About a concentration camp, in the sense, now accepted. I was not told anything at all. The documents show that the concept concentration camp and collection camp are in the orders of the Plenipotentiary General Serbia and in the reports used indiscriminately. In Sabac for instance one hears sometimes of a concentration camp and sometimes of a collection camp.
Q Without distinction again, let me ask you this: Did you arrest all the Jews and Gypsies or did you arrest only those which you felt were connected somehow with the insurgent movement?
A I personally have not ordered the arrest of Gypsies and Jews. Orders regarding the arrest of Gypsies and Jews were issued by the Plenipotentiary General Serbia as the Commander responsible for law and order in Serbia.
Q You knew what the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia was doing with respect to the arrest of Jews, didn't you?
A I know from his report at the end of November or beginning of December that the persons connected with the insurgent movement were to be arrested and I know from an order which was issued sometime later by the successor of Boehme, General Bader, that we have to understand that these people were the same kind of people as were previously arrested.
Q Did you ever investigate to see if all Jews were being arrested and not simply those who had a connection with the insurgent movement?
A This was clear from all the reports as far as they were present, as far as I remember only a few were arrested.
Q How many do you think were arrested?
A That I cannot say. In any case I believe to remember that the number of which I was told at the end of November or the beginning of December had not been reached.
Q Could you hazard a guess whether there were a few hundred or a few thousand.?
A I can not estimate that because I have no documents to fall back on.
Q You have your general recollection to go by, General Kuntze?
You were deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast and it was your job to know what was happening in your area?
A It was my task to know what happened but one also had to bear in mind that things happened in a very wide frame-work. Quite a number of personalities who were either insurgents themselves or in connection with the insurgent movement itself were arrested.
Q Wasn't the arrest of Jews of enough importance to come to your attention?
A The arrest of Jews? That question was not particularly reported to me. I believe my answers show that the Jews as such did not interest me. I lived in Salonika and I might say in a community of thousands and thousands of Jews.
Q And you didn't know what was happening to the Jews in Serbia?
A No.
Q If you turn to Exhibit 193 in Document Book VII which is on page 105 in the English and on page 86 in the German. This is a report from General Bader to you, General Kuntze, dated Belgrade, 20 March 1942. You will note under paragraph 6 of that report, under the second sentence: In the Jewish camp at Semlin there were 5,150 persons. Don't you recollect anything of that nature?
A That is reportedly in a ten day report. I don't know whether this was submitted to me.
Q It is addressed to you.
A Many reports were addressed to me.
Q Don't you remember receiving them?
A That they were received must be assumed but whether they were submitted to me I don't know.
Q It was the duty of your chief to toll you what was going on? Didn't General Foertsch toll you about these things?
A General Foertsch has informed me about all important matters.
Q Wasn't the fact that there were over 5,000 Jews in a camp at Semlin important to you?
A Considerable numbers of persons which had to be arrested were collected in camps. I believe it is not very different in Germany now where all persons who were at all connected with the Party who might become dangerous are also gathered in camps.
Q Then you believe that these over 5,000 Jews were all connected somehow with the insurgent movement and that is why they were arrested and not simply because they were Jews?
A No, I want to emphasize again that when in Greece we lived among a large number of Jews, especially in Salonika and that nothing happened to the Jews there. If the Jews were to be persecuted as a race the first to suffer from that would have been the Jews in Salonika; that the Jews in Serbia had to be arrested is clear from a number of reports.
Q Maybe it is just a matter of time. You know from the documents what happened to the Jews of Salonika in 1943, don't you?
A That I don't know because I left Salonika on the 8th of August 1942.
Q We will come to the Jews of Salonika a little later in this case but for the moment let's confine ourselves to the Jews in Serbia. Do you believe all the Jews were arrested because they were connected with the insurgent movement?
A That I assume as certain.
Q Did you ever investigate to make sure it was certain. You know Thurner's attitude towards the Jews?
A Thurner's attitude has only become clear to me now only after reading the documents.
Q You knew Thurner was a dangerous man; according to your own testimony he liked to be independent and you had a hard time keeping him in line. Wouldn't it have been natural for you to investigate to see what Thurner was up to, especially in view of the fact you got reports saying Jews were arrested and put into camps.
