THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the document number again, please?
DR. MENZEL: That is Document 1378, Exhibit 104-B, Volume 3, English document book page 93, German document book page 69.
BY DR. MENZEL:
A. That is a statement made by a civilian who had temporarily been captured by bands and who says here in the second paragraph: On the 25th of October the communists and Chetniks cooperated. He says here in paragraph 2 that they had an agreement not to attack each other, but instead to fight the Germans together.
Q. I will come to this point again later.
How did General Boehme talk to you about the treatment of captured insurgents?
A. The insurgents had to be treated as franc-tireurs.
Q. What was to happen to them?
A. A franc-tireur is punishable by death.
Q. What measures did Boehme, other than that, explain to you for the suppression of the insurgents?
A. He said that it had been tried with propaganda and it had been tried to prevent parts of the population from cooperating with the insurgents. That had been done by public appeals and by announcements in the press and by the Serbian authorities, but these warnings had, for the most part been in vain. On the contrary, sabotage acts had increased. He saw himself forced to adopt the harsh measure of the taking of hostages, and that is the taking of hostages in reprisal.
Q. Did he say anything about the fact that the levying of hostages had been ordered from above?
A. He talked to me of an order by the OKW which had ordered the taking of hostages.
Q. Did Boehme then give such orders himself?
A. He had not talked to me.
Q. Did Boehme report to you the order by Keitel of the 16th of September?
A. He only said that hostages, reprisal hostages, were to be taken. The order of the 16th of September I do not think he reported to me.
Q. Did you see that order later?
A. I saw it much later.
Q. When?
A. In December, as far as I remember.
Q. These ratios which were mentioned in the order were they applied?
A. As far as I got to know them, no.
Q. Did Boehme report to you an order by Field Marshal List of the 4th of September?
A. Boehme did not report to me an order with the date of the 4th of September by Field Marshal List. As I have already stated, Boehme only reported to me measures by Field Marshal list regarding two important points: The Field Marshal List had intervened once by bringing in reinforcements, to Serbia as far as he could free them in Greece, and, secondly, that he insisted that the troops which were dispersed in small garrisons all over the country by concentrated. And that these smaller enterprises, which were no longer effective against the band, would stop, and that from then on the fighting would be carried out in a concentrated manner.
Q. Did Boehme report to you about events in Belgrade, Kraljevo and Kragujevac?
A. No.
Q. When did you gain knowledge of these incidents?
A. I gained knowledge of these incidents, here.
Q. Did at that time or later read Thurner's ten-day report of the 30th of October 1941? I will show it to you. This is Exhibit 124, Volume 4, page 153 of the English; and 92-93 of the German.
A. I cannot remember having seen this report. The report is dated the 30th of October 1941. I must therefore have arrived in the Southeast at the time when the Staff was transferred from Athens to Salonika.
Q. When did that transfer of the Staff take place?
A. May I say something about this? The figures in the report, are comparatively high, of 2,300 hostages, and Kragujevac. The 2,000 hostages in Kraltjevo transfer of the Staff from Athens to Salonika took several days and, as far as I remember, the transfer started on the 30th of October and was carried through, in the whole, about the 2nd of November.
Q. Did you, after Gen. Boehme's report to you, give him any instructions?
A. No, and I couldn't do that because, first of all, I had not yet taken over the affairs there, and then I was not in a position at such an early date to give any orders regarding Military operations. Thirdly, after Boehme's report there was no reason at all to order anything.
Q. Did Boehme tell yon anything about the organization and cooperation of the commands responsible in Serbia and of any of one other responsible offices?
A. Yes, I must add here that I have talked to Boehme at great length for at least two hours in the evening, and on the next day before I flew to Athens, so that the question of the organization was certainly mentioned and discussed. He told me the following. His staff, Corps Headquarters Eighteen, dealt with all tactical matters as far as they concerned the 65th Corps, the 342d Division, and the expected 113th Division. Then there was a further technical staff. That was the headquarters of the military commander who was no longer actually present in person. Then the administrative staff of the former military commander for all matters concerning administration, police cooperation with Serbian authorities, and the Plenipotentiary for Economy.
Q. Whose orders did he receive?
A. His orders came directly from Goering, as the man in charge of the Four Year Plan.
Q. Was any talk about State Counsellor Thurner
A. State Counsellor Thurner was the chief of the administrative Staff.
Q. Whose orders did he receive?
A. He was subordinate to Gen. Boehme, but all the time he received orders on the one hand from the Quartermaster concerning administrative matters and from Himmler directly concerning police matters.
