Q Who told you that?
A The Chief of the Army Personnel office.
Q Then did you go to Keitel?
A Yes, then I went to Keitel and I arrived in Berlin on the same evening, that was the 23rd of October, and Keitel repeated roughly what the situation was, the same way as Hitler had briefly described it, and then he talked to me about the tasks of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, and of the Commander in Chief of the 12th Army.
Q According to what you were told, were your tasks purely connected with the occupation, or were they of an administrative nature, regarding the possibility of an invasion?
A No. as I have already stated, the description of the situation was the same as the one which I had given before; the main task of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, was not locally restricted, and not an administrative task; it was a tactical, strategical task. I actually had two fronts; indirectly, there was the eastern front and the Mediterranean, and Keitel added that in view of the not yet clarified situation in Africa, it was important to develop the Island of Crete, and to lay in stock, because the Island of Crete was the main base for the operational air warfare in the eastern Mediterranean.
In the same way he emphasized the importance of a quick restoration of law and order in the Yugoslavian area.
Q You said before that you regarded your commission of a tactical, strategical nature?
A Yes, I repeat that the important thing was that the Balkans remained in German hands, and that the preparedness for defense of the Balkan area was at any time guaranteed.
Q Did you also receive from one of these authorities which you have just quoted, a commission of a political nature?
A No, I did not receive a commission of a political nature, and I cannot possibly think that a general from the front would have been withdrawn for such a commission of all people.
Q You want to say by this, that you did not consider yourself suitable?
A Yes, I considered myself unsuitable because I never occupied myself with such matters.
Q Well now, another question. When you received these commissions, was there ever any talk that the population was to be decimated or that the economy in the Balkans was to be destroyed?
A No, Keitel especially emphasized that a quick, pacification in Serbia was in our interests, and in the interests of the population. For the one reason alone, that economy between Yugoslavia and Germany which already before the war was in close contact was put in order again.
Q Did Keitel tell you anything about a Special Staff Rosenberg?
A No.
Q When did you hear for the first time of this Staff?
A I heard for the first time here about the Special Staff Rosenberg.
Q Do you remember from the documents the letter from Rosenberg to Boohma?
A I read, it.
Q When did you read it for the first time?
A I cannot say for sure; that must have been for the first time when I came here.
Q Then here is when you first read the document?
A Yes, here when I read the documents.
Q From what time does that letter date?
A I cannot remember that. I only read it through very quickly, because it did not interest me and it did not concern me, and so I cannot remember any details.
Q I will now submit to you this document, it is exhibit 4-B, in Document Book 1, English page 8, and German text, page 6. Does this letter concern your time of office?
A No. The letter is dated the 23rd of April, 1941.
Q Did it at any time reach the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast?
A No, it is impossible that a purely private letter reached the Wehrmacht Commanded Southeast.
PRESIDENT WENNERSTRUM: Will we need the document books form now on? Will you be referring to them in your examination?
DR. MENZEL: Yes, not at the moment, but later on, to a large extent.
BY DR. MENZEL:
Q Where did you go when you had finished with this reporting to Keitel, etc?
A I then went to Kaiserslautern where I had been stationed in peace time, when I had been or leave for a day, to search for some of my things, and then to Belgrade.
Q When did you arrive in Belgrade?
A So far as I remember, on the 25th or 26th of October, in the late afternoon.
Q From whom did you first seek information?
A From the airport I went immediately to the Plenipotentiary Commanding General, in order to get information about the situation from him.
Q And who was that?
A That was General Boehme.
Q How did he describe the situation to you?
A He said roughly this, about the situation: "The unrest in Yugoslavia, and especially in the old Serbian area, but also in the Italian occupied territory, in Dalmatia and Montenegro, had started approximately in the second half of June, and even before that isolated acts of sabotage had occurred. One could only, as of the beginning of the campaign against Russia, talk about real unrest. This unrest had then expanded continuously, and had gathered in strength, mainly in the manner that the rear communications were systematically interrupted, railway tracks were the main target, and communication installations and highways as well.
Surprise attacks on isolated members of the Wehrmacht were currently carried out, as for instance guards, on isolated posts, couriers, and signal troops, supply transports, individual field guards had also been attacked, who up to then had been dispersed all over the country in small garrisons, and through these activities they were partly cut off.
