Q Along came the Western offensive, and what was your task in this?
A I stood with my Army in the Eiffel, and my job was to break through the Maginot line near Mezieres and Sedan and further on to advance towards the West.
Q And was this carried out?
A In the West of Sedan my Army was stopped and turned towards the South against the Aisne to set up a new front which the Panzer forces which were behind me advanced towards the West.
Q How long did you remain in France after the conclusion of the Western campaign?
A Until the middle of October or the end of October 1940.
Q Then where did you go?
AAt this time the Army High Command was again transferred towards the East, towards Cracow.
Q And how did you learn about this new task.
A By orders, an order that the Army High Command had to go toward the East and take over a new task. This task consisted of the development of the fortification line along the German-Russian demarkation line.
Q And at that time did you speak to the Commander in Chief of the Army?
A The Commander in Chief of the Army came during December, shortly before Christmas, and visited me. He was on a visit to the troops.
Q And what did he tell you?
A On this occasion I received a new commission, namely, that the Army High Command from 12 should build out a new group in Roumania whose advance at this time was already in force.
Q And for which reason did one think that kind of assembly of forces from Roumania was necessary?
A There were indications that the British were retrenching themselves in Roumanian there were reports of landing intentions, and of the erection of air bases and that could force us to turn against this in order to prevent it.
Q What operation did you have to count on then?
AAt that time there were thoughts that it could be necessary to occupy Greece up as far as the Aegian coast and in this way to prevent a threat to the Italian Front by the British forces and at the same time to prevent the British from setting up air bases in Greece which would be a great danger to the oil fields, especially those near Ploesti and to the supply along the Danube.
Q And what hopes did you entertain at that time?
AAt that time too I thought that an armed dispute would not arise. And Hitler too didn't want a war with Greece and I counted on the fact that the establishment if necessary by our troops in Bulgaria would along have been sufficient to s top the Italian-Greek conflict and that an armed dispute would not be necessary.
Q Did you express this opinion?
A Yes, I discussed this opinion with my officers and other things were also discussed immediately prior to my departure to Rumania, that is, in the last days of February 1941, with the Dowager Queen of Roumania, the sister of the King of Greece, who at that time of course expressed the hope to me that we would not be forced to wage war against her brother. Her brother was the King of Greece and I could only tell her that I shared this hope.
Q Then was your opinion strengthened by any kind of events that war should not come in that stage.
A This opinion in the next few weeks was of course strengthened by the Anschluss of Yugoslavia joining in the German-Italian pact.
Q Then how did the situation become changed?
A The situation was completely changed from the 27th of March 1941 by the Revolution in Jugoslavia.
Q Then what else happened in Jugoslavia?
A Some news came from Jugoslavia that Jugoslavia since January or February had been mobilizing and on the Bulgarian and Jugoslavian front there were also signs at this time of troops of various formations and, according to British sources later on, Jugoslavia at this time had nine times a hundred thousand men under arms.
Q What orders did you receive then?
A By reason of this coup d'etat I received the order not only as was intended before planned to advance against Greece but simultaneously from the East against Jugoslavia.
Q And what was necessary in order to carry out this order?
A Formerly my eyes were exclusively in the direction of Greece. About my long right flank, already in the weeks before, I had been calmed down by the Commander in Chief of the Army, and I also received the order to reassure King Boris of Bulgaria who told me repeatedly, said to me repeatedly, "don't be so sure; I know my cousins; in the shortest time possible they will advance in your right flank." The forces at this time were not present and were not envisaged and therefore the new task demanded a sudden swing around the whole plan of operation and a new advance against Jugoslavia and so an alteration of the former advance against Greece.
Q The Prosecution contends, Field Marshall, that the campaign against Greece was well prepared.
A The campaign against Greece was prepared; the campaign against Jugoslavia was in no way prepared, but before the 27th there was a friendship pact which was concluded with Jugoslavia, to prepare for an attack against Jugoslavia, we only had the period from the 28th of March until the 6th of April.
Q. When did you receive an order to start a campaign?
A. In the last days of March 1941.
Q. And when did the campaign start?
A. The campaign started against South Macedonia and against Greece on the 6th of April 1941 with the Tank Group Kleist which was further to the North on the 8th of April 1941 it was two days later, because Kleist Panzer group was not ready for the advance.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, before I question the witness about the forces which were under his command at that time I would like to show the Tribunal Exhibit List No. 1. This is four sketches and the photostats are four exhibits together. Actually, when I need them during the examination I will hand them over to the Tribunal and the General Secretary.