A We received first of all concerned the Commander and later became merely a police matter. We have followed this up and whether I sent any one to investigate these things in the camps I cannot say now.
Q Will you turn to Exhibit 200 in Document Book VIII, page 19 of the English and page 19 of the German. This is another tan day report from General Bader to you, General Kuntze. This is dated one month later than the preceeding one. This one is dated 20 April 1942 and you will note under paragraph 7: In the concentration camps there are 182 hostages, 3,266 reprisal prisoners, and 4,005 Jews. Have you any idea what happened to the 1,000 Jaws that represent the difference between those that were in camps in March and those that are in camps now in April?
A I don't know that.
Q You don't recall having received this report?
A No, I don't know whether I received this report. If I received it the original must be initialed by me.
Q Very well, we will pass to a different subject, General Kuntze. I believe you said earlier that you recall that the so-called Communist Partisans had political commissars among their troops. Is that correct?
A I have not spoken to a political commissar among the Communists as far as I remember.
Q There were political commissars among the Communist insurgents?
A I have read here in the documents that communist partisans had political commissars.
Q You didn't know about that until you came to Nurnberg?
A I have only learned of this here.
Q Will you look at Exhibit 127 in Document Book V, page 43 of the English, and page 43 of the German. This exhibit is a series of reports from the Commander in Serbia to you as Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast. I bag your pardon this particular report which is on page 43 of both the English and the German is dated 17 September 1941 which of course is prior to your time, but you will note under paragraph 1 of this report that insurgents in the area Cacak-Uzice are reported to have political commissars besides their military leaders.
Since this report was only one month prior to your assuming office as Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast I am wondering if General Foertsch perhaps did not tell you about this information. Do you recall whether Foertsch had anything to say about political commissars among the Communist units?
A No, I can't remember that. May I add here that the political commissars were to be looked upon as insurgents in the same way as other insurgents.
Q The political commissars were supposed to indoctrinate their units with political ideology; that at least is the role of the political commissar with the Russian troops and since the Communist insurgents by your own testimony were organized on the Russian model I assume that the political commissars among the Partisan Communists also had the same function. Do you agree?
A I cannot say anything to this matter. This would have to be contained in the instructions of the Communist Party of Serbia but I have not seen it.
Q General Kuntze, will you look at this document, please. This is NOKW 1389 which is offered as Prosecution Exhibit 590. 3 copies for your Honors; copies for defense counsel; for the Secretary-General; for court reporters and court interpreters, and here is a copy for Dr. Menzel to examine. General Kuntze, this is a report from the 738th Infantry Regiment to the 718th Infantry Division, dated the 29th of April 1942. I believe at that time the 718th Division was subordinate to you, was it not?
A The 718th Division was subordinate to Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia and therefore, also, to me.
Q You will see from this report-
A I beg your pardon, I must correct myself. On the 29th of April 1942 the 718th Division was not subordinate to me but to the Italian Commander in Chief of the 2nd Army, General Roatta. These were in combat in the Southeastern areas of Croatia.
Q The 718th Infantry Division was a German division, was it not, General Kuntze?
A It was a German Division. I may point to the conference of Abazia which took place in March and during which combined operation was planned between German and Italian troops, and which was later ordered by the Commanders in Chiefs of the respective forces. This operation under the code name Trio was subordinate to the Italian Army Command 2; the German forces which took part were the staff of General Bader, as combat group Bader, and the 718th Division and perhaps a few other smaller units, mostly technical troops. This combat group Bader, under the command of the Italian Army Command and 3 Italian Divisions took part, as well as part of a Croatian 203 Division -- it was formed at the beginning of April and as far as I remember it was dissolved in May, at the end of May.
Q In any event General Kuntze, no matter to whom the division was subordinate to at the particular time, you received reports about the activities of that division, didn't you?
A No, I received reports of an operative nature from the combat group Bader. Details which are listed here were not contained in the reports as far as I know.
Q Well, Bader would incorporate the most important facts from the reports of subordinate divisions in his report to you, would he not?
