A. I considered that perfectly justifiable because it is in the nature of taking reprisal hostages that they are taken from all groups which are in some way connected with the illegal actions which one wants to prevent and from which one wants to deter.
Q. You explained to me on Friday already that you personally were of the opinion that when ordering and taking reprisal measures there has to be a certain inner connection between those who are responsible for the attack and those who are then possibily executed in retaliation.
A. I said if possible.
Q. Yes, if possible.
A. Because I would not always be in a position to know from what ideological direction the attack originates. That would load me half way to the recognition of who incited it.
Q. And in this order you have this inner connection? The sentence reads, "In case of attack hostages of the group corresponding to that to which the culprit belongs are to be shot."
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. In a reasonable execution of this order that could basically comply with your own opinion?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. Otherwise,one could not explain your remark that you had no misgivings in passing on that order?
A. That thought is correct.
Q. We will now turn to Document Book III of the Prosecution. Here again I shall refer to the compilation concerning tho exhibits which you have seen for tho first time during this trial. According to this compilation these are Exhibits 81, 88, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 99, 100, 101, 104, 104-B, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 114-B, and 114-C. These documents with which the Prosecution charges you, you got to know only now.
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. I will talk now about the retaliation for the murder of the 22 soldiers of tho 521st Army Signal Regiment. In Exhibit 78, on Page 1 of Document Book III, we have a written report by the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, dated the 4th of October 1941, and this shows that the attack on the German soldiers took place on the 2nd of October 1941. That is, the murder of the German soldiers. I ask you was this attack on the German soldiers reported to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast before General Bochme issued this order, Exhibit 78, dated the 4th of October?
A: Yes, I took it from the Prosecution documents that the report on the surprise attack reached the Armed Forces Commander on the 3rd of October.
Q: Witness, do you mean Exhibit 127 in Document Book V?
A: Will you give me the number again?
Q: Exhibit 127?
A: Yes, no. 127. That is the one, the report of the 3rd of October 1941. It's on Page 99 of the German text.
Q: And what can we see from this order?
A: Army Signal Regiment 521st, 2 dead, two wounded.
Q: Were any details reported to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, especially details concerning the manner in which the soldiers were killed?
A: That was done during the further course of events. I remember such reports.
Q: Did the Armed Forces Commander Southeast himself intervene because of the reprisal measures to be taken?
A: No, but I believe that at that time the OKW expressly ordered the application of the ratio 1 to 100.
Q: Did the Armed Forces Commander Southeast gain knowledge of the ordering of reprisal measures by the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia?
A: Yes, on the basis of Boehme's report of the 9th of October.
Q: Is this report, you're referring to, Exhibit 122, contained in Document Book IV, on Page 60 of the English text and Page 45 of the German text?
This is a radio message to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
A: Yes, its a radio message of the 9th of October.
Q: Or a teletype?
A: Yes, it may be a teletype, but it appears to be a radio message because all of these reports here are designated as radio messages, but that's immaterial.
Q: We will refer you to this document again when we deal with Document Book IV? Now, did one have no misgivings in the office of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast concerning the execution of such orders? Just in this particular case a large number of people had to give their lives.
A: We had had thoughts of that nature already at a prior time -- expensive thoughts -- and I think that I have already said quite a lot about the treatment of the basic question when I talked about my discussion with Keitel etc.
Q: The number is 21, as can be seen from Exhibit 78. That is Boehme's order. What did the men think about that order?
A: During that time I did not myself lead any units, but I do not believe that I am wrong if from discussions with troop commanders of all ranks and all ages I still today have the impression, that the men themselves demanded energetic measures of this insurgent pest.
Q: Could you give an explanation for that attitude of the troops?
A: Such an explanation is very simple in my opinion. A military unit that has occupational tasks and sees its military tasks in the preparation of a prevention of an invasion, and an occupation which wants to live in peace with the population and above all a military unit which consists of men of older ages, as was the case at that time in Serbia, and they were more prepared for a peaceful life of occupation than for any other kind of fight, such a military unit demands from its superiors an intervention against surprise attacks, ambushes, and illegal actions of all kinds for their own protection.
And this is done from a healthy attitude, such as soldiers of every nation would have it.
Q: Did you yourself, from a legal standpoint, have any misgivings against that order?
A: Boehme was entitled and authorized to issue that order on the basis of the basic directives of the 16th of September.
Q. Witness, in this connection I show you again the paragraph 47 of the German Military Penal Code, "if by the execution of an order with regard for official matters, a paragraph of the penal code is violated, the superior alone is responsible. However, the obeying subordinate will be punished as a participant, 1) if he exceeded the order; 2) if he knew that the order of the superior concerned an action which had as its purpose the committing of a civil or military crime." This provision of the German Military Code, did that not give you a means to refuse the carrying out of orders such as that Bochme Order?
