Nothing arises from the documents submitted for the assertion of the charge. As far as they are supposed to prove that the defendant knew of this order in his later official capacity in the Southeast. I will prove that when the defendant took over his new position in this combat zone the order had already been passed on some time before to his subordinate troops. I will also prove in general to this point and later on in particular that in a typical commando operation within the sphere of the Panzer Army this so-called commando order was not applied.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Dr. Fritsch, I think this is a suitable time for our morning recess. We will recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
DR. FRITSCH: On page 6 of the German text:
III. The Fighting in the Balkans.
In the view of the defense, the fighting in the Balkans cannot be properly evaluated from the perspective shown here by the prosecution. It will, therefore, be the task of the defense to describe the general conditions in the Balkans, conditions, which cannot be compared with those general in Europe. In this connection it will be necessary, for the maintenance of historical events to refer to the former fighting and to the situation at that time in the Balkans. To understand the connections it will also be necessary to observe more closely current events in the Balkans. The defense states here, that it will ask for the support of the Tribunal in obtaining from the General Secretary of the United Nations the records of the inquiry into the current events in the Balkans, as far as they deal in detail with the method of warfare. The defense wishes to present in this connection as clear arid as graphic a material as possible, but realises that this desire is beset with enormous difficulties. It will, therefore, often have to produce only general data, but these, as for example the fact of the recent large excommunicztion by the Holy Seat, will throw significant light on the confused happenings and the now usual methods of fighting in the Balkans.
One of the chief preliminary questions will be to go into the entirely unfounded claim of the Prosecution that the partisans, regardless of their leanings, were belligerents, and that the statement in German orders describing them as partisans or bandits was wrong. The claim of the prosecution that the partisans openly carried arms, observed the laws and customs of war, and that the groups of partisans were under a unified and responsible command and wore uniforms or insignia recognisable at a distance, - this prosecution assertion will be confronted by the defense assertion that this was not the case. There can be no doubt that according to General knowledge of the methods of warfare in the Balkans, the defense assertion takes prima facie precedence, and the prosecution must therefore bring the corresponding evidence for its assertion.
When necessary for the defense, the illegality of the warfare carried on by Tito and the other groups of partisans will be proved, as will also the fact that at least until the middle of 1944 the Allies did not recognize the various kinds of partisan units within the sphere of the 2nd Panzer Army as belligerents.
Before the defense deals with the individual charges, it will be shown that the defendant did not arrive in the Balkans until the end of August 1943 and remained there until the end of June 1944. Especially important in the view of the defense is the statement that General Rendulic came into a situation which had arisen without his help, it will prove that with the means at his disposal it was quite impossible for him to regulate his own actions and those of his troops on completely new lines.
With regard to the general charges made by the prosecution, on these questions, the defense sub-divides them as follows:
a) Treatment of reprisal hostages.
b) Treatment of franc-tireurs, especially of the Italian forces.
c) General behaviour towards the civilian population.
A) The defense has already pointed out that the admission of a fact such as the "killing of hostages" in this short form as contained in Article II 1b of Control Council Law No. 10 must arouse legal doubts. And in this respect I will also refer to the statements of my colleague, Dr. Laternserm who in my opinion, has already proved that the Control Council Law only refers to the so-called treaty hostage (Vertragsgeisel) of classical international law, a hostage taken according to international treaties. But I will, however, prove that the hostages taken in the area of the defendant's army were persons taken by the troops in their zone as a security measure against unlawful actions by hostile sections of the civilian population. And I will also prove that these measures were in accordance with the American "Rules of Land Warfare," dated 1940 which contain the provision in article 358. I quote:
"Those forces and sections of the populace committing illegal acts may be subjugated with legally appropriate reprisal measures. Hostages taken and held for the declared purpose of ensuring security against unlawful acts by hostile forces or the population may be punished or killed if the unlawful acts are committed in spite of this measure."
Even if the Control Council Law does not refer exclusively to the hostage in the meaning of classical international Law, it also would not express the prevailing view of international law but would contradict this view. The defense will prove that within the sphere of General Rendulic's 2nd Panzer Army no illegal killing of reprisal hostages was carried out.
And in factual connection the following can be pointed out here:
It will not be difficult for the defense to prove that within the sphere of the defendant General Rendulic's Army high command expiation measures only took place on a very small scale. And here the fact must be taken into account that mostly 12, and for a time up to 16 German divisions, were continuously in action and within a very large area. The defense is able to prove that the reprisal figure stated by the prosecution was in no way applied, but that if reprisal figures were drawn up, the combat conditions of the 2nd Panzer Army necessitated these being kept at a considerably smaller ratio, and that this ratio, however, must be taken as the justifiably lowest possible limit in view of the military necessity. The defense will bring evidence to show that the defendant mitigated Hitler's so-called Expiation Order and never insisted on the observation by his troops of the ratios demanded by Hitler and always approved of the far smaller ratios reported. Furthermore the defense will prove that the defendant never issued a single initial expiation order. The measures so executed were in no way contrary to the customs of war and to the law of war.
b) A large area of the Balkans, under the command of the 2nd Panzer Army later on, the whole coast, was mainly occupied by Italian troops as can be assumed to be known to the Tribunal.