AAfter all is said from time to time he sent reports of an operative nature, that is, reports of the actions which took place and the details of the successes were not contained as for instance details of battalions, such as in this case.
Q This is a report of an operational nature, General Kuntze, on activities of Battalions and very important to a Divisional Commander and in turn to an Armed Forces Commander, are they not?
AAn order of a battalion in the large Southeastern area was of no importance to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, that Battalion reports were directed to a division is somewhat strange because in general the battalion reports to the regiment and the regiment reports to the division.
Q But this is a report of the regiment to the division, is it not, General Kuntze?
these are a series of reports from the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia to, you as Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. Will you look at the second report, the one for the 6th of June 1942. In that report it states: "Royal Bulgarian Occupation Corps mopping up operations by 717th Infantry Division between the Prokuplje and the Jastrebac mountains terminated. 31 insurgents seized, 2 rifles and ammunition captured. Successful engagements of the Bulgarian troops 24 kilometers south of Prokuplje, 1 Commissar and 2 Communist students shot to death, 18 insurgents captured as well as 2 rifles, 3 pistols and ammunition." Does this refresh your recollection at all with respect to the execution of commissars?
A. No. This is not a report of an execution. It says "one commissar and two students were shot," and since this was preceeded by fighting between Bulgarian troops and Communist insurgents, we have to assume that these persons were shot during fighting. This assumption is confirmed by the report what goes on to say that 18 insurgents were arrested and weapons were captured.
Q. General, do you recall reports introduced in evidence in this case, stating a certain number of persons had fallen in combat and a certain number of other persons were shot to death, and I believe perhaps you can recall that I asked Field Marshal List what that distinction meant, and I believe you will recall he stated, fallen in combat meant killed in action, and shot to death meant shot after combat. Doesn't shot to death here mean that these persons were shot after they had been captured, and not in combat?
A. No. Field Marshal list cannot have made this very sharp distinction. I know from the documents in a certain number of cases where the reports read "Shot during fighting."
Q. Very well, let's turn to Russia for a minute General Kuntze. You were in command of the 42nd Corps in Russia for a time, were you not?
A. Yes.
Q. What was that time again?
A. I would have to investigate this. It mentions a Battalion here, a regiment, yes. The regiment reports to the Infantry Division 718, yes, that is right.
Q. That is right. Will you look at the last sentence of the report, "One Partisan Commissar captured without weapons and shot." Your received not information to the effect that Commissars were being captured and shot?
A. No, this report is not known to me.
Q. Not this particular report of January 16; but from reports of a general nature, certainly you must have known from reports, and information from your subordinates, that there were commissars among the insurgents, and that those commissars were being captured and shot?
A. The commissars which took part in the fighting were, of course, shot with the insurgents as partisans.
Q. You recall that, do you, you recall the execution of commissars?
A. No, I have just been asked whether commissars of the partisans were to be shot or not, and I said if a commissar took part in the fighting he is to be treated in the same manner as any other franc-tireur.
Q. At any rate you do not know whether there were commissars among the communist insurgents, and therefore you did not know whether they were shot?
A. I didn't say that. I have never troubled myself over the whole question at the time. I know now from the documents that commissars did exist. The only thing of importance to me at that time was whether I had deal with insurgents or not, and from all my statements it is clear that it is my opinion that everyone who fought with the partisant was to be look on as an insurgent.
Q. And at that time you had no knowledge of the commissars fighting with the partisans?
A. I don't remember.
Q. General Kuntze, will you look at this document, please. This is NOKW 1393, which is offered as Prosecution Exhibit 591. General Kuntze,
A. I lead the corps from the beginning of the Russian campaign from the 22nd of June until the beginning of October. I cannot give an exact date.
Q. Was the 61st Infantry Division ever subordinate to you during that time?
A. The 61st Infantry Division was subordinate to me during an operation near Koon and Oesel.
Q. And the 217th Infantry Division, do you recall that being subordinate to the 42d Corps?
A. The 217th Infantry Division was subordinate somewhat earlier, as far as I can recollect from the beginning of August onwards until October.