A. I am not a jurist but I do know that paragraph 47 has as a prerequisited that the person concerned is consciously aware of the fact that the order against which he can or should object has as its purpose a crime. And, accordingly my practical military experience this paragraph concerns cases as for instance the following: A Lieutenant orders a corporal to go and hit his nin-commissioned officer. Then it is quite obvious that the corporal will say that the purpose of this order is to insult the non commissioned officer and I can, therefore, not do it. Or a Major tells a first Lieutenant, I order you to rape a certain woman during a certain night; then the purpose, is quite obvious. For instance theft, or plunder is ordered - but I believe in the whole German Reich there would not have been a single court to regard a Hitler order or a Keitel order, an order which proclaims the will of Hitler as incitement, as instigation to an illegal action, a crime,- that is quite beyond my imagination.
Q. Now, let's turn to Exhibits 81, 82 and 83. They are reports by the SD and they are on the pages 9 of the German and 11 of the English Document Book and subsequent pages.
JUDGE WENNERSTRUM: Pardon me. Will you repeat that again; I didn't get it.
Q. Exhibits 81, 82, and 83. They start on page 9 of the German text and on page 11 of the English Document Book. Did you get to know these reports during your assignment in the Southeast?
A. No.
Q. In the report Exhibit 81 there is some talk about the installation of a collection camp near Mitrovica. Do you know on whose orders this camp was instituted?
A. I don't know that. I would assume it was done on Boehme's order in connection with Sabac but certainly not on the basis of the order by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
Q. In Exhibit 82, the page is 11 of the German Document Book and 13 of the English Document Book. In this exhibit a larger number of attacks and sabotage acts are mentioned. Were these attacks reported to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A. I assume that for certain even if in a different form, but after all in two weeks, two weeks following the previously mentioned week, there are mentioned 70 dead, 107 wounded, 9 kidnapped. Further 183 attacks on post and telegraph offices, 38 on installations, 38 on railroad stations, and I am sure that that was reported.
Q. In this document there is also some talk about the bands recruiting by force all men between the ages of 16 and 60 and that is under threat of death penalty. Did the Armed Forces Commander Southeast also gain knowledge of this?
A. Such reports came in frequently.
Q. Furthermore there is some talk about a prisoner camp in Sabac and it says that of the 22,000 prisoners up to date about 8,000 had been examined and 910 had been liquidated. Did the Armed Forces Commander Southeast gain knowledge of this too?
A. The checking of these camps was expressly ordered by Field Marshall List in his order on the 4th of October. However, without saying that this screening had to be done by the SD. The shootings are probably retaliation measures, which reached the Armed Forces Commander probably in some other form of report.
JUDGE WENNERSTRUM: Pardon me, just a moment. Before we got too far away from the matter that I am interested in, I wish you would again question the witness concerning the statements he made relative to the German Penal Code.
He spoke rather rapidly and the interpretation was rather rapid and I would like to have him explain more in detail his attitude and his comments that ho made at that time. If that could be done now I would appreciate it.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACK:
Q. Yes, I shall repeat that question. Witness we sill come back to paragraph 47 of the German Military Penal Code.
JUDGE WENNERSTRUM: And go slow.
Q. And will you please talk slowly because before the Tribunal because of your rapidity did not get everything. I had read to you the text of paragraph 47 and I think that the text of paragraph 47 was understood correctly and I had then put a question to you. Did you, because of that paragraph 47 of the German Military Penal Code, have the possibility and saw the possibility that the Boehme order regarding the shooting of 2,100 because of the surprise attack would not have to be carried out.
A. I can, of course, not repeat the exact words which I used in my previous statement but as to the actual meaning I said the following: I am not a jurist but I do know that this paragraph 47 for the person that wants to use it contains two prerequisites which are decisive. First of all that the order which is supposed to be rejected has as its purpose a crime or the committing of a crime and secondly that the person who wants to make use of that paragraph has to be consciously aware of this purpose and intent of the order so that he can immediately realize and did recognize that this order which he is given requests him to commit a crime.
Q. Just a minute, could a German soldier gain that awareness if such an order came from the OKW and Hitler?
A. In this connection I said a bout the following: I could not think of any court in the whole German Reich of that time which would regard a Hitler order or a Keitel order, expressing Hitler's will, as instigation to a crime of a criminal act, because Hitler was the head of the State, Hitler was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and according to the then customary attitude Hitler's orders one might say wore almost law, so that no German court without facing execution itself would have risked to say "this Hitler order intends a crime, that is, that Hitler is a criminal and you who is merely a soldier, you who objects to this order, are right."
