A I knew the officers of tho staff of Armed Fores Commander Southeast, and I was mainly interested in the political problems of the area. It was the constantly returning opinion of these officers that the Serbs were the most remarkable and most gifted elements in that area, but nobody really trusted them very far.
Q What now were the relations between the occupation power and the population in Croatia?
A This relation was completely different from a political and military point of view. It had to be different, because Croatia was an independent state, where the German Wehrmacht, to put it quite briefly, had nothing to say. In Croatia, under the head of the State, the Poglavnic, who had come from -- Italian immigration.
Q What does the word "Poglavnic" mean?
A It moans head of State, leader.
Q Who was it at that time?
A It was Pavelic.
Q Will you spell the name?
A P-a-v-o-l-i-c.
Q Now, will you please continue in the description of the relationship toward the population?
A There was no considerable relationship toward the population, not to the extent as in Serbia. Croatia was an independent state. It was not exposed to the hands of the German armed forces, instead it was exposed to tho hands of the Ustasha.
Q What kind of an organization do we have in the Ustasha?
A The Ustasha is in its neucleus, a body guard of tho Poglavnic, let us say a Fascist Military organization which has half the character of a police troop too.
Q Was the Ustasha the only Croat bearer of arms?
A No.
Q Who else carried weapons there?
A Croatia had tried in the so-called Domobranen ----
Q Will you spell that, please?
A I spell it, -- D-o-m-o-b-r-a-n-e-n. Croat tried in the Domobranen to establish a kind of armed force, without the comparison really being exact in detail, one might compare the relationship between the Domobranen and the Ustasha as the relationship between the SS and the Armed forces in Germany. I don't know whether I may say that just as there was a continued difference between the SS and the Wehrmacht, there was a continued difference between the Ustasha and the Domobranen.
Q To whom were the Domobranen subordinate to?
A The Domobranen wore subordinated to the Croat Ministry of War. But to this problem of the Domobranen I wanted to make a decisive statement, they supplied the partisans with weapons.
Q How?
A In going over to the partisans almost like regiments with their leaders, and their guns wore fired against us.
Q And that applies to Croatia, what you said just now?
A Beg pardon, I said almost like regiments, in order to be absolutely based on the material available to me, certainly in the size of battalions.
Q Now, what you have stated about Domobranen and Ustasha applies to the sphere of the State of Croatia?
A Yes.
Q Now, about the Ustasha, whom were they subordinate to?
A To the Poglavnic.
Q And what wore the methods of these Ustasha, and whom did the Ustasha fight?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I wish to object to the Question as not being covered by the indictment, and there is no charge at all brought by the Prosecution as regards to the activities of the Ustasha. I object to the question on the grounds it is irrelevant and immaterial.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, the defense maintains the point of view that the conditions in the Balkans are of decisive importance, because these conditions explain the measures which had to be, or which were ordered by the military authorities; the total conditions which the prosecution describes as though they were normal European conditions. I have the duty, as defense counsel, with the means at my disposal, to prove to the Tribunal how, at that time, the conditions in the Balkans actually were, and the Ustasha belongs to the whole problem.
JUDGE CARTER: The objection will be overruled.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you.
Witness, I asked you about the Ustasha, and I had asked you what methods they used, and whom they fought.
Will you be brief and clear on this subject?
A The main opponents of the Ustasha were the Serbs. There was Ustasha, the struggle of the Ustasha against the Chetniks was the struggle of the Faschist Croats against the National-minded Serbians, and finally, the struggle Ustasha gainst Chetnik is the struggle of the orthodox against the Catholics.
Q What methods did the Ustasha apply?
A Balkan methods, partisan methods.
Q What do you mean by that?
AAlthough they were an organized unit, they did not remain behind concerning cruelties, cruelties which became known to us of the unorganized partisan groups, through this, they made extreme difficulties for the German occupation, because after all, the Ustasha were the instrument of the Croat Government, recognized, by us, and of course all of the things which were committed by the Ustasha -- was put at our expense as the political supporters of Croatia.
Q Do you know whether the Wehrmacht authorities have tried to intervene against the Ustasha methods when they became known, or whether they tried to cause the Croat Government to take influence on the Ustasha?
