A If it had been ascertained that the village had nothing to do with the whole combat action, no military commander would ever have given orders to burn such a village.
Q Would you ever have ordered the burning down of a village in reprisal where there was a shot from a single house in a village?
A No.
Q You recall the testimony of one of the Greek witnesses, perhaps, who said that the partisans never defended villages because they feared that the village would be burned down if they had been quartered in it and since they came from that village they didn't want their relatives to suffer. Is it true or isn't it that the villages in the southeast area were not defended but that the attacks upon your troops took place in fact away from the villages?
A It can be seen from a report the witness was talking of a period which was long after my time in the Balkans.
Q You don't believe that situation applied earlier?
A Villages were defended by the robber bands which were somewhere near North Salonika and there, for instance, the village of Selli was defended.
Q General Kuntze, I would like to return for just one very brief minute to the subject of political commissars. Would you take a look at this document please?
Document NOKW-2195 is offered as prosecution Exhibit 593. General Kuntze, this is an activity report of the Field Gendarme Squad 161a (motorized). This particular exhibit appears to be an enclosure No. 8 to the War Diary of the 61st Division, which I believe you testified was subordinate to your command when you were in Russia with the 42nd Corps. Is that correct?
A Yes, it was subordinate to me for the operations on moon and Ohsel.
Q Do you know what date the division was subordinate to your command?
A I have already said, as far as I remember, from the middle of September to approximately the beginning of October till the command was transferred to Rumania.
Q Are you quite sure that it was not subordinate to you at all during August, 1941?
A I cannot say that from recollection now.
Q Will you look, General Kuntze, at the entry for the 26th which I believe means the 26th of August? It should be on page 3 of your document.
A Yes, indeed.
Q I would like to correct myself. I believe the 26th probably refers to the month of September since later on you will note 27th, 28th, 29th September, 1941. Under the 26th, "Continuation of search - see under the 25th. A fuel depot containing 17,000 liters was discovered and secured. Shooting to death of saboteurs and Commissars."
And then will you turn to the entry under the 8th and 9th of October on page 4 of the document?
"In Camp Arensberg 18 Commissars and Politruks shot."
Then under 11 October, "2 Commissars and 1 Colonel shot in Arensberg."
Then turning to page 5 of the document, the entry for the 14th of October, "1 Politruk shot in Camp Kuiwastu."
Under the 15th, 16th, and 17th, "As 14th September. Squad Commander went as courier to Army to Conastie. 2 Commissars and several soldiers are being shot who belonged to a Russian squad which had landed in the rear area on Orsel and bad ambushed units. 4 Politruks shot in Camo Kuiwastu."
Under the 18th, "As 14th September. 4 additional Politruks shot in Kuiwastu."
Dropping down to the entry for the 21st and 22nd, "In Camp Kuiwastu there was an accident during guard duty. During the change of guard 1 soldier from the Supply Service was shot at after failing to answer upon being challenged four times.
3 Commissars were shot."
Turning to page 6 of the document, the entry for the 28th of October, " A prison camp being set up in Libula. Town patrolling in Hapsaln. 1 Jew and 1 Politruk wore shot."
Did you never hear about the shooting of political commissars and Politruks while you were commander of the 42nd Corps in Russia?
A I have already said that the general command was withdrawn at the beginning of October and was transported to Rumania and this transport took place from Riga, as far as I remember, on the 6th of October.
Q That still leaves one reference to us, the one of the 26th of September.
A May I have another look, please? Is that the entry which starts with "continuation of the negotiations--"
Q Yes, that is the one.
A It says here, "discovery"--I can't read it. It says-
(Another copy was handed to the witness.)
"A fuel depot containing 1700 liters was discovered and secured. Shooting to death of saboteurs and Commissars."
Q You never heard about that?
A No.
Q You heard for the first time here in Murnberg about the execution of Commissars by troops under your command, when you were in charge in tho 42nd Corps in Russia?
A No.
Q. I don't quite understand your answer, General Kuntze. Did you hear for the first time here in Nurnberg about the execution of Commissars by troops subordinate to your command when you were in Russia in charge of the 42nd Corps? You heard that for the first time here?
A. Today I have for the first time read that a Field Gendarme Unit of the 66th Division shot Commissars during the time when the division was subordinate to me.
Q. Now a few questions on superior orders, General Kuntze. Did you ever disobey any orders which came to you from your superior officers?
A. Yes, I did obey orders.
Q. You never disobeyed any orders which you ever got from your superiors?
A. No. If I had not obeyed any order for any special reasons, I would have reported it because that would contradict all military principles. Orders have to be obeyed and executed.
