Q Did they ever tell you about this, that they were in charge of this SD unit for matters in addition to rations and quarters, including discipline, and that they were ordering them to report to the commander Southern Greece?
A I have no knowledge of this subordination, because the Chief did not think it necessary to report to me because a small staff which was only looking at archives was there. There is something I would like to point out, you said that these people were members of the SD, the command Rosenberg had nothing to do with the SD, they weren't SD people. The command Rosenberg was a command which consisted of some personalities of the Staff Rosenberg which had the task to investigate certain ideological documents or documents directed against the Reich which were contained in these archives. I take it thus from the exhibit which you just showed me before, but Rosenberg had nothing to do with the SD, on the contrary Rosenberg had had a fight with Bormann because Bormann didn't want Rosenberg to intervene in these matters. All I can say is that Rosenberg was possibly under the control of the SD to a certain extent. In this sense I have to understand Rosenberg's letter, Rosenberg had had differences of opinion with Bormann, because Bormann didn't want Rosenberg to deal with these matters in the Southeast. Obviously Bormann meant to give these orders on his own initiative. The SD had nothing to do with Rosenberg as far as I can recollect, and as far as I am informed. Rosenberg only wanted the SD to help him.
Q Who was the Chief of Staff at the time that the order -
A That was the then Col. Foertsch.
Q If I may finish my question. - At the time that Exhibit 68 was issued your Chief of Staff was the Defendant Foertsch?
A The order of the 2nd of October?
Q Yes.
A Yes, that is right.
Q. Thank you. Now, at that time who was the commander of Southern Greece?
AAs far as I know it was Felmy.
Q Now, you recall that, perhaps you could take us over some of these dates when you were in and out; maybe we can start from the end and work back. It was on the 17 October 1941 that you were operated on in the hospital at Athens, Greece, for appendicitis, is that right?
A Yes.
Q And just for a moment to go beyond that, you stayed in the hospital until sometime early in December of that year?
A Yes.
Q Could you help me with the date in December?
A I beg your pardon.
Q Could you help me with the date in December when you left the hospital.
A I beg your pardon, I did not understand the question. On the 6th of December, it might have been the 8th of December - December 8.
Q And when you left your command, in October to go to the hospital it was on the 15th, was it not?
A Yes, on the 15th of October; I beg your pardon, it might have been on the 16th of October. At least on the 15th I had to stay in bed.
Q You either left on the 15th or you were in bed on the 15th; in any event you were operated on on the 17th.
A Yes, on the 15th I was obliged to go to bed. On the 17th I was operated on. I don't know for sure whether it was the 15th or 16th that I was brought from my quarters to the hospital.
Q Now shortly before that you had been in Crete. Can you help me with those dates.
A I was on Crete during the time of the 8th up to the 11th of October.
Q Do you remember when you came back on the 11th?
A During the course of the afternoon.
Q And then prior to the 8th of October were you in Athens all the time after you got back from leave sometime late in August?
A That was on the 24th of August; then I was in Athens.
Q And you were there all the time until the 8th when you went to Crete?
A Yes.
Q When did you go on leave?
A On the 23rd of July I left Belgrade.
Q And you went to Vienna and then you went down to the suburb of Garnisch and stayed there?
A Yes.
Q You were in Serbia and Yugoslavia for several days prior to the 23rd of July 1941, were you not?
A Yes.
Q Do you recall how long you were there?
Couvt V, Case 7
A From the 21st until the 23rd I was there, that is July.
Q Now during your absence on leave who was acting on your behalf as Armed Forces Commander Southeast and Commanding General of the 12th Army?
A I believe that was General Felmy.
Q And when you were in Servia did you hear anything about General Lontschar. Did you know General Lontschar?
A No.
Q Never heard of him?
A I have now heard about him from these documents.
Q The first time that you ever heard that in Serbia on the 18th of July, three days before you were there, that a General in an Army's car had been shot at, and someone else in the car had been wounded, was here in the Courthouse?
A I do not recollect in any case at that time I have learned of this in Nish or Belgrade.
Q When you were in Belgrade prior to your departure on leave you said that you may have given some oral orders. Do you recall that?
A I did at that time talk to General Bader and I talked to a number of Divisional Commanders and it can be assumed that we discussed what they could do against this Parting of an uprising but I cannot remember details. For that purpose there did not seem to be any cause at that time.
Q Was not there among the Divisional Commanders some general talk about the uprising in Serbia? You don't have any recollection of what took place at that time?
A There had been uprisings in Serbia, sabotage acts. I myself could not go from Nish to Belgrade on the 21st which I intended to do, but all of a sudden I had to go by plane because there were interruptions of the railway line between Nish and Belgrade and in Belgrade itself there was reason for great caution against surprise attacks.
