Q. Witness, how about the training of the population as franc-tireurs?
A. This training is the product of centuries. The individual partisans did not really need any training any longer. Partisan activity is somewhat of a tradition. It originated from a time when these - historically viewed - unfortunate people were kept in slavedom over centuries. It goes back to times where a so-called Heiduck formed itself and this tradition is alive, in folk songs, in legends about heroes, in literature and in the whole political idea of the Balkan people.
Q. Witness, what you just said about the training, or one might call it preparedness, to be franc-tireurs, on the part of the population is that merely your opinion, or is this a scientific opinion and a scientifically recognized opinion?
A. This statement, as all statements of mine, is based on two factors. Not on my personal opinion, but first of all on the thousand documents which I described initially in my examination, and secondly on scientific knowledge. I mention only a few names where all the characteristics which I mentioned might be examined and found. There is, for instance, the research of Miklovic. I spell--
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I object to the second part of the witnesses answer. I don't think he has been qualified as an expert on scientific opinions with respect to the Balkan people. I think he may testified to what he knows as a result of examining the documents, but not otherwise.
JUDGE CARTER: I think perhaps we should have some limitation on the examination, Dr. Laternser. Sustained.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
Q. Let us then drop this particular point, witness, and we will talk about something else. Maybe we can touch what we have already talked about again by the answering of one question. Was the Partisan activity a result only of the existence of the German occupation power, or did the preparedness of the population for such activities play an important part?
A. Certainly very country is pushed through a war into conditions which loosened up the generally existing order, and such a loosening up condition provided in the Balkans an immediate occasion, or rather was used as an occasion to release all the various conflicts amongst the population.
Q. Witness, how did it happen that Partisan activity took place on such a large scale basis, what were the reasons for this?
A. In order to be a Partisan weapons are needed. The man in the Balkans is used to having his own weapons, shooting weapons and bayonets. The Partisans in the Balkans would not think, if there is a poster to deliver up all arms, he would not think of really giving them up. At that moment he is only thinking how to hide his weapons even better. As a consequence, especially immediately after a campaign where the Yugoslavian Army capitulated, a great number of arms were dispersed over the country, and it was a trivial thing for the population to hide these arms in this area in the Balkans. It was feasible to do that every day, and thus started the guerilla fighting.
Q. Do yon know anything about the extent of the supply of the population in the area on the part of the allies?
A. The files are full of reports about dropping of weapons by planes.
Q. When was that dropping of weapons done, during the day or during the night?
A. Without being able to answer this question exhaustively I am just giving some answers from memory from the file notes which I read, I would say mostly that weapons were dropped during the night in the small localities marked by lights. It is possible I have retained this impression, because I have memorized these remarks best.
Q. Where did these supplies come from?
A. As far as I know the Wehrmacht itself did not know that.
Q. Do you know whether the supply was effected by Russia too?
A. I cannot make any statements about that.
Q. Witness, what then was the consequence of these lively Balkan activities, the consequences regarding the occupation powers?
A. The troops were desperate. At least during their first experience they felt helpless when confronted with this opponent.
Q. What opportunities were there for capturing the partisans?
A. First of all for geographical reasons, for instance five Partisans fought in a mountain area making an attack on a column....
JUDGE CARTER: Due to mechanical difficulties we will take a recess for a few minutes.
(Thereupon a recess was taken.)
(Following Recess.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE CARTER: (Presiding): You may proceed.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Doctor, to begin with, I will ask you to talk a little lower. Shortly before the interruption, I had asked you what possibilities there were for the seizing of the perpetrators?
A. The geographical conditions were the worst possible, an attack by a very small partisan group, by three, five or eight men in this mountain area demanded employment of troops of a much larger number. If mountain infantry really reached the suspected spot, then the knowledge of the locality on the part of the partisans and also their support by the population made it almost impossible to catch the actual perpetrators.
Q. Can you give a practical example and describe to us that which characterized the particular surprise attacks, which were almost every day routine?
A. A typical surprise attack was the dynamiting of bridges, rocks were dynamited and sent hurling down to the streets. One has to take into consideration that there were only very few highways in that area and how blasted sections were sufficient to delay any larger counter measures for a longer period; sometimes for a number of days it was made impossible.
Q. What did the troops expect?
A. Insofar as you mean by troops to common soldier, the ordinary guard or a small command post of ten men or even a company, I would say that these people lived in a constant fear of threat from ambush and I can really only answer that question bases on discussions with officers from the Staff Southeast. These people again and again expressed the feeling, "Just give us anything so we can fight this menace." Because normal military measures were not able to cope with this abnormal situation on the enemy's side or at least were not able to cope adequately with it.