The population partly participated; partly, however, it suffered under the terror measures of the bands, and therefore rejected the bands. He stated that the partisans recruited ruthlessly, that the partisans got money and food for themselves through attacks, that they attacked individual communities which were not occupied by German troops, but by Serbian Gendarmes, and that industry was partially crippled by the threat to the population prepared to work.
Q Did he also talk of an especially threatened and an especially important railway line?
A Yes, he further mentioned the vital orders of the entire Balkna area, was the only efficient railway line from Belgrade by Salenika and towards Athens, and that if supplies along this railway line were decisively interrupted, not only the German and Italian forces in Greece would have to suffer through this, but that also the Greek population would have to suffer under it.
Q Did Boehme also tell you what political attitude these bands had?
A The situation when I arrived there was approximately the following. There were three groups, two of which,-- that is the Communist, under an unknown leader, - if there was a leader at all, - and a national group under Colonel Muhajlevic. These two groups fought against the Germans; whereas a third group under Kosta Petanac, and I spell it, K-e-s-t-a P-e-t-a-n-a-c.......
A... The third group, under Kosta Pecanac, kept to the Nedic Government and fought against the Communists. And he said that the Nedic Government, as of approximately the middle of September, took over with the forces at its disposal. That is, the Serbian police, the Serbian Gendarmes, and the Getniks, who were loyal to the government under Kosta Pecanac in the southern Serbian area, and a few other groups also in northern and western Serbian area fought with Germany.
Q. Did Boehme also tell you anything about instructions of the Communist Party of Serbia regarding band warfare?
A. Yes, he mentioned, as far as I remember, this instruction or this directive as a proof of the fact that the disengagement of the Communist insurgent movement in Serbia must have been dictated by Moscow.
Q. What did he tell you about the manner of fighting of the Partisans?
A. He said the manner of fighting on the part of the Partisans was such as was only applied by franc-tireurs. There was no open fighting in which the two parties opposed each other on clearly defined fronts, but the difficulty of the situation was mainly that these bands sometimes appeared as franc-tireurs, and at other times they appeared as peaceful citizens. They turned up in unexpected places, and then by surprise attacks damaged the German Wehrmacht wherever they could. And he said that on the occasion of such attacks they treated their prisoners in a manner violating International Law. He pointed this out to me on the basis of several reports. Of course, in the course of time I forgot a number of details but just the example of the attack, which has repeatedly been mentioned here, on parts of the Signal Regiment. These details I happen to remember.
Q. Did he say anything about German uniforms which the Partisans were when they appeared?
A. Yes, he said that it had repeatedly been ascertained that the Partisans took uniforms away from captured or killed German soldiers and then wore these German uniforms.
Q. Were the contents of the Yugoslavian capitulation known to you?
A. The contents as such were not known to me, but I knew, of course, from the radio and from press reports that the Yugoslavian Army -- I beg your pardon, not the Yugoslavian Army, the Yugoslavian Armed Forces - capitulated somewhere around the 17th of April.
Q. Did the capitulation contain a provision as to how somebody had to be treated who, as a former Yugoslavian soldier, further carried uniforms and weapons?
A. I have already stated that the contents of the capitulation negotiations were not known to me, but during a conversation -
MR. DENNEY: If Your Honors please, if he says he doesn't know anything about the Yugoslavian capitulation, I don't know how he is competent to testify to it. I object to any further statements unless the proper foundation is laid.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Objection over-ruled.
BY DR. MENZEL:
A. I repeat; I have already stated that the contents of the capitulation negations as such were not known to me. However, during conversations I have heard that there was a special clause, according to which every former Armed Forces member, who after a fixed date, was found with a weapon or a uniform was punishable by death.
Q. But you only heard that during conversations?
A. Yes. I only heard it here.
Q. Well, I'll return to that at some other point. These bands, were they a peculiarity of the Serbian area or were they generally found throughout the Balkans?
A. The widespread bands in the Balkans, as is well known, dated from Turkish times. The reason for this, first of all, a glorified robber organization, and then from the very clearly defined differences in the Balkans between the religions and between the different nationalities.