Q. Now you got an order from Keitel to execute persons at the ratio of from 50 to 100 to one. Did you carry out that order or not?
A. As I nave already stated, i circumvented that order as much as possible and I made personal representations to the offices concerned in the OKW.
Q. Did your circumvention never amount to the fact that you disobeyed it?
A. Yes, one can put it that way, that the order was circumvented.
Q. You mean by that it was disobeyed?
A. It was not executed in the manner in which it was ordered.
Q. Did you feel free to disobey orders which you got from your superiors?
A. I beg your pardon, I didn't understand your question.
(The question was repeated by the interpreter.)
A. As I have said, when I got orders which I did not execute, then I reported to the commands concerned the fact that I did not execute the orders.
Q. General Kuntze, you said that you did not carry out the Keitel order with respect to 50 to 100 to one and I am asking you, did you feel free at any time to disobey orders which you received from your superiors?
A. This order could be circumvented because it said in the order that as a rule--and that was a flexible order, that is when the situation demanded it, harsh measures could be taken but one was authorized in other situations to alter the order.
Q. Then it was not an order but it was rather a directive?
A. That is very difficult to separate.
Q. Haven't you already said that when you gave instructions to your troops that were subordinate to you in the language of suggestions, they were only directives which could be followed or not? Now if the Keitel paper need not have been followed in every case, then it too was a directive rather than an order?
A. In the directive, as I gave it, I said the words very clearly that "there may" and for instance - in Keitel's order it says "as a rule" that it is put very much more clearly. However, even this order leaves the possibility that if the general situation changes and the attitude of the population changes, mitigations can be made.
Q. You say then that you circumvented the Keitel order? Were there any other orders which you received from your superiors which you circumvented?
A. No, circumvention is not the right expression. That is, I just interpreted this order differently and as to other orders I didn't no anything.
Q. Do you think Keitel intended you to interpret his order the way you did?
A. Keitel was personally informed by me. He knew exactly that I endeavored to achieve mitigation of the situation in Serbia.
Q. He didn't object to your not carrying out his order to the letter?
A. Of course he rejected at that time a complete alteration of the directive by the OHW, but soon afterwards an order arrived which crossed with my order, according to which prisoners were no longer to be shot on principle, could be used as laborers and that measure was a considerable change and also one of the opinions of the OKW.
Q. Can we put it this way the, General Kuntze, that you never disobeyed an order of your superiors? You might have circumvented them but you never disobeyed them.
A. No.
Q. Well, I don't understand. Is that a correct way of putting it?
A. I said I have executed orders. If I circumvented them, I reported accordingly.
Q. Do you consider a circumvention a disobedience of an order?
A. Yes.
Q. So then to the extant that you circumvented certain orders, we can say that you disobeyed them?
A. I didn't understand the question.
Q. I will put it another way. Did you consider the circumvention of orders of your superiors disobedience on your part?
A. No.
Q. Have you had legal training with respect to the rules of war, General Kuntze, at the War Academy perhaps?
A. No, I did not have any legal training.
Q. Are you familiar with the rules of war?
A. I beg your pardon--the rules of war?
Q. Yes, are you familiar with them?
A. Yes, I am familiar with them.
Q. Did you ever have any legal assistance at your headquarters as Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A. In my staff, there were several law counselors.
Q. Did they advise you with respect to the legality of your orders and orders of your superiors?
A. I cannot say that, whether every order reached the knowledge of the gentlemen concerned. Generally speaking, ail orders which were issued by the Armed Forces Commander Southeast went through channels. Whether incoming orders, as far as they were available, got to the knowledge of these gentlemen I don't know.
Q. When you first got to know of the Keitel order of 16 September 1941, what was your reaction? Did you consider that a legal order?
A. I had to assume that an order which came from the OKW had been examined, also, from a legal angle by all the responsible authorities.
Q. You as an officer in the German Wehrmacht had a duty to obey only legal orders, did you not, General Kuntze?
A. Yes.
Q. And you assumed that all orders which came to you from OKW were legal?
A. Yes, I have already stated that.
Q. You never questioned them or asked the advice of your legal advisers with respect to their legality?
A. If an order comes from the OKW, I have to assume that it has already been examined, and I have already states that all important orders within the staff, the departments concerned, that is Department III dealt with legal matters and I had to assume that these orders were being examined.
Q. General Kuntze, you had a duty to obey only legal orders. Does that not involve a duty on your part to ascertain whether the orders which came from your superiors were in fact legal?
