Q: Witness, do you need the original?
A: No; I have here a copy of the original.
Q: Then what can you tell us in addition to this? It is page 12 in the English document book.
A: In daily report of the 7th of the 8th, there is missing for instance, on the 7th of the 8th, a Wehrmacht automobile found shot up on the road near Werdice, two soldiers wounded and at Uzice, four telephone lines destroyed by sabotage."
Then in the next report of the 10th of the 8th, there is missing for example, "attacks on gendarmerie stations, goods train shot at near Milanovac, the brakeman dead and the stoker seriously wounded."
Then in the report of the 13th of the 8th, for instance, the following is missing: "13th of the 8th, Morning, 2 Wehrmacht trucks south of Topola attacked by 60 bandits. Two soldiers killed, one wounded. Trucks blown up at station Markovac. Cash box robbed at the station. Attack on mines near Misacia. In the sector Stalac-Nish, an engine blown up by explosives. Large fire in the district of Petrograd because of arson. 40 to 50 Zoch (German measurement) of wheat burnt.
Then in a report of the 14th of the 8th, the following is missing". Guards near Krupanj attacked. Cable troops attacked by bandits near Kraljevo. Two soldiers dead, two wounded. Railway bridge damaged, two rail stations and five community offices attacked."
On the 15th of the 8th, the following missing -- cable repair troops shot at, munition train attacked.
Five soldiers dead, seven wounded. An ammunition train derailed because of sabotage. Two gendarmerie stations attacked. Four bandit attacks on communities."
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I am not sure whether General Foertsch is testifying to this from his own memory now or whether he is reading sections from the report. I would think that the best evidence on this point is the reports themselves.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I think these exhibits have been read into the evidence once and the Tribunal has the exhibits here. It seems to me we don't need to read them all into the record again. Cannot the witness tell what he understands about them without the necessity of doing that again?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: These passages are not contained in the records. Those are exactly the passages which were omitted by the prosecution in their document book, At least, I haven't got them in the German document book. They are being read from the original and are to show the incompleteness of the prosecution's document book and how they have omitted exactly those passages which would support the evidence of the defense and that is why they are being read now.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I would think the way to do that, your Honor, would be to have the missing excerpts put in the defense document book on behalf of Foertsch rather than to have him read these passages himself now.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I think if you are going into matters that were not put into evidence by the prosecution, you have a right to proceed.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Witness, you have given a large number of examples fro the omissions in the prosecution document book and I will present the other omissions in a supplement to the document book.
JUDGE BURKE: I wonder if you understood the ruling of the Tribunal?
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: I think I understood correctly. I was allowed to continue reading the passages which the prosecution omitted but the ones which have been read seem to be sufficient to me and I will bring the rest as a document. But if the Tribunal wishes to hear them to the end, then we can continue.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Your understanding, is correct. You may proceed.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q: Witness, we will Just take perhaps two more examples because they have some connection with the next question. You were talking about the report of the 14th of the 8th.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal seems to be divided on what you understand what the nature of the ruling was. The ruling was that if you were offering parts of exhibits that had not previously been put in evidence, you had a right to proceed and do so if you cared to. If you want to put them in another document book that is your option.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q: Witness, the report of the 16th of the 8th, Exhibit 39, what is missing from this report in the prosecution document book?
A: The part about the political situation in the Serbian sphere in which it says, amongst other things, the situation further tense, terror and sabotage acts, presumably carried out according to plan, also directed against the Wehrmacht.
Recently also terrorization of the population. The bulk of the population itself is suffering severely under terror acts and in general remains loyal."
Q: And then from the 17th of the 8th -
A: 17th --.
Q: Well perhaps we will go through to the 25th and that would be sufficient examples.
A: From the 16th of the 8th, in the daily report, "German guard shot at. No losses. Wehrmacht lorry shot at by machine guns. No losses. Three Wehrmacht vehicles shot at by machine guns near Topola. One paymaster dead. Small railway line destroyed, train derailed and shot at. One wounded. Sabotage at telephone line near Nish. Tunnel explosion in the railway line west of Potsega. Railway bridge blown up at Zagilga. And in another place, grain stores and dairy destroyed by fire.
On the 17th of the 8th "Railway Lakovac attacked. 5 soldiers dead. 3 wounded. Near Jagedina one man from the organization Todt found shot dead. Leave train shot at by machine guns. Explosive attack on a tunnel. Farm burnt down probably by arson. Band attacks on 5 community offices."