Q. What attempts were made by the occupation forces in order to pacify the Balkan area?
A To begin with I have to point to large numbers of individual operations by which it was attempted to fight the respective Partisan attacks which I have already briefly described and what difficulties had to be met. Besides large military operations were attempted and it was also intended on the basis of negotiations to achieve the pacification of at least certain sectors. These negotiations were not only based on the request of the Wehrmacht but the opponents had the same desire and that applies especially to the Cetnik leaders. This desire on the part of the Cetnik leaders to enter negotiations with German authorities was certainly not based on any special love for the Germans, but on an emergency situation in which the Cetniks found themselves because they were simultaneously fighting the Communists and in order not to have to fight on two fronts, they often tried to at least arrive at a compromise, to a healthy compromise with the German Wehrmacht. That one could not put any faith in their proposal for negotiations is obvious, because one had to expect at the moment when the third opponent would withdraw to other areas at the time when the Cetniks were ready to negotiate, they would have an immediate opportunity to attack the German soldier from ambush. A further factor which made the Cetnik negotiations more difficult can be found in the fact that the individual band leaders were not completely authorized by Mihajlovic to negotiate with the German armed forces. Mihajlovic, which can be seen from the radio addresses which were listened in by the German Intelligence Service, gave very ambiguous directives to his subleaders. To judge whether Mihajlovic really meant it if he admitted negotiations in individual cases would be difficult, but regarding the total impression of these negotiations one can say that all these negotiations with the Cetniks, because of the behavior of the Cetniks, did by no means represent a guarantee for the German Wehrmacht that after a few weeks the negotiator of today would not be an opponent of tomorrow.
Q. Now, witness, what was the relation to Nedic, who as we know was at that time the head of the Serb government?
A. Nedic and his system was the most essential attempt on the part of the German armed forces authorities to achieve the ends without military operations, without harsh measures, but instead to build up a system of administration of pacification and thus to establish law and order. The favorable opinion, which existed in the staff of the armed forces commander Southeast regarding the Serbs played an important part. There was a certain antagonism against the Poglavnik and I mentioned the Ustasha yesterday. I don't think I am wrong if I say that the Nedic system had for the armed forces command Southeast the importance of being a stable factor in this mixture of conflicting forces of the Southeastern area. Therefore one gave the Prime Minister Nedic his own ministry, it can be said that the occupying forces influenced this Government and that was in the nature of things, but there was certain attempts to give Nedic the possibility - to give Nedic Serbian forces in order to build up an administrative machine in order to keep the Serbian area peaceful and pacified.
Q.- What was the success of these endeavors regarding the partisan activities?
A.- There was a considerable pacification and a considerable decreasing of the partisan danger and it did not result from the Nedic system. The police force which was put at Nedic's disposal was most unreliable and pacification of the country in spite of this strong endeavor to build up an own national administration, at least, in the long run, was not achieved.
Q.- And what was the result of this fact for the occupation forces?
A.- The occupation forces because of the possibility of the seemingly increased dispersal of the partisan units over the whole country, were forced to plan large military operations.
Q.- What was the course then of the large scale military operations which you have just mentioned frequently?
A.- A short answer to this question will have to be restricted to the total measures of these operations. I assume that you did not mean the question this way that I should describe military operations.
Q.- No, but tell us what importance did these operations have for the situation of the partisan activities?
A.- The employment of German troops against larger partisan units had normally the result that these partisans were compressed to narrower sectors and in the course of planned military actions their entire destruction would have been possible, if not one factor almost automatically had to be admitted in all these military operations. It was the task of the Italian troops to cooperate with the Germans and to cooperate together with them. Especially in the western sectors they had to achieve a certain restriction of the area. It was tragic for almost all large scale operations that the Germans managed to compress the partisans in a comparatively small area as they managed to catch them, but the Italians at the last moment opened the net and the par tisans could thus break through.
There was no entire mopping-up achieved of the fighting area, but all it meant was the fighting area was transferred to another district, the troops lost men and one had to attack yet another partisan unit.
Q.- Dr. Ibbeken, we have now come to the end. All I want to ask you now is what were the aims in the combatting of the partisans?
A.- The aim of every fighting activity of the German occupation forces was the securing of the supply lines, the pacification of the country merely in order to be able to make use of the war potentialities of the country. The aim. of the military leadership was to guarantee the mere existence of the troops in such an ared interspersed by partisans. Orders and measures had the aim to give the military units the impression that they wore not exposed to the enemy helplessly, but that they had means to defend their own lives in this area and that they could fulfill their larger military tasks.
