his military defensive successes, did not recognize the Italian.
Q. And what about Crete?
A. Crete was always a particular area of Greece. In Crete until the very last period of my presence in the Southeast there were definite robber bands, and various kinds of acts of sabotage frequently took place.
Q. In Exhibit III there is an entry "Situation Report of 10 November." Page 19 of the original report. On the 7th page of the document in the Document Book. Here the concentration camp of Salonika was mentioned. What did one understand at that time by the term "concentration camp?"
A. A collection camp. In any case not the same as the post War experiences lead us to understand by "concentration camps".
Q. Did you over see the camp in Semlin?
A. When I was driving past from the airbase to the town.
Q. And what impression did you get of the camp?
A. From the outside I got the simple impression of an internment camp.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. An internment camp as one also has here today, and in which I myself have been for 8 months.
Q. That is not a concentration camp in the political sense with which it was connected in the Third Reich?
A. No, a hut camp, such hut meant camps as arc usually set up for internment camps.
Q. Exhibit 112, German page 103, English page 151. This contains under the 8 December, an activity report. On the third page of the copy, page 10 of the original there is an entry about a fight between the Cetniks and the Communists. What kind of Cetniks were those?
A. It can't be seen from this. It could be the so-called Government Cetniks, but it could also be the Mihjlovic Cetniks.
Q. Who lead these Cetniks?
A. The Cetniks who were loyal to the Government were lead in spirit by Kosta Pecanac, who has often been mentioned.
Q. And what role did Kosta Pecanac play in this war?
A. In the First World War Pecanac was a leader of the insurgents around about the year 1916 or 1917, and in this war he was the oldish man who warned the population against any kind of insurgent movement or any kind of illegal activity, because by reason of his experience he was convinced that this only occurred at the cost of the Serbian population.
Q. And did he have any success with his warnings?
A. At the beginning, yes, in that district in which he was, heard it was usually peaceful. Later on---
Q. I don't think that came through on the translation. I asked you whether Pecanac had success with his warnings? Please repeat the answer.
A. In the first period he had quite definite success, above all in that area in which he was heard. It was extraordinarily peaceful at that time in this area. Later on his voice was drowned by Mihajlovic, as well as by the Communists.
Q. And did any other sections fight against the communists?
A. Yes, exactly the Mihajlovic Cetniks.
Q. Witness, on the last page of this document, Exhibit 112, there is a note under the 21st of November, that after an entry of the Cetniks after paying homage to Peter IInd and Kosra Pecanac, 20 communists were arrested, slaughtered and thrown into the Danube.
Q. Who arrested, slaughtered and throw these communists into the Danube?
A. According to the report here, the Cetniks.
Q. And was that unusual brutality?
A. In Serbia everything was possible. The conditions there could not be compared with any other area of Europe.
Q And did you frequently receive such kind of reports?
A These kind of reports partly confirmed and photographed appeared often enough.
Q What were the aims of the Communist movement in Serbia?
A Primarily they wanted to make Serbia into a Communist state.
Q And was there to be some kind of an internal revolutionary fight or a fight against the occupation powers?
A Both.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: The witness has been asked to state the aims of the Communists in Serbia. I think he ought to be qualified to speak on that point.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q Have you had any definite experience, any definite basis or did you have any at that time, which justifies you to speak on the aims of the Communist movement in Serbia?
A Yes, we had numberous testimony from captured band members and in addition we intercepted the radio messages of the bands, although there weren't very many and we had therefore definite reports from as the term wont, "reliable sources."
Q And this fighting inside Serbia, did it come to any definite head while you were in the Southeastern area?
A No.
Q Which aims of the Communist movement in Serbia were recognizable to you from tho external fighting that is against the occupation powers?
A The external political aims, if I can call them that.
Q Noo perhaps more definite, the aims which tho Communist movement had in relation to the occupation power?
A The fighting against the occupation power.
Q And what was the attitude to their neighbors in the Balkans.
A Their external political aim, if one may call it that, this movement was undoubtedly a Communist Greater Serbia or the restoration of a Communist Panslavia. In any case an aim which was also directed against the neighboring states of Serbia, Hungary, Bulgaria and the newly created Croatia.
Q And did this situation have any influence on the attitude of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast toward the question of the recognition of the Tito movement?
A Insofar as this was also a reason for the fact that the question of the recognition of the non-recognition was a highly political question, and not a decision which the Wehrmacht Commander or the Commander in Chief Southeast could make.