Such an imagination, such a picture always seen in the light of that time is quite impossible and I mentioned that according to my military and soldierly experiences paragraph 47 means something entirely different. It applies to cases which definitely imply an order to steal, to rape, to plunder, to insult, that is, orders where the common soldier can recognize immediately that he is asked to commit a crime and that he mustn't do that and then he knows that paragraph 47 protects him if he refuses to execute that order. That is in my opinion with regard to the meaning of that paragraph.
JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will recess until 1:30.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 13 October 1947)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q. Witness, before the recess we got to Exhibit No. 82, Document Book III, German page 11, English page 13. On the last page of this exhibit is a report of the Chief of the Security Police and SD and it says amongst other things: "After the liquidation which had already been ordered by the Commander of Serbia, of the rest of the male Jews, the ghetto would contain about 10,000 female Jews and children." This is the ghetto in Belgrade. I now ask you, was the establishment of this ghetto ordered by the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A. No.
Q. Did the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast issue an order that the male inhabitants of this ghetto should be liquidated?
A. No, I don't know of any order issued or passed on by the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast which ordered that Jews were to be killed simply because they were Jews.
Q. Did you know anything about the attitude of the OKW in this connection?
A. No.
Q. Did you know anything about the shooting of the 200 Communists and or Jews in Belgrade as mentioned in the SD report of the 20th of October?
A. May I ask, is that also Exhibit 82?
Q. Yes, also Exhibit 82, on the third page of this exhibit, page 4 of the original: "200 Communists and or Jews shot to death."
A. I can't say . I haven't found any kinds of report a bout this in the documents which have been submitted to me.
Q. To whom then did this report of the SD go, this report, Exhibit 82?
A. There is no distribution list. I assume that it went inside the police area but at any rate it didn't go to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, and also don't think it went to military offices ad thin the sphere of the Commander Southeast. I have never seen such reports.
Q. Exhibit 84, German Document Book, page 19, English page 22 ---this is an order of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia. It is an execution order to the Boehme order of the 10th Of October. Did you know this Boehm order of the 10th of October?
A. From the 19th?
Q. This is an order from the 19th, an execution order, but the question concerns Boehm's order dated the 10th of October and it is Exhibit No. 88, German Document Book page 27 and the English Document Book, page 34. That is Boehme's order of the 10th of October 1941 about the crushing of the Communist insurgent movement which is referred to in Exhibit 84 which has just been mentioned. I ask you, did you know the Boehme order of the 10th of October? That is Exhibit 88.
A. I can't say with certainty -- probably.
Q. In the first paragraph it says: "In Serbia it is necessary on the basis of the Balkan mentality and the groat expansion of communist insurgent movements to carry out the orders of the AKW in the most severe form." Can you tell me which order of the AKW is referred to here?
A. The order of the 16th of the 9th which ordered reprisal ratios. This can be seen from the heading of this letter which states expressly: "Supplement of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia to the order of the 16th of the 9th." Then, also, the order of the 28th of the 9th was the basis for figure "2".
Q. And is the order of the 28th of the 9th the order which we were speaking about before the recess, which ordered that a hostage supply should be preserved?
A. Yes, that's the order.
Q. New, these from the AKW orders, -- the forst one at least is considerably earlier. How did it happen that Boehme only issued his order on the 10th of October?
Doesn't that go back to the initiative of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A. No, in no way at all on the initiative of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. I don't know the reason for the order. I can only made an assumption, and this is that the events in Topola caused Boehme to issue this order.
Q. Did the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast at that time or at any other time order himself a reprisal ratio?
A. No, in my time, at least, he didn't for the reasons which I have already stated because he didn't have sufficient insight into the individual incidents and circumstances.
Q. And sis you think Boehme was authorized by reason of the OAK order mentioned to issue such an order as this one of the 1-th of October?
A. Yes, as far as I can see from the heading of the letter, his corps judicial official had helped him work out the order, this is show quite clearly by the figure, Roman 3, at the beginning of the reference number. The figure 3, in the judicial department.
Q. Now back again to Exhibit No. 54, this document concerns the ordering of reprisal measures for the German soldiers attacked in Valjevo and partly killed and partly wounded. This document belongs in your view to those which you saw for the first time here in this trial. Is that correct?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. Was this surprise attack on the German soldiers reported to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A. Probably it was reported. I can't check this.