Q. Did Boehme tell you anything about the installations of concentration camps?
A. No.
Q. Did he talk otherwise about any camp?
A. He did say that the captured insurgents were brought into collecting camps.
Q. When did you learn anything at all about those camps which we today designate as concentration camps?
A. That may sound peculiar, but it is actually a fact that I, myself, and many of my comrades, heard only after we had been taken prisoner of concentration camps in the current meaning of the word.
Q. What did Boehme say now about the cooperation of his staff with the administration?
A. Boehme said that through the whole not clearly defined responsibility and authority there was a lot of tension and friction, and that State Counsellor Thurner, the chief of the Administration, liked to go his own way.
Q What did you consider as "going his own way?"
A I would say if a subordinate orders or executes anything without immediate orders from his superior.
Q I will now show you a document that is Exhibit 105, in Volume III, page 71 in the German document book and page 96 in the English document book. (Document handed to witness.)
JUDGE CARTER: Which document book, please?
DR. MENZEL: Book III, Exhibit 105.
THE WITNESS: This is an order according to the heading which went out from the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Serbia, (Commander Serbia Administrative Staff), dated the 26th of October, and it is addressed to all administrative sub-area and all district headquarters. The subject is: Arrest of Hostages. This order is signed for the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Serbia, the Chief of the Administrative Staff Thurner.
BY DR. MENZEL:
Q Was that admissible?
A No, such a basic and important order should never have been issued by the Chief of the Administrative Staff, but had to be given to the commander concerned for signature, which, in this case, would have been General Boehme. Furthermore, it is significant that this order did not even go to the corps headquarters, 18th Corps, nor to the General Staff, for information.
Q In connection with this I will show you a second document. That is Exhibit 136, in Document Book VI, page 12 of the German text and page 15 of the English text. (Document handed to witness.)
A This is in order with the heading Commander Serbia, Administrative Staff, dated the first of November, and it is addressed to the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Serbia, Higher Command, 65, Command Staff, Einsatzgruppe of the Security Police and of the SD.
This order, too, concerns an arrest of hostages. It talks about 700 representatives of the population of Belgrade.
Q Who issued it?
A This order, too, is signed for the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Serbia, Chief of the Administrative Staff; signature illegible. One would assume that it was Thurner too who signed it. This order, too, is of such a basic and important nature that it should certainly have had the consent and signature of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General.
Q Were these documents examples of an independence shown by Thurner in the sense you had mentioned before?
A Yes.
Q These two orders which you just read--did you know them at that time?
A No, the distribution did not show that the first order was also sent to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. Besides, the first order is dated the 26th of October, which was prior to my arrival there and the second order does not show a distribution to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
Q You had previously talked about tensions between those authorities. Now was anything done for the elimination of tension.
A The Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Foertsch reported to me at that time. If I may say something about the position of State Counsellor Thurner. The OKW had been asked to dismiss State Counsellor Thurner and after I had gained insight into conditions, had asked Keitel that Thurner be dismissed from his office.
Q Were you successful in this respect?
A No.
Q Now, about something else. You deputized for Field Marshal List in the southeast area. When was that?
AAfter my discussion with Boehme I flew to Athens. As far as I remember, it was the 26th or the 27th, but I do not know whether I am mistaken now. It might have been the 26th in the evening that I arrived there. I took charge of matters there, and this is mentioned in a report of the 27th of October which the Armed Forces Commander Southeast made to the AKW.
Q When did you officially and formally take over command?
A On the 27th of October, but it was obvious that before that I had to report to Field Marshal List and that I had to take a certain amount of time to adjust myself to matters under the command of the Armed Forces Commander.
Q Was there a further delay when the staff was transferred?
A No, there was no more delay.
Q You mean no delay when you took over, when you took charge?
A No.
Q What about your adjustment to the work?
A The situation was difficult. As a consequence of his severe illness, I could not see Field Marshal List immediately, but only two or three days after my arrival. He was so ill that there could be no talk of a detailed, and not even of a cursory, instruction to me.
My adjustment to the work was carried through in the following manner: Athens and later in Salonika I got information from the Chief of Staff and from the leaders of the various departments, and by means of various trips I could collect information from the commanders on the spot.
Q By means of those reports which you have just mentioned, was what General Boehme said about conditions in the Balkans borne out by these reports?
A Yes, Boehme's view regarding the situation in Serbia was confirmed to me.
Q About what time was it that you gained a complete insight into the situation and that you thought that you were well-informed enough in order to be able to make decisions on your own behalf?