Q. Witness, exhibit 100-B-27, this is a loose document submitted by the prosecution to document book 3, it is the interrogation of the Oberregierungerat Kiessel; did you know Kiessel?
A I don't remember that I have ever seen him or spoken to him. I know that he was the first collaborator of Thumer's.
Q During this interrogation Kiessel was in Belgrade prison on the 21st of March of this year, and among other things he was asked about the employment of a police battalion. Among other things it says that the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast knew about the subordination of this police battalion to the Chief of the General Staff of the Commander Serbia; is that correct?
A Yes, that is, it doesn't mean subordination to LieutenantColonel Grafenherst, but a subordination for the disposition of the troops, in contrast to the subordination for disposition by Thurner as administrative man. This question of subordination was known to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast and he was in agreement with this regulation.
Q In this interrogation Kiessel speaks about the fact that Lieutenant-Colonel Grafenhorst had referred to your order when Kiessel protested against the Skela operation. First, a preliminary question concerning this Skela action, what was this Skela action?
A This Skela action was an attack on one or two cars which were occupied by German police officials and in which three or four were killed and thrown in the Save.
Q We will talk about that later on. What was done as a result of this attack and by whom?
A In the documents there are reports from which can be seen the following; that on 14 August at 1650 hours this attack took place in the village of Skela and on 15 August, that is immediately afterwards, as a reprisal a number of Communists were shot to death, the village was burned down or the houses in the village were burned down and also there is a supplementary report, according to which small numbers of villages residents were shot to death because they knew about this attack.
Q Kiessel maintains here in his interrogation that he protested against this reprisal action Skela, and when he protested LieutenantColonel Grafenhorst emphatically referred to your order; who was Grafenhorst?
A Grafenhorst was the Chief of the General Staff of the Commander Serbia.
Q Do you know whether or not Grafenhorst referred to your order to Kiessel?
A I don't know what Grafenhorst said to Kiessel. In any case he did not get the order, or as he described further on in his interrogation, the approval, from me.
Q Why not?
A First, because there was nothing for me to approve, I also did not approve anything. Then the report about the attack of 14 August in the afternoon at 1650 hours, and the report of the reprisal action, which had already been carried out, were both contained in the same daily report of 15 August. With the communication at that time it seems to me very doubtful if not impossible, that between the attack which took place at 1650 hours and then comes the report etc. and the decision to carry out the reprisal, it seems to me impossible that some kind of an approval or discussion had taken place; and thirdly it is very improbable that General Dankelman, who was completely justified to order reprisals himself, had made inquires through his chief because Dankelman knew exactly that Field Marshal List was on leave at that time, and that General Felmy was his deputy.
And, Dnakelman was not a man, who would have asked for approval from an equal, at that moment deputy superior for a measure which he could have carried out on his own authority and which he also had carried out.
Q Witness, you said that the report about the Skela incident arrived at the same time as the report about the intended reprisal measures, which can be seen from the daily report; do you know which day this could have been?
A The 15th of August, I know that exactly.
Q. And that must be the report contained in exhibit 127, document book 5, beginning on page 34 of the German, page 27 of the English document book. Which report do you mean there?
A. It is the report with the heading "Teletype No. 7688, 15 August, 1445." The daily report of the 15th of August.
Q. Yes, this is on page 4 of this document, it is on page 9 of the original. This will help you to find the English page quicker, page 9 of the original, Teletype 7688 from 15 August on page 33 of the English. What do you gather from this report?
A. As I already said the attack took place on 14 August - 1650 hours on a passenger car of the police company which was shot at by bandits with machine guns: the car was burned-out and the police killed. The search party found the bodies of one sergeant and one lieutenant thrown in the Save, and two sergeants were missing. In the same report it says on 15 August, that is the day of the report and the day immediately after the attack: the village of Skela burned to the ground and fifty Communists from Belgrade hanged there.
Q. And in this period, that must have been on the same day, was any connection made because of this with me Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A. I already said I don't remember about that, and in this case because of the reasons of time mentioned, I think it highly impossible if not technically out of the question.
Q. How does it happen that you remember this case about Skela?
A. The affair of Skela in the middle of August was nevertheless the most malicious and cowardly attack which had taken place in that period.