Italy's exit from the war resulted in a particularly critical situation for the defendant General Rendulic's 2nd Panzer Army, because apart from the partisans, a new enemy had arisen in the Italian troop units. These units, as can be proved, were numerically superior to the German units, and in addition there was the possibility of an Allied landing in the Balkans. In this situation, the defendant General Rendulic concluded with the competent italian army officer a legally effective capitulation in accordance with international law, the details of which will be proved by witnesses and documents. In case further difficulties were caused by the behaviour of the italian troops, the defendant Rendulic, as a responsible army commander, was authorized to provide measures and if necessary to threaten their use, in order to guarantee the execution of the conditions agreed to by the Italians. The Prosecution, however, has provided no proof for its assertion, that the defendant ordered expiation measures against the Italians, and that his troops carried out such measures. The defense will prove that the Prosecution obviously misinterpreted an order by the defendant, which misinterpretation was probably aided by a wrong translation.
The defense will furthermore refute the assertions of the Prosecution that 300 captured Italian officers from the Bergamo division were shot to death. It will bring evidence to show that the Italians fighting against the German Wehrmacht after the capitulation were franc tireurs, and that those Italians who gave arms to the partisans after the capitulation were treated no differently from the way in which would have been German soldiers if they had committed the same offense.
In so far as Italian officers of the Italian division named were shot at all, the defense will prove that contrary to the OKW order merely a fraction of the named figure was sentenced to death and executed after a regular trial according to martial law.
It is not clear What sort of evidence the prosecution wants to submit with the document containing the order by the Defendant Rendulic concerning the Italian General Roncaglia. The defense states again, that it sees no need to go further into such prosecution assertions as these, if the prosecution itself does not produce corresponding evidence to support its statements. In any case, the defense would be able to prove that the order arose from absolute military necessity and in addition that General Roncaglia left the defendant Rendulic's sphere of command alive.
c) As far as the defendant is charged with the operations "Panther" and "Hafenfahrt", the defense will show that the order to send members of the civilian population for work in Germany was an affair of the German and Croatian civilian authorities, and did not come within the competence and the sphere of decision of the 2nd Panzer Army. The defense will prove further that when raids took place in combat zones, the troops only took those unreliable people who endangered the security of the troops. IV. Norway.
With regard to Norway, I would like to mention a few general facts in advance:
The question of the evacuation and destruction in Finmark must be considered from two points of view:
1) With regard to the military necessity of the destruction and with this also the evacuation, and
2) with regard to the treatment of the population during the evacuation.
In the view of the defense, the prosecution have neither been able to prove original treatment during the evacuation nor the non-existence of a military necessity for evacuation and destruction, so that even the destructions must still be regarded as in accordance with Article 23 of the Hague Land Warfare Convention, and therefore does not constitute an offense. The defense therefore moves that the Tribunal rule that proceedings against General Rendulic, in so far as criminal actions during the evacuation and destructions of Finmark are maintained, be suspended, and that this count without the possibility of a new charge, be stricken from the indictment. The reasons for my motion are:
The best proof for the manner in which the defendant General Rendulic wanted the evacuation to be carried out, is his order of 29 Oct. 1944, which has been submitted by the prosecution as exhibit No. 504, in document book 22 on page 9 of the German, and on page 10 of the English book. Under point 7 of this order he expressly directs that the evacuation is to be carried out as a welfare measure for the population and that the Norwegians were to be safeguarded. From the report of the evacuation staff, dated 25 Nov. 1944 exhibit No-506 Prosecution Document-Book 22 page 14 of the German and page 16 of the English text, which cannot be doubted in any manner and the verdict of which is very sincere, it can be seen that the evacuation was carried out very carefully and considerately, and counsel for the defense believes that he can establish that this evacuation was carried out differently from any other of the many evacuations which took place during the war and especially also after the war. That also in this case mistakes were made at one or the other point must be considered the result of the tactlessness and incompetence of various subordinated offices, and as the report itself states, such mistakes were unavoidable. With the exception of the hints, which occur in above mentioned report, the defendant was never informed about that. The fact that the events which occurred on the ships are not part of the responsibility of the defendant Rendulic can be s en from the documents presented by the prosecution as well as from the fact that the Navy was not under the jurisdiction of the commander-in-chief of the 20th Mountain Army.
I consider it necessary to point out that Hitler had to give the order for the evacuation twice before it was actually carried out by the 20th Mountain Army. In the Beginning, the defendant Rendulic did not consider the evacuation as absolutely necessary. At that time he did not yet know of the overwhelming deployment of forces of the Russians who were by far superior in strong h, a deployment which would scarcely have been thought possible in this territory. At that time he did not know either that he would soon have to send off more than half of his Army for operations on the continent.