We passed through town very quickly and I was quite heavily guarded because surprise attacks and surprise murders occurred everywhere. Of course I was told about it, but the suppression of this had already been started and was in the process of being carried out.
Q The situation at that time then was critical in Serbia?
A Yes, it was critical; that's right.
Q And you were very concerned about it?
A Yes, I was concerned. Any uprising in an occupied country..... if, for instance, here in Germany there would be about twenty surprise attacks every day, the bridges of the Autobahn would be dynamited, if soldiers of the American Army were ambushed, then the American authorities would be concerned too. If I may say so, I would not have gone on leave if it hand't been very necessary because I had a stomach ailment which I had acquired in Crete.
Q Now, during your leave did you get any reports in Partenkirchen as to what was happening in the Southeastern area?
A I can't say that today anymore to what extent I was informed. I did see a couple of reports but my knowledge at the moment does not tell me to what extent I was informed. Of course I was not kept posted, about everything that went on.
Q How were you posted of whatever knowledge you did acquire about the operations in your command in your absence?
A I have just said I can't recollect any more to what extent I was informed, and what exact knowledge I had.
Q Did anyone speak to you by phone?
A I got mail by courier. There was no telephonic communication.
Q Did you get any mail from your acting deputy, General Felmy?
A No.
Q Did you get any nail from your Chief of Staff, Colonel Foertsch?
A Yes, certainly; I think I did.
Q But you don't recall what he advised you about?
A No.
MR. DENNEY: Would this be a convenient place to interrupt, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: You wish to recess at this time?
MR. DENNEY: If we could. I am about to go into a new subject and I would appreciate it if Your Honor would take a recess.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take a recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
BY MR. DENNEY:
Q May it please your Honors, do you recall being asked by withdrawn. Will you please hand the witness Document Book 1 in German? I am referring now to Document 22 which is at page 76 of the English and page 55 of the German Book 1. This is a report from the Chief of the Security Police of the SD, 22 July 1941. It says that in reprisal for the attempted attack on the life of the German general, 52 Communist Jews and families of band members in the villages of Vzice, Valjevo and Cacac were shot to death on the 20th. Did you ever hear of that incident?
A I don't t know any longer whehter I heard about it or not. I cannot recollect it. It didn't remain in my memory.
Q Then if you will turn over to the next exhibit which is Exhibit 23, this is extracts from the activity report of the 704th Division which was under the 65th Coros at this time, that is July 1941, and the 65th Corps was under the 12th Army. Is that correct?
A Yes, it is correct.
Q And you will note in that under the date of 20 July 1941, Valjevo, it is on about the third page or perhaps the second, the second page of the original, the same incident is recited. Did you ever have any knowledge of it through this source? Through the 65th Corps by reports which might have been sent up to you?
A This activity report I didn't know for sure. This activity report originates from the 704th Division. I never had a possibility to look at it. The same applies to the previous document which is the report from the chief of the Security Police in Berlin to the Reichsfuehrer SS.
Q And you don't recall anybody calling your attention to the fact that these 52 people were executed because of this attack and/or at any later time?
AAll I say is I cannot remember whether I was informed or not. I don't know.
Q It is page 54 of the German. This is Exhibit 555, and Book 24, which is at page 85 of the English and page 54 of the German copy of that document book. It is dated 8 September 1941 and recites that 50 guilty Communists were executed as reprisal for an attack on a soldier at the station of Belgrad-Fopicer. Do you ever recall having that come to your attention?
A Concerning this report, as well as all others, I cannot recollect today whether details were reported to me or whether I was only generally informed, I cannot recollect that today.
I have already said it this morning or yesterday that it is impossible for me to say now after six years that I have been informed or not been informed of individual matters. I have just a very general impression of the uprising but whether any particular messages were given to me and whether any particular events were reported to me I cannot say anymore.
On a large scale, I have certainly been informed but to name individual cases it is impossible. The same applies when I recollect the campaign against France. I remember the campaign as a whole but I cannot recollect individual messages that were submitted to me at that time. It is simply impossible.
Q Do you have any present recollection of having been informed at that time - say July, August and early September of 1941- that people were being executed at the ratio of 50 to 1 for woundings?
A That the reports were made to me on the basis of the Keitel order and that these occurrences came to my knowledge on the basis of the reports, that may well be so.
Q I am now directing your attention to these dates specifically in July, August and September, which were prior to the Keitel order.
Do you remember having been advised of executions at the rate mentioned during that period?