Q. At that time did you hear anything about the existence of a tendency to exterminate them?
A. The question is a very strange and surprising one to me because we have talked hare about measures of a military necessity and I wouldn't know how in an area which one intends to secure and use economically, how one can plan in such an area an extermination. I don't see the motive for that.
Q. In other words, did you at that time hear anything about an extermination tendency towards the population as is now being maintained?
A. In the one and a half years of my activity with the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, I have ascertained almost scientifically how one can secure and keep order in such an area, how one can bring order into the chaos which existed there, The word "extermination" was never mentioned and the thought never entered anybody's mind.
Q. Thank you. I have no further questions.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH (Counsel for the defendant Foertsch):
Q. Witness, since when do you know General Foertsch?
A. Since I started my activities and duties in the Balkans.
Q. You have already described how you got to the Balkans and I would now like you to testify as to your contact with General Foertsch there.
A. When I received the commission to make a description of the military political conditions in Southeastern Europe General Foertsch was just about to change his office. Immediately after my arrival on the basis of discussions with General Winter and Lieutenant Colonel von Harling I took it that General Foertsch through his long stay in the Balkans was very familiar with the problems there and, therefore, I asked General Foertsch to inform me concerning my work and General Foertsch subsequently gave me repeated opportunity to discuss the problems which had developed in that area.
Q. Who was General Winter?
A. Chief of the Staff of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, successor to General Foertsch.
Q. Was General Foertsch at that time on active duty or had General Winter taken over the tasks of the Chief of Staff when he got there?
A. I do not know the exact date when the tasks of the Chief changed hands. It was just at that time that General Foertsch discontinued his activities there and I don't know where he went from there.
Q. You have just said that at the beginning of your activities in the Southeast area you discussed matters with General Foertsch. What was General Foertsch's attitude concerning Hitler's Southeast policy?
A. The defeat of Jugoslavia and the Croatian prestige had to lead every higher officer active in that area to a decision because these decisions of the Reichsregierung made conditions in that area even more difficult for the German troops.
Q. What was General Foertsch's attitude on the smashing of Jugoslavia?
A. Discussions with General Foertsch gave me his personal opinion; the repeatedly mentioned initial sympathies of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast for the Serbs were very clearly characterized in General Foertsch.
Q. You have already mentioned in the direct examination that the troops in the Southeast and thus the Armed Forces Commander Southeast and his staff were some-what caught between the policy of the Reich Government and the restless band activities in the country. Did you at any time talk to General Foertsch about his ideas for the solution of that conflict?
A. That question was much discussed but it is divided in two parts. On the one hand, the soldier who is responsible for the security of the troops or even who is as an advisor co-responsible for the security of the troops has to solve certain problems and tasks. He has to prevent and reject attacks and he has to prepare military operations, That is another sphere. The solution of the different conflicts in the area are something which occupied General Foertsch day and night. At least, I did not make the acquaintance of any officer in the Balkans who so intensely strove for the solution of these conflicts which were based on history and on present conditions. I want to recall that General Foertsch again and again raised the question how one can disentangle these religious and historic problems, but I would like to say these questions which General Foertsch put to himself and which we discussed -- there was never any answer that there was a certain way by which it could be achieved. The result was almost always that it was such a chaos that we as occupation forces have no possibility to create order, bring order in to conditions which have developed through centuries.
Q. Now, witness, you did not only discuss those matters with General Foertsch but you also saw and studied the extensive files of the Southeast. Out of both those things, from the discussions as well as from the files, did you gain any impression concerning how General Foertsch wanted to solve these problems of the area and of the mere existence of his troops. Those were two tasks, as you said.
A. The most important doing for the military leader is always to do what is demanded for the security of troops.
Q. What, then, was General Foertsch's attitude towards measures which had to be taken for the security of the troops?
A. Will you please explain the meaning of that question?
Q. I want to make it quite clear: if it had become necessary in the country to take measures in order to secure the troops against the attacks of the bands what then was General Foertsch's attitude in his discussions with you concerning the question how that could be achieved?
A. The attitude of the officer who in employing his military means exhausts these means into orders achieve the greatest possible success in fighting the opponent.
