A News regarding executions which had been carried out?
Q News regarding at least an order by Col. Wurster to Pongruber to continue with the executions.
A I can only explain this paragraph as follows. I assume that my commander -- that is the Commander of the Second Battalion of the Signal Regiment -- made representations to Col. Wurster as Chief of the Signal Regiment and gave his reasons. I further assume that in the course of this discussion, our Battalion was released from further executions and that in the course of this discussion the Signal Chief mentioned that the Corps Signal Battalion would have to continue. Otherwise, I could not explain this matter.
I don't assume that we got a written order to stop executions with the message that somebody else would have to take over the executions. On the strength of my experiences, I take it that such things are discussed and dealt within discussions between commanders. As I said, this is just an assumption which I now, after having read this, take as explanation for the version of this letter.
Q You yourself feel a little bit unclear about the matter of further executions? After six years?
A No.
Q You know nothing about the order by Col. Wurster to Pongruber to continue with the executions, did you?
A I must have known it because I assume that I saw it from this letter as a report from this battalion.
Q Now that you have seen this, does it refresh your recollection as to what happened in the matter of further executions?
A This letter only says that Major Pongruber had received the order.
Q Now I am asking you whether you can now recall, after six years, whether any further executions were carried out by Pongruber?
A I cannot say that.
Q As far as you know, only about four or five hundred persons were executed?
A Yes, as far as I remember, that number is correct, because I remember the figures of two executions and I remember the figure of four to seven hundred -- that is to say executed by our Battalion by our units.
Q Did the interpreter -- did you mean four to seven hundred or four to five hundred?
THE INTERPRETER: Four to seven hundred.
THE WITNESS: Five hundred.
THE INTERPRETER: Five hundred -- that is what the witness said.
Q Did you ever receive information from the Pongruber with regard to the executions he carried out in compliance with Wurster's order?
A I can't say that. It is not to be assumed because there is no relationship of dependence between us because if the Battalion of Pongruber had continued with its executions, it would not have been obliged to tell us about that.
Q I thought perhaps as your Battalion Commander you got the order from Wurster to Pongruber; perhaps he also had knowledge of the report from Pongruber to Wurster regarding the further executions?
A If the Battalion Pongruber executed, it made corresponding reports to Col.
Wurster as we did, but that again is only an assumption.
Q. Would you or would you not have gathered information regarding Pongruber's executions? You got knowledge of an order from Wurster to Pongruber; could you also have gotten knowledge of a report from Pongruber to Wurster?
A. I have already said I cannot say that whether the commander got most of these. I don't know personally. I don't remember.
Q. Will you look at the last page of that document, Mr. Krage, it is page 7 of the English, page 5 of the German Document Book. This is a report from First Lieutenant Liepe. I think you already identified him as the commander of the Second Company of your Battalion?
A. The Third Company.
Q. The third Company, thank you. This report of Lt. Liepe again talks about the shooting of Jews on the 9th and 11th; did you ever see Lt. Liepe's report?
A. Yes, I believe that this is the report which I have just mentioned in passing. I take from the version of this report of Lt. Liepe which only mentions Jews, that also the report of the Battalion did only mention Jews.
Q. Do you believe that Liepe's report when it talks about Jews means captured Partisans who also happened to be Jews?
A. Yes, I must assume it.
Q. Now, will you look at paragraph two of Hope's report, which bears you out, Mr. Krage, that two officers and 20 men were killed, that 16 were missing and three were wounded?
A. Yes.
Q. You have a very good memory for figures?
A. I have already stated that of course I know the number of the dead with great certainty, because this incident was rather unique. I also know that the number of the wounded was only very small. Along them was Kerbler, who has been mentioned before, and the last number, that again I was trying to explain, can be figured out when adding the strength of the platoon of the Usce, these platoons usually had the strength of about five or six persons to the remaining number of people who escaped at Topola.
The people missing I thus figured to be about 15 or 16.
Q. Do you also remember the uniqueness of the number of people killed in retaliation for the death of these German soldiers?
A. I have already stated it, giving the figure of between 400 and 500. Naturally, I remember the figure of my own comrades more accurately and I think this is quite comprehensible.
Q. Now, will you turn to page 5 of that document, page 9 of the English, page 7 of the German Document Book. Will you notice the second paragraph of that page of Liepe's report. Here he talks about shooting of 180 men on 9 October, and in this paragraph he states that another shooting took place October 11. That it went according to plan, and that 269 men were shot. From Liepe's figures it appears that the total of 449 persons were shot.