On the 18th of the 8th, "Bicycle patrol attacked by Communists. One soldier dead, 2 wounded. German car shot at near Topola. One wounded. 3 German lorries shot at by Communists near Skela. One German dead. 2 Serbian gendarmes wounded. Attacks of heavily armed band on lorries belonging to organization Todt. 2 dead, one wounded. Railway bridge blown up. Band attacks on 4 railway stations."
And then for example on the 22nd of the 8th, shooting on German Battalion East of Topola. Attack on factories, 3 soldiers dead, one wounded. A pursuit detachment shot at from ambush. At a mine, the miners did not come to work because of danger from bandits.
on 23 and 24 of the 8th, again "shooting up of German vehicles; blowing up of a road bridge. Blowing up of a railroad line. Attack on 3 railway stations. Telephone lines destroyed."
Q I think that those are sufficient examples. In this compilation of reports in Exhibit 39 a number of reprisal measures are mentioned, and I now ask you were these reprisal measures carried out according to an order of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A No. I think I said already previously that these reprisal measures were in principle ordered by Hitler. And that the OKW again and again exercised pressure with regard to the carrying out of these measures. The individual reprisal measures could only be ordered by those officers who could check the individual case and had the corresponding insight into it. Because of the large area this couldn't be done by the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast.
Q Well, now, something else, witness, did you ever think during that period about the effect which it would have if because of the insurrection movement the army did not held the positions in the Southeast?
A Those were cur daily worries. We realized completely that on the whole even at the end of the actual fighting the importance of the Southeastern theatre of war had remained the same as before. As I said recently, as the large Southern flank for the Russian theatre of war, as a road to Africa, and as an airbase for the air operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Q And then what did you think was necessary in order not to have the situation in the Balkans endangered by the insurgents; you have already briefly referred to this before on Friday?
A The Wehrmacht commander Southeast was principally of the opinion that the combatting of the insurgents should if possible be carried out at once by military means.
Q Did you think it also possible that by increasing the troops reprisal measures would be quite superfluous?
A No, it wasn't as simple as that. The reprisal measures remained dependent entirely on the attitude of the population. By increasing the troops we wanted to insure that the insurgents would be crushed from the very beginning, and we also wanted to achieve by this that the mopped up and pacified districts could be occupied as far as possible. We could then hope that the population would not be so easy to win for illegal actions, and now seeing their peaceful attitude the occupation troops would no longer be forced to take reprisal measures.
Q And did one take reprisal measures because one had too few troops?
A No. I just said that the reprisal measures dependent alone on the attitude of the population, but even if there had been more troops individual sabotage acts or other senseless actions of an instigated population could possibly have occurred which asked for reprisal measures.
Q And then do I assume correctly from this that you are of the opinion that retaliation measures under certain circumstances are unavoidable with no regards as to the equipment and strength of the own troops?
A Yes, that is correct. That was my opinion. And it is subsstantiated by two facts, which do not concern the Southeast area, however -first of all by the fact that in May 1945 in Berlin retaliation measures were threatened in case of attacks on Russian soldiers, and where it is stated that apart from the perpetrators as a rule 50 Nazies will have to pay with their lives for the attack on one Russian soldier. And another case I know that in the agreement between the Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces, General Eisenhower and Marshal Bedoglio at the end of September 1943, there was one provision which stated that the allies resolved themselves the right if the agreement was violated to carry out special measures among other things occupation of other territories, but also punishment, for instance punishment actions carried out by aircraft and other measures. And I think that both occupation troops, the Russians in Berlin in 1943, and as well as the Allies in 1943 in Italy were not weak as regards their numerical strength.
Q Do you know whether the measures so threatened by the Americans and by the Russians were carried out?
A I hope that it hadn't been necessary, and I think that the population of these two civilized nations had enough understanding to realize their duty towards the occupation powers and not to cause the respective Commander in Chief so much trouble as the population in the Southeast caused us.
Q Now, I come back again to the measures which you took to combat the insurgents which you thought were correct. We talked already about the military fighting and the strengthening of the occupation to combat the insurgents; in the political and economical sphere did you see any possibilities there to quell the insurgents?
A Yes. The Armed Forces Commander and later on the Commander in Chief Southeast frequently in memoranda and reports tried to transform the preconditions which partly were responsible for the development of the restlessness among the population.