Q. Did the report perhaps take place when Field Marshal List was no longer there and before the post was taken over by General Kuntze?
A. In any case after Field Marshal List had become sick, probably also during the time before General Kuntze arrived.
Q. The how was the deputizing for Field Marshal List regulated?
A. When it became clear that Field Marshal List had to have an operation, I reported to the OKW and asked for regulations for somebody to deputize for Field Marshal List. I still remember exactly that I received a telephone call about this question during the night from. I think it was, General Warlimont. It was very difficult to understand. It was a long distance call. The OKW had the intention that the Commander-in-Chief of the 12th Army and the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast should each receive one deputy. There-upon, I asked that this should not be done because this would only cause complications.
Q. And then what happened in the end?
A. On the next morning -- that is, it must have been about the 18th came the decision that General Kuntze had been commissioned deputy. Then I asked what should happen with regard to the deputizing until General Kuntze arrived and I received the answer that it could only be a question of two or three days and until then -- that is, until General Kuntze arrived -- the commanders within their own sheres should take over the the deputizing -- that is, they should independant. The reports however, should continue through the old channels because we had to cound on General Kuntze's arriving any day, and because the communication apparatus ran smoothly.
Q. Did General Kuntze arrive quickly?
A. No, it was prolonged until the 26th of October in the afternoon.
Q. And in the meantime were orders issued by the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A. Individual orders from the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast could not be issued because during these days there was no Wehrmacht Commander, but only a staff.
Q. Why couldn't you take over the deputizing?
A. I was a colonel and the commanders were long-standing generals, and in addition I had no authority to issue orders.
Q. And then why did the reports go through your staff?
A. Because the reports always went that way, and because we expected General Kuntze to arrive at any moment.
Q. And to whom did you report during this period then?
A. I reported to nobody. I didn't have anybody to report to.
Q. And what would have happened if decisions had been necessary?
A. Then I would have had to apply for these myself from the OKW direct.
Q. We now come to Exhibit 85, in German Document Book Page 20, and in the English Document Book 23. This is the War Diary of the Higher Command for Special Employment, No. 65. This contains an entry on the 18th of October, that the 717th Infantry Division for losses received on the 15 of October had in return shot altogether 1736 men, and 19 Communist women.
Q. Does this report also fall within the period when there was no Commander-in-Chief, and no deputy present?
A. Yes.
Q. On the third page of this document there is an entry under 30 October, "Wehrmacht Commander Southeast is in agreement with the intentions of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General for the employment of the troops.
The formations of the troops under the command of the Higher Command 65 can be carried out." To what does this note refer? (It's on the 3rd page of exhibit 85 at the top, on the 3rd page of the English too. Entry for the 30th of October. The English page at the be ginning of the document was 23.)
A. There was an understanding with regard to the tactical employment of the troops, and this can be seen from the fact that it mentions "the formation of the subordinate troops can be carried out."
Q. I now come to the case of the shooting of 2300 Serbs in Kragujevac. This is Exhibit 87, in the German page 25 and in the English book page 31 of Document Book III. It contains the following note in the entry of the 20th October: "About 3200 men --there's obviously a mistake here, because underneath it says again 2300-age 16 to 50, from Kragujevac are being arrested. In the evening the Communists and Jews arrested on 18th October and 33 penal prisoners from the local prison of Kragujcvac were shot together behind the captured material depot." The next entry for 21 October "Concluded operations, a total of 2300 Serbs various ages and occupations have been shot to death." Did you know this document?
A. I didn't know this document.
Q. Did you know anything about the shooting of the 2300 Serbs in Kragujevac?
A. This shooting was contained, in a 10-day report dated 30th October, I can't say with certainty whether or when I read this report, because the original with my initial is not available here.
Q. And who issued the order for this shooting?
A. I don't know, but it did not come from the Wehrmacht commander.
Q. And were the further details about the carrying out of this shooting described by the prosecution, know to you?
A. No, they were not known to me.
Q. And now please take Exhibit 99, page 53 of the German, page 71 of the English Document Book. Beginning on the second page the report of the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters, 832; did you know about this report officially?
A. No, I did not know of the report.
Q. Did you learn anything about it unofficially?
A. Not unofficially either. I heard about it for the first time here in Nurnberg in jail.
Q. Would it have been impressed on your memory if you had seen the report?
A. Yes, I should think so, because if events had happened as described here, then I think I would certainly have intervened, because this could only have been a case of an infringement by a commander.
Q. You mean the way it was carried out?
A. Yes.
Q. Exhibit 97, the German Document Book page 51, and English Document Book page 67-- Exhibit 97 is a letter from the Commander in Serbia to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. What kind of a document is this?
