Q. You are not certain whether you did that or not?
A. No, I can't say that definitely today. Otherwise, I would have said it.
Q. Did you consult with Field marshal List frequently after you took over as Deputy Armed Forces, Commander Southeast?
A. No, I have already stated that my first meeting with Field Marshal List took place in Athens and could only be a very short one because Field Marshal List at that time was a very sick man.
Q. Do you know when Field Marshal List left the Southeast?
A. Field Marshal List I saw briefly when he came through Saloniki when he was dismissed from the hospital in Athens and went home.
Q. Do you know on what date that was?
A. I don't know exactly. It must have been around the end of November or the beginning of December.
Q. Wasn't it strange that Field Marshal List was never actually replaced as Armed Forces Commander Southeast? Did you ever feel that you were only in charge -
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Withdrawn.
Q. Did you ever have the feeling that he was in effect still in charge even though you had the title. "Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast"?
A. No. When I took charge of the affairs of Field Marshal List his rights and authorities came to me. It was a difficult situation for me because I didn't know how long this post would last for me.
Q. General Kuntze, will you look at Exhibit 311 in Document Book VIII on page 71 of the English and page 60 of the German? These are excerpts from the War Diary of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. Will you look at the entry for 4 July 1941?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. I beg your pardon. That should be 4 July 1942.
A. Yes, 1942.
Q. "The Fuehrer has appointed General Field Marshal List to commend an armed group in Russia. The former Commander in Chief of the 12th Army remembers all soldiers subordinates to him in an order of the day and expresses to them his gratitude and appreciation."
The 12th Army at that time, July 1942, was it still subordinate to Field Marshal List?
A. No.
Q. This language indicated that Field Marshal List considers the soldiers of the 12th Army still subordinate to him on 4 July 1942.
A. He said his farewell message in this letter which is always the case when a commander definitely and finally leaves his post.
Q. But you assume full responsibility, do you, for the events in the villages of the Southwest from the time you took over as Field Marshal List's deputy until the time you were succeeded by General Loehr?
A. Yes.
Q. General Kuntze, do you believe that the measures which you ordered in the activities of your troops in the Southeast during your tenure were all necessary from a strictly military standpoint?
A. Yes.
Q. Don't you believe that, in fact, those measures had a boomer and effect upon the German troops because of the harshness and severity of them? They, in fact, drove more civilians in the heads of the partisans and made your problem that much greater?
A. No, it can be clearly seen from the whole development in Serbia from the winter of 1941 until the summer of 1942 and even to a later date.
Q. General, isn't it true that if you did burn down a village the homeless inhabitants are bound to turn to the partisans in revenge? Wasn't the result of your reprisal burnings that the reprisals got more recruits?
A. No, frequently it was thus: that such villages were burned down 6 0ct.
-M-JP-11-4-Primeau (Int. Schaeffer) because they were defended, and the inhabitants had already left prior to the burning down.
Q. General Kuntze, isn't it a fact that your measures were so severe that even the common German soldier rebelled at carrying them out?
A. That he rebelled against carrying them out? No.
Q. Look at Exhibit 143 in Document Book VI, page 33 of the English and page 25 of the German. This is a report of the 734th Infantry Regiment which was received by the 704th Infantry Division on the 10th of November 1941. By that time you were already in the Southeast. This particular report concerns the execution of Jews and gypsies. It goes into quite some detail about it. Will you look on page 35 of the English the middle of the page and page 26 of the German and there is some remarks that the shooting of the Jews is simpler than that of the shooting of gypsies -- and then the paragraph beginning:
"In the beginning, my soldiers were not impressed. The largest part of the time was consumed by the digging of the ditches. The execution by shooting itself of 100 men in 40 minutes went very rapidly. The second day, however, it had become noticeable that one or the other did not have the nerve to carry out shooting to death for a longer period of time. My personal impression is that one does not develop any psychological inhibitions during the shooting to death. However, these appear if one contemplates it quietly after a few days in the evening."