MR. DENNEY: Could we have the understanding that they are offered in evidence before determining whether or not an objection should be made. Perhaps Dr. Laternser would like to lay a foundation for it, as there is nothing to show what they are. At this time I object to them.
DR. LATERNSER: Of course I would be very pleased to show them to the Prosecution.
MR. DENNEY: We have them but don't know what they are.
JUDGE GARTER: I assume Dr. Laternser proposes to show when questioning his witness, what they are.
DR. LATERNSER: That was my intention, I think they were distributed a little too early.
Q. Now, Field Marshall, you will see from these sketches, looking at the first one --
MR. DENNEY: I don't want to be unreasonable about it but throughout the presentation of our evidence we constantly were abiding by the 24 hour rule. We won't insist upon it because this document is nothing more than some sort of a chart which has been prepared by somebody who has something to do with the defense. However, I don't think it is unreasonable to respectfully request the Tribunal to direct in an exhibit as simple as this that we be served with copies before so we will have some idea what was being offered and to save time both for the Tribunal and counsel.
DR. LATERNSER: Of course, Your Honor, I realize that, and everything I submit to the Tribunal I will submit to the prosecution 24 hours beforehand.
JUDGE CARTER: There appears that the Prosecution has not made an objection on the 24 hour rule so you may proceed.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Field Marshall, please look at the first chart. Does this chart give a clear picture of the forces which were under your commandeat that time?
A. Yes.
Q. Please explain this chart to the Tribunal?
A. At the top is Hitler and at the same time OKW and then OKH, Commander in Chief of the Army, General Field Marshall yon Brauchitsch; I was subordinate to him at that time.
MR. DENNEY: The interpreters don't even have a copy of this thing and what they are saying, for instance she just said about the center, talking about OKW; OKW is not at the center and I ask that the defense counsel give them a copy. It is not the interpretor's fault but they arc just repeating what the witness says without having the document.
DR. LATERNSER: I an sorry I didn't know that the interpreters didn't have a copy. Your Honor, in this connection may I say the following: I don't want to make any difficulties; it isn't so simple for the defense to get so many copies of German photostats because if we ask for a certain number then we are told, "you can do with less," and it makes a difference whether the defense asks for a certain number of copies or the Prosecution asks for them. In this case I would ask the Prosecution to take this into account.
It is exactly the same with translations. I this connection I would like to state this:
If the Prosecution gives anything to be translated and say they needed it in two days. I assume this, this is a pure assumption -- I assume they get it, but it I, as defense counsel, ask for it, I may not get it according to the experiences I have had up to now something of this kind might well happen in the course of the trial so that technical difficulties arise in this direction and I would ask that what I have just said be taken into account.
JUDGE GARTER: We evidently have enough copies of this so let's proceed.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Field Marshall -
A. Then AOK 12 and my Chief was von Grafenberg, and subordinate to me the Panzer group 1 von Kleist, and General Command Stumme, and General Command 18 Mountain Corps Boehme, General Command of the 30th Corps, under off, and under Panzer Group 1 there were two general Commands the 14th Panzer Corps, von Wiestersheim and the General Command 11th Army Corps von Kortzfleisch.
Q. Now field Marshall, what about Panzer Group von Kleist.
A. Panzer Group von Kleist advanced on the Northern flank, via Nisch towards Belgrade and they had to smash the Serbian forces between there and then to occupy Belgrade. With the entry into Belgrade Panzer Group 1 with its troops was transferred to AOK II and General Field Marshall von Weichs.
Q. That is sufficient from this chart. I now would like to ask you how the campaign went on. Please describe it to the Tribunal quite briefly.
A. I have already said on the right flank from the East to West there was Panzer Group Kleist which went via Nish towards Belgrade.
Q. Just a minute Field Marshall, the other charts, which are joined to this one, which I will submit to you later on, I will come to these.
Q. And then towards the South General Command Stumme with the divisions under him had to advance, break through, the Bulgarian-Jugoslavian frontier mountains, smash the Jugoslavian forces there, and take up communication with tho italians. The 18th Mountain Corps had the last sector, had to limit attacks to this line towards the South, also the corps Ott in the direction of Thrace, where were the Creek Bulgarian frontier mountains.