Continuing with his report he states: "No prisoner escaped in either shooting and the unit had no special events and occurrences to report. A platoon of the unit of Major Pongruber under command of 2nd Lt. Hau was employed for strengthening the security." Do you recall whether in addition to the two companies of your Battalion which participated in the execution, that there was also a platoon of Major Pongruber detailed to the execution spot?
A. I wouldn't have remembered it if I hadn't read it just now.
Q. Do you remember it now that you have read it?
A. Yes, I assume that I read this report, because such a report must have passed through my hands, but Lt. Hau is personally unknown to me, and it is of course possible that at this opportunity he was used for security purposes.
Q. Now, that you have read this, does it refresh your recollection regarding the details of this execution; can you say now that you remember that in 1941 in October a platoon of Major Pongruber was attached to the execution squads of the two companies for security purposes?
A. If that is contained in the document I take it to be a natter of course that it happened in this manner.
Q. Now, will you continue with the report, page 10 of the English and page 8 of the German Document Book: "Altogether 449 men were shot on the 9th and 11th of October 1941 by the units named." Now, will you note the last paragraph, Mr. Krage:
"Unfortunately, an additional shooting by the units named had to be stopped on account of commitment and a transfer of the mission to the unit of Major Pongruber resulted."
Do you remember now whether Pongruber actually carried out the mission of continuing the execution of the 2100 Serba which General Boehme had previously ordered?
A. I must stick to my statement that I did not gain any knowledge of the fact that the executions of 2200 persons had been carried out.
Q. You can't say whether or not Major Pongruber carried out further executions, you do not know?
A. It is possible, but I don't know it.
Q. I just want to show you one more document, Mr. Krage, this is NO. 3402 -- I don't seem to have that document, so we will pass by it, Mr. Krage.
JUDGE CARDER: That is Exhibit 83 in Book 3, isn't it?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I wanted to show the witness the actual photostat copy. Perhaps Dr. Laternser wouldn't mind if I submit the witness the German Document Book. It is on page 9 of the German Document Book. Supposing you show the witness. Dr. Laternser, I wonder if I could borrow your German Document Book III to show the witness this particular exhibit?
Q. Mr. Klage, will you turn to page 15 in that document book. Mr. Klage, this is a report of the Chief of Security Police in the SD, dated Berlin, 21 October 1941. I don't suppose you have ever seen this particular report. Will you turn to Paragraph 3-b) of the report which is on page 16 of the German Document Book. First, do you know whether an SD unit was operating near Topola, near your unit, in October 1941?
A. A field Police unit?
DR. LATERNSER: The prosecution has just asked concerning an SD unit. That was translated as Field Police.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it correct?
Q. My question is, your Honor, Mr. Krage do you know whether an SD unit was operating near Topola, near your unit in Serbia, in October 1941?
A. I didn't know anything of a SD unit near Topola. I only know that in Belgrade the SD was employed, but I don't know anything of a unit near Topola.
Q. This particular report of the Chief of the Security Police in the SD says in par. 3 b), under Special Events, that General Boehme's order, according to which 100 Serbs will be executed for every soldier killed and 50 for every soldier wounded, has established a completely clear routine for action. Do you remember ever receiving a 100: 1 and 50 to one order of General Boehme?
A. I remember an order to this effect, but I believe it originated from the OKW, and not from General Boehme.
That was a fundamental order.
Q General Boehme could have passed that order down to your Regiment and Battalion, could he not?
A Yes, I remember this OKW order.
Q And this particular SD report does on to say, "On the strength of this order, for instance, 2200 Serbs and Jews were shot in reprisal for an attack on a convoy near Ropola, during which 22 members of the Wehrmacht perished."
A I can only say what I have already stated, the number of executions carried out by us, that is by the company concerned, was between 400 and 500. Other units must have carried out executions, but I don't remember that.
Q Mr. Krage, there were 22 soldiers killed in the attach on Topola
A Yes, and 16 missing.
Q If we add these two figures we get 38, and you recall that the number of persons actually executed by the two companies involved was in the neighborhood of 400 to 500, that would mean a ratio of 10 to one. Did you ever receive an order to execute at the ratio of 10 to one in reprisal for the Topola action?
A I can only remember that the orders which were received by the troops regarding the reprisal measures became more and more aggravated in the same ratio as the sabotage acts and attacks from ambush increased. Whether initially there was an order of one to 10 I really cannot say now, but I certainly remember the order of one to 100, because of its extreme severity and because we later were affected by it ourselves.