The Partisans organization was first made known to the German Armies in the years 1917 and 1918. And it is probably significant that the leader of the Partisans at that time, behind the German Bulgarian, Front, was Kosta Pecanac. But now probably in realization of his activity then which he probably did not consider correct, he now continued at the side of the Serbian Government. Now, the bands will have found their basis in the organization of the Cetniks, who partly fought on the German side and were partly subordinated to Mihajlovic. The Cetniks, also the anti-German Centiks, were politically strongly opposed to the Communists. At that time, of course, that difference had not shown any effects, but it was recognizable to us only as of the middle of November. May I add here that the situation in the Italian occupied area, as far as it was known to me and clear to me at that time, was already approximately thus: That there too was unrest, and this was unrest of Communist origin, as well as unrest of a national origin, which, here again, can traced back to the very clearly defined differences between the Roman Catholic Croats, and the orthodox Serbs.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: At this point we will take the usual recess until half past one.
(A RECESS WAS TAKEN)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The present session will continue until three-thirty this afternoon and will then recess until tomorrow morning at half-past nine. You may proceed.
DR. MENZEL: May I make two statements for my colleague, Dr. Laternser? He has asked me to state that I am authorized if necessary to deputize for him because he is not able to attend this afternoon. Furthermore, he has asked me to announce a witness for him. That is the witness Herbert Krage. This witness is to testify about the events with -
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: There seem to be some mechanical difficulties. Is it corrected? You may proceed.
DR. MENZEL: Before the recess we stopped at the manner of fighting of the partisans.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Just a moment please. We will have to take a short recess because of mechanical difficulties, in the recording machine here and downstairs. We will remain seated until we are advised it is necessary to take a longer recess.
(A recess was taken.)
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I am advised that it may take five or ten minutes so the Court will recess until we are advised it is completely ready.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: We may now proceed -- I trust.
BY DR. MENZEL (Counsel for defendant Kuntze):
Q. Before the recess we stopped at discussions about the manner of fighting used by the partisans. Now, witness, what did General Boehme tell you about his further plans in fighting the bands?
A. He simply said the following: A change in the situation had already started towards the end of September, and that was on the occasion of the employment of the newly imported 342nd Division from France. This division reinforced by other forces previously imported from Greece on the order of Field Marshal List, had combatted a stronger partisan group near Sabac. This success, however, had unfortunately not been a decisive one since strong parts of the partisan groups had been able to escape to the mountains south of Sabac. The main breeding place of the insurgents was supposedly somewhere near Uzice. I will spell that name: Uzice. But smaller groups too were all over the place, in the northwestern part of Serbia, and these band remnants had to be found first and then destroyed. It would be feasible that a further division, the 113th Division, which as of the beginning of November was expected as of that date -- its arrival, since it was to come from the East, might well be delayed as far as the second half of November. When this division had arrived and the small remnants of the bands had been eliminated, then with two groups, that is, with the 342nd, approximately in the district of Loznica -- I will spell that name: Loznica -- and with the 113th Division from the East he would attack a main source of resistance near Uzice. He had hoped that this enterprise would then lead to success, and that thus the bulk of the insurgents from the old Serbian area would be eliminated.
Q. What now did the Serbian government itself do against the band attacks?
A. The Serbian government was of a strongly anti--communist attitude and all forces at its disposal -- that is the police, the Gen armes, and the Chetniks, which were gathered under the name Assistant Gendarmes -- all these forces were put at the disposal, and with all these forces either in an independent enterprise or together with German forces, the Communists would he fought.
Their attitude toward Mihajlovic was described to me by Boehme an inscrutable, and I can well understand that. It is quite obvious that every nationally minded Serb sympathized with the Mihajlovic people.
Q. Was the success of these government measures different in northern Serbia from the southern part of Serbia?
A. I have already stated that in southern Serbia - that is, about in the district west of Nish, right over to the Albanian frontier, that is in the Ibar Valley, near Nebaza, apart from isolated sabotage acts -there was peace and order. And apart from the 117th Division, which was located in that area, Kosta Pecanac took care of this law and order.
Q. Did General Boehme give you any information about the strength of the bands and about the strength of the auxiliary police?
A. He may have given me information. It is very difficult now in retrospect to make a picture of the actual strength of the bands. Later on, on the basis of communications during the time of September and up until about the beginning of October -- that is, before the enterprise of Sabac -- I would have estimated them as a whole on the strength of about 20 to 30,000. A large part of those had already crumbled off. The Gendarmes amounted, originally, to about 1,500 men. The Chetnik units, which fought together with the Germans, amounted to about 10,000 men.
