I must say from then on I didn't have any chance to express my own opinion.
Q Witness from the testimony of Field Marshal List; it was seen that the greater part of the acts as set down in Exhibit 1939 took place while he was on leave; can you toll us approximately when Field Marshal List was on leave at that time?
A I think ho was absent from the 21st or the 22nd of July until the 23rd or 24th of August.
Q And who was his deputy while he was on leave?
A The deputy was General Felmy.
Q And by whom was General Felmy appointed?
A That happened on the proposal of Field Marshal List through the O.K.W.
Q And did General Felmy also carry out his other tasks while he was deputizing?
A Yes.
Q During the time he was deputizing did anything change with regard to the leadership and administration of the Wehrmacht commander southeast as compared with the previous period?
A In principle no; in office and technical matters however, but in principle no.
Q During this period were any kind of fundamental orders issued with regard to the Southeast, which had any great effect in the Southeast, especially in Serbia?
A From the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, as far as I can remember no. From the O.K.W., it is quite possible because from there pressure and warnings etc. came all the time.
Q Was General Felmy limited at all in his influence as deputy?
A Yes, of course by the fact that he had the same rank as the other commanders and then by the fact that he was only deputizing during leave, also by the fact that there was the general reserve of a deputy used in such circumstances.
Q You have already stated that Field Marshal List returned approximately on the 24th of August; did Field Marshal List before his return find out about at headquarters the conditions in Serbia and about the events which took place?
A Yes, on his return journey he was in Belgrade and there he heard all about the situation.
Q And what was the situation when he returned?
A The situation had become considerable more aggravated.
Q In this respect to what extent?
A To the extent that at the end of August one could already speak about the beginning of a certain insurgent movement.
Q And then what did the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast decide by reason of this aggravated situation in Serbia?
A One came to the clear realization that the means which had been used up to then were no longer sufficient.
Q And what measures had been taken up to then in order to combat the bands?
A On the whole it was loft to the initiative of the Wehrmacht Commander in Serbia. As we can see from these reports which we have just read, they were essentially police actions, and then there was the employment of the troops by the small so-called "Jagdkommandos."
Q To what decision did the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast come to by reason of the aggravation of the situation?
A He then decided that stronger troops should now be employed there in order to light the sources and area of the insurgents militarily.
Q And were there differences of opinion in the military quarters in the Southeast?
A Yes, between the views of the Commander of Serbia, General Dahkelmann at that time, and the views of the Commanding General of the 65th Corps, General Bader.
Q And what were these differences?
A General Dankelmann thought that police action was most necessary and wanted to use more Serbia forces. General Bader thought that this police action would not be sufficient; and was also of the opinion that stronger military forces had to intervene.
He also mistrusted Dankelmann's idea that Serbian forces could really achieve anything here.
Q And then how were Dankelmann's ideas regarded by the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A The Wehrmacht Commander Southeast agreed with the opinions of Bader.
Q And then what did the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast do in order to carry out the measures which you previously stated and which you thought were correct?
A He kept on asking for troops from the OKW.
Q And did you yourself ever acquaint yourself with the situation in Belgrade?
A Yes, from the beginning of September until the end of September I was on leave, and on my way out I received the commission from Field Marshal List to find out in Belgrade about the whole situation and to tell him about my impressions. In addition I also received the commission if possible at the beginning of my leave, to talk with the OKW and there to submit orally the estimate of the situation, which was already known through the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast.
Q And with whom did you speak in Belgrade?
A In Belgrade I spoke to General Dankelmann the Commander of Serbia and with General Bader, the Commanding General of the 65th Corps.
Q And what judgment did you come to by reason of these discussions?
A The one I have already described. The view that here there were differences of opinion and General Bader's opinion seemed to me to be the correct one.
Q Did you find anything else out in Belgrade?
A Yes, I had to get some kind of an idea about the prospects of Dankelmann's newly-formed government Nedic.
Q And what judgment did you arrive then?
A Of course, it was very difficult for me in one single day to get some kind of an idea of the prospects of the Nedic government and by reason of conversations with Dankelmann, Bader and their chiefs, I tried to do this, I then came to the opinion that such an attempt had to be undertaken by a government represented by Nedic.
I would like to say a peaceful means for the pacification of the country should be used.
Q You said previously that you also had to talk to Field Marshal Keitel at that time; who was he at that time?