Q Did you ever feel as a soldier or Battalion Adjutant that the orders which you were receiving from your superiors and which you had the duty to pass on to your subordinated were brutalizing the common German soldier?
A I believe it was rather the opposite. I would ask you to remember that the troops when the campaign was finished, as members of the occupational force, were understandably excited and agitated and embittered when they saw that again and again their comrades were murdered or killed in this way outside of acts of War.
I have not gained the impression that such orders, especially not in the case of such a unit as a signal unit was, had in any way led to a brutalization, as you have called it. I would further like to consider that the individual soldier did not have the right in any way to become active in order to carry out a reprisal action. The individual soldier could only become active on orders, and in our case it was like this, that none of those who actually took part in the offense were caught in the act, so that it could not come to brutal measures in flagranti, so to speak. I rather believe that the troops when they heard of this order of one to 100 were not waiting to see high figures of executions, but they rather hoped that such a deterent order would finally accomplish what military actions could not accomplish in the Balkans -- everybody who knows the Balkans will confirm this -- expecially not with the troops who were at the disposal of the German military leaders at that time. That is how I can answer this question.
Q Some of the orders which you received from your superior officers were so harsh and severe that your troops refused to carry them out. I am thinking now of your statement that the troops were not fit psychologically to carry out the execution as it had been ordered by General Boehme, the execution of 2100 Serbs?
A The term rebellion is not correct. I tried previously to explain it like that. I said that all members of the execution squads, until that time, had hardly ever been used in actual combat, they had only fulfilled their signal tasks. Almost none of them did ever fire a shot at the enemy. That such an experience, that is to say the execution of a great number of human brings who had after all not harmed any of the members of the execution squad, apart from the fact that they, or rather their countrymen, had killed the comrades of these executioners.
This experience was, of course, inclined to produce certain mental effects. I therefore assume that one or another member of this squad asked the Chief of the company to Let him off from the next execution, because of the reasons which I have just mentioned.
But since it was not possible for all of them I assume that on the basis of this experience the company leader made representations in the way I have just described and that then the employment reasons were added to this, and finally gave cause to discontinue the executions at least the executions of our units.
Q Did the fact that the troops did not like to execute large numbers of innocent persons play any part in the psychology with which they treated their victims as members of execution details?
A That I cannot say, since I myself did not take part. I can only try to place myself into the soul of the person who was completely ignorant as to combat, and with regard to the killing of a person. I can only try to imagine what his mental reactions were. Not the idea that the shooting of hostages is something unjust in itself, but merely the mental shock connected with these executions was the reason why the executions were discontinued.
Q Don't you feel, Mr. Krage, that this particular order of General Boehme to execute 2100 Serbs and the 100 to one order which you received through channels, was intended to terriroze the Serbian population?
A No, on the contrary I assume that the reason for this order was that seeing that military orders had not been a success intimidation of the population was to prevent the population from attacking the supplies and military.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Thank you, Mr. Krage. No further questions, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any redirect examination?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q The victims of the attack, the German victims of this attack, all originated from the third and fourth Company of your Battalion?
A Yes, they were all members of these two companies.
Q This Battalion Pongruber, which has been mentioned here, did it suffer any losses?
A Not that I know of.
Q Then let us assume that the Battalion Pongruber had continued with those executions; would your Battalion then have been informed of the continuation of the executions since the victims were members of these companies?
A I can only say that there was no official cause for this, because there was no relationship of subordination or the relationship of a parallel nature did not exist.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions then.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any further questions on the part of any of defense counsel?
Judge Carter wishes to interrogate the witness.
EXAMINATION BY JUDGE CARTER:
Q. Mr. Witness, you said that this attack on the German troops took place at Topola.
A. Yes. Not in Topola but, as far as I remember, in a small village south of Topola.
Q. And how far was it from Belgrade?
A. I guess the distance from Belgrade to Topola is between fifteen and twenty kilometers, and the place of the attack was, as far as I remember -- I don't know exactly; I just guess -- was probably ten kilometers south of Topola.
Q. How far is it from Topola to Sabac?
A. Well, from Topola to Sabac, as far as I remember, -- Sabac is west of Belgrade, possibly thirty kilometers west of Belgrade, and Topola... but I am not sure.
Q. And does Topola lie between Sabac and Belgrade?
A. No. It is situated more to the south of Belgrade whereas Sabac, as far as I remember, lies west of Belgrade. Mathematically speaking, if you would connect these three places, a triangle would appear.