A. I believe I did not have the right to examine legally orders from the OKU and nobody would have had that idea either.
Q. Before you issued your order of 19 March 1942, did you consult with your legal advisers as to whether it was within the limitations of the rules of war?
A. Whether the order had been examined also by Department III I cannot say. It took quite a long time to work on it and I'm convinced that I discussed it with the competent gentleman.
Q. And do you believe that you were advised that there was nothing illegal about your order of 19 March 1942?
A. If they had any objections to it, there would have been a note to that effect. I don't believe there was any such thing.
Q. General Kuntze, what would have happened to you if you had disobeyed an order of OKW and it had come to the attention of OKW?
A. If I had disobeyed an order?
Q. Yes, if you had disobeyed an order?
A. Then I would have had to bear the consequences.
Q. What would those consequences have been?
A. That can be various. That could have resulted either in the demotion from the position or to arrest in a fortress or even other things.
Q. Do you recall the document which we introduced sometime ago which was a protest by Colonel von Bothmer against carrying out an order of his superior regarding the execution of hostages? Do yon know if anything ever happened to Colonel von Bothmer as a result of his protest?
A. I don't know that. It was before my time. I never knew Bothmer.
Q. Wasn't Bothmer still in charge of Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters in Nish while you were Deputy Commander Armed Forces Southeast?
A. I didn't understand the question. Would you please repeat it?
Q. Wasn't Colonel von Bothmer still in charge of Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters in Nish while you were Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A. I have already said that I did not know Bothmer. I did not make his acquaintance.
Q. Do you recall from that document that Bothmer asked to be replaced?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever ask to be removed from your position as Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A. That was not necessary because that took piece in any case.
Q. But it didn't take place until quite a while. Did you ever fell that the things you had been asked to do in the Southeast were such that you wished you didn't have to do them and, therefore, asked to be replaced?
A. Nobody particularly liked to be in the Southeast and it was because the tasks t ere were far removed from the regular tasks of a soldier.
Q. Did you ever ask to be replaced because of that feeling of yours?
A. I cannot say definitely "Yes" today. It is easily, possible that during the discussions which I had with Jodl and Keitel I might have put my office at their disposal.
Q. You are not certain whether you did that or not?
A. No, I can't say that definitely today. Otherwise, I would have said it.
Q. Did you consult with Field marshal List frequently after you took over as Deputy Armed Forces, Commander Southeast?
A. No, I have already stated that my first meeting with Field Marshal List took place in Athens and could only be a very short one because Field Marshal List at that time was a very sick man.
Q. Do you know when Field Marshal List left the Southeast?
A. Field Marshal List I saw briefly when he came through Saloniki when he was dismissed from the hospital in Athens and went home.
Q. Do you know on what date that was?
A. I don't know exactly. It must have been around the end of November or the beginning of December.
Q. Wasn't it strange that Field Marshal List was never actually replaced as Armed Forces Commander Southeast? Did you ever feel that you were only in charge -
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Withdrawn.
Q. Did you ever have the feeling that he was in effect still in charge even though you had the title. "Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast"?
A. No. When I took charge of the affairs of Field Marshal List his rights and authorities came to me. It was a difficult situation for me because I didn't know how long this post would last for me.
Q. General Kuntze, will you look at Exhibit 311 in Document Book VIII on page 71 of the English and page 60 of the German? These are excerpts from the War Diary of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. Will you look at the entry for 4 July 1941?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. I beg your pardon. That should be 4 July 1942.
A. Yes, 1942.
Q. "The Fuehrer has appointed General Field Marshal List to commend an armed group in Russia. The former Commander in Chief of the 12th Army remembers all soldiers subordinates to him in an order of the day and expresses to them his gratitude and appreciation."
The 12th Army at that time, July 1942, was it still subordinate to Field Marshal List?
A. No.
Q. This language indicated that Field Marshal List considers the soldiers of the 12th Army still subordinate to him on 4 July 1942.
A. He said his farewell message in this letter which is always the case when a commander definitely and finally leaves his post.
Q. But you assume full responsibility, do you, for the events in the villages of the Southwest from the time you took over as Field Marshal List's deputy until the time you were succeeded by General Loehr?
A. Yes.
Q. General Kuntze, do you believe that the measures which you ordered in the activities of your troops in the Southeast during your tenure were all necessary from a strictly military standpoint?
A. Yes.
Q. Don't you believe that, in fact, those measures had a boomer and effect upon the German troops because of the harshness and severity of them? They, in fact, drove more civilians in the heads of the partisans and made your problem that much greater?