Did you not have a psychological problem on your hands with your German soldiers who found this execution of these harsh reprisal measures more than they could take?
A. This report about the shooting of Jews and gypsies was not known to me at the time.
Q. I am not asking you so much about this particular report, General Kuntze, as about the general fact that you might have had a psychological problem on your hands.
A. The cause of that might be that the unit which had to carry out the shootings -- I do not know the connections now -- that this unit was not part of the troops concerned. This report is about the execution of an order which, as far as I remember, was issued about the 19th or 20th of October.
Q. Let's forget about the report for a minute, General Kuntze. Did you or didn't you have a psychological problem on your hands because your German soldiers couldn't stand to execute these severe reprisal measures?
A. No.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: We will take our noon recess at this time (A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General Kuntze, prior to the luncheon recess we were talking about the military necessity for the measures which you ordered and which your troops put into effect during the period of time you were deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast. Is it your position that the measures which you ordered were warranted from a military necessity standpoint?
A. I only ordered measures once in the order of the 19th of March. These measures were necessary because at that time, as I have repeatedly stated, we had to reckon with a considerable uprising.
Q. Prior to 19 March 1942 were the measures which you ordered and which your troops put into effect warranted from a military necessity standpoint?
A. Yes, they were justified by military necessity.
Q. General Kuntze, did you believe you could break the back of the insurgent movement and pacify the Southeast by draconic measures?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you believe that the orders which came to you from OKW were warranted from a military necessity standpoint?
A. Yes, I believe they were warranted.
Q. Didn't you. earlier say that you protested to OKW about these orders?
A. I protested against the order of the 1st of February issued by the OKW because it exceeded the measures recommended by me.
Q. If those measures were necessary from a military standpoint why did you protest against them?
A. I protested against this order because it demanded or rather it told me no prisoners were to be taken; that persons were to be liquidated and other such things.
Q. General Kintze, directing your attention to the reprisal measures which were ordered by OKW and which you yourself ordered. Did you believe that these harsh reprisal measures would pacify Serbia?
A. I have already mentioned that it was necessary at that time to keep the reprisal measures at a rather harsh standard and as soon as this was no longer necessary they were mitigated.
Q. General Kuntze, do you recall being examined by Dr. Hindemith on behalf of General Foertsch and being asked whether you ever protested the OKW and then giving this answer: "I believe I have already mentioned that there were two arguments which caused me to make representations to the OKW and which made me oppose their views. The first was that I did not believe that the very harsh measures demanded by the OKW would help in the pacification of the country, and the second argument was that the carrying out of these very harsh measures could have meant a great loss for the Serbian economy." What is your opinion today? Do you believe that the harsh measures did help to pacify Serbia or that they did not.
A. I am of the view that two things which are completely separate from each other - I have generally been asked whether harsh measures would lead to a pacification of Serbia and I added that was necessary in view of the situation and that harsh measures were to be taken and in other places where it was necessary more gentle measures would have to be taken; and that I protested against the order of the OKW on the 1st of February because these measures could not be called harsh but rather exceedingly harsh.
Q. General Kuntze, will you look at Exhibit 211 in Document Dock VIII, page 61 of the English and page 52 of the German. This is your report of 23 February 1942 and you will note from the second sentence of that report "up to now we have been unable to break the backbone of the insurgents by draconic measures." Why did you continue to use these measures if they were not having success?
A. I was not able to understand you. I couldn't follow that; it was too vague.
Q. In your report of 28 February 1942 you state that up until now we have been unable to break the backbone of the insurgents by draconic measures" and I am of the impression that you continued to use draconic measures from February until August when you left the Southeast and I am wondering why you continued to use these measures if they were not having any success.
A. This is not a report of mine. This is a draft which was given to me by the OKW. What you have just read is an extract of the 1st of February and the OKW tells me that my measures were not draconic enough.
Q. As to what the report says from the chief of OKW he points out the situation in Serbia, according to reports of Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. The OKW communication was based upon reports which you had submitted; you had apparently told the OKW that draconic measures were not working in the Southeast?