JUDGE CARTER: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Burke, do you have any questions?
JUDGE BURKE: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may be excused.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, as the next witness I call Karl Kraeutler.
KARL KRAEUTLER, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:
THE PRESIDENT: The witness will raise his right hand and be sworn. I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may be seated.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Would you please give your full name to the Court?
A. Karl Kraeutler.
Q. Would you kindly spell your surname?
A. K-r-a-e-u-t-l-e-r.
Q. Where and when were you born?
A. On the 30th of October, 1894.
Q. And where?
A. In Laa on the Theyer.
Q. Would you kindly spell this name?
A.L-a-a
Q. And in which country is this place situated?
A. In lower Austria
Q. And what profession did you exercise at the start of this war?
A. I was director of a secondary school (Hauptschule)
Q. Where were you director of a secondary school (Hauptschule)?
A. In Gars on Hamm.
Q. Would you kindly spell that, too?
A. G-a-r-s.
Q. And in which country is that place situated?
A. In lower Austria.
Q. Did you take part in the last war?
A. I took part in the last war.
Q. In what capacity?
A. At the beginning of the war I was 1st Lieutenant. In 1940 I was promoted to Captain. On the 1st of September, 1944, I was promoted to Major.
Q. What were you during the Polish campaign?
A. I was adjutant of a sub-area administrative headquarters in Poland.
Q. To which area did this sub-area administrative headquarters belong?
A. It was in the rear army area of the Army List.
Q. Did you then also take part in the Western campaign?
A. In the Western campaign I was regimental adjutant of the Infantry, Regiment 646.
Q. When did you join the 12th Army?
A. At the beginning of November, 1940.
Q. Where was the Army High Command stationed at that time?
A. In Cracow and Zakopane.
Q. What official position did you receive in the Army High Command?
A. I became 4th orderly officer, that is to say 2nd orderly officer in the operational department.
Q. When was the Army High Command transferred from Poland?
A. At the beginning of January, 1941.
Q. And where did you go then?
A. We went to Romania.
Q. Did you take part in the campaign against Greece?
A. I took part in the campaign against Greece in the staff of the AOK-12.
Q. How long did you remain with the AOK-12?
A. Until the 31st of December, 1942.
Q. Where were you sent then?
A. To Army Group E.
Q. And how long did you remain with Army Group E?
A. Until August, 1943.
Q. What position did you get then?
A. In the same capacity I joined Army Group F.
Q. And how long did you remain with Army Group F?
A. Until the end of October, 1943.
Q. Witness, you said that you became 4th orderly officer in the AOK-12. We are going a little back as to time. What were your tasks as 4th orderly officer?
Q. As orderly officer 4 I had to supervise the clerks, administrative matters, etc.
Q. What was the abbreviation for the operational department?
A. Their abbreviation was I-A. Apart from that I had to look after the super top Secret matters.
Q. What do you mean by "Chefsachen",(super top secrets)?
A. Super top secrets were especially designated "secret command matters" which were marked with a blue stamp: "top super Secret. For officers only."
Q. How were super top secret matters dealt with when they came in?
A. The super top secret matters which we received were opened by me, were examined as to whether the number of pages and the number of enclosures were correct, were entered into a special book and were then submitted to the chief of the general staff.
Q. Now you are talking of the incoming super top secret matters. Now what about those outgoing super top secret matters? Did they also pass through your hands?
A. Any outgoing super top Secret matters when they had been signed were entered in a book by me and passed on.
Q. Of which documents in the staff of the AOK-12
A. I gained knowledge of all the incoming and outgoing super top secret matters i.e. of all important documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we will take our noon recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess until one-thirty.
(The Tribunal recessed until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats. The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed. Dr. Laternser.
KARL KRAEUTLER - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Witness, shortly before the recess you said that the staff of AOK 12 was transferred to Roumania. Where did it go after that.
A. After that it came to Bulgaria.
Q. What was the commission that the AOK 12 had at that time?
A. Shortly after we came to Bulgaria the AOK 12 got the commission to prevent an English invasion in Greece.
Q. Were plans made for that?
A. Yes, plans were made
Q. Was that status maintained?
A. Yes, that was maintained.
Q. What happened at the end of March in Jugoslavia?
A. At the end of March there was a coup d'etat.
Q And what orders did you receive subsequently?
A. Subsequently, we received the orders to change the plans which had been made in order to be also prepared towards Serbia.