Q. Now, you said, General Kuntze, that General Strauss received the Commissar order, but that he did not pass it on in the form in which he received it, he changed it to read "Political Commissars among the Russian troops were to be treated as prisoners of War and not to be executed out of hand," and you also stated, that Strauss was not to pass the order out of form, namely that he was to pass prisoners of war on to you?
A. Strauss did not receive the order in this way, but rather he passed it on in this shape to us as his subordinate generals.
Q. Did he pass it on to you in writing?
A. No, the order was communicated verbally.
Q. How did you pass it on to you subordinate units.
A. I passed it on verbally to the three divisions subordinate to me.
Q. The way you passed it on was to the effect that political commissars were to be treated as prisoners of war?
A. Yes, they were to be treated as prisoners of war.
Q. That was because, I take it, the political commissars who were with the Russian troops were possibly uniformed and were garbed as troops of Soviet Russia?
A. It is to be assumed that they belonged to the troops and were completely uniformed.
Q. Did Strauss tell you that the order he received was to treat the political commissars not as prisoners of war, but to execute the mout of hand?
A. I cannot of course say now what the order read in detail. As far as I remember it said Commissary are not to be shot but are to be treated as prisoners of war.
Q. Did you ever hear of the commissar order in the form in which it was sent out by the OKH?
A. No, I only read the commissar order here.
Q. You didn't hear about it before you came to Nurnberg?
A. In the version as it is here I only learned of it here.
Q. General Kuntze, will you look at this document, please.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: We offer this NOKW 1533, as Prosecution Exhibit 592.
Q General Kuntze, you will note that this is an enclosure to the 1-C Activity Report, the War Diary of the 217th Infantry Division. Will you look under the entry for 4th July 1941? "4 July 1941, So far 4 dead Politruks, 1 captured alive was handed over". Do you know what a Politruk was?
A I am sorry. Can you just tell me which report you are referring to? I have here the report of 27 June and the 1 July.
Q Will you look under 4 July 1941? Do you know what a Politruk is?
A A Politruk is a political commissar. I don't know what his tasks are, what his position is.
Q He corresponded to the political commissar, except that he was connected with a battalion -- lower, isn't that correct?
A I cannot tell you. I don't know anything about this.
Q General Kuntze, will you look under the entry for 27 June 1941 -- I beg your pardon, under the evening report for 1 July 1943: "The advance of the Division proceeded according to plan and, for the time being, was continued as far as the area of Jocava. During the advance the woods were searched. 30 prisoners were taken. These Russians all belonged to the dispersed 90th Division. Gradually, after days of wandering about and persuasion by the civilian population, they became certain they will not be shot any more. Partly they already turned themselves in voluntarily. The 389th Infantry Regiment shot a Political Commissar." Then will you look down at the final sentence of the entry, "Political Commissars were shot by the 1st Battalion of the 389th Infantry Regiment. Detailed reports about the prisoners follow." Does this refresh your recollection at all about the execution of political commissars by units subordinate to you when you were commander of the 42nd Corps in Russia?
A The 42nd Corps, you mean?
Q Yes.
A I may refer to my statement that from the beginning of June until July I was in the 9th Army to which this division did not belong, rather the division I Can only designate it by the names of its commanders, the division von Studnitz, the division Rittau and Division Ansorge.
The 217th Division was with the 18th Army: The division only became subordinate to me when I was used in Estonia. I may briefly repeat that after I finished my first task in the East I was withdrawn from the Army at the beginning of July, as far as I remember, that then I had to lead the Reserves of the 16th Army, and after we had crossed the Duena I received the order to march off to the 18th Army, I was resting there for a few days and then I was used again for covering the attacks which had started in the middle of Estonia against Reval, and only at that time the 217th Division became subordinate to me.
Q Do you believe -
JUDGE BURKE: Just a moment, please. I am a little confused. Apparently it purports to be a report from the 22d June to 13 July 1941. Your question has just referred to an evening report of July 1, 1943.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I am sorry I didn't call Your Honor's attention to this earlier. It is a typographical error which can be seen from the original document. It should read 1 July 1941.