A. I didn't report that; that's an opinion of the OKW.
Q. Let's read it together, General. This sentence of the report in the teletype dated 1 February 1942, the Chief of OK points out that the situation in Serbia according to reports of Wehrmacht Commander Southeast and the result of the penal exhibitions is not as yet justified, hopes that insurgents on a large scale will not start again in Spring. Hadn't you earlier reported to OKW that your measures were not working?
A. No.
Q. General Kuntze, you didn't have enough troops in the Southeast to pacify the whole area. Isn't it true that you took these harsh reprisal measures in order to terrorize the population and make up for the shortage of troops by terroristic measure methods?
A. No, I did not terrorize the population; I certainly did not terrorize them and I have proved it in the reports which I have submitted here and which show that the situation in Serbia remained completely quiet and that I should therefore take milder measures.
I have also said that I asked for reinforcements for those troops in order to carry out the pacification more quickly by denser occupation of the country. I have never said there were too few troops to pacify the country.
Q. You believe then that the record shows that you ordered very mild measures, and that your troops took very mild measures in accomplishing the pacification of the Southeast?
A. The reprisal measures which were imposed were necessary at that time, because acts of sabotage took place, burning down of many villages. I have stated here that once during my time of service, not a whole village was burnt down, but only those buildings where German equipment was found were burnt down.
Q. Are you proud of your record as Deputy Commander Southeast, General Kuntze?
A. No, I am sad that I ever received this post. I would have preferred to be sent to the fighting front, rather than to a front where one had to fight against partisans, but not against an active enemy.
Q. You never asked to be removed from your position, did you?
A. I believe that it was not necessary to ask for a formal dismissal, but the fact I was never appointed High Commander Southeast, and that all my suggestions to the OKW were never heeded, and that they were rather brusquely rejected, and that I had personal differences with Jodl and Keitel, made a formal dismissal unnecessary.
Q. When did you take over the Deputy Commander Southeast, do you recall the date?
A. Yes, I do. It was reported on the 27th October. I arrived especially on the 26 October, and I was told by a report of the OKW that I had taken office on 27 October.
Q. General Kuntze, will you look at this document which is a copy of your service record --
MR. FENSTERMACHER:NOKW 1779 is offered as Prosecution Exhibit 594.
Q. General Kintze, you will note in your service record the date October 24, 1941, as the date when you became Deputy Commander and Chief 12th Army, simultaneously Deputy Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, can you explain why your service record indicated the 24 October 1941 as the date when you took over, when you believe you took over only on the 27 October?
A. I am of the view that this is clear from the documents, the report from the German Commander Southeast to the OKW. There is a note here attached to the 164th Division. I can only explain it in this way, that the directives appointing me as deputy bears this date, and that this date was used for my Army record.
Q Will you turn to the next page of the document. You will note on 1 February 1941, General Busch had this to say of you: "Estimate by Strauss of 6 July 40 remains valid. Reserved, clear and definite, glad to accept responsibility in action." Do you assume responsibility for what your troops did in the Southeast during the time you were Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A. Yes, I assume responsibility for everything which the troops carried out on the strength of my orders, and from what was reported to me and what became known to me.
Q. Now, just a very few questions regarding your relationship with General Foertsch; you considered General Foertsch and expert on the Balkans, did you not, General Kuntze?
A. General Foertsch had good knowledge of the Balkans.
Q. Foertsch had been there for sometime when you arrived and had more experience dealing with the Balkan affairs than you; did you rely to a large extent on his judgment?
A. As in ever situation like this, one either has trust in one's Chief of Staff or one hasn't. Foertsch had supported me according to his best belief and knowledge.
Q. Do you consider Foertsch a man of extremely high intelligence?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he initiate measures, did he come to you and say this ought to be done on many occasions?
A. It was part of a chief's task sometimes to suggest measures. I certainly want to emphasize that Foertsch was never what you call an instigator. He never tried to instigate sharp measures.