A He was the chief of the O.K.W.
Q And when did you speak to Keitel?
A On either the 2nd or 3rd of September I came home and phoned the O.K.W. and asked that I be allowed to report at once, this was rejected. Then a few days after I tried again and asked that I should be allowed to come, but again it was not suitable. I don't know the reasons for that, but actually along about the 20th of September I went to Keitel in East Prussia in the Fuehrer's headquarters.
Q And then what did you report to Keitel?
AAt that time I told Keitel Field Marshal List's views, as I have shortly described before. Of course I cannot remember the text anymore, but the total contents of this report remains very clear in my memory because I only reported twice during my Southeastern period to Keitel and both of these were unfortunately without success.
Q Did you object against the view that the pacification of the country could be carried out by so-called terror measures?
A That is just what I wanted to say. The most essential part of the report was banally spoken it can't be done as you want it to be done, it can only be done through the adequate employment of adequately strong troops. I would like to say the following here, I only spoke for about five or six minutes at the most and then I told how the situation was with us. Then Keitel said to me, "That in individual cases perhaps you can see better than we see here, but on the whole we are right. That is what I want to explain to you and please tell that to your Commander in Chief." Then I must have looked at him rather incredulously because he said to me, "You don't seem to be very convinced." Whereupon I said to him, "No", and I wanted to try again to present our point of view, thereupon I was interrupted in a very unfriendly manner and the discussion closed by Keitel saying to me, "I already know the views of your Field Marshal, because I still remember this rather unkind teletype in which he asks that the responsibility should be left to him to take the steps which he thinks are necessary.
I should just tell my Commander-in-Chief that his responsibility lies in obedience and for what had been ordered, - I don't remember now whether he said the Fuehrer or the O.K.W. would take the full responsibility. This was the rather abrupt end of this approximately half hour discussion.
Q To what measures or what orders did Keitel refer when he said that the Fuehrer's or the O.K.W.'s orders be the only right ones?
A I can only assume this because this had not been exactly expressed in the meantime. I discovered later that the order of the 16th of September had been issued, the order appointing Boehme, and the order for the transfer of the 342nd Division down there.
Q When did you hear about Keitel's order of the 16th of September?
A I cannot state the exact date, but it was at any rate after my return from leave.
Q What impression did you gain on the whole from this conversation with Keitel?
A In general I was very disappointed and had the opinion that he was completely inaccessible.
Q Did you have any other conversations in the O.K.W., any other discussions?
A Not in the O.K.W. itself, but then I went to Generaloberst Halder, chief of the army general staff. I know that he did not have anything to do with the Southeast, but I tried on behalf of Field Marshal List to got some kind of troops from Halder for our area.
Q And what was Halder's reaction to your report?
A Generaloberst Halder was very interested and seemed to be very sympathetic. He then showed me the large map of the Eastern territory of war and said something like that "You see my task now is to prepare for the battle of Wyasma Briansk. I have no more reserves and at the moment I cannot help you and also cannot promise you anything for the next period, but I think that your desire is completely justified."
Q On your return journey to the Southeast did you have any discussions with officers there?
A Yes, on the 26th of September on my return journey I was in Belgrade and then I talked again with Bader, also with Dankelmann and with General Boehme, who in the meantime had got his Belgrad assignment.
Q And what was the subject of the discussions?
A On the whole it was the employment and use of troops at present in Serbia and of those troops which we expected to arrive in Serbia to fight the unrest.
Q What plans were in existence at this time?
AAt that time Boehme planned to mop up the Drina Save bend and afterwards to advance towards the Cer mountains towards the South.
Q And was the evacuation of Sabac mentioned at that time?
A Yes, I heard about Boehme's intention that he wanted to evacuate the population of Sabac.
Q What did you think about that?
A I was rather surprised at the idea and I said to I do not remember whether it was Boehme or the chief of staff - that I had misgivings about it, especially with regard to the difficulties of housing, accomodations and the feeding of the population who should be taken away from this place.
JUDGE CARTER: (Presiding): The Tribunal will recess for fifteen minutes.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 10 minutes after 11:00 o'clock.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed. You may proceeds.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q Witness, before the recess we talked about the evacuation of Sabac and you have said already that you had misgivings in respect to that evacuation. I am asking you now, did Boehme share those misgivings?