A I can only say the same, Mr. Prosecutor, as I have just said before. Today I can't say any more that I did know a specific report. All I can say, it is possible that I knew about it, and today I do not know for sure whether I did or not.
Q Will you hand him Book 2, please? It is exhibit 59 at page 95 in the English Book 2, it is about the 16th page in the Exhibit-it is the report of 4/9/1941 for September.
A Page 63 of the German.
Q Do you recall having been advised of that, that in reprisal for the killing of a soldier in Belgrade on the 3rd of September, 50 people were executed?
MR. DENNEY: It is page 95 of the English document book 2, your Honor, of Exhibit 59.
FIELD MARSHAL LIST: I beg your pardon, on which page in the German is it?
MR. DENNEY: I thought you told me.
BY MR. DENNEY
Q. Do you recall having been advised of that in this report which is directed to your office?
A. I can only say the same as I have said before, that I cannot recollect it now anymore but that it is quite possible that the report was submitted to me. Generally speaking, I was informed about events and therefore it is possible, even likely, that I was informed of this occurrence but today I cannot recollect it any longer.
Q. Thank you. Will you hand him hook 2 again, Exhibit 43, Exhibit 42, I am sorry. This is on page 23 of the English copy of book 2, your Honor, and I will tell you it is page 21 of the German.
I am directing your attention to -- do you recall this order which was sent out on 5 September 1941?
A. Yes.
Q. When, to your knowledge, was the first time that you ordered hostages to be taken?
A. Yes.
Q. No, I say when did you first order hostages to be taken? You don't have to look at the order now. I am not talking about that.
A. The first order for the taking of hostages...that is, an order to that effect had not been issued by me before.
Q. This is the first time you gave such an order?
A. Yes. Orders from the OKH must have been in existence before that.
Q. Well, do you recall what orders you got from the OK--excuse me. Who gave you the orders---OKW or OKH?
A. They must have been in existence from the OKH in Serbia in my opinion, and I am sure that orders came during my time from the OKW.
Whether they concerned the taking of hostages or other matters I cannot recollect, but my objection which I raised with the OKW, can be retraced to the fact that orders must have come in from the OKW. In detail, I do not remember these orders.
Q. Well, do you recall whether they were written orders or oral orders?
A. They couldn't have been oral orders because they must have come by teletype or by radio transmission.
Q. And this order of September 5th, you feel, was sent out based on orders that you got prior to that date from OKW or OKH?
A. On the basis of current orders to proceed vigorously against the insurgents, Several Teletypes had come in to that effect, and on the 5th, on the same day, a telephone call came from the OKW asking what had been done in order to combat the insurrection. In view of this uprising and the crisis which we faced at that time, this order was given, also in view of the activities of the partisans and the cunning manner in which they proceeded. And then there had been orders issued by the Communist party that permitted the bands to use all means. On the basis of all these facts combined the order was given.
One must all the time picture the situation of the Balkans and the enormous effects of the insurrection not only on the occupational forces but on the whole situation.
Q. I am talking about a telephone call that you got from OKW on the 15th, the 15th of September I take it, that is.
A. On the 5th.
Q. On the 5th? On the 5th of September, I beg your pardon.
A. I beg your pardon, I meant on the 5th.
Q. Now if you will notice that paragraph f of this order, Exhibit 42, You speak of the seizure of more hostages.
A. Yes.
Q. Now what did you mean by that?
A. At the end of August, beginning of September, the insurgent movement had assumed an essentially greater proportions. After I returned from my leave, I found a completely changed situation. The insurgent movement had extended to considerably larger areas. Attacks became more frequent and in their whole manner they were somehow stronger. On the basis of these facts it had became necessary to carry out the taking of more hostages. The intensity of the insurgent movement and the extension of the movement to larger areas caused this.
Q. Where did you get your information as to what had happened during your leave from the 23rd of July to the 24 of August?
A. On my return journey, I stopped in Belgrade and there I think I gained the first impression through a discussion with the Military Commander Serbai--that was General Danckelmann--and the Military Commander of the Higher Command 65, General Bader, and then I was informed after my return to Athens in my headquarters.
Q. Who gave you the information in your headquarters at Athens?
A. I assume it was the chief of staff. Probably the Ia was present too. It might have been the Ic also. I cannot recollect that today.
Q. Did you talk to General Felmy about it when you got back?
A. I assume that I talked to General Felmy about it.
Q. And your chief at that time was Colonel Foertsch, was he not?
A. That is correct.
Q. We have already discussed the Keitel order of 16 September 1941 with reference to 50 to 1, and 100 to 1. That hears the same date, does it not? That Keitel order is Exhibit 53. That bears the same date as Exhibit 49, which is the Hitler order of the same date, 16 September 1941, which appears at page 53 of the English copy of Book 2 and page 52.