Q. Did Foertsch have a great deal of influence on you?
A. Foertsch had no influence on me, and I had to receive his suggestions and his proposals at first, but I remember that we had differences of opinion later on, not on the questions mentioned today but rather in the tactical field.
Q. Did you ever have the feeling Foertsch was dominating you, that he, rather than you, was the power in the Southeast?
A. No.
Q. Did you consider Foertsch next to you the most powerful man in the Southeast during your tenure?
A. A chief of staff has no power to order actions. For that reason he cannot be the most powerful man.
Q. But in the sense of having influence and respect for his judgment wasn't Foertsch a very powerful man at the Armed Forces Southeast Headquarters?
A. That one has to agree as Chief of Staff is clear. That one has to discuss some measures of a general measure is clear. I can only answer the question so far there is no question of power as mentioned here, because the Chief of Staff is advisory, but is not a commander.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: No further questions, Your Honor.
JUDGE CARTER: Any redirect examination?
DR. MENZEL: Yes.
Menzel for General Kuntze. Your Honor, before I start the redirect examination I want to make a short observation regarding the following point. On Friday we received the German transcript for the cross-examination before the recess. I have ascertained that some mistakes have occurred in this transcript, which are probably due to the fact that General Kuntze has taked somewhat fast, and not very clearly, and that for this reason the interpreters and court reporters could not follow him. Today I received the English transcript, and I found there that in general that the English transcript is correct. If it should turn out that the English transcript too contains mistakes the court will, I hope, allow me to rectify this at a later date.
JUDGE CARTER: Certainly.
DR. MENZEL: Thank you.
I will try to be as brief as possible in my redirect examination.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. MENZEL:Q.- General Kuntze, you will remember that before we went into recess in cross-examination the question of the executive power in the Balkan area was discussed.
You said that you would appoint and dismiss civil servents, that this was in the framework of this executive power. In this contention I want to put some questions to you.
A.- May I just say something to that? As far as I remember, I said that in peacetime -- that is, in Germany -- a dismissal of civil servants was in the hands of the commander to whom the executive power had been transferred.
Q.- Yes. You mean to say that during peacetime, for instance in Germany, if a high commander had been given executive power?
A.- No. That was actually the case. Field Marshal von Rundstedt received executive power when the Prussian government was removed and I remember that in this position he removed the police president of Berlin as well as the Commander of the Security of Berlin on the strength of his executive power.
Q.- How, what about executive power for you during your tenure of office as commander? Could you, for example, dismiss Serbian or Greek officials?
A.- I personally would not have done that because the appointment in the intercourse with the government was a matter for the local commanders for Serbia; for the Plenipotentiary Commanding General for Greece it was out of the question because the Greek government worked together with the Minister von Altenburg.
Q.- Could you dismiss German officials of the German Wehrmacht?
A.- No.
Q.- Could you dismiss officials of the German Civil Service?
A.- I could not do that either.
Q.- Could you, for instance -- would you have, for instance, been in a position to dismiss Thurner?
A.- If Thurner could have been dismissed this would probably have happened before my time. I have stated here that during my time representations were made to the OKW on account of Thurner and finally by me personally in March of 1942 to Jodl as well as to Keitel.
Q.- Now, another point in the redirect examination. The tactical tasks in the Balkans were discussed and you said that this unrest had to be suppressed. What was your chief tactical task in the Balkans?
A.- My task was not of a tactical nature but of a strategical nature. My chief task as Commander in Chief Southeast, according to the Fuehrer directive, was to defend the entire area and to safeguard this defense, especially the front against the Mediterranean.
Q.- That was protection against invasion?
A.- Yes, that was protection against invasion.
Q.- I now revert to the partisans quite briefly. We talked about their bearing insignia which could not be recognized at a distance. Now, I want to put two questions to you in this context. Did the partisans always wear these insignia or did only part of the partisans wear this insignia?