A I refer to the extensive correspondence between General GlaiseHorstenau, and the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, which dealt with all of the Croat problems, and with all Ustasha problems. These reports by General Glaise-Horstenau were one continuous complaint, and one continuous begging to free the German Wehrmacht of the Ustasha and I know that the endeavors for a restriction of the influence of the Ustasha went right up to the highest German authorities, on the part of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
I believe that one of the representations to Hitler personally via the Reich Government, was sabotaged by the Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and never reached the Fuehrer Headquarters, the reason for this may well be that the German clinging to the Croat position in the total area, was first of all the result of the political tendencies of Foreign minister Ribbentrop, and he and the SA Envoy Kasche, supported this Croat Fascist system partly to the disgust of the Wehrmacht.
Q Witness, you have now shown us the relationship between the Armed Forces and the Serbs, and between the Armed Forces and the Croats, and you have already mentioned the difference, the contrast between the Serbs on one hand and the Croats on the other hand. Of what kind were the differences between the Serbs and the Croats, and how did they affect the conditions at the tine of the occupation?
A Most sharply in the fact that the occupation power had no uniform tendency and directness when fighting the partisans, because the fighting activities in the total area, was not clear-cut and directed merely against the occupation forces from the opponents but because there was fighting everywhere.
Q How then, witness, did the differences between Croats and Serbs show up; what was the consequence? How, for instance, were the Serbs treated in Croatia, and the other way around, how were the Croats treated in Serbia?
A I believe one must not separate Croatia and Serbia thus sharply. Of course it was impossible for the Serbs to have a political leading position in Croatia and Serbia; on the other hand was a German occupation area. I am not quite clear about the meaning of the question which was put to me.
Q I wanted to know the consequences of the differences between the Croats and the Serbs in the occupational area. For instance, during the occupation time, did the Serbs remain in Croatia and what measures would the Croats take against the Serbs, and the other way around?
A During the course of the fights between the Croats and the Serbs, and the Ustasha and Chetniks, and later during the course of fights between Tito and Chetniks and Tito and Ustasha, there were movements of the population which were quite considerable. Whole parts of the country were thrown into such unrest; later they were torn away with the streams of partisans in the course of the big military operation, so that one can well say that this inner struggle between Croats and Serbs at least resulted in the dissolution of the whole social structure of the country.
Q The Serbs and Croats speak the same language?
A There is a strong difference in dialect, not a basically different language, but there is a very great difficulty arising from the fact that the Serbs use kyrillian handwriting, and the Croats the Latin handwriting.
Q You have already mentioned the Moslems during your examination. What was the relation of the Moslems to the National Serbs?
A One does not have to see a very great difference in the contrast between the Orthodox and Catholics on the one side and the contrast between Orthodox and Moslems on the other hand. In both cases, the confessional, the religious contrast, has taken a political nature and thus found its effect in the Balkan political differences.
If, on the basis of my documentary knowledge, I should draw conclusions, I would say that probably the most cruel thing which occurred in this Slav brother warfare, was that it was carried out on the body of the Moslems.
Q Witness, yon further mentioned the various spheres of influence of the great powers in the Balkans. I am not asking you now for political opinions. I am merely putting the question in order to establish a dividing effect on the population caused by these spheres of influence. How as an occupation power did one regarded these spheres of influence.
A The occupational power, through the existence of spheres of influence by the great powers on these areas, was confronted with the fact that the population of this area was now split in even more parties, even more than it had already been split up, on the basis of their own inner conflicts and of the differences to the occupation power, because traditionally, the sympathies of the Greeks are with Great Britain; that is caused through the old. Mediterranean interests, but from the frontier, via Bulgaria, the stream of the Russian influence in the Communistic form penetrates but by no means that is a free stream. I am talking of the time of the occupation. In this moment there is a new factor. While there is still a struggle between these English and Russian attempts of influence, right in the middle there is the old historical attempt of an independent nation, Macedonia. One more conflict is added. The influence of Italy by Trieste, by the Dalmatian Coast, Albania, made life difficult for the German Wehrmacht - more difficult probably than any other factor caused by the great powers in those days. This influence plays in the immediate military operations, where this influence leads to a catastrophe.
Q I think, witness, we will have to conclude now there will be a recess.