Q. Did, in autumn of 1941, the relation between the two large bands change at all?
A. Yes, it did change, as was made known to us about the middle of November. The documents, too, show several communications quite clearly.
Q. Exhibit 104 on page 93 in the English and page 69 in the German?
A. I can't say that. I will have to look at it.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the document number again, please?
DR. MENZEL: That is Document 1378, Exhibit 104-B, Volume 3, English document book page 93, German document book page 69.
BY DR. MENZEL:
A. That is a statement made by a civilian who had temporarily been captured by bands and who says here in the second paragraph: On the 25th of October the communists and Chetniks cooperated. He says here in paragraph 2 that they had an agreement not to attack each other, but instead to fight the Germans together.
Q. I will come to this point again later.
How did General Boehme talk to you about the treatment of captured insurgents?
A. The insurgents had to be treated as franc-tireurs.
Q. What was to happen to them?
A. A franc-tireur is punishable by death.
Q. What measures did Boehme, other than that, explain to you for the suppression of the insurgents?
A. He said that it had been tried with propaganda and it had been tried to prevent parts of the population from cooperating with the insurgents. That had been done by public appeals and by announcements in the press and by the Serbian authorities, but these warnings had, for the most part been in vain. On the contrary, sabotage acts had increased. He saw himself forced to adopt the harsh measure of the taking of hostages, and that is the taking of hostages in reprisal.
Q. Did he say anything about the fact that the levying of hostages had been ordered from above?
A. He talked to me of an order by the OKW which had ordered the taking of hostages.
Q. Did Boehme then give such orders himself?
A. He had not talked to me.
Q. Did Boehme report to you the order by Keitel of the 16th of September?
A. He only said that hostages, reprisal hostages, were to be taken. The order of the 16th of September I do not think he reported to me.
Q. Did you see that order later?
A. I saw it much later.
Q. When?
A. In December, as far as I remember.
Q. These ratios which were mentioned in the order were they applied?
A. As far as I got to know them, no.
Q. Did Boehme report to you an order by Field Marshal List of the 4th of September?
A. Boehme did not report to me an order with the date of the 4th of September by Field Marshal List. As I have already stated, Boehme only reported to me measures by Field Marshal list regarding two important points: The Field Marshal List had intervened once by bringing in reinforcements, to Serbia as far as he could free them in Greece, and, secondly, that he insisted that the troops which were dispersed in small garrisons all over the country by concentrated. And that these smaller enterprises, which were no longer effective against the band, would stop, and that from then on the fighting would be carried out in a concentrated manner.
Q. Did Boehme report to you about events in Belgrade, Kraljevo and Kragujevac?
A. No.
Q. When did you gain knowledge of these incidents?
A. I gained knowledge of these incidents, here.
Q. Did at that time or later read Thurner's ten-day report of the 30th of October 1941? I will show it to you. This is Exhibit 124, Volume 4, page 153 of the English; and 92-93 of the German.
A. I cannot remember having seen this report. The report is dated the 30th of October 1941. I must therefore have arrived in the Southeast at the time when the Staff was transferred from Athens to Salonika.
Q. When did that transfer of the Staff take place?
A. May I say something about this? The figures in the report, are comparatively high, of 2,300 hostages, and Kragujevac. The 2,000 hostages in Kraltjevo transfer of the Staff from Athens to Salonika took several days and, as far as I remember, the transfer started on the 30th of October and was carried through, in the whole, about the 2nd of November.
Q. Did you, after Gen. Boehme's report to you, give him any instructions?
A. No, and I couldn't do that because, first of all, I had not yet taken over the affairs there, and then I was not in a position at such an early date to give any orders regarding Military operations. Thirdly, after Boehme's report there was no reason at all to order anything.
Q. Did Boehme tell yon anything about the organization and cooperation of the commands responsible in Serbia and of any of one other responsible offices?
A. Yes, I must add here that I have talked to Boehme at great length for at least two hours in the evening, and on the next day before I flew to Athens, so that the question of the organization was certainly mentioned and discussed. He told me the following. His staff, Corps Headquarters Eighteen, dealt with all tactical matters as far as they concerned the 65th Corps, the 342d Division, and the expected 113th Division. Then there was a further technical staff. That was the headquarters of the military commander who was no longer actually present in person. Then the administrative staff of the former military commander for all matters concerning administration, police cooperation with Serbian authorities, and the Plenipotentiary for Economy.