Q. When was Salonika occupied?
A. A Panzer division of Corps Boehme to go around and attacked this line towards South Macedonia in the direction of Salonika. Salonika was occupied on the 9th of April 1941 without fighting.
Q. What was the result of this occupation in Salonika?
A. By the occupation of Salonika the Greek-Thracian Army and the occupations of the Metaxas line fortifications were cut off from their communication with the rear. The Greek-Thracian Army, therefore, capitulated on the 9th of April 1941.
Q. What happened after the capture of Salonika?
A. After the capture of Salonika the forces of the 18th Mountain Corps turned against the Olympic positions which were occupied by Creeks and British.
Q: And when were these positions removed?
A: I can't say the exact date, during the next few days.
Q: And then what happened after this removal?
A: These troops then went towards Larissa, and at the same time from the North a Panzer Division came down. This was sent by Panzer Group Kleist, and went from Florina, towards Larissa. From there the troops went on towards the south in the general direction of Athens which another group of forces went against the rear of the Greek Epirus Army, who faced the Italians.
Q: And what was the result?
A: One of these detachments went over the Mecovo pass in the direction of Joannina; the headquarters was in Joannina, the headquarters of the Greek Epirus Army. This Greek Epirus Army then capitulated.
Q : Why, Field Marshall?
A: By reason of the fact that through this advance their communication, too, was completely cut off.
Q: Who concluded the capitulation of this Epirus Army?
A: The capitulation of the Epirus Army was concluded by me with the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Epirus Army, a General Zolacoughlu.
Q: Where was the real commander in Chief?
A: The real commander in chief bad left his Army shortly before.
Q: When was the capitulation concluded?
A: The capitulation was concluded and signed on the 21st of April 1941.
Q: And did things remain like this?
A: No.
Q: Why not?
A: The capitulation had to be renewed, that is had to be effected again with the same contents. The reason was that the commander in chief of the Epirus Army had only offered this capitulation to the Germans. Of course, I asked during the negotiations for capitulation that with the signing of the capitulation the fighting had to be stopped also against the Italians. Now Mussolini objected to this conclusion, because it was against his prestige that the capitulation also wasn't offered to him and it was not signed by the Italians, so this had to be done.
Q: And when was the capitulation signed for a second time?
A: It was signed again. I think, on the 23 of April 1941 in my headquarters.
Q : And who concluded it? Between whom was it concluded?
A: This capitulation was signed between -- for the Germans Generaloberst Jodl, for the Italians I don't know who signed it, and for the Greeks General Zolacoughlu. I refused to sign the capitulation which had already been concluded.
Q: Did you meet this Greek General again?
A: In the capitulation negotiations on the 23 April, which took place in my headquarters, even if I didn't take part, I met General Zolacoughlu again. I invited him to breakfast without the Italian mission, in order not to offend his honor as a soldier, because he hadn't been conquered by the Italians.
Q: With the signing of the capitulation did the fighting stop?
A: Yes, completely, at least against the Greek troops?
Q: How many Armies did the Greeks have?
A: The Greeks had two armies.
Q: And what were these armies?
A: The Thracian Army and the Epirus Army.
Q: Could you make it quite clear when the Epirus Army and when the Thracian Army capitulated?
A: The Thracian Army capitulated on the 9th of April and the Epirus Army capitulated on the 21st, and again on the 23rd of April 1941.
Q: To whom did those forces capitulate, who were in action in Albania against the Italians?
A: That was the Epirus Army.
Q: And which provisions did the capitulation negotiations contain about the treatment of the Greek soldiers?
A: The Greek soldiers immediately after the cessation of fighting and after the arms had been turned in the soldiers were released.
Q: At that time did you issue an order with regard to the treatment of the Greek soldiers?
A: I issued an order to the effect that to correspond with the bravery of Greece and the Greek soldiers should also be treated in such a manner.
Q: And did any Greek forces come into the captivity of the Italians?
A: No.
Q: Why not?
A: After the Greek Army had first of all only offered the capitulation to the Germans, I wanted to save the Greeks from this. On former Greek-Italian fighting line set up German Security troops in order to prevent the Italians from going over this demarcation line until the disarming had been carried out, and the Greek troops were started on their way home.
Maybe not all of them succeeded in getting through this mountain territory. Maybe some of them remained there.
Q: And how was the sending home of the Greek soldiers carried out?
A: As far as the troops could do this the Greek soldiers were given every facility, and they were put on a baggage vehicle, which went along with the columns.
Q: And were the officers treated in the same way?