A. This is a report from the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast with reference to the Keital order of 28 September.
Q. And what Keitel order was that?
A. About the taking of hostages.
Q. And did you know anything about this executive order?
A. Probably. I can't say with certainty, because I don't see my initials.
Q. Figure 2 reads as follows: "With", and then comes the authority, "It was further ordered in order to stop the transmission of the intelligence of the insurgents, the families relatives of the insurgents are to be seized." "This means male relatives, as well as the wives of the insurgents.
However, for shooting to death only the male relatives are to be considered." Did you think the seizing of the relatives of the insurgents was justified?
A. In view of the reason which Boehme gives regarding stopping the transmission of intelligence reports I think it was justified.
Q. Please look again at Exhibit 107. This is a report about sabotage on the telephone line of Obrenovac-Valjevo, and the request following this by Field Marshall List; did you know anything about this request?
A. Yes, I assume with certainty, although I can't see my initials.
Q. And did you know about the answer to the request?
A. Yes, I think so, but I can't say with definite certainty.
Q. And now Exhibit 111, the German page 96, the English page 140; this is an activity report for the 164th Infantry Division; in which area was this division?
A. The division was in the Solonika area.
Q. And was this area also threatened by insurgents?
A. Until September it was on the whole peaceful, but in September illegal activities started there too.
Q. And what was the cause of this?
A. As far as I remember it was partly a case of robber bands, but it was also the effect from outside as during this period, frequent reports came in about parachutists who were doubtless communist agents.
Q. This report of the 164th Infantry Division, there is also mention in it of retaliation measures, under whose orders were they carried out?
A. I should think by order of the Commander in Salonika-Agean, who was responsible in this area.
Q. And were the measures made known to you?
A. By the report afterwards.
Q. And were they justified? Were there any definite reasons?
A. According to the reports here I must assume that.
Q. And were they successful?
A. These meausres were absolutely successful, because after that up until 1943 in this area it was almost entirely peaceful, and after these measures I would like to say there was a sudden cessation of the landing of such parachutists.
Q. And could one drive around in this area without a guard?
A. Yes, I myself was stationed near Salonika from November 1941 until August 1943, and I drove around in my car without any kind of a gurard whatsoever.
Q. And what about the conditions in Southern Greece?
A. In Southern Greece, as far as I remember at this time it was quiet, individual acts of sabotage occurred.
Q. What was the attitude of the German troops towards the Greek population at that time?
A. At that time it was very good.
Q. And what was your own attitude towards the Greeks?
A. I only felt friendly towards the Greeks, and I enjoyed the culture of Ancient Greece with a special pleasure.
Q. And when did a change come about between the German troops and the Greek population?
A. It changed at the beginning of 1943.
Q. And what was the reason for the change?
A. The reason was the general, war situation, and in connection with this a strengthened influence on the population from outside.
Q. What kind of influence was this?
A. That was from the Allied side, as well as from Moscow.
Q. And did the bad food situation in Greece play a part in this?
A. Certainly, partly, but the food supply in the bulk of the Greek area was an Italian affair, above all in Athens.
Q. And what was the attitude of the Greeks toward Italy?
A. It was very tense from the very beginning.
Q. Why?
A. Old national hatred and above all the Greek soldiers by reason of his military defensive successes, did not recognize the Italian.
Q. And what about Crete?
A. Crete was always a particular area of Greece. In Crete until the very last period of my presence in the Southeast there were definite robber bands, and various kinds of acts of sabotage frequently took place.
Q. In Exhibit III there is an entry "Situation Report of 10 November." Page 19 of the original report. On the 7th page of the document in the Document Book. Here the concentration camp of Salonika was mentioned. What did one understand at that time by the term "concentration camp?"
A. A collection camp. In any case not the same as the post War experiences lead us to understand by "concentration camps".
Q. Did you over see the camp in Semlin?
A. When I was driving past from the airbase to the town.
Q. And what impression did you get of the camp?
A. From the outside I got the simple impression of an internment camp.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. An internment camp as one also has here today, and in which I myself have been for 8 months.
Q. That is not a concentration camp in the political sense with which it was connected in the Third Reich?
A. No, a hut camp, such hut meant camps as arc usually set up for internment camps.
Q. Exhibit 112, German page 103, English page 151. This contains under the 8 December, an activity report. On the third page of the copy, page 10 of the original there is an entry about a fight between the Cetniks and the Communists. What kind of Cetniks were those?
A. It can't be seen from this. It could be the so-called Government Cetniks, but it could also be the Mihjlovic Cetniks.
Q. Who lead these Cetniks?