Q. Whose orders did he receive?
A. His orders came directly from Goering, as the man in charge of the Four Year Plan.
Q. Was any talk about State Counsellor Thurner
A. State Counsellor Thurner was the chief of the administrative Staff.
Q. Whose orders did he receive?
A. He was subordinate to Gen. Boehme, but all the time he received orders on the one hand from the Quartermaster concerning administrative matters and from Himmler directly concerning police matters.
Q. Did Boehme tell you anything about the installations of concentration camps?
A. No.
Q. Did he talk otherwise about any camp?
A. He did say that the captured insurgents were brought into collecting camps.
Q. When did you learn anything at all about those camps which we today designate as concentration camps?
A. That may sound peculiar, but it is actually a fact that I, myself, and many of my comrades, heard only after we had been taken prisoner of concentration camps in the current meaning of the word.
Q. What did Boehme say now about the cooperation of his staff with the administration?
A. Boehme said that through the whole not clearly defined responsibility and authority there was a lot of tension and friction, and that State Counsellor Thurner, the chief of the Administration, liked to go his own way.
Q What did you consider as "going his own way?"
A I would say if a subordinate orders or executes anything without immediate orders from his superior.
Q I will now show you a document that is Exhibit 105, in Volume III, page 71 in the German document book and page 96 in the English document book. (Document handed to witness.)
JUDGE CARTER: Which document book, please?
DR. MENZEL: Book III, Exhibit 105.
THE WITNESS: This is an order according to the heading which went out from the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Serbia, (Commander Serbia Administrative Staff), dated the 26th of October, and it is addressed to all administrative sub-area and all district headquarters. The subject is: Arrest of Hostages. This order is signed for the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Serbia, the Chief of the Administrative Staff Thurner.
BY DR. MENZEL:
Q Was that admissible?
A No, such a basic and important order should never have been issued by the Chief of the Administrative Staff, but had to be given to the commander concerned for signature, which, in this case, would have been General Boehme. Furthermore, it is significant that this order did not even go to the corps headquarters, 18th Corps, nor to the General Staff, for information.
Q In connection with this I will show you a second document. That is Exhibit 136, in Document Book VI, page 12 of the German text and page 15 of the English text. (Document handed to witness.)
A This is in order with the heading Commander Serbia, Administrative Staff, dated the first of November, and it is addressed to the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Serbia, Higher Command, 65, Command Staff, Einsatzgruppe of the Security Police and of the SD.
This order, too, concerns an arrest of hostages. It talks about 700 representatives of the population of Belgrade.
Q Who issued it?
A This order, too, is signed for the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Serbia, Chief of the Administrative Staff; signature illegible. One would assume that it was Thurner too who signed it. This order, too, is of such a basic and important nature that it should certainly have had the consent and signature of the Plenipotentiary Commanding General.
Q Were these documents examples of an independence shown by Thurner in the sense you had mentioned before?
A Yes.
Q These two orders which you just read--did you know them at that time?
A No, the distribution did not show that the first order was also sent to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast. Besides, the first order is dated the 26th of October, which was prior to my arrival there and the second order does not show a distribution to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
Q You had previously talked about tensions between those authorities. Now was anything done for the elimination of tension.
A The Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Foertsch reported to me at that time. If I may say something about the position of State Counsellor Thurner. The OKW had been asked to dismiss State Counsellor Thurner and after I had gained insight into conditions, had asked Keitel that Thurner be dismissed from his office.
Q Were you successful in this respect?
A No.
Q Now, about something else. You deputized for Field Marshal List in the southeast area. When was that?
AAfter my discussion with Boehme I flew to Athens. As far as I remember, it was the 26th or the 27th, but I do not know whether I am mistaken now. It might have been the 26th in the evening that I arrived there. I took charge of matters there, and this is mentioned in a report of the 27th of October which the Armed Forces Commander Southeast made to the AKW.
Q When did you officially and formally take over command?
A On the 27th of October, but it was obvious that before that I had to report to Field Marshal List and that I had to take a certain amount of time to adjust myself to matters under the command of the Armed Forces Commander.