A. That is Exhibit 50, is it?
Q. Exhibit 49, I believe.
Q. That's the Hitler order to you of 16 September 1941 with reference to General Boehme.
A. To General Boehme?
Q. We're still referring to General Boehme.
A. You said Bader.
Q. Boehme.
A. You mean Boehme?
Q. Yes. Now, on the bottom of page 1 of that order it states:
"The latter," referring to Lt. General of Infantry Boehme, "exercises executive power in the insurgent area itself, pursuant to directives of Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. Insofar, all military and civilian offices must follow his instructions and regulations for a more accurate definition of his authority. The interests of the Four Year Plan are to be taken into consideration as a matter of principle."
Do you recall receiving that order from the OKW?
A. Yes.
Q. And that order was sent to you from OKW in response to your request to them of the 14th of September, which is Exhibit 48, the exhibit before, which is at page 51 of the English document book and page 42 of the German document book?
A. Yes.
Q. And in your letter to the OKW of 14 September you mentioned, at the top of the second page, a fact that it was fully understood that with the appointment of General Boehme for duty in Serbia that the interests of the Four Year Plan will be taken into consideration in this case.
A. Yes.
Q. And the OKW replied to you -- there is the notation that the interests of the Four Year Plan are to be taken into consideration as a matter of principle. What was the Four Year Plan?
A. The Four Year Plan was a plan which Goering had established and Goering had a special plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan in Belgrade who, I think, had the task, first of all, to reactivate the mines and/or to keep them going.
I am not informed in detail of the tasks of the plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan. The addition which I made in my request that the interests of the Four Year Plan should be taken into consideration was made for the reason to support my request concerning the employment of Boehme, i.e. to achieve this at all with Hitler, or rather with the OKW. I knew that Goering considered the southeast area, so to speak, as his own reservation and that he wanted to institute in Serbia a general of the Air Force, in order to thus exercise more influence in Serbia. And for that reason I added that supplement to my request.
Q. In Exhibit 50, which is your order to the Commander in Serbia, which is dated the 19th of September 1941, appointing General Boehme - this is at page 57 in the English document book, Your Honors, and page 46 in the German - you stated there that General Boehme was the "only possessor of executive power in accordance with the Fuehrer order binding instructions to all military and civilian offices".
A. Yes.
Q. And you stated further that "instructions for the carrying-out of operations for the necessary protective measures will be given by me only to General Boehme, who is responsible for their being carried out".
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if you'll turn to Exhibit 79 in Document Book II, which is at page 3, page 2 of the German. Your Honors, it is page 3 of the English document book, Exhibit 79. Sorry, that was the wrong book (witness handed the wrong book). That's the report from General Boehme of 9 October dealing with the execution of approximately two thousand communists and Jews in reprisal for twenty-two murdered of a signal battalion.
Do you recall having seen that at that time?
A. I have already stated that on the 9th of October I was in Crete and that I did not receive, therefore, this report until the 11th of October at the earliest, after my return from Crete.
And I have further stated that this is the only case which I can specifically recollect, and that is the murder - the murder and beastly mutilation of these soldiers of the Signal Corps.
Q. Did you make any inquiries about the source of the people who were killed in retaliation for these killings of German troops?
A. As far as I remember, no.
Q. You didn't think that ratio of approximately 100 to 1 is unusual?
A. I have already said that I recollect that the order to the 1 to 100 ratio in this case came directly from the OKW. That is what I had said and which explains the mix-up with the order of Bohme of the 10th of October. The ratio of 1 to 100 seemed high to me in any case.
Q. But you had passed down that 100 to 1 order which you received from Keitel on the 16th of September, did you not?
A. Yes, I passed it on after my objection with the OKW had been in vain. The Keitel order mentions 1 to 50, up to 1 to 100, and as far as I can recollect, it was additionally expressly ordered 1 to 100. Besides the people who had been actually shot on the 9th and 11th of October - I think there were 442 - I could not have recalled them back to life, and a larger figure than 442 people had actually been shot cannot be seen from any report contained in this documents here - I think altogether twelve times. One cannot see that a larger number than that mentioned was ever killed.
Q. So far as you know, you never made any inquiry based on the figure of two thousand to twenty-two hundred?
A. No.
Q. Did I understand you correctly to say that OKW may have ordered Boehme directly, without going through you, to carry out this particular reprisal measure?