A: The officers were released with arms.
Q: When was Athens occupied?
A: Athens was occupied on the 27 April.
Q: And then how did the Peloponnesus campaign come to end?
A: I would like to repeat it all happened after the signing of the capitulation, and while the soldiers of the Greek army were already in the process of being released. Violent fightings was still going on with British troops around the Thermopylae positions. After the entry into Athens, motorized forces, Panzer divisions went via Corinthian Isthmus toward the Peloponnesus, and these forces smashed the British troops which were still there, and those who could no longer get into the ships were taken prisoner. These were the last group in the south of Peloponnesus and there were about 10,000 British.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, may I ask one more question to finish this chapter? I can be finished at once.
Q: What were the losses of the German side and the other side?
A: On both sides they were very small.
JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon at 4:30 a recess was taken)
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 17 September 1947, 0930, Justice Wennerstrum presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshall, will you ascertain if all the defendants are present in the Court room?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all the defendants are present in the Court room.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Laternser.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) WILHELM LIST BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Field Marshall, yesterday we stopped at the end of the Balkan campaign. Have you anything to add to your testimony of yesterday?
A. I think that I said a name wrongly at the end, I said that the British were taken prisoner at the south end of the Peloponnesus and I said the name of the place was Kalabakki. The name really is Kalamata.
Q. Where was your headquarters at the end of the Balkan campaign?
A. For a few days in Athens and than in a little place a few kilometers away from Athens called Kuphisia.
Q. Why didn't you remain in Athens?
A. Actually we weren't supposed to go into Athens at all because at that time Hitler wanted to reserve Athens for the Italians.
Q. What were your tasks at this time? That is, at the end of the Balkan campaign?
A. At the end of the Balkan campaign, my main task was the security against attack, against unrest. In addition, supply for the transports, securing of communication services and transport system.
Q. And what was the situation at that time in Greece?
A. The situation in Greece was at that time completely peaceful.
Q. Which troops were at your command for the execution of the occupation?
A. At the beginning of the occupation, I still had those troops left over from the campaign. These troops were slowly drawn out and taken away from Groece and that part which finally I wouldn't say finally but for the next period were to remain in Greece.
Q. And what remained to you when the forces were withdrawn?
A. When the forces were withdrawn, the general command 18th Mauntain Corps remained and the two Mountain Divisions, the 164th Division, Infantry Regiment 125, and at the beginning , parts of the 5th Panzer Division and then some security forces.
Q. I have here in this chart which we already submitted yesterday to the Tribunal for information, that is chart LI-150 which I will submit to you to look at. It is the second chart, your Honors.
Is this chart correct?
A. Yes, it is correct.
Q. And what does it portray?
A. It portrays the command at that time and the troops and the command authorities which were at that time subordinated to me.
Q. What do you mean by "at that time"?
A. By "that time" I mean the period after the end of the Balkan campaign when the occupation started. At the end of the fighting, after which the other general commanders had already been withdrawn from the Greek area.
Q. When, approximately, did this situation arise--only approximately?
A. Well, this happened during May.
Q. The forces available at that time -- were they sufficient for the execution of the occupation?
A. These forces were sufficient at that time because, of course, as was natural for a campaign, one needs so many more forces as long as the enemy forces were still undefeated. When one saw that the enemy was peaceful at that time in Greece, then these forces were sufficient for the occupation, for the security and to maintain peace and order.
Q. May I have the chart back?
Which order was issued at that time?
A. Then the order came, Order No. 29.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honors, this is Exhibit No. 9 in English Document Book No. 1, page 33 - 37, in the German Document Book 1, page 24.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly repeat that again, Doctor?
DR. LATERNSER: I am now referring to Exhibit No. 9. This is in English Document Book No. 1, pages 33 to 37. Might I point out, your Honors, that during the examination of Field Marshal List, I will refer frequently to Document Book I to V and No. XXIV.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Field Marshal, have you looked at Exhibit No. 9?
A. Yes.
Q. According to this order, who was responsible for the security of the country?
A. According to this order, the security in the Greek zone was the responsibility of the Italians.
Q. What was the relation to the Italian offices?
A. The relation to the Italian offices was -- as it is usually between allies -- correct, with the Italian Commander in Chief at that time I had a rather loose but comradely relationship and the mutual meetings were relatively few.