A Boehme explained to me that he considered the evacuation necessary in order to keep the rear of the troop clear and he considered the technical misgivings which I had considered, quarters, security, supplies, et cetera, not very material because he thought there would be a solution found.
Q Was there any talk about the institution of collection camps for the population?
A Yes, on a large scale. The installation of a camp for the evacuation of Sabac became necessary and the subject was, of course, touched.
Q Was that installation intended to be of a permanent nature?
A No, it was clearly just a provisional installation.
Q Were further details discussed concerning the treatment of the population?
AAs far as I can recollect, no; we mainly talked of the military employment and of the enemy situation.
Q And what did you talk about with General Bader?
A We discussed the same questions.
Q Did you find out about any opinion contrary to yours?
A I gained the impression that Boehme and Bader were of the same opinion -- that is, basically.
Q Did Dankelmann's opinion change before you had gone on leave you had already gone to see Dankelmann?
A Yes.
Q And who was Dankelmann?
A Dankelmann was the Commander of Serbia.
Q And then when you came back from leave you talked to him again?
A Yes.
Q Had his opinion changed?
A I have to state frankly that I could not make head and tail of Dankelmann's opinions. I could only establish that he was very dissatisfied with the organizational set up which had been reached through Boehme's assignment and I touched upon the question whether it would not be better if he asked for another assignment if he did not consider that solution fortunate.
Q How long did you remain in Belgrade?
A One day.
Q And when did you return to your staff?
A I flew from Belgrade to Athens on the 27th and in the course of the 27th of September I reached my staff. I believe it was in the afternoon.
Q. And what was the opinion you transmitted to your Commander in-Chief?
A. As I recollect, I transmitted to him the impression that one could agree to the employment of forces as Boehme had suggested it, but I believe I also told him that for reasons of organization I did not consider Dankelmann's remaining in his post a very good solution because there might well be tensions.
Q. What did you report to your Commander-in-Chief regarding your representations with Keitel?
A. I am sure I reported to him in detail regarding our whole discussion and that I had the total impression at that time and I believe that I also voiced it, that in view of Keitel's attitude I did not now consider a direct opposition possible any longer. That I instead had gained the impression that through such opposition Hitler would only be moved to an even stronger resistance against our opposition.
Q. Will you please have a look at Exhibit 41? It is contained in Document Book II on page 19 of the German text and page 21 of the English text, Exhibit 41. Did you at that time gain knowledge of that teletype?
A. It was sent out during the time of my furlough and I do not believe I read it at a later date.
Q. Now, Exhibit 42 -- it is in the German document book on page 21 in the German and on page 23 of the English document book. It is an order by the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast dated the 5th of September 1941 and its subject is the suppression of the Serbian insurrection movement.
A. I did not know that directive when it was drafted. That, too, fell into the time of my furlough but I would assume it is certain that I read it after my return.
Q. In this document under the signature we find an initial, "K".
What could that mean?
A. That is the initial of my deputy, Colonel Kuebler.
Q. Now, let's have a look at Exhibit 43. Its on page 23 of the German text and page 27 of the English text.
A. That is the same document as Exhibit 42.
Q. It is the same order, is it?
A. Yes, the same order.
Q. Well, now to Exhibit 45. It is on the German page 30 and on page 34 in the English document book. It is a teletype to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast.
A. I assume that I know that report to the extent to which it did not fall into the time of my furlough.
Q. And then Exhibits 38, 49, and 50 which refer to General Boehme's assignment in Serbia as Plenipotentiary Commanding General.
A. I have already stated that during all those events I was not present. I learned about Boehme's assignment at the OKW through a teletype which was sent to me there by my office and this teletype stated that this assignment had been effected.
Q. Before you had started on your leave, had it been considered that the Armed Forces commander southeast was to apply for Boehme's assignment?
A. No, there had never been any talk about that previously.
Q. Did you know General Boehme previously?
A. I knew Boehme from -- that is, I saw him for the first time after the Greek campaign and in the course of the subsequent months I met him about three or four times. Before that I did not know him.
Q. Exhibit 53 which is on page 52 in the German and 67 of the English document book is the important Keitel order of the 16th of September 1941. It is the order where the ratio of 50 up to 100 to 1 as reprisal measures is contained. When did you gain knowledge of this order for the first time?