A. I do recollect that the OKN issued orders in this case directly.
Q. You do recollect that?
A. May I add that not only in this case but quite frequently, in view of the very much better communications and connections between East Prussia and Belgrade, directives arrived at Belgrade earlier, and not via the Military Commander Southeast, and we were informed later on.
Q. And who informed you later, OKW or the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia?
A. I cannot say that any more today. I don't know.
Q Now, when did you first begin to have differences of opinion with Hitler?
A Differences of opinion with Hitler, I had only one occasion, and that was when I resigned. Previously I had never been in the position to have differences of opinion with him because I had never been able to submit a report to him alone. I had never been called or admitted to such a report.
Q Well, you said that in November, 1939 you were at a meeting where it was indicated that you had not been withdrawn.
You said that you were at a meeting in Berlin where the older generals were accused of being timid and that you were not reappointed to the Southeast Command because it was felt that you hadn't done all that you might -- that is, from Hitler's standpoint. When did you first feel that you didn't enjoy Hitler's complete confidence?
A I may clarify this in order not to leave anything unclear. The conference in Berlin in November 1939 was not a conference or a discussion, but it was a clear utterance of Hitler's wills and wishes, which he expressed in an address to the generals. None of the generals had the possibility in this so-called meeting to say one single word. The fact that I did not return to the Southeast, I did not consider a difference of opinion with Hitler. That was an opinion which Hitler had formed about me, without there ever having been any exchange of opinions between us.
Q Yet in April, 1942, Keitel indicated that you enjoyed Hitler's complete confidence on your Service Record. Do you recall that?
A I have read that now here in the documents.
MR. DENNEY: If your Honors please, Mr. Fenstermacher has some questions which he would like to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: May I make the inquiry, Mr. Denney, as to what the practice has been relative to the use of two counsel for the Prosecution in cross-examination?
MR. DENNEY: Well, as I understand it, your Honor, that has been done before, and before the Commissions we did it.
THE PRESIDENT: According to the practices of which I have any personal knowledge, it is not permitted. Are there any rules or regulations in connection with the set up here?
MR. DENNEY: There are no rules with which I am familiar, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any objections on the part of defense counsel?
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, may I have a short pause of possibly three minutes so that I can talk to my colleagues; and then we can tell our attitude to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, without wanting to establish a precedent for further cases, especially since it was also the practice before the International Military Tribunal only one member of every individual delegation could put questions in cross-examination, we, in this case, agree that two prosecutors may put questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Mr. Fenstermacher, before you commence your further examination I trust it is not necessary to caution you not to cover any matters which have already been covered in the examination by Mr. Denney.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Yes, your Honor.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q Field Marshal, I believe you stated under direct examination that there were three main groups of insurgents operating in Yugoslavia when you were Armed forces Commander Southeast. Is that correct?
A Yes. it's correct.
Q You enumerated them as communist insurgents, Cetniks under Draja Mihailovic, and another group under Kosta Petanac. Is that Correct?
A Yes.
Q Did the communist insurgents wear any identifying insignia?
A No.
Q Did the Cetniks under Draja Mihailovic wear any identifying insignia?
A I don't remember.
Q And did the Kosta Petanac units--did they have any insignia?
A I don't know that either.
Q Did the Kosta Petanac insurgents and the Mihailovic insurgents ever collaborate with your troops in your fight against the Communists?
A Yes.
Q Would you say that they collaborated with your troops frequently or infrequently during the period you were in the Southeast?
AAs far as I can remember Kosta Petanac frequently collaborated; as to Draja Mihailovic he only occasionally collaborated with us during the last period.
Q You mean then that you permitted certain units of yours to collaborate with troops who might not have worn insignia?
A The collaboration was not thus that those troops were attached to our troops. They just fought in the same area. There was no uniform leadership under which they might have fought. I do not recollect anything like that. Instead when they had any occasion--the Kosta Petanacs--to spot a Communist group somewhere, then they started hostilities against this Communist group, but, of course, not under German leadership, as far as I remember; those were individual fights. One must imagine there was an insurgent movement about to start, and here and there scattered groups were caught sometimes by the Communists, sometimes by Draja Mihailovic; but in the main, by German troops. The picture is that the insurgent movement was about to begin and then became stronger. It was no so that no could say from the very beginning, "These are Communists and there are Draja Mihailovics and those are Kosta Petanacs there was no clear picture at that time. And one could not get a clear idea of what was going on, as one can now see on the basis of all these documents, when one has worked through them.
In those days I did by no means have the insight as I have gained it now from the documentary material. At that time it was a completely new situation which had to be coped with, and if a man like Petanac said he would help you, one willingly accepted that help and said, "if you find a Communist band fight it."