Q You say General Kuntze, on 1 July 1941 the 217th Division was not subordinate to you?
A No.
Q General Kuntze, let's turn for a minute again to the subject of reprisals - very briefly. What is your definition of a reprisal?
AA reprisal measure is a measure which has to be taken and may be taken if warnings addressed to the population are constantly disregarded. That is warnings which were issued in order to prevent illegal actions against the occupational power.
Q Reprisals are to be used only as a last resort, are they not, General?
A Yes, as a last resort after the warnings which were issued in Serbia by the Commanders during my time were ignored.
Q They are to be proportionate to the act for which the reprisal is to be taken, are they not? That is to say the act of reprisal must not exceed in violence the act for which the reprisal is taken?
A There is no provision to that effect. It is obvious that reprisal measures must be applied in such a way that they reach their aim. That before my time such measures were taken is universally known, and is not denied. But that these harsh measures fulfilled their purpose is not only proved by the reports which are in existence about them, but also by reports to the effect that in the Serbian area around about 1941-1942, peace and quiet was restored, and that this lasted in general until the summer of 1942, - that is as far as I can judge it.
Q You never heard that reprisals taken must be proportionate to the act of violence for which they are taken?
AAs far as regards my own attitude, - as far as they were carried out by me, - they were always in the proper relation. I have only stated that I remember the case of General Bader in January 1942. General Bader had issued a very harsh reprisal measure, but this reprisal measure had its justification in the fact that in the case in question it concerned a communistic band of murderers, we had located several murderers already - and that in this case we had first of all applied mild measures, and then he had to apply sterner measures in order to stop the activities of this band.
Q You don't need to go into all those details, General Kuntze, I just wanted to find out if you agree that reprisal measures must be proportionate to the act for which they are taken in reprisal, do you agree to that?
A That depends on the situation. Now, one cannot make a statement of a general nature. If you imagine yourself to have been there at that time -- the main thing was to justify the contrary, and I can agree with the opinion which was given by Bader at that time that as far as possible we should act mildly, but if the situation demanded it we would have to be exceptionally stringent.
Q Do you believe there are no limitations to what a commander can do in reprisal for an illegal attack upon his troops.
A I don't put it that way. The limitations may be found in the general laws of humanity.
Q Isn't one of those limitations the fact that reprisals must be proportionate to the illegal act?
A I have already stated that this depends entirely upon the situation. One can not generalize about this. In Serbia situations arose which had been caused by the other side which cried to High Heaven not only were our soldiers murdered in the most beastial manner, but the inhabitants were also murdered in the same way. Terror and terrible ferocity was rampant, and the population was ordered to work at factories where there occurred sabotage, and all of these are conditions which have their effect on the reprisal measures which had to be taken.
Q. Now do you agree that reprisal measures must never be taken out of vengeance, but must always be taken with an idea of deterring the population from Committing similar illegal acts in the future?
A. If we had wanted to take revenge, We could have done so, because then we could have become really violent.
Q. Do you mean you murdered these partisan , not motivated by vengeance?
A. No.
Q. You also had the idea of deterrence in mind?
A. We wanted to warn the population to desist from participation in the activities of the partisans.
Q. You mean by taking severe reprisal measures attacking of homes, by taking of hostages, you could deter the partisans from attacking your troops?
A. That has happened. I have repeatedly stated that after the fighting near Uzice in November, there was a complete cessation of insurgent activities so that we restricted our reprisal measures. I may repeat again that in December, the reprisal order issued by Boehme was altered in its essentials, and that in the last resort the compilation which was made, proved that the ratio of the reprisals to the losses, was a very restricted one.
Q. General Kuntze, please try to answer my question. I asked what your motive was in taking reprisal measures. I asked you especially whether you took reprisal measures out of vengeance, or whether your motive was one of deterrance?
S. No, it was a reprisal. The population was to be deterred and the aim was to make it desist from participation in and acts of sabotage.
Q. General Kuntze, would you look at Exhibit 161 in Document book 6. page 100, in the English, and page 81 in the German -
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that again, please?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Exhibit 161, Document book 6, page 100 in the English and page 81 of the German.