JUDGE CARTER: We will recess until nine thirty tomorrow morning.
(In recess until nine-thirty o'clock October 7, 1947)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 7 October 1947, 0930-1630, Justice Carter Presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: Ascertain whether or not all defendants are present in the courtroom.
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honor, all defendants are present in the courtroom except the defendant von Weichs, who is absent due to illness.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter will preside at this session.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor will recall the conference which Dr. Laternser and I had with the Tribunal Friday morning with reference to the defendant von Weichs. I am advised by the prison officer that von Weichs was sent to the hospital today for a few days or a few weeks. It is hoped at the end of that time he will be able to return to Court and testify on his own behalf. The Prosecution has no objection to Dr. Laternser visiting von Weichs on his behalf and talking to him about the case.
JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal understands, of course, this action is probably necessary, and it is done with the further understanding that it is without prejudice to the rights of the defendant von Weichs. Is that agreeable to Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
JUDGE CARTER: Dr. Laternser having indicated his assent thereto we will permit it to stand in the manner in which it has been handled.
You may proceed.
RUDOLF IBBEKEN - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Witness, yesterday we had stopped with the description of the various spheres of influence on the Balkans. Now, I would like to ask you what political interest existed on the part of the Germans during the time of the occupation?
A The German interest in the Serb-Croat area, or rather in the whole area of Southeastern Europe consisted first of all in the maintenance of the lines of communication between Zagreb and Saloniki up to Crete. There was further a strong political interest regarding the war in the country, and the real political interest was restricted and was comparatively small, because the political prestige of Italy had been fixed in the course of German policy. Only one direct political interest was essential and has to be named, this is the fact that Germany, in spite of allowing the Italians to retain prestige still made a strong distinction between Italy and Hungary, and thus at least secured the political entrance into that area.
Q Witness, what effects were caused by the various spheres of influence on the population of the Balkans?
A This question I would like to answer in calling that the area, as I have stated yesterday was inhabited by a great number of various groups and political tendencies. All these tendencies conflicting with each other, had, of course, the one tendency to find support and help from the outside in order to gain advantage over the opponent in this manner politically, as well as regards supply of ammunitions, etc. As a consequence we find in all these groups and tendencies the inclination to lean on the great power which is geographically closest, and thus to gain for their own fight and for their fight against the occupation powers certain advantages. As a consequence the answer of this question would again include a circle around the whole southeastern area, which I drew yesterday, and we would find that from Serbia, at least during the first years of the occupation, there was a strong tendency to keep contact from Russia on the part of Mihajlovic, as the representative of Serbia.
We could, at first, clearly see a tendency to lean on England. The Tito movement again severs connections and leans on Russia. The Greek insurgents were divided in their political tendency. The National Greeks looked for support in England, and the Communist bands again leant on the Eastern influence. The whole tendency goes towards making the influences of the great powers useful to them and thus leads politically also practically to a splitting up of the whole Balkan area.
Q In other words, then, Witness, in these spheres of influence did that result in a further division of the population in political and other matters?
A Yes.
Q And now briefly turn to the Partisan activities. How was it possible in the Balkans that such a strong Partisan activity managed to exist, how do you explain that on the basis of the experiences which you gained there?
A The ethnic explanation for the strong appearance of Partisans in the Balkans again demanded high action, and here again we have a struggle of political wills which was fed by religious sources, and therefore took on an enormously ethnic character. The distinction of the Partisan groups, the fact that the Partisans acted on their own initiative without any orders, the fact that they turned out of the smallest villages, out of every isolated hut, can be explained by the national character. The Balkans, especially the central area, the Serb-Croat area, partly until today lives in the concept of a patriot order. By this I mean the family is the political sphere, where the man lives and thinks. The smallest cells are the most important center to the simple man in the street. The head of the family to him is the most important authority he knows. An order by the head of the family or by the head of a clan of about 50 to 100 people is almost sacred.