Q How long was that before the intended attack on Greece.
A. I would estimate about a week.
Q. What was the consequence of this change?
A. The consequence of this change was that the plans had to be altered to the effect to be also ready for any action in Serbia and at that time we had a lot of work in the Operations Department because we had to work very quickly in order to comply with the deadline.
Q. We do not have to concern ourselves with the campaign itself because it has already been dealt with here. How were the acts against Greece concluded?
A. By the capitulation of the Epirus' Army and the subsequent negotiations for an armistice with the former Greek High Command.
Q. Did the Greeks go on fighting after the conclusion of the negotiations?
A. I do not know anything about that.
Q. On the part of the German units were any military operations carried out in Greece after the capitulation had been concluded?
A. Against the remnants of British troops which had remained in Greece and in the islands.
Q. Who occupied Greece?
A. At first the German troops occupied Greece and then soon after that the Italians were commissioned to occupy Southeastern Greece and the Peloponesus.
Q. What was the attitude of the Greeks to this cessation of the occupation to the Italians?
A. The Greeks were annoyed because they did not sympathize particularly with the Italians, if they did not even hate them.
Q. That was the relations between the Greek population and the German Armed Forces?
A. The Greeks were not hostile towards the German Armed Forces.
Q. How were the Greek prisoners of war treated?
A. The Greek prisoners of war were treated in a very mild manner after the capitulation.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If you please, your Honors, I object to the question and ask that the answer of the witness be stricken. I think he has testified he has only seen top secret orders which came from above, which he passed on. I don't believe he is competent or qualified to say how the Greek prisoners of war were treated by the Germans.
THE PRESIDENT: Sustained.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honors, I would like to say something to the objection if I may.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed with your questioning.
Q. What did the German Armed Forces do for the Greek civilian population?
A. As far as I remember, the Wehrmacht provided meals for the civilian population and I can also remember that the Greek civilian population frequently consulted our doctors and physicians.
Q. Where was AOK 12 stationed up to October 1941?
A. It was stationed near Athens in Kiphissa.
Q. And what was the situation in Greece at that time concerning unrest?
A. I do not remember anything concerning that. I don't believe that anything particular occurred in that regard.
Q. When did Field Marshal List become Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
A. I believe during the course of June or July 1941, towards the middle of July, I think.
Q. In this capacity was the Serbian area subordinate to him, too?
A. Yes.
Q. At that time what was the situation in Serbia?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors please, I express my previous objection.
DR, LATERNSER: Your Honor, the witness was a member of the staff of the Headquarters of the 12th Army and in this capacity he has not only gained knowledge of the contents of top secret matters but also of other events and, if I am asking him we can then ascendance whether he knows something about it or not. The prosecution cannot know in advance whether he knows anything about it or not and I therefore ask you to admit this question.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors please, it has not even yet appeared that the witness has read these orders, He has testified that he was in charge of the administrative clerks and that he was the man through whom the orders passed in there.
THE PRESIDENT: If the witness can be qualified as to his knowledge of these facts, he can testify but he should first be qualified and we can thereby ascertain as to whether or not he is informed as to the matters of which you make inquiry.
Q. Witness, I ask you to describe to the Tribunal the kind, the manner of your activities and the extent to which you were informed of official matters in that area.
A. As 4th ordnance officer in charge of the offices of the Operational Department and this Operational Department was in closest connection with the Chief of Staff and thus was the office of the Commander in Chief. Through my activities as manager of super top secret matters I had not only contact with my immediate superior, the I-a, but also with the Chief of Staff and with the Commander in Chief personally because I had to take super top secret matters there and deliver them, Since I naturally had knowledge of the contents of super bop secret matters, it was customary that the I-a and at times also the Chief of Staff discussed these matters with me by way of conversation. Besides, as a member of the Operational Department I participated at the meals of the Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff quite frequently and thus heard after the meals on the occasion of discussions talks which referred to military matters of that time.
Q. I think, witness, that is sufficient for this point. What was the situation during June and July regarding the band situation?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors please, I object. I don't believe the man has been qualified yet. It doesn't appear -- the precise nature of the the reports which he has read, what they contained.
THE PRESIDENT: Overruled. He may state as to what he knows, as to the facts of which he has knowledge.
Q. I ask you to answer the question.
A. I remember that before my leave at the end of June, beginning of July, I heard some talk about band activities in the Serbian area and that was from the I-a reports which came in concerning this subject.
Q. How during the course of August did this situation develop?