A. No, it can be clearly seen from the whole development in Serbia from the winter of 1941 until the summer of 1942 and even to a later date.
Q. General, isn't it true that if you did burn down a village the homeless inhabitants are bound to turn to the partisans in revenge? Wasn't the result of your reprisal burnings that the reprisals got more recruits?
A. No, frequently it was thus: that such villages were burned down 6 0ct.
-M-JP-11-4-Primeau (Int. Schaeffer) because they were defended, and the inhabitants had already left prior to the burning down.
Q. General Kuntze, isn't it a fact that your measures were so severe that even the common German soldier rebelled at carrying them out?
A. That he rebelled against carrying them out? No.
Q. Look at Exhibit 143 in Document Book VI, page 33 of the English and page 25 of the German. This is a report of the 734th Infantry Regiment which was received by the 704th Infantry Division on the 10th of November 1941. By that time you were already in the Southeast. This particular report concerns the execution of Jews and gypsies. It goes into quite some detail about it. Will you look on page 35 of the English the middle of the page and page 26 of the German and there is some remarks that the shooting of the Jews is simpler than that of the shooting of gypsies -- and then the paragraph beginning:
"In the beginning, my soldiers were not impressed. The largest part of the time was consumed by the digging of the ditches. The execution by shooting itself of 100 men in 40 minutes went very rapidly. The second day, however, it had become noticeable that one or the other did not have the nerve to carry out shooting to death for a longer period of time. My personal impression is that one does not develop any psychological inhibitions during the shooting to death. However, these appear if one contemplates it quietly after a few days in the evening."
Did you not have a psychological problem on your hands with your German soldiers who found this execution of these harsh reprisal measures more than they could take?
A. This report about the shooting of Jews and gypsies was not known to me at the time.
Q. I am not asking you so much about this particular report, General Kuntze, as about the general fact that you might have had a psychological problem on your hands.
A. The cause of that might be that the unit which had to carry out the shootings -- I do not know the connections now -- that this unit was not part of the troops concerned. This report is about the execution of an order which, as far as I remember, was issued about the 19th or 20th of October.
Q. Let's forget about the report for a minute, General Kuntze. Did you or didn't you have a psychological problem on your hands because your German soldiers couldn't stand to execute these severe reprisal measures?
A. No.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: We will take our noon recess at this time (A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General Kuntze, prior to the luncheon recess we were talking about the military necessity for the measures which you ordered and which your troops put into effect during the period of time you were deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast. Is it your position that the measures which you ordered were warranted from a military necessity standpoint?
A. I only ordered measures once in the order of the 19th of March. These measures were necessary because at that time, as I have repeatedly stated, we had to reckon with a considerable uprising.
Q. Prior to 19 March 1942 were the measures which you ordered and which your troops put into effect warranted from a military necessity standpoint?
A. Yes, they were justified by military necessity.
Q. General Kuntze, did you believe you could break the back of the insurgent movement and pacify the Southeast by draconic measures?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you believe that the orders which came to you from OKW were warranted from a military necessity standpoint?
A. Yes, I believe they were warranted.
Q. Didn't you. earlier say that you protested to OKW about these orders?
A. I protested against the order of the 1st of February issued by the OKW because it exceeded the measures recommended by me.
Q. If those measures were necessary from a military standpoint why did you protest against them?
A. I protested against this order because it demanded or rather it told me no prisoners were to be taken; that persons were to be liquidated and other such things.
Q. General Kintze, directing your attention to the reprisal measures which were ordered by OKW and which you yourself ordered. Did you believe that these harsh reprisal measures would pacify Serbia?
A. I have already mentioned that it was necessary at that time to keep the reprisal measures at a rather harsh standard and as soon as this was no longer necessary they were mitigated.
Q. General Kuntze, do you recall being examined by Dr. Hindemith on behalf of General Foertsch and being asked whether you ever protested the OKW and then giving this answer: "I believe I have already mentioned that there were two arguments which caused me to make representations to the OKW and which made me oppose their views. The first was that I did not believe that the very harsh measures demanded by the OKW would help in the pacification of the country, and the second argument was that the carrying out of these very harsh measures could have meant a great loss for the Serbian economy." What is your opinion today? Do you believe that the harsh measures did help to pacify Serbia or that they did not.
A. I am of the view that two things which are completely separate from each other - I have generally been asked whether harsh measures would lead to a pacification of Serbia and I added that was necessary in view of the situation and that harsh measures were to be taken and in other places where it was necessary more gentle measures would have to be taken; and that I protested against the order of the OKW on the 1st of February because these measures could not be called harsh but rather exceedingly harsh.