He made proposals for the adjustment of frontiers. He frequently attempted to mitigate the inner political conditions in Croatia, and to give the newly created Serbia clarity with regard to its political future. Later on we proposed that Montenegro should be incorporated into Serbia. And then here the very intensive fighting against individual diplomats, especially against Envoy Kasche in Zagreb should be mentioned. Economically, I would like to state the following: The attempts of the Supreme Military Quarters in the Southeast to leave as many of the products in the land , to exercise a little pressure in the restoration and modernization of the factories and mines, and to give as many workers as possible wages and food. Then these are the permanent efforts to improve the railroad situation. Propaganda measures also interested us very much, and this, of course, was principally in the Southeast,to get rid of the centralized ideas which they had in Berlin, where it was thought that the whole of Europe could be worked from one single propaganda drum beat. We were of the opinion that here the possibilities of the area had to be taken into account and of course these are the examples for such action.
Q And were all these possibilities within your sphere of power?
A No, unfortunately not. They were essentially political decisions, which we could not make ourselves. We could only request them.
Q And now within your small possibilities did you try to make things easier in the country economically?
AAs far as we could do it ourselves, of course we did it.
Q We now come back to the retaliation measures; Witness, in the period about which we are speaking, that is the autumn of 1941, were definite quotas already ordered for retaliation measures and by whom?
A No, before the 16th of September no ratios were ordered.
Q And what did yourself thing about the fixing of definite ratios?
A My personal opinion was the following: it might be expedient for definite districts and for limited periods that such ratios should be fixed principally as a warning for the population, but as I have already stated, it is necessary that every individual retaliation measure should be checked according to the circumstances and a decision taken corresponding to the case.
Q And did your Commanders in Chief order definite ratios?
A No. As long as I was Chief of Staff in the Southeast, my Commanders in Chief never ordered definite ratios.
Q Witness, in military language at that time, what was understood by the term "Communists?"
A Communist Partisans.
Q And how was this interpretation arrived at?
AAt that time we knew about a directive of the Communist Party in Serbia for combatting the bands, this directive contained measures and provisions for the members of Communists Party in Serbia for such band fighting.
Q Witness, it is reported in many reports that Jews were shot as hostage; what consideration were taken into account here for the fact that Jews were especially considered for hostages?
A I remember that from the reports, principally in Serbia, it was frequently seen that Jewish circles were behind the insurgent movement through intellectual support financial support and ether kinds of help.
Q In the Southeast was there a Jewish extermination program?
A I never heard about such a program.
Q And what was your own attitude towards the Jewish problem?
A I myself was never an anti-semite, and thought that the persecution of the Jews was, I would like to say, indecent and also stupid from a political point of view. I would like perhaps to add that in Greece there was no question at all of any kind of retaliation measures against the Jews. A sign that whatever was undertaken there was only undertaken if there was a reason for it.
Q The morning report of 16 August 1941, page 8 of the German Document Book, Exhibit 39, contains a judgment of the political situation within the sphere of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. who made out this judgments?
A It certainly is a compilation of the various reports from the various districts.
Q Did this judgment express your own opinion?
A My personal opinion?
Q Yes. On page 9 it states, bulk of the population itself suffered severely under the terror acts and remains on the whole loyal, "and then at the top there is mention of the band activity, which states "Recently also terrorization of the population." And later on, "Fertile grounds here also for mass expulsion of Serbs from Croatia, amongst other things,"
A I think that the description of the situation as it is set down here, certainly conforms with the situation at that time, but with regard to your question about my own opinions being set down, I can state that my own opinion only had any effect at all until that moment when it was submitted to the Commander in Chief, when he decided about it or approved it.
I must say from then on I didn't have any chance to express my own opinion.
Q Witness from the testimony of Field Marshal List; it was seen that the greater part of the acts as set down in Exhibit 1939 took place while he was on leave; can you toll us approximately when Field Marshal List was on leave at that time?
A I think ho was absent from the 21st or the 22nd of July until the 23rd or 24th of August.
Q And who was his deputy while he was on leave?
A The deputy was General Felmy.
Q And by whom was General Felmy appointed?
A That happened on the proposal of Field Marshal List through the O.K.W.
Q And did General Felmy also carry out his other tasks while he was deputizing?
A Yes.
Q During the time he was deputizing did anything change with regard to the leadership and administration of the Wehrmacht commander southeast as compared with the previous period?
A In principle no; in office and technical matters however, but in principle no.