Such a head of a clan only has to say one word, like say, for instance, "tomorrow morning on the first motor car that passes at a certain spot stones shall be thrown," and that would be sufficient for this thing to be carried out the next day. And through the fact that orders are observed within a very small circle alone it becomes possible that on numerous spots in the country there are simultaneously attacks on the German troops, which are disastrous. The Partisans of the Balkans spring from population used to living with the idea of blood revenge. The history of the Balkans during the last BOO to 600 years can almost be regarded as a history of vendetta and party struggle. But the large scale point of view which makes up the history of a country or a state played a smaller part, and just because these smaller parts refused to become states, only by the fact that they split up among themselves. There is only one exception from this Partisan activity, and I might almost say activity without order, and that is Tito's Communist movement. That is something absolutely new in the Balkan area. The fact that Tito's Partisans, for the first time, achieved a large scale movement seems significant to us and that he overcame these divisions and combined these numerous individual ideas under one leadership. In spite of this feat in which Tito succeeded, and which gave the Partisans a slightly changed character, it did not mean a decreasing of the conflicts in the Balkans, but only a sharpening- The stronger Tito's Partisans became the more embittered the struggle became on the part of his people towards the Cetniks, Ustasha and against the Wehrmacht.
Q. Witness, how about the training of the population as franc-tireurs?
A. This training is the product of centuries. The individual partisans did not really need any training any longer. Partisan activity is somewhat of a tradition. It originated from a time when these - historically viewed - unfortunate people were kept in slavedom over centuries. It goes back to times where a so-called Heiduck formed itself and this tradition is alive, in folk songs, in legends about heroes, in literature and in the whole political idea of the Balkan people.
Q. Witness, what you just said about the training, or one might call it preparedness, to be franc-tireurs, on the part of the population is that merely your opinion, or is this a scientific opinion and a scientifically recognized opinion?
A. This statement, as all statements of mine, is based on two factors. Not on my personal opinion, but first of all on the thousand documents which I described initially in my examination, and secondly on scientific knowledge. I mention only a few names where all the characteristics which I mentioned might be examined and found. There is, for instance, the research of Miklovic. I spell--
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I object to the second part of the witnesses answer. I don't think he has been qualified as an expert on scientific opinions with respect to the Balkan people. I think he may testified to what he knows as a result of examining the documents, but not otherwise.
JUDGE CARTER: I think perhaps we should have some limitation on the examination, Dr. Laternser. Sustained.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
Q. Let us then drop this particular point, witness, and we will talk about something else. Maybe we can touch what we have already talked about again by the answering of one question. Was the Partisan activity a result only of the existence of the German occupation power, or did the preparedness of the population for such activities play an important part?
A. Certainly very country is pushed through a war into conditions which loosened up the generally existing order, and such a loosening up condition provided in the Balkans an immediate occasion, or rather was used as an occasion to release all the various conflicts amongst the population.
Q. Witness, how did it happen that Partisan activity took place on such a large scale basis, what were the reasons for this?
A. In order to be a Partisan weapons are needed. The man in the Balkans is used to having his own weapons, shooting weapons and bayonets. The Partisans in the Balkans would not think, if there is a poster to deliver up all arms, he would not think of really giving them up. At that moment he is only thinking how to hide his weapons even better. As a consequence, especially immediately after a campaign where the Yugoslavian Army capitulated, a great number of arms were dispersed over the country, and it was a trivial thing for the population to hide these arms in this area in the Balkans. It was feasible to do that every day, and thus started the guerilla fighting.
Q. Do yon know anything about the extent of the supply of the population in the area on the part of the allies?
A. The files are full of reports about dropping of weapons by planes.
Q. When was that dropping of weapons done, during the day or during the night?
A. Without being able to answer this question exhaustively I am just giving some answers from memory from the file notes which I read, I would say mostly that weapons were dropped during the night in the small localities marked by lights. It is possible I have retained this impression, because I have memorized these remarks best.
Q. Where did these supplies come from?
A. As far as I know the Wehrmacht itself did not know that.
Q. Do you know whether the supply was effected by Russia too?
A. I cannot make any statements about that.
Q. Witness, what then was the consequence of these lively Balkan activities, the consequences regarding the occupation powers?
A. The troops were desperate. At least during their first experience they felt helpless when confronted with this opponent.
Q. What opportunities were there for capturing the partisans?
A. First of all for geographical reasons, for instance five Partisans fought in a mountain area making an attack on a column....
JUDGE CARTER: Due to mechanical difficulties we will take a recess for a few minutes.