Q. And was there relation of subordination between the German troops and the Italian officers?
A. No, not at all.
Q. Which area of Greece was occupied by the German troops?
A. The German troops occupied an area around Salonika, and around the port of Piraeus with its district and a few islands. Later on, Crete was added. At this time, this wasn't yet in the hands of the Germans.
Q. And which area was occupied by the Italians?
A. The Italians occupied the rest of Greece.
Q. And who occupied Athens?
A. For troop billeting, Athens was not to be used by us.
Q. Field Marshal, I asked you who occupied Athens?
A. The Italians. Also for the German offices a German local command was set up there.
Q. Were no German troops in Athens?
A. No, no troops.
Q. What was in Athens?
A. There were a number of staffs in Athens and at that time they became more and more.
Q. What about the subordination of the Air Force, under your command.
A. The Air Force had to carry out the operational war, independently and according to the immediate orders they were direct orders of the Commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe to whom they were subordinate.
Q. And what about the navy?
A. The navy was in a similar position and the coastal defenses, too, was to be a matter for the navy.
Q. Did AOK-12 have anything to do with the military administration?
A. No.
Q. To whom was this subordinate?
A. The Military Administration in the Greek zone was subordinate to the Italians, and the order went so far that I was instructed to refuse any mediation activities by the Greeks.
Q. When you speak about orders, do you mean Exhibit No. 9?
A. Yes, Exhibit No. 9.
Q. At that time what was your relation to the Commander of Serbia?
A. The Military Commander of Serbia was at that time quite independent and was subordinate directly to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Q. Then you had no official connection with him?
A. No.
Q. One last question with regard to Exhibit No. 9. Did this order which is contained in Exhibit 9 change anything in your position which you had during the Balkan campaign?
A. As Commander-in-Chief of the Army, no.
Q. And what about the island of Crete at that time?
A. The island of Crete was at that time not conquered.
Q. And when it was captured?
A. When it was captured, it remained first of all under the Air Force. The Air Force had to carry out independently the operation of capturing Crete.
Q. When, approximately, was the capture of Crete?
A. In the last day of May as far as I remember.
Q. Then it was like this at that period? You had neither Serbia nor southern Greece nor Crete -- these three places were not subordinate to you?
A. Yes.
Q. And how long did this situation remain so?
A. This situation remained like this until the next order from the fuehrer. This was fuehrer order No. 31 in which the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast was created.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, we will now refer to Exhibit No. 15. This is in English Document Book No. 1, page 55 to 59, and in the German document book I, page 38 to 43.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Field Marshal, why were these titles mentioned here? What were you named in this order?
A. I was appointed Wehrmacht Commander Southeast.
Q. Did you remain Commander-in-Chief of the 12 Army.
MR. DENNEY: I believe what was asked was what was he named in this order, and I believe that the witness replied "Wehrmachts befehlshaber Suedost" and it was translated by the interpreter as Field Marshal Commander Southeast, which is not the proper translation.
DR. LATERNSER: May I ask how it was translated?
THE INTERPRETER: It was translated Wehrmacht Commander Southeast.
THE PRESIDENT: Does that clarify the situation?
DR. LATERNSER: I think so, yes.
Q. Did you remain commander in chief of the 10th Army?
A. Yes.
Q. Which powers did you receive through this appointment as Wehrmacht commander Southeast, quite generally?
A. The chief powers --- the most important task was the unified defense of that part of Serbia occupied by the German troops and also that part of Greece occupied by the German troops, including the Greek island, against attacks and unrest. In addition, the security of supply and transport.
Q. Field Marshall intermediate question. Since this contained in the order, please only state quite briefly what the tasks were at that time because the text of the order is in front of the Tribunal.
A. The chief tasks I have already stated.
MR. DENNEY: If your Honors please, I think it is apparent that the witness is reading from the document. The document is in evidence. He is being asked what his duties were. There is no objection to his refreshing his recollection from the document, but I certainly object to his reading the document into the record.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, before this objection was raised, I had already pointed this out to the witness for these simples matters usually knows by heart.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be overruled. The witness however should keep in mind the suggestion made by his counsel.
Q. (By Dr. Laternser) Field Marshal, I had asked you which were the chief tasks, generally speaking according to this order?
A. Shall I repeat?
Q. Quite briefly, yes.
MR DENNEY: As I understand the translation with reference to the question about military administration, first the interpreter said no and then said yes. I would like to have it clear in the record.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel will kindly put the question again and the translation and interpreters will then give a further and in their judg ment a correct interpretation.