A Roughly speaking, in general outlines, I was informed about November, and later I could find out about the details. It was difficult, of course, to resettle the staff, and these difficulties increased by the large area, by the difficult communications.
Q Was this knowledge a confirmation to you that these bands were illegal?
A The illegality of the bands was confirmed to me by the fact that the capitulation agreement was broken. That act in itself was an act which put the bands outside the law, and all the officials and officers with whom I discussed this said the fallowing:
No uniform action on the part of the bands against the Germans. From November onwards a fight of the Communist bands against the Mihajlovic bands. No identification on the part of the members of the bands. No uniforms. No insignia which could be seen easily from a distance, as was the regulation. They did not openly carry arms. And, finally, those acts violating International Law which have already been mentioned -- the murder of prisoners, etc.
Q. Do you therefore personally have any doubts that the bands could be treated legally as franc-tireurs or not?
A. No, I had no doubts on that score at all?
Q. Have you any legal training at all?
A. No.
Q. Is it known to you as a soldier how other states treat franc-tireurs in such cases?
A. I only know the German regulations say that there is a provision in International Law about that, but I know that other states have acted in the same manner as we have.
Q. I sit also known to you whether other states have sanctioned the taking of reprisal hostages?
A. Yes, that is known to me.
Q. Can you quote an example for this?
A. Yes, I can do that. I know of a provision or regulation of the Magistrate of the City of Berlin is issued, as far as I remember, at the end of May 1945, which states that for every killed member of an occupation Army not only those people who are guilty of this murder but also 50 members of the Party are to be punished by death. Cases of sabotage, -that I cannot say exactly, -- are to be punished in a similar manner. I cannot imagine that at that time a provision of this kind could have been issued without the approval and consent of the then occupation power.
Q. Now, another problem. How was the economic situation of Greece protrayed to you, at that time?
A. Well, that is a rather wide field, the economic conditions.
Q. On what did the economic life of Greece depend?
A. The economic life of Greece depended first of all on the supply of coal, but mainly on the supply of food stuffs.
Q. By which route had these food stuffs to be brought to Greece?
A. At that time food had to be brought to Greece, first of all by railroad, because it happened repeatedly that ships with grain were torpedoed.
Q. Did the destruction of railroad lines result in any consequences for the civilian population?
A. Yes, I have already said that the only railroad line which could be used, from Belgrade via Salonika, was the life line, not only for Yugoslavia but also for Greece.
Q. Can you tell us anything about the fact that the destruction of bridges had a special effect in this case?
A. They had a very great effect, and it has already been stated here that the destruction of two large viaducts, had great effects,--e. g. that of the Bralo bridge.
Q. How long do you estimate the Bralo bridge was?
A. The Bralo bridge was, as I remember about 500 to 600 meters long.
Q. And that bridge had been destroyed?
A. Yes, it had been completely destroyed.
Q. Was the food situation difficult in Greece, all over Greece?
A. The food situation in Greece was quite different in different regions. Generally it may be said that at the end of October and the beginning of November, the food situation in the large cities like Athens and Salonika had reached a certain point of tension, and that during the course of the winter the situation became aggravated, while on the land the population had enough to live on.
Q. Now what was it like on the islands?
A. It was different on the islands. There were islands which could have lived well, because of their oil production, if the necessary grain had been brought there, and vice-versa; and the difficulty here again was transportation.
Not alone the railways, but also a large part of the ships which had been used for the coastal traffic had been destroyed when the English retreated.
Q. By whom were they destroyed?
A. By the English.
Q. Which part of Greece was occupied by Germany and which part of Greece was occupied by the Italians?
A. The part of Greece which was occupied by the Germans was only Thessaly, apart from that part which was ceded to Bulgaria, and the region of the Italian occupation.
Q. What about the Harbor area of Piraeus and the airdromes?
A. The Piraeus had remained German, because it was the starting point of the traffic to Crete, I leave already talked about the importance of Crete as an aircraft carrier for the German airforce in the Mediterranean.
Q. Who was liaison officer for the Greek Government?
A. That was the Minister Altenburg.
Q. What was his official designation?
A. He was the German Minister in Athens.
Q. Who had the executive power in the German occupation area?
A. The commanders had the executive power, that is in Serbia the plenipotentiary, commanding general, in Northern Greece, as far as it was occupied by German troops, the Commander Salonika, in the Harbor area of Piraeus, the Commander Southern Greece, and on the Island of Crete the commandant.