Q. General Kuntze, this order outlines the procedure by which German losses are to be avenged. Will you look at page 83 in the German, page 102 in the English, under paragraph 5, "Reprisal prisoners and hostages may from now on be shot only on my previously given written order, which is to be obtained for each individual case. The principle is that the unit is to avenge its losses itself, if at all possible."
The language there is that of vengeance rather than of deterrance. Can you explain that?
A. This is a mistake in the language which can unfortunately be found repeatedly in orders relating to reprisal measures.
Q. Do you think that kind of language is improper?
A. No.
Q. Do you agree that that language is a correct statement of the motive which had moved German troops in their conduct of reprisal measures?
A. The motive was not vengeance, but it was a motive of reprisal of retaliation.
Q. And retaliation must have as its end deterrance rather than vengeance?
A. Yes.
Q. You disagree with the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia who used the language of vengeance here with respect to reprisal measures?
A. No.
Q. Do you agree that the language is perfectly proper?
A. No, that is not correct.
Q. You disagree with the language which the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia used?
No.
Q. I don't quite understand. Do you agree that this language is perfectly proper? That is, that the language of vengeance should find its way into an order with respect to reprisal measures?
A. Pardon. I have said the opposite.
Q. You believe that this language is perfectly proper?
A. No. I have said the opposite.
Q. In other words, you disagree with the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia who used this language; you would not use this language yourself?
A. No, I have already said that this expression is wrong, - incorrect.
Q. If you had heard about the Plenipotentiary Commanding General instructing his troops in this manner you would have called him to task would you not?
A. I must say that I have read this report here repeatedly. This word, "revenge" I have -- this word has struck me for the first time today, because the whole tone, the whole tenor of this order seems to prove to me that it was not aiming at vengeance. If Bader had wanted to take his revenge, he would not have so clearly the reprisal measures as much as he has done in order to prevent excesses.
Q. Your victims in these reprisal measures were of two types as I understand your testimony. They were hostages who had previously been taken from all classes of the population and held in certain camps, and they were also captured partisans. Now directing your attention/ first to the hostages. It is true, is it not? that hostages must only be taken before an attack occures?
A. Yes.
Q. Now when attacks did occur in villages from which you had previously taken hostages; your troops executed those hostages, did they not?
A. If an attack originated from a village, these hostages which are reported by the troops, were not hostages at all; they were prisoners.
Q. Now general Kuntze, weren't persons taken from all classes of the population, civilians arrested and gathered together in certain camps, and weren't posters put up in the village saying that if an attack occurred in this village, then "the hostages which we have previously taken will be shot?"
Wasn't that "practice followed in the southeast during your tenure?
A. No, in general they were not. This taking of hostages was continued, of course, and it served as a means of pressure in order to restrict acts of sabotage so far as possible. In the first reports from November shootings of hostages wore reported, but in this case, this is probably not a matter of hostages, because at the beginning it says, "Shot in combat, so-and-so many; shot as hostages so-and-so many; taken prisoner in combat, so-and-so many, and it cannot be a case of hostages merely, but of prisoners. I have also established that the language used for these reports is not clear either.
For instance, in a case which was submitted by the prosecution, that the 3rd Battalion of the 697th Division, had shot 130 men; a later report says, -- I must correct "later"-. I must correct the word, "later"-I mean to say, it was reported by another office that in the same case, it was a matter of hostages, either of hostages or of prisoners.
Q. General Kuntze, you are familiar with Field Marshal List's order of 5 September, stating that hostages should be taken; you are familiar also with Keitel's directive of 16 September 1941 stating that hostages should be taken from all classes of the population; you are familiar also with Boehme's order regarding the arrest of hostages from all classes of the population, Nationalists, Communists, Jews and Democrats; now do you mean that there were no hostages of that type executed in the southeast area while you were Deputy Armed Forces Command for the Southeast, and that the only persons shot in reprisal were captured partisans?
A. I could not establish from the documents that these were really shootings of hostages.
Q. Will you look at -
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Fenstermacher, I believe we will take our morning recess at this time, due to outside circumstances.
(Court in recess until eleven o'clock.)