Q. General Kuntze, will you look at Exhibit 211 in Document Dock VIII, page 61 of the English and page 52 of the German. This is your report of 23 February 1942 and you will note from the second sentence of that report "up to now we have been unable to break the backbone of the insurgents by draconic measures." Why did you continue to use these measures if they were not having success?
A. I was not able to understand you. I couldn't follow that; it was too vague.
Q. In your report of 28 February 1942 you state that up until now we have been unable to break the backbone of the insurgents by draconic measures" and I am of the impression that you continued to use draconic measures from February until August when you left the Southeast and I am wondering why you continued to use these measures if they were not having any success.
A. This is not a report of mine. This is a draft which was given to me by the OKW. What you have just read is an extract of the 1st of February and the OKW tells me that my measures were not draconic enough.
Q. As to what the report says from the chief of OKW he points out the situation in Serbia, according to reports of Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. The OKW communication was based upon reports which you had submitted; you had apparently told the OKW that draconic measures were not working in the Southeast?
A. I didn't report that; that's an opinion of the OKW.
Q. Let's read it together, General. This sentence of the report in the teletype dated 1 February 1942, the Chief of OK points out that the situation in Serbia according to reports of Wehrmacht Commander Southeast and the result of the penal exhibitions is not as yet justified, hopes that insurgents on a large scale will not start again in Spring. Hadn't you earlier reported to OKW that your measures were not working?
A. No.
Q. General Kuntze, you didn't have enough troops in the Southeast to pacify the whole area. Isn't it true that you took these harsh reprisal measures in order to terrorize the population and make up for the shortage of troops by terroristic measure methods?
A. No, I did not terrorize the population; I certainly did not terrorize them and I have proved it in the reports which I have submitted here and which show that the situation in Serbia remained completely quiet and that I should therefore take milder measures.
I have also said that I asked for reinforcements for those troops in order to carry out the pacification more quickly by denser occupation of the country. I have never said there were too few troops to pacify the country.
Q. You believe then that the record shows that you ordered very mild measures, and that your troops took very mild measures in accomplishing the pacification of the Southeast?
A. The reprisal measures which were imposed were necessary at that time, because acts of sabotage took place, burning down of many villages. I have stated here that once during my time of service, not a whole village was burnt down, but only those buildings where German equipment was found were burnt down.
Q. Are you proud of your record as Deputy Commander Southeast, General Kuntze?
A. No, I am sad that I ever received this post. I would have preferred to be sent to the fighting front, rather than to a front where one had to fight against partisans, but not against an active enemy.
Q. You never asked to be removed from your position, did you?
A. I believe that it was not necessary to ask for a formal dismissal, but the fact I was never appointed High Commander Southeast, and that all my suggestions to the OKW were never heeded, and that they were rather brusquely rejected, and that I had personal differences with Jodl and Keitel, made a formal dismissal unnecessary.
Q. When did you take over the Deputy Commander Southeast, do you recall the date?
A. Yes, I do. It was reported on the 27th October. I arrived especially on the 26 October, and I was told by a report of the OKW that I had taken office on 27 October.
Q. General Kuntze, will you look at this document which is a copy of your service record --
MR. FENSTERMACHER:NOKW 1779 is offered as Prosecution Exhibit 594.
Q. General Kintze, you will note in your service record the date October 24, 1941, as the date when you became Deputy Commander and Chief 12th Army, simultaneously Deputy Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, can you explain why your service record indicated the 24 October 1941 as the date when you took over, when you believe you took over only on the 27 October?
A. I am of the view that this is clear from the documents, the report from the German Commander Southeast to the OKW. There is a note here attached to the 164th Division. I can only explain it in this way, that the directives appointing me as deputy bears this date, and that this date was used for my Army record.
Q Will you turn to the next page of the document. You will note on 1 February 1941, General Busch had this to say of you: "Estimate by Strauss of 6 July 40 remains valid. Reserved, clear and definite, glad to accept responsibility in action." Do you assume responsibility for what your troops did in the Southeast during the time you were Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast?
A. Yes, I assume responsibility for everything which the troops carried out on the strength of my orders, and from what was reported to me and what became known to me.
Q. Now, just a very few questions regarding your relationship with General Foertsch; you considered General Foertsch and expert on the Balkans, did you not, General Kuntze?
A. General Foertsch had good knowledge of the Balkans.
Q. Foertsch had been there for sometime when you arrived and had more experience dealing with the Balkan affairs than you; did you rely to a large extent on his judgment?