A. I can of course, not name the exact date but it was after return from my leave.
Q. When this order came to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast from the OKW and when it was further worked on you were on leave, weren't you?
A. Yes, when the order came in and when it was worked on I was not present at my office.
Q. What was the meaning and significance of this order during the subsequent time?
A. In this order I see the essential basis for all reprisal measures of the subsequent time -- above all, in Serbia, and this order showed, furthermore, all persons who received it very clearly what Hitler's tendency was. It told all persons concerned that even for the most stringent measures of that kind, they could count on the approval of the highest authorities.
Q. Please note particularly figure "2"; Arabic 2. It reads: "The measures taken up to now to counteract this general Communistic insurgent movement have proved themselves to be inadequate. The Fuehrer has now ordered that severest measures are to be employed in order to break down this movement in the shortest time possible. Only in this manner, which has always been applied successfully in the history of the extension of power of great peoples, can quiet be restored." Did that show clearly the opinion of the OKW?
A. I thought of that passage when I mentioned just now that every person who took even the most stringent measures' could count on Hitler's approval and that was Hitler's opinion.
Q. And under paragraph 3-B; the order reads: "In order to stop these insurrections at their inception; the severest measures arc to be applied immediately at the first appearance in order to demonstrate the authority of the occupying power and in order to prevent further progress. One must keep in mind that a human life frequently counts for naught in the affected country."
That, too, complies with the opinion of the OKW, doesn't it, in the way that it was shown in your discussion with Keitel?
A. It does comply in the meaning. Whether these words were actually mentioned, I do not know but the meaning is quite clear.
Q. Was this order issued on the motion of authorities in the Southeast?
A. By no means. I believe that I have already stated that the opinion of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast was contrasting. I want to repeat again we wanted to cope with the situation by reinforcement of troops.
Q. Exhibit 56 contained on page 56 of the German and 71 of the English document book is an order by the Commander Serbia headquarters Staff. The subject is: "Insurgent movement." Did that order become known to you at the time?
A. No, this order, too, falls in the days of my furlough and, furthermore, I do not believe that it reached the Armed Forces Commander Southeast but I do know the contents as such and, above all, I know the directive of the Communist Party for Serbia for band warfare which I mentioned before.
Q. Witness, I will show you a photostatic copy. This is not one of the documents which were submitted by the prosecution but it is a photostat of a document which was amongst the documents that came from Washington. I want to ask you whether this is the directive that you mentioned?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, may I ask that the 24-hour rule be observed with respect to documents which arrived from Washington?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I think probably under the rules that it should.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Your Honors, I am not offering this document as an exhibit but I am just showing this document to the witness and at this point it is not yet an exhibit.
Later on I shall present it in my document book and in all the trials in which I have participated as defense counsel or of which I have read, the prosecutors have during their examination of witnesses, and above all in cross examination, been allowed to submit documents to their witnesses which until that time had not been presented, without showing these documents to the defense beforehand, and objections of the defense regarding these incidents have always been rejected. I am just submitting this to the witness. At present it is not introduced in evidence. All I want to do is for the witness to say whether this is the directive to the Communist Party concerning band warfare and whether, looking at that document, he can remember especially significant passages.
THE PRESIDENT: I think probably you're entitled to identify the document, but after it is offered into evidence or road from, I think the twenty-four-hour rule would apply.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: That is correct.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q. Now then, Witness, will you please restrict yourself to merely telling me whether this is the document that I mentioned and what you can recall by looking at it, but please do not read it aloud.
A. I take it from the title and individual sentences that it is the document mentioned. I believe to be able to take it that these arc the directives of the Communist Party of Serbia for the band warfare which I know at the time. I merely recollect that the document which had been submitted to me at that time was more extensive, but I do find two points here which remind me essentially that it is this document.
Q. Can you take from it that the Communist Party approved of an especially cruel band warfare?
A. I did still recollect that these directivesof the Communist Party for band warfare in their whole tendency relied oh Moscow, and I find here, for instance, one hint, "vengeance for fallen fighters," and I read directives concerning the participation of the population, and I think that is what was meant.
Q. During the further course of events were further such directives issued from the bands?
A. I do not recollect any written directives of that nature, but I do remember rather well that radio Moscow currently mentioned individual partisan operations by giving the names and the localities, which may have been fictional, with an exact description of how these individual sabotage acts -- suprise attacks etc. -- were carried out, and every child could assume from this that this was not the description of an operation which had already taken place, but instead it was clearly a directive of how such a plan was to be carried out.