(Thereupon a recess was taken.)
(Following Recess.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE CARTER: (Presiding): You may proceed.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Doctor, to begin with, I will ask you to talk a little lower. Shortly before the interruption, I had asked you what possibilities there were for the seizing of the perpetrators?
A. The geographical conditions were the worst possible, an attack by a very small partisan group, by three, five or eight men in this mountain area demanded employment of troops of a much larger number. If mountain infantry really reached the suspected spot, then the knowledge of the locality on the part of the partisans and also their support by the population made it almost impossible to catch the actual perpetrators.
Q. Can you give a practical example and describe to us that which characterized the particular surprise attacks, which were almost every day routine?
A. A typical surprise attack was the dynamiting of bridges, rocks were dynamited and sent hurling down to the streets. One has to take into consideration that there were only very few highways in that area and how blasted sections were sufficient to delay any larger counter measures for a longer period; sometimes for a number of days it was made impossible.
Q. What did the troops expect?
A. Insofar as you mean by troops to common soldier, the ordinary guard or a small command post of ten men or even a company, I would say that these people lived in a constant fear of threat from ambush and I can really only answer that question bases on discussions with officers from the Staff Southeast. These people again and again expressed the feeling, "Just give us anything so we can fight this menace." Because normal military measures were not able to cope with this abnormal situation on the enemy's side or at least were not able to cope adequately with it.
Q. What attempts were made by the occupation forces in order to pacify the Balkan area?
A To begin with I have to point to large numbers of individual operations by which it was attempted to fight the respective Partisan attacks which I have already briefly described and what difficulties had to be met. Besides large military operations were attempted and it was also intended on the basis of negotiations to achieve the pacification of at least certain sectors. These negotiations were not only based on the request of the Wehrmacht but the opponents had the same desire and that applies especially to the Cetnik leaders. This desire on the part of the Cetnik leaders to enter negotiations with German authorities was certainly not based on any special love for the Germans, but on an emergency situation in which the Cetniks found themselves because they were simultaneously fighting the Communists and in order not to have to fight on two fronts, they often tried to at least arrive at a compromise, to a healthy compromise with the German Wehrmacht. That one could not put any faith in their proposal for negotiations is obvious, because one had to expect at the moment when the third opponent would withdraw to other areas at the time when the Cetniks were ready to negotiate, they would have an immediate opportunity to attack the German soldier from ambush. A further factor which made the Cetnik negotiations more difficult can be found in the fact that the individual band leaders were not completely authorized by Mihajlovic to negotiate with the German armed forces. Mihajlovic, which can be seen from the radio addresses which were listened in by the German Intelligence Service, gave very ambiguous directives to his subleaders. To judge whether Mihajlovic really meant it if he admitted negotiations in individual cases would be difficult, but regarding the total impression of these negotiations one can say that all these negotiations with the Cetniks, because of the behavior of the Cetniks, did by no means represent a guarantee for the German Wehrmacht that after a few weeks the negotiator of today would not be an opponent of tomorrow.
Q. Now, witness, what was the relation to Nedic, who as we know was at that time the head of the Serb government?
A. Nedic and his system was the most essential attempt on the part of the German armed forces authorities to achieve the ends without military operations, without harsh measures, but instead to build up a system of administration of pacification and thus to establish law and order. The favorable opinion, which existed in the staff of the armed forces commander Southeast regarding the Serbs played an important part. There was a certain antagonism against the Poglavnik and I mentioned the Ustasha yesterday. I don't think I am wrong if I say that the Nedic system had for the armed forces command Southeast the importance of being a stable factor in this mixture of conflicting forces of the Southeastern area. Therefore one gave the Prime Minister Nedic his own ministry, it can be said that the occupying forces influenced this Government and that was in the nature of things, but there was certain attempts to give Nedic the possibility - to give Nedic Serbian forces in order to build up an administrative machine in order to keep the Serbian area peaceful and pacified.
Q.- What was the success of these endeavors regarding the partisan activities?
A.- There was a considerable pacification and a considerable decreasing of the partisan danger and it did not result from the Nedic system. The police force which was put at Nedic's disposal was most unreliable and pacification of the country in spite of this strong endeavor to build up an own national administration, at least, in the long run, was not achieved.