Q. And to what extent aid he consider the interests of the population?
A. The consideration of the interests of the population, especially on the part of General Foertsch, I cannot testify to because what he thought about those things I can only gather from General orders by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. My own commission had to do with the military history. It had more to do with political military matters so that I did not concern myself with the intentions of operations or with the behavior of the troops towards the population, at least not as far as specific orders of this kind were concerned.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. Did at any time General Foertsch voice any opinion to you whether security measures finally are not to the advantage of the population?
A. I cannot remember any specific discussion regarding this point.
Q. Witness, you have already indicated that General Foertsch was by no means agreed to the policy of the Reich government. Well, we can then ask ourselves why, then, did he stay in the Southeast for such a long time? Did you make any experiences in that connection?
A. Yes, I remember that General Foertsch in one talk told me, by the way, that repeatedly he had requested other employment but when these requests were not approved he as an officer couldn't do anything but remain at his post.
Q. Now, something entirely different: Witness, at the very beginning you mentioned that General Foertsch can be called to be familiar with the Balkans. Now, what about his inclinations? Was he not only familiar with the area or did he also have special sympathies for the area and population?
A. If on the basis of a discussion of four whole days with General Foertsch regarding the situation in the Balkans, if I may draw a conclusion regarding his innermost honest attitude to the problems which confronted him, I would say General Foertsch with his unusual mental intensity tried to find out the problems of the Balkans and their causes -- I don't want to use too high sounding a word -- he gained something like love for that country. He got involved in the problems to an extent where his own heart did not remain impartial.
Q. Now, witness, in order to make this quite clear, is is possible, for instance, that somebody can have a love for a certain district but not for the population.
You have heard it said that General Foertsch wanted to find a solution by pacification. Was that a pacification by means of good treatment of the population or a pacification by extermination; that is a kind of cemetery peace that can always be achieved.
A. My impression is that General Foertsch took military measures quite decisively when they were necessary for the good of the troops but that at the same time during the whole time of his office there was simultaneously the endeavor to create order in another manner and just in that direction General Foertsch practically endeavored to achieve something and I think we find that confirmed in the fact that he supported the Nedie system which we have previously mentioned.
Q. Witness, General Foertsch was Chief of Staff and do you know what duties and what powers he had in that position?
A. A Chief of Staff in the German Armed Forces has the part of an expert worker without having the legal responsibility nor the power of decision of the Armed Forces Commander at the same time.
Q. Now, in order to give an example, was it, for instance, possible for General Foertsch, when he heard about a surprise attack and when he was probably excited about such an attack -- could he then order that for the two killed German soldiers two hundred slaves had to be executed?
A. No, he couldn't do that.
Q. Now, could he in a positive sense make his weight felt -- could he exert influence on the treatment of the population in a good sense?
A. For four years he advised a responsible armed forces commander. He helped and supported him. Of course, he has a possibility to make his own attitude known in either direction.
The decision has to be made by the military commander, by the Commander in Chief, inasmuch as he on his part is not defendant on other orders.
Q. Do you know anything about whether General Foertsch was active as an adviser, as a kind of trouble maker, or did he rather carry out his activities in the sense of his attitude as he described it to you?
A. If I may concentrate my answer on the word "trouble maker", I can only say I believe that the measures which were taken were not accompanied by sentimental feelings on the part of General Foertsch out on the consideration of the actual necessities and the political essentials.
Q. In order to make it quite clear, did General Foertsch himself take measures?
A. He couldn't do that.
Q. What impression did you gain of the personality of General Foertsch as a soldier, generally speaking?
A. A man who was able to do an enormous amount of work and who demanded almost the impossible from his subordinates concerning work. One day of work in the Staff of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast under General Foertsch's direction -- that was a full day of work.
Q. Witness, concerning the activities with the Armed Forces Commander Southeast I mean the following: during this trial we once heard the word "spiritus rector" and General Foertsch has also been designated at the "evil spirit of the Balkans." Was he now that "spiritus rector" in the Southeast?
A. Without doubt, he was an officer of a strong natural activeness. To that extent one can talk about "spiritus" as a man who was mentally and scientifically endeavoring to find out the causes of problems; to be "rector" -- that is to be guiding -- was not possible for him in his position.
Q. Now, one more question: from your studies of the documentary material and from your studies of the Southeastern areas could you conclude whether General Foertsch took influence on the military commander subordinate to the armed forces commander?
A. From personal discussions I could not gain that impression because General Foertsch would certainly not tell me whether he had more or less influence on the Commanderin-Chief.
Q. In order to make that quite clear, the subordinate military commander -- I do not mean his commander in chief.
A. I cannot purely technically deduce that from the documentary material.
Q. Thank you. I have no further questions.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: We will take our morning recess at this time.