Q During this period were any kind of fundamental orders issued with regard to the Southeast, which had any great effect in the Southeast, especially in Serbia?
A From the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, as far as I can remember no. From the O.K.W., it is quite possible because from there pressure and warnings etc. came all the time.
Q Was General Felmy limited at all in his influence as deputy?
A Yes, of course by the fact that he had the same rank as the other commanders and then by the fact that he was only deputizing during leave, also by the fact that there was the general reserve of a deputy used in such circumstances.
Q You have already stated that Field Marshal List returned approximately on the 24th of August; did Field Marshal List before his return find out about at headquarters the conditions in Serbia and about the events which took place?
A Yes, on his return journey he was in Belgrade and there he heard all about the situation.
Q And what was the situation when he returned?
A The situation had become considerable more aggravated.
Q In this respect to what extent?
A To the extent that at the end of August one could already speak about the beginning of a certain insurgent movement.
Q And then what did the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast decide by reason of this aggravated situation in Serbia?
A One came to the clear realization that the means which had been used up to then were no longer sufficient.
Q And what measures had been taken up to then in order to combat the bands?
A On the whole it was loft to the initiative of the Wehrmacht Commander in Serbia. As we can see from these reports which we have just read, they were essentially police actions, and then there was the employment of the troops by the small so-called "Jagdkommandos."
Q To what decision did the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast come to by reason of the aggravation of the situation?
A He then decided that stronger troops should now be employed there in order to light the sources and area of the insurgents militarily.
Q And were there differences of opinion in the military quarters in the Southeast?
A Yes, between the views of the Commander of Serbia, General Dahkelmann at that time, and the views of the Commanding General of the 65th Corps, General Bader.
Q And what were these differences?
A General Dankelmann thought that police action was most necessary and wanted to use more Serbia forces. General Bader thought that this police action would not be sufficient; and was also of the opinion that stronger military forces had to intervene.
He also mistrusted Dankelmann's idea that Serbian forces could really achieve anything here.
Q And then how were Dankelmann's ideas regarded by the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A The Wehrmacht Commander Southeast agreed with the opinions of Bader.
Q And then what did the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast do in order to carry out the measures which you previously stated and which you thought were correct?
A He kept on asking for troops from the OKW.
Q And did you yourself ever acquaint yourself with the situation in Belgrade?
A Yes, from the beginning of September until the end of September I was on leave, and on my way out I received the commission from Field Marshal List to find out in Belgrade about the whole situation and to tell him about my impressions. In addition I also received the commission if possible at the beginning of my leave, to talk with the OKW and there to submit orally the estimate of the situation, which was already known through the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast.
Q And with whom did you speak in Belgrade?
A In Belgrade I spoke to General Dankelmann the Commander of Serbia and with General Bader, the Commanding General of the 65th Corps.
Q And what judgment did you come to by reason of these discussions?
A The one I have already described. The view that here there were differences of opinion and General Bader's opinion seemed to me to be the correct one.
Q Did you find anything else out in Belgrade?
A Yes, I had to get some kind of an idea about the prospects of Dankelmann's newly-formed government Nedic.
Q And what judgment did you arrive then?
A Of course, it was very difficult for me in one single day to get some kind of an idea of the prospects of the Nedic government and by reason of conversations with Dankelmann, Bader and their chiefs, I tried to do this, I then came to the opinion that such an attempt had to be undertaken by a government represented by Nedic.
I would like to say a peaceful means for the pacification of the country should be used.
Q You said previously that you also had to talk to Field Marshal Keitel at that time; who was he at that time?
A He was the chief of the O.K.W.
Q And when did you speak to Keitel?
A On either the 2nd or 3rd of September I came home and phoned the O.K.W. and asked that I be allowed to report at once, this was rejected. Then a few days after I tried again and asked that I should be allowed to come, but again it was not suitable. I don't know the reasons for that, but actually along about the 20th of September I went to Keitel in East Prussia in the Fuehrer's headquarters.
Q And then what did you report to Keitel?
AAt that time I told Keitel Field Marshal List's views, as I have shortly described before. Of course I cannot remember the text anymore, but the total contents of this report remains very clear in my memory because I only reported twice during my Southeastern period to Keitel and both of these were unfortunately without success.
Q Did you object against the view that the pacification of the country could be carried out by so-called terror measures?