Q.- And what was the result of this fact for the occupation forces?
A.- The occupation forces because of the possibility of the seemingly increased dispersal of the partisan units over the whole country, were forced to plan large military operations.
Q.- What was the course then of the large scale military operations which you have just mentioned frequently?
A.- A short answer to this question will have to be restricted to the total measures of these operations. I assume that you did not mean the question this way that I should describe military operations.
Q.- No, but tell us what importance did these operations have for the situation of the partisan activities?
A.- The employment of German troops against larger partisan units had normally the result that these partisans were compressed to narrower sectors and in the course of planned military actions their entire destruction would have been possible, if not one factor almost automatically had to be admitted in all these military operations. It was the task of the Italian troops to cooperate with the Germans and to cooperate together with them. Especially in the western sectors they had to achieve a certain restriction of the area. It was tragic for almost all large scale operations that the Germans managed to compress the partisans in a comparatively small area as they managed to catch them, but the Italians at the last moment opened the net and the par tisans could thus break through.
There was no entire mopping-up achieved of the fighting area, but all it meant was the fighting area was transferred to another district, the troops lost men and one had to attack yet another partisan unit.
Q.- Dr. Ibbeken, we have now come to the end. All I want to ask you now is what were the aims in the combatting of the partisans?
A.- The aim of every fighting activity of the German occupation forces was the securing of the supply lines, the pacification of the country merely in order to be able to make use of the war potentialities of the country. The aim. of the military leadership was to guarantee the mere existence of the troops in such an ared interspersed by partisans. Orders and measures had the aim to give the military units the impression that they wore not exposed to the enemy helplessly, but that they had means to defend their own lives in this area and that they could fulfill their larger military tasks.
Q. At that time did you hear anything about the existence of a tendency to exterminate them?
A. The question is a very strange and surprising one to me because we have talked hare about measures of a military necessity and I wouldn't know how in an area which one intends to secure and use economically, how one can plan in such an area an extermination. I don't see the motive for that.
Q. In other words, did you at that time hear anything about an extermination tendency towards the population as is now being maintained?
A. In the one and a half years of my activity with the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, I have ascertained almost scientifically how one can secure and keep order in such an area, how one can bring order into the chaos which existed there, The word "extermination" was never mentioned and the thought never entered anybody's mind.
Q. Thank you. I have no further questions.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH (Counsel for the defendant Foertsch):
Q. Witness, since when do you know General Foertsch?
A. Since I started my activities and duties in the Balkans.
Q. You have already described how you got to the Balkans and I would now like you to testify as to your contact with General Foertsch there.
A. When I received the commission to make a description of the military political conditions in Southeastern Europe General Foertsch was just about to change his office. Immediately after my arrival on the basis of discussions with General Winter and Lieutenant Colonel von Harling I took it that General Foertsch through his long stay in the Balkans was very familiar with the problems there and, therefore, I asked General Foertsch to inform me concerning my work and General Foertsch subsequently gave me repeated opportunity to discuss the problems which had developed in that area.
Q. Who was General Winter?
A. Chief of the Staff of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, successor to General Foertsch.
Q. Was General Foertsch at that time on active duty or had General Winter taken over the tasks of the Chief of Staff when he got there?
A. I do not know the exact date when the tasks of the Chief changed hands. It was just at that time that General Foertsch discontinued his activities there and I don't know where he went from there.
Q. You have just said that at the beginning of your activities in the Southeast area you discussed matters with General Foertsch. What was General Foertsch's attitude concerning Hitler's Southeast policy?
A. The defeat of Jugoslavia and the Croatian prestige had to lead every higher officer active in that area to a decision because these decisions of the Reichsregierung made conditions in that area even more difficult for the German troops.
Q. What was General Foertsch's attitude on the smashing of Jugoslavia?
A. Discussions with General Foertsch gave me his personal opinion; the repeatedly mentioned initial sympathies of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast for the Serbs were very clearly characterized in General Foertsch.
Q. You have already mentioned in the direct examination that the troops in the Southeast and thus the Armed Forces Commander Southeast and his staff were some-what caught between the policy of the Reich Government and the restless band activities in the country. Did you at any time talk to General Foertsch about his ideas for the solution of that conflict?