Q. Was there any subordination of Italian troops under the German troops?
A. No, there was no subordination of Italian troops under any German command.
Q. Now, what about Crete?
A. No, I have to correct myself. On Crete there was one Italian Division in the eastern part of the island which was practi cally subordinated to the commandant of Crete.
Q. Also as far as discipline was concerned?
A. No.
Q. To whom were the units of the airforce subordinated?
A. To the Commander in Chief of the Airforce.
Q. What was the food situation on Crete like?
A. The food situation on Crete was, thanks to considerable production of oil, better as compared with Greece.
Q. Did the irrigation installations play a roll there?
A. They played a big roll. We had therefore a great number of irrigation systems installed by the troops, and we proved that apparently barren ground can yield a lot of products.
Q Could you utilize these measures or did the picture change?
A The same measures were taken in Greece originally and to my knowledge on a large estate which could supply the whole of Athens. This whole estate was put to order again. Unfortunately it later had to be transferred to the Italians.
Q Was there unrest in Greece when you arrived there?
A No, completely quiet reigned there.
Q And how about Croatia?
A The situation in Croatia at that time until the end of October can be described as generally quiet. At that time there were already cases of sabotage, especially on railway lines; fights had already started between several ethnic groups. Unrest, uprisings, only appeared when considerable part of the insurgents succeeded to escape from an encirclement near Uzice which had not been successful and to take root in Croatia.
Q When you assumed office in the Balkans for what period of time did you expect stay?
A I have already stated that I had been told that I would have to deputize from four to about six weeks.
Q Did you think you were justified as deputy for such a short time to change orders of basic importance or to take any decisive measures at all.
A That is a question of tact. Of course according to the letter I was justified to make alterations but in general it is not usual to carry out any measures in such a limited period of time which would mean radical changes or alterations. Apart from that there was no reason for doing that.
Q What orders regarding the chain of command did you find there?
A I found the Fuehrer directive 31 and then the order regarding the chain of command in the Southeastern area, dated 16 September, I believe. This order was superseded by an order issued in the first days of November.
That had become necessary for purely formal reasons. So far as I remember in the first order, the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia had not been named while in the second order the Plenipotentiary Commanding General Serbia had been named as the possessor of the executive power and as being responsible for quiet and order in Serbia.
Q I shall now submit a document to you, that is Exhibit 153, Volume VI, pages 55 of the German and 70 of the English Document Books.
A That is the new order which I have mentioned previously. It is not given here literally but is taken from the activity report of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast of the 13 of November.
Q Can you tell us something about this order, something which seems of particular importance to you?
A Yes, figure 2 is important, that is, the subordination of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast to Hitler and then figure 6 which states that the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia and the Commander in Greece who have been mentioned previously in Number 5 as Commanders Salonika-Tegacis and the Commanders Southern Greece, are responsible for the coordination of the defense in their areas and for the security against interior disturbances . They have the authority of territorial commanders, they possess executive power and directly supervise the administration.
Q Now, did you intervene as far as independence of these offices were concerned or not?
A No, the same way as Field Marshal List, I left all these commanders their independence because the conditions were different in every area, I was deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast interferred only when an order of the OKW made this absolutely necessary.
Q Was the fact that you were only deputy Armed Forces Commander of any importance in that connection?
A No.
Q When these four to six weeks had elapsed for which you had been originally appointed were you not told by the Army Personnel Office that you had been appointed for a longer term or were you left in the dark so that you must reckon with the end of your term almost any day?
A I was left in the dark and not in accordance with my personal attitude to direct an inquiry to the Army personnel office.
Q Did you read all the orders for the fighting of the insurgents issued by General Field Marshal List, before you took over the Command?
A That was not possible in view of the great amount of work which I had to deal with every day. Only in the course of time I could study the orders which had been issued before my time.
Q When did you first meet with certain reprisal ratios?
AAs far as I remember I only found certain reprisal ratios. Very late, probably in connection with the Boehme order. I have already stated it must have been around December.
Q Did you agree with these ratios?
A I traced these things and it became clear to me that this Boehme order must be based on the Keitel order of the 16 of September and I must say that these high ratios were contrary to my whole attitude.
Q Did you at that time do anything in order to decrease or lower these ratios?
A Yes after the fights or during the fights near Uzice I went to Belgrade in order to discuss the situation which in my opinion had changed, at the spot. At this discussions the following were present as far as I remember: General Boehme, and General Bader, who as I knew for certain at that time was to be appointed successor to Boehme. And as far as I remember I tried to influence Bader to the effect that the reprisal ratios had to be lowered and that the reprisal measures should be carried out in a tolerable way.