A That is just what I wanted to say. The most essential part of the report was banally spoken it can't be done as you want it to be done, it can only be done through the adequate employment of adequately strong troops. I would like to say the following here, I only spoke for about five or six minutes at the most and then I told how the situation was with us. Then Keitel said to me, "That in individual cases perhaps you can see better than we see here, but on the whole we are right. That is what I want to explain to you and please tell that to your Commander in Chief." Then I must have looked at him rather incredulously because he said to me, "You don't seem to be very convinced." Whereupon I said to him, "No", and I wanted to try again to present our point of view, thereupon I was interrupted in a very unfriendly manner and the discussion closed by Keitel saying to me, "I already know the views of your Field Marshal, because I still remember this rather unkind teletype in which he asks that the responsibility should be left to him to take the steps which he thinks are necessary.
I should just tell my Commander-in-Chief that his responsibility lies in obedience and for what had been ordered, - I don't remember now whether he said the Fuehrer or the O.K.W. would take the full responsibility. This was the rather abrupt end of this approximately half hour discussion.
Q To what measures or what orders did Keitel refer when he said that the Fuehrer's or the O.K.W.'s orders be the only right ones?
A I can only assume this because this had not been exactly expressed in the meantime. I discovered later that the order of the 16th of September had been issued, the order appointing Boehme, and the order for the transfer of the 342nd Division down there.
Q When did you hear about Keitel's order of the 16th of September?
A I cannot state the exact date, but it was at any rate after my return from leave.
Q What impression did you gain on the whole from this conversation with Keitel?
A In general I was very disappointed and had the opinion that he was completely inaccessible.
Q Did you have any other conversations in the O.K.W., any other discussions?
A Not in the O.K.W. itself, but then I went to Generaloberst Halder, chief of the army general staff. I know that he did not have anything to do with the Southeast, but I tried on behalf of Field Marshal List to got some kind of troops from Halder for our area.
Q And what was Halder's reaction to your report?
A Generaloberst Halder was very interested and seemed to be very sympathetic. He then showed me the large map of the Eastern territory of war and said something like that "You see my task now is to prepare for the battle of Wyasma Briansk. I have no more reserves and at the moment I cannot help you and also cannot promise you anything for the next period, but I think that your desire is completely justified."
Q On your return journey to the Southeast did you have any discussions with officers there?
A Yes, on the 26th of September on my return journey I was in Belgrade and then I talked again with Bader, also with Dankelmann and with General Boehme, who in the meantime had got his Belgrad assignment.
Q And what was the subject of the discussions?
A On the whole it was the employment and use of troops at present in Serbia and of those troops which we expected to arrive in Serbia to fight the unrest.
Q What plans were in existence at this time?
AAt that time Boehme planned to mop up the Drina Save bend and afterwards to advance towards the Cer mountains towards the South.
Q And was the evacuation of Sabac mentioned at that time?
A Yes, I heard about Boehme's intention that he wanted to evacuate the population of Sabac.
Q What did you think about that?
A I was rather surprised at the idea and I said to I do not remember whether it was Boehme or the chief of staff - that I had misgivings about it, especially with regard to the difficulties of housing, accomodations and the feeding of the population who should be taken away from this place.
JUDGE CARTER: (Presiding): The Tribunal will recess for fifteen minutes.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 10 minutes after 11:00 o'clock.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed. You may proceeds.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
Q Witness, before the recess we talked about the evacuation of Sabac and you have said already that you had misgivings in respect to that evacuation. I am asking you now, did Boehme share those misgivings?
A Boehme explained to me that he considered the evacuation necessary in order to keep the rear of the troop clear and he considered the technical misgivings which I had considered, quarters, security, supplies, et cetera, not very material because he thought there would be a solution found.
Q Was there any talk about the institution of collection camps for the population?
A Yes, on a large scale. The installation of a camp for the evacuation of Sabac became necessary and the subject was, of course, touched.
Q Was that installation intended to be of a permanent nature?
A No, it was clearly just a provisional installation.
Q Were further details discussed concerning the treatment of the population?
AAs far as I can recollect, no; we mainly talked of the military employment and of the enemy situation.
Q And what did you talk about with General Bader?
A We discussed the same questions.
Q Did you find out about any opinion contrary to yours?
A I gained the impression that Boehme and Bader were of the same opinion -- that is, basically.
Q Did Dankelmann's opinion change before you had gone on leave you had already gone to see Dankelmann?
A Yes.
Q And who was Dankelmann?
A Dankelmann was the Commander of Serbia.