Q. Kiessel states in his interrogation that the connection between you and Grafenhorst was very close; was that correct?
A. Unfortunately, it is not correct because of the very difficult communications.
Q. Could you telephone him at any time?
A. No, from the daily reports, from the complete daily reports, it can be seen how many acts of sabotage were undertaken on telephone lines, and how often attacks on Post Offices took place. In addition, one must also know that on the Belgrade-Salonika-Athens line, at this time this was a distance of about 1,500 or almost 2,000 kilometers, and on this line there were only overhead cables, that is a telephone line, which is only usual here on land. There were no underground cables, but only telephone poles and then plain wire and these went through most isolated districts. If the communication was interrupted in a place like this, then it took hours before the spot could be found, and then it took also a long time until it was repaired. If for instance, let us say ten telephone poles were sawn down, and of course this took place in a district where there were no trees at all, sometimes it took a whole day until the ten telegraph poles were set up again, therefore for two or three days we could not telephone at all.
Q. What about the connections with Grafenhorst's successor, Kewisch.
A. With Kewisch it was a much better because my staff was then in Salonika, and the distance was only about one half, there wore also more repair units, more signal forces available: however, I also experienced even in 1943 that sometimes one could not telephone for a whole day.
Q. Witness, we now come to prosecution book No. 4, at the beginning I read the documents which you know only from the trial. These are exhibits 115, 116, 119, 120, 121 and 123.
A. Those are the ones which I did not know.
Q. Yes the ones that you did not know. Among these is also contained exhibit 118, this is German page 30, English page 40; now what is your knowledge with respect to the incidents which are described in this document?
A. I know the incidents as far as they are reported, but I cannot say anything certain about them because the report is not complete.
Q. From the figures contained in this document, that is in these daily reports, it can be seen that the losses of the bands in comparison with the German losses was very high; can you give any explanation for this?
A. Yes, the losses by the bands were, according to our experience, very high in comparison to the German losses, because the bands were poorly trained and also in comparison with our troops were poorly equipped, but as far as pure figures go, in general they were stronger than they German troops, that is according to the German soldier they offered more targets-they were easier to shoot at because there were more of them. The bands were numerically stronger than the German troops, as a result they offered more targets and as a result, since there were more targets they also had more losses. I found this confirmed in figures about the present fighting in Northern Greece where the losses on the side of the rebels were in the same way sometimes even twenty times greater than the losses on the side of the regular Greek troops. Therefore, this must certainly be a typical aspect of the band fighting.
Q. From this daily report it can also be seen that German soldiers, who were captured by the bands, were released; did that happen regularly or frequently?
A. If that had happened regularly then it would have not been reported. The mere fact of the report of such an event shows the exception.
Q. What was done in the other cases by the bands with the German soldiers?
A. We often received reports to the effect that the prisoners were shot or that they had been found shot, or mutiliated, etc. This was discovered when the German troops came into these places, or else they were found by the population.
Q. Now please take Exhibit 120. This also belongs in itself to those which you learned for the first time in the trial here, but it is necessary to ask a question on it. The document is on page 40 of the German, page 53 of the English document book, exhibit 120.
A. Exhibit 120?
Q. Exhibit 120, these are daily reports which the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Belgrade.
It says here on page 42 of the German document book--and it will probably be on page 56 of the English, in the report from the 12th of the 10th, page 55 of the English:
"In Banat near Kevin and Dubevac appearance of small groops of insurgents in black uniform."
This note brings me to the question about the uniform of the bands in general and what information there was about this,
A Well, there can be no talk at all of a general uniform. It is exactly the present individual reports about the fact that bandits had been found in uniform shows that these were exceptions. The uniform of a regular army is typical and is, in spite of camouflage, to be recognized through the cut, through the shape of the helmet, through the equipment and, therefore, our own soldiers needs only once, at the beginning of such a campaing, to have a lecture about this with a board where the enemy soldiers are portrayed, and then he has the picture, let's say, of the American soldier or the Russian soldier, in his head.
Q And what were the characteristics of the bands?
A In the bands occasional uniforms appeared and this was the Serbian, German, Croatian, Italian and, later on, English, and they also wore occasionally certain badges, insignia.
Q And could one see them from a distance? Could one recognize them from a distance?
A No, in modern one must demand that such insignia, such uniform, must be recognizable at firing distance. That is normally 800 to 1,000 meters; and, in the same way, a soldier must be recognizable from a fast flying aircraft; but mostly a dirty stripe or star or piece of metal on a cap which one can turn round at a decisivemoment or which one can tear off, can never be insignia which can be recognizable from a distance.
Q You said already that for a soldier in the regular army it was necessary for his whole uniform and equipment to be typical. What was done in order always to learn how the members of these bands looked?