A.- According to the reports, as has now become known to me, the insigna were worn by most of the partisans. Some reports say that not all partisans wore these insignia.
Q.- Can you tell us something of the fact whether these insignia could be torn off by a partisan who was fleeing and could be thrown away?
A.- Yes, the difficulty was that at that time partisans wore apart from these insignia, no military clothing at all. They were just wearing peasants' clothing and they often appeared as fighters and then again as peasants and the removal of the Soviet Star still sufficed to make them peaceful peasants again.
The same held good for the Nihajlovic Cetniks who wore the Jugoslav crest as their insignia.
Q.- Apart from these insignia; you also said that the partisans were franc-tireurs because they also did not fulfil other conditions of the law -- that is, they would also have been set upon as franc tireurs if they had worn uniforms. You have given us examples, they did not openly bear arms and especially continued to fight after the capitulation,et cetera. Is a case known to you from German history which caused a great sensation at that time in Germany where German officers were shot who had continued to fight after capitulation in full uniform?
A.- No such case is not known to me when German officers continued to fight after capitulation.
Q.- You are probably only thinking of the more modern times but the officers of Schill would probably be known to you.
A.- Yes, I think the Schill officers are known to me, but they did not continue to fight after an instrument of capitulation but, exactly as in Serbia, they broke the instrument of capitulation. Schill, after the capitulation of the Prussian Army, marched off from Berlin with his regiment and opened the partisan warfare against Napoleon.
Q.- In this view, quite legally speaking, he was a franc-tireur in spite of his uniform?
A.- Yes.
Q.- As a soldier I want to put another question to you. Now, what is your opinion of the following case. If now in any area in Germany occupied by the Allied powers National Socialists gathered and started a kind of guerilla warfare from the woods, and if these people were the party insignia, for example, would you as a soldier look upon these people as franc-tireurs or as fighting troops?
A.- As franc-tireurs.
Q.- And why?
A.- Because they had started fighting again by breaking an agreement.
Q.- I must now return to one ether point which has been discussed twice, but which has not been cleared entirely. That is the removal of mines. Now, could you subdivide -- rather, in how many parts do you subdivide the action of clearing mines?
A.- The removal of mines takes place in the following way: first of all, the mines have to be found. This can only be done with the help of special operators and only engineers or pioneers who are skilled in the use of these instruments can use these instruments. Once we have ascertained where these mines have been laid, special pioneer removal corps have to pull out these mines; that is to say, these mines have to be dug up and the detonators have to be removed; but since one never knows what kind of detonator is used in a mine and where these mines do not have detonators, - apart from those on the surface, whether or not they have others underneath, these mines are exploded; and since every mine contains a lot of dynamite, large craters are caused by the blasting of mines, and these represent great obstacles on roads; and then the second act begins in the removal of mines -- or, rather, the craters are filled in again. Anyone can do that. This is what is meant by the removal of mines.
Q.- I understand you like this. - If in your order you talked about the fact that the civilian population may be used for removal work of mines, you only meant the filling in of craters?
A.- Yes, this is quite definitely so and it is also proved by the fact that we go on to talk about the removal of barbed wire obstacles, etc.
Q.- You meant the second part of the operation?
A.- Yes.
Q. In cross examination a deportation of captured partisans was discussed. The deportation of captured partisans into the German Reich for labor employment. Apart from the consequences was this a harsh measure against the imprisoned partisans?
A. This was not a hard measure.
Q. And why not?
A. Because the partisan were, according to regulations, to be treated as franc-tireurs; that is, they would actually have deserved death.
Q. Now, let us leave the franc-tireurs aside and let us talk about regular prisoners of war of a fighting army. Were these to be sent from the combat area to the home country of the victor and to be used for work?
A. This has happened repeatedly in this war.
Q. Is this admissible?
A. It is admissible.
Q. If I may ask you who may be used for work, what restriction does there exist about who may not be used for work? Enlisted men can be used and non-commissioned officers can be used for work?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, something about the collection camps: was that a polite measure or a military measure?