(A recess was taken).
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Is there any further examination of this witness by the Defense? If not, you may cross-examine.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q Dr. Ibbeken, had you over lived in the Balkans prior to the time you went down there at the end of 1943?
A No.
Q When did you first begin to lecture at the University of Berlin?
A I started lecturing at the University of Berlin in 1942, during home leave from the Front.
Q Had you ever taught history before that time?
A No, I didn't teach.
Q And how long did you lecture at the University of Berlin in history?
A Since 1929. I did scientific work first of all for the Reich Historical Commission. I had to publish a document on the Prussian Foreign policy from 1862 to 1866. And I had on hand material from the archives of all the European capitals, the development of Rome, Copenhagen, Stockholm, etc.
Q Had you ever given a course in Balkan history?
AAt the Munich University I attended to lectures on European history by my chief Herman Omken, especially in connection with the history of the Southeast, especially dealing with the development of Serbia.
Q But you yourself never instructed in Balkan history?
A No, I never instructed.
Q Were you a member of the Party?
A Yes.
Q Are you familiar with the works of the Nazi historian Alfred Rosenberg?
A Which works?
Q Well, his works, generally speaking.
A The only thing I read by Alfred Rosenberg was the "Mythos," at least the main part of it, which was for me, as an historian, the most confusing book which I had ever read from a National Socialist authority.
Q As a member of the Party, you are no doubt familiar with Nazi ideology, and I take it you're sympathetic to the teachings of Nazism. Is that correct?
AAs a scientist my attitude towards Nazi ideology was confronted from the very beginning by the one great difficulty that Nazi ideology sort of looked at the world as if it had been created by God in 1933; and a historian with a knowledge of about a thousand years of European history at least has some knowledge which enables him to know that the world existed before 1933.
Q But in spite of this you joined the Party?
A I entered into the National Socialist Party in 1937. For me it was based on no decision from fundamental principles about the necessity and not of the whole National Socialist idealogy, but in 1937 the so-called Third Reich seemed to be the State which was going to be the sort of government Germany was going to have for a long time and if one had any inclination at all to continue independently one had to consider that outside the organization of the Party there was no chance of working at all, unless he wanted to limit his activities to fruitless criticism behind closed walls. But as an active man, one tried to go in to it and do whatever one could from inside and tried to bring to bear whatever different ideas one had.
Q Did you approve of Hitler's policy toward the Jews in Germany? You will recall that in 1935 the Nurnberg Laws were passed discriminating against the Jews.
A The Jewish question for a German who was also a human being was, at that time, at least one of the most doubtful ideas of Nazi ideology, and I'm convinced that not only I but millions of Germans, if they had even dreamed what these abstractions of Nazi ideology could result in for the Jews, they Would never have entered into National Socialism.
But, for myself, I would like to say that directly on this point I possessed the courage of open opposition. At the end of 1943 in a lecture to officers in Jueterbog, although no discussion had been envisaged, I tried to oppose SS Standartenfueher Sottke from Rosenberg's office when he developed racial theories. I was in opposition to this, and by one single question I ruined the whole lecture by a scientific rejection of the arguments presented by the SS Standartenfueher Sottke.
Q Dr. Ibbeken, I don't want to limit you, even necessarily, in your answers, but I will try to phrase my questions so that you can give a "yes" or "no" answer, and, if you feel necessary, a brief explanation. I'm just interested now in Hitler's attitude towards the Jews, and I take it you were in opposition. You were no doubt also familiar, as a historian, with Hitler's and Rosenberg's attitude toward the Slavic race and towards the Balkan peoples. He considered them an inferior race did he not? Are you in agreement?
A I think not, insofar as the question concerns the person of Hitler and insofar as it concerns the main participation of the Slavic people in the Servo-Croat area, that is the Serbians and the Croats, but I do not think that Hitler regarded Serbs as an especially inferior people. I believe that the attitude of rejection toward the Serbian people, was more the affair of Ribbentropp of the Foreign Office than that of the Fuehrer.
Q Well, the Serbs and the Croats were Slavic peoples were they not?
A This is an old scientific dispute, and it cannot be clearly answered. That the Serbs are Slavs is a fact, the Croats arc such a mixed people that it is very difficult to say, Slavs or not Slavs.
Q Isn't it true, Dr. Ibbeken, that the only reason you were allowed to teach or lecture at the University of Berlin was because you were a Party member and were considered safe to instruct the youth COURT, V, CASE VII of Germany so far as Nazi ideology is concerned?