Q Was there a further delay when the staff was transferred?
A No, there was no more delay.
Q You mean no delay when you took over, when you took charge?
A No.
Q What about your adjustment to the work?
A The situation was difficult. As a consequence of his severe illness, I could not see Field Marshal List immediately, but only two or three days after my arrival. He was so ill that there could be no talk of a detailed, and not even of a cursory, instruction to me.
My adjustment to the work was carried through in the following manner: Athens and later in Salonika I got information from the Chief of Staff and from the leaders of the various departments, and by means of various trips I could collect information from the commanders on the spot.
Q By means of those reports which you have just mentioned, was what General Boehme said about conditions in the Balkans borne out by these reports?
A Yes, Boehme's view regarding the situation in Serbia was confirmed to me.
Q About what time was it that you gained a complete insight into the situation and that you thought that you were well-informed enough in order to be able to make decisions on your own behalf?
A Roughly speaking, in general outlines, I was informed about November, and later I could find out about the details. It was difficult, of course, to resettle the staff, and these difficulties increased by the large area, by the difficult communications.
Q Was this knowledge a confirmation to you that these bands were illegal?
A The illegality of the bands was confirmed to me by the fact that the capitulation agreement was broken. That act in itself was an act which put the bands outside the law, and all the officials and officers with whom I discussed this said the fallowing:
No uniform action on the part of the bands against the Germans. From November onwards a fight of the Communist bands against the Mihajlovic bands. No identification on the part of the members of the bands. No uniforms. No insignia which could be seen easily from a distance, as was the regulation. They did not openly carry arms. And, finally, those acts violating International Law which have already been mentioned -- the murder of prisoners, etc.
Q. Do you therefore personally have any doubts that the bands could be treated legally as franc-tireurs or not?
A. No, I had no doubts on that score at all?
Q. Have you any legal training at all?
A. No.
Q. Is it known to you as a soldier how other states treat franc-tireurs in such cases?
A. I only know the German regulations say that there is a provision in International Law about that, but I know that other states have acted in the same manner as we have.
Q. I sit also known to you whether other states have sanctioned the taking of reprisal hostages?
A. Yes, that is known to me.
Q. Can you quote an example for this?
A. Yes, I can do that. I know of a provision or regulation of the Magistrate of the City of Berlin is issued, as far as I remember, at the end of May 1945, which states that for every killed member of an occupation Army not only those people who are guilty of this murder but also 50 members of the Party are to be punished by death. Cases of sabotage, -that I cannot say exactly, -- are to be punished in a similar manner. I cannot imagine that at that time a provision of this kind could have been issued without the approval and consent of the then occupation power.
Q. Now, another problem. How was the economic situation of Greece protrayed to you, at that time?
A. Well, that is a rather wide field, the economic conditions.
Q. On what did the economic life of Greece depend?
A. The economic life of Greece depended first of all on the supply of coal, but mainly on the supply of food stuffs.
Q. By which route had these food stuffs to be brought to Greece?
A. At that time food had to be brought to Greece, first of all by railroad, because it happened repeatedly that ships with grain were torpedoed.
Q. Did the destruction of railroad lines result in any consequences for the civilian population?
A. Yes, I have already said that the only railroad line which could be used, from Belgrade via Salonika, was the life line, not only for Yugoslavia but also for Greece.
Q. Can you tell us anything about the fact that the destruction of bridges had a special effect in this case?
A. They had a very great effect, and it has already been stated here that the destruction of two large viaducts, had great effects,--e. g. that of the Bralo bridge.
Q. How long do you estimate the Bralo bridge was?
A. The Bralo bridge was, as I remember about 500 to 600 meters long.
Q. And that bridge had been destroyed?
A. Yes, it had been completely destroyed.
Q. Was the food situation difficult in Greece, all over Greece?
A. The food situation in Greece was quite different in different regions. Generally it may be said that at the end of October and the beginning of November, the food situation in the large cities like Athens and Salonika had reached a certain point of tension, and that during the course of the winter the situation became aggravated, while on the land the population had enough to live on.
Q. Now what was it like on the islands?
A. It was different on the islands. There were islands which could have lived well, because of their oil production, if the necessary grain had been brought there, and vice-versa; and the difficulty here again was transportation.