A. The guarding of the camps?
Q. No, the installation of the measures.
A. That was a police measure.
Q. Was the Higher SS and Police Leader subordinate to you?
A. No.
Q. If this man received directives, for instance, from Himmler, or from the quartermaster general, did he not inform you of these directives?
A. No.
Q. Now, coming back to today's cross examination, we want to put a few questions to you. The prosecution asked you whether at that time in the Balkans all Jews were collected, in collection camps or not.
I am now asking you, at the time when these collection camps were already in existence, were many Jews in the Balkans still at liberty?
A. That may be assumed. I cannot say that in detail.
Q. You cannot give us any figures but can you tell us whether in Salonika, for instance, many Jews were still at liberty?
A. I have already stated that Jews were in Salonika and that nothing had happened to them and that in Serbia the figure mentioned in one report, the figure of 5,000 which was read, proved to me that this was a far higher figure.
Q. Is it known to you whether, for instance, in Salonika German officers lived with Jews?
A. Yes, I know that.
Q. Now, something else: we have discussed whether the reports which were directed to you as Armed Forces Commander Southeast were always submitted to you. Were all reports and all measures submitted to you?
A. The reports and messages were only submitted to me when they were especially important generally. All the messages and all the reports which were sent to the OKW were told to me in summary in a verbal report and only the most important individual reports were given to me.
Q. You are just talking about reports to superior headquarters. Now, about the reports which reached you from lower headquarters.
A. It was like this. All these reports were summarized in a verbal report before they were sent to the OKW and in the verbal report especailly important messages were read to me and were submitted to me.
Q. Do you remember a War Diary which was shown to you this morning as a new document, as Exhibit 593? That has something to do with the Field Gendarmerie unit which had shot commissars in Russia. Were war diaries submitted to you by lower units?
A. No.
Q. That never happened in practice?
A. The war diaries wore kept and when they were initialed they were sent home.
Q. Without being shown to you?
A. Without reaching me.
Q. Now, another question: the prosecution asked you this morning if and why you, during your tenure of office never asked for your release from office. Did the fact also play a role here that you had only been Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast and during that whole time had reckoned on being relieved at very short notice?
A. Yes, that was an added moment.
Q. You did not think that you would have to stay for such a long time?
A. No.
Q. Now another question regarding the responsibility: the prosecution has quite expressly asked you whether you took the responsibility for everything that happened in the Southeast, and you stated that you did assume responsibility as far as your power of command was concerned as far as your tenure of office was concerned and as far as you knew what was happening, and I want to ask you whether you want to restrict this statement in the following way or not; that is to say, do you want to restrict it to the effect that you don't feel yourself responsible for orders which were issued by the OKW and which you looked upon as binding for you. Do you want to assume responsibility for those orders, too, or do you want to state that these orders were binding for you?
A. I have stated that I am responsible for all acts which were carried out on the strength of my orders and also, in the opposite sense, those orders which came to my knowledge.
Q. All right, if you say you were responsible for those orders which you yourself issued, how about responsibility of such an order from you as complete conformity with an order of the OKW -- that is, if it only repeats what the OKW ordered you to do, who is then responsible?
A. The OKW.
Q. I am now coming to the last point. In cross examination you stated that the shooting of reprisal prisoners is a reprisal measure, or the shooting of captured partisans took place after they had been sentenced, by courtmartial. I now want to submit a document to you, not in the version as it was submitted by the prosecution. It is Exhibit 111. I don't submit the prosecution's version because this exhibit was submitted by the prosecution only as an extract, and important parts were not reproduced. I, therefore, submit the photostat which we have now received from Washington. That is Exhibit 111 which in the document books. There is not much point in looking for it because it has been given in a very abbreviated form. Can you toll mo from this exhibit something regarding a summary courtmartial? I refer to two reports, one to the report of the 27th of October 1941 --. I am sorry -- the 7th of October 1941 -- that's page 2 at the bottom.