That is, it was an instructional radio transmission for partisan candidates, if I may put it that way.
Q. Would you like to look at Exhibit 59? It's on page 63 of the German and Page 79 of the English. Those are reports by the Commander of Serbia. Did you gain any knowledge of those?
A. I knew those reports, as can be seen from my initials on some of these reports, but essentially they arc repetitions of reports such as are contained at the beginning of this document book and contained repeatedly in other documents. They are not individual reports.
Q. Are the reports contained there those which came in during September?
A. Yes, the report here as of the 4th of September on Page 76 of the German document book--that one I do not know because it came during the days of my leave.
Q. Now, to Exhibit 61. It's on Page 82 of the German and Page 103 of the English. This is an order by the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia concerning the evacuation of Sabac. Was this order known to you?
A. Whether I read the text of this order upon my return I cannot say any more today, but the fact of the evacuation of Sabac was known to me, as I have explained before when talking about the discussions in Belgrade.
Q. Then, let's go to Exhibit 69. It's on Page 104 of the German and Page 13 of the English document book. This is an order by OKW, dated the 28th of September 1941, and it refers to the taking of hostages. Who passed this OKW order on to the subordinate offices?
A. After verbal report to the Commander-in-Chief, this order was passed on with my signature.
Q. That is your signature then on Page 2 of the document?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. Does it comply with military procedure that such orders before they were passed on were signed by tho Chief?
A. If the Commander-in-Chief had no additions to make or no directives for the execution the passing on was merely a matter of routine and could, therefore, be signed by the Chief.
Q. In this order Keitel, on behalf of the OKW, orders that the military Commanders have to have always at their disposal a number of hostages of different political shades, and he says according to the attitude of the perpetrators -- whether he is a Nationalist, a Democratic middle class, or a Communist. In case of attack hostages of the group corresponding to that to which the culprit belonged are to be shot. What was your attitude to this order?
A. I had no nisgivings concerning the passing on of this order, quite apart from tho fact that I could not have prevented a passing on of the order had I wanted to.
Q. If that order had not been issued by the OKW but insteand of that by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast himself, would you have signed then too?
A. No, in that case it would have been a directive or an order of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. Then, I would not have been allowed to sign that, but only the Commander-in-Chief would have been in a position to sign it because of its fundamental nature. However, this was not an order of the Wehrmacht Commander. It was an order by the OKW.
Q. Now, to Exhibit 70. It's on Page 108 of the German and Page 114 of the English text. This order deals with the treatment of the male population in the territories that had been mopped up. What caused this order?
A. The necessity for such a regulation was obvious, but maybe my discussion with Boehme concerning this question might have played a certain part when this order was drafted, because it was issued shortly after my return on the 4th of October.
It appears to be necessary to establish peace and order in these mopped-up, territories.
Q. In Exhibit 71 on Page 110 of the German and Page 133 of the English text there is some talk about a concentration camp by the name of Sasavica. Did you know of the establishment of that camp at that time?
A. No, this camp and also the name were not know to me.
Q. Exhibit 72 on Page 112 of the German and Page 146 of the English text is a communication from the Chief of the Security Police and the SD. A number of band attacks are reported here. Was that an exceptionally large number? Did you know the document?
A. Yes, I have it here. After all there were in one week 46 dead, 35 wounded, and 63 missing, on our part and amongst them there were 19 civilians who were killed, and 12 civilians who had been kidnapped. There wore 35 attacks in one week on railway installations and 46 attacks on communities in one week. There wore 21 attacks on bridges and ships. That is a very high number of attacks, but unfortunately normal considering the situation at that time.
Q. Witness, let us just briefly return to the order for the taking of hostages. That is Exhibit 69. It's on Page 104 of the German text and Page 138 of the English document book. You said you had no misgivings in passing on that order. To make it quite clear, did you have misgivings against taking hostages at all?
A. No.
Q. Were you of the opinion that one was permitted to take hostages and that it was customary in the usages of war to take hostages?
A. Yes, that had been established and laid down.
Q. And what was your attitude to the fact that the OKW recommended the taking of hostages from certain groups, that is, from Nationalist, Democratic Diddle class, and Communist groups?