Q Were you successful in your efforts?
A Yes, first of all, as is also shown by the documents, the retaliation ratios were not high in November and December and Bader ordered on his part that the retaliation ratio was to be "lowered" and here, this is a very important point, Bader ordered that only he himself and no other office in Serbia could order retaliation measures.
Q. Are you referring to the Bader order of the 22 of December?
A. As far as I remember the order was issued at the end of December.
Q. I shall now submit to you document, volume IV, page 77 in the German and 95 in the English, Document 342.
A. Document 342 reproduces the order of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia of 22 December. This order is an extract from an order of 20 December 1941, since I have gone through the files I know that it is a basic order for the measures to be taken by troops subordinate to Baker and by the commands during the winter and this order from Bader, which contains no distribution list, at least not in the copy before me, reduces the retaliation ratio by 50 per cent.
Q. Did you have any reason why you yourself did not order a reduction of the retaliation ratio but rather let General Bader do it.
A. I did not do it in view of the fact that the first order had also been issued by the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia.
Q. Did you then want the change made by the same office.
A. Yes, that was the reason.
Q. Was perhaps, apart from this, the retaliation matter a territorial matter?
A. I think to make it already clear in my answers, as the basis order had been issued by Boehme, I thought it was only fit for the same office to issue the amendment.
Q. Did you later take any steps with the OKW?
A. Yes, I did do that.
Q. I will refer to that later. Now what about the shooting of hostages in Kraljevo and Kragujevac. Do you have any knowledge of this?
A. I have already stated that I have heard for the first time here of these shooting of hostages.
Q. Did the Armed Forces Commander Southeast get any information oh principle about the orders issued by subordinate offices?
A. No, it was not usual in the German Army that subordinate officers submitted orders they gave to their superior offices.
That only happened in very exceptional cases, when it had been ordered from above. I may quote here an example from the first World War. When, for instance, during the extraordinary difficult position warfare in the West an attack of considerable extent was to be order, it had become usual I can only say unfortunately that the subordinate officers had to submit the orders for such an attack previously. That of course limits the independence and as a consequence the self confidence of the subordinate leaders and for that reason this procedure was only followed in very exceptional cases later on.
Q. Can it be investigated and tested now, whether in an exceptional case a subordinate office submitted such an order to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
A. This can be established beyond any doubt. The fact that in such a case the respective office must be named in the distribution list of the order and the order will also show how it is being handled when it was received. It is usual that everybody who has taken notice of an order or of a report initials this report or this order, that is signs them with his initials.
Q. Can you quote any orders by which you are incriminated which, however, were not sent on to the Commanding General Southeast?
A. There are quite a number of such orders. For instance from all the officers subordinate to the Commanding General in Serbia. The orders issued from the divisions and the regiments were not sent on to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast and that is also true of the reports. Occasionally it may happen in the case of a particular important report, some person thought it was important to add something to a report but in general the reports of the regiments to the division were not handed on from the divisions to the plenipotentiary Commanding General in the Southeast.
Q. Which reports did you take note of?
A. I took note of all those orders of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia and then the reports from the armed Forces Commander Southeast to the OKH as far as they were tactically important.
Q. If I have understood you correctly numerous orders and reports with which you were formerly incriminated have not come to you knowledge at all. This is also true of activity reports and war diaries.
A. Keeping our war diary and activity report which is also a form of a war diary I may add here that activity reports were kept at higher headquarters where special tasks had to be separated. For instance the Armed Forces Commander Southeast--------
(The interpreter asks the witness to repeat)
A. -----The incidents are laid down in war diaries and activity reports. Activity reports may be look upon as war dairies as it is merely another expression for the same thing. Activity reports were issued from the various departments of the higher staffs. In order to record the incidents in their sphere of activity which was of quite a separate nature, for instance Department I-A Southeast is purely of a tactical nature of a Quartermaster General and they were purely of an administrative nature and they were completely different from each other. Apart from that the Armed Forces Commander Southeast kept a war diary the result of which you find is reproduced in the work of the Archives of counsellor Wisshaupt.
Q. Apart from these reports that did not reach you what was the general situation when something reached the Commander Southeast?
A. The document passed through various department and was dealt with there; especially important messages or reports were submitted at once to the Chief of Staff who reported them to the Commanding General.
Q. Was it like this that everything else received the Armed Forces Commander were not submitted to you at all that you only gained knowledge of them by way of report?
A. In the case of the staff it is like this: The Commander South east has such a large sphere of tasks and it is very difficult and it would also be wrong to read everything that was received.