To ignore the second evacuation order, which had been solicited by the commissioner of the Reich or to carry it out in like manner as the first, proved to be impossible for the defendant Rendulic. On one hand he was in a way constantly under the supervision of the commissioner of the Reich, who saw to it that Hitler's order was carried out, and on the other hand, and that was of decisive importance, Hitler gave as the reason for his repeated order the military necessity. At that time, on 28 October 1944, the Army had already clearly recognized the entire impact of the superiority of the Russian Forces and the danger, which was constituted by the Fins. The 19th Corps alone had at that tine lost more than 6 000 men. Furthermore, on or about this date the first orders to relinquish troops had been received. Under these circumstances it was impossible for the commander-in-chief of the 20th Mountain Army to reject the idea to by destruction would make it difficult or even impossible for the enemy to advance. In view of this attitude the condition which appears in Article 23 of the Hague land Warfare Convention must be considered attained, as it states, that the destruction or confiscation of enemy property is permissible, if the necessities of the war should make such action incumbent.
Furthermore, in every Army throughout the entire world there would in any case, in which it was doubtful whether or not it was a military necessity, the judgment of the superior authority be decisive and must be decisive, especially since Hitler had issued this order clearly referring to this military necessity. One must also point out that the commander-in-chief of the 20th Mountain Army had been given besides these purely military reason an important political reason for the evacuation and the destructions in the Finmark. Hitler wanted to prevent the Norwegian exile government from settling in Finmark. It was clear that such an event must influence the life of the German troops in Norway and the defense of the country to a great extent. Although the defendant Rendulic was not responsible for the evaluation of political questions he was nevertheless bound to assume that although this matter fell within the scope of Article 23 G of the Hague Convention, which does not speak of military necessities but of the much broader concept of a "necessity of War." Thus it is apparent that this term covers also political measures which are important to the conduct of the war. To carry out the evacuation order was made easier for the defendant as commander-in-chief of the 2-th Mountain Army by the fact that in view of his accurate knowledge of the Finmark he could assume that these destructions could not ca.use any undue damage. In an area of the extent of Belgium and Holland together there were living only 62 000 people. Although the calculations of the Norwegian government with regard to damages have resulted in an amount which although regrettable cannot be considered unduly high. Such damages and frequently even greater damages were caused in a single air-raid against a German-English or French town. It has not been possible for the prosecution to prove by the testimony of the witnesses which it has called namely:
1. That there was no military necessity for the destruction and for the evacuation.
2. That the evacuation was carried out in an incompetent manner in violation of the laws of humanity. The two generals whose testimony we have heard, expressed the opinion, which, however, they based merely on assumptions, that they did not consider the evacuation necessary. Both generals did say, however, that one could count on the possibility of a Russian advance. One of them stated, that the destructions had been justified if one counted on such a possibility.
The focal question when dealing with the evacuation and the destructions in Finmark is decisive whether or not these measures were justified by necessity in the sense and meaning of the Hague Convention.
The literature on international la.w of the Anglo-American legal circles, which is here of decisive importance, is particularly and uniformly expressive with regard to this question. Thus Professor Fenwick states in his book "international Law", Second Edition 1934, page 483: "General destruction of property as a means to cover the retreat has, however, been common usage in the conduct of wars." He backs this view, amongst others, by mentioning the destruction of a. large territory from Atlanta to the Sea as well as the destruction of the Shenandoahvalky by General Sherman in 1865. Professor Fenwick even stresses that Article 23 G of the Hague Regulations leaves it to the Army which is engaged in warfare to decide which circumstances would make such measures a military necessity.
The leading author on international law Professor Lauterpacht writes in his essay, which appeared in the British Annual for International. Law 1944. On page 74:
"Such actions, as general devastation . . . . . can offer sufficient reasons for condemnation and protests; . . . .after the conclusion of the war they may justify the imposition of collective sanctions either by way of reparations or by other measures to be distinguished from condemnations in individual cases of a criminal nature.
Criminal proceedings, however, before state tribunals of the victorious powers may appear to many a questionable method in order to remove existing doubts and in order to establish authoritatively what is right in doubtful cases. Total war has changed the nature of many a law. In an age when the policy of "scorched earth" is partially applied by the warring power in its own country to a large extent, the general devastation, which has been ordered in the cause of large scale strategic operations is not a suitable subject of a criminal proceedings."
Since the prosecution has not proved its allegation, since further it has not shown any facts which could be considered criminal actions perpetrated by the defendant during the evacuation, the motion which I have put forward is justified and I beg the High Tribunal to rule upon it.
V.
With regard to the general position of the defense in my case I consider myself now at the conclusion of my remarks obliged to point out to your Honors the difficulties with which I as counsel for the defense have to cope; especially with regard to the case for the Balcans only a small part of really very extensive material is available. The evidentiary material, which would serve to show more clearly all possible circumstances which led to the various actions of the defendant Rendulic are not accessible to me. Also it is possible for me to submit parts of the prosecution documents only to a small extent, parts which can serve to exonerate the defendant, the defendant and therefore also the counsel for the defense must in the main rely on the memory of the defendant in the conduct of his defense. It is simply beyond the capacity of the human brain still to remember details, facts, persons, conferences and discussions, relevant for this trial after 4 years and more than 3 years since the conclusion of the war during which the defendant was active on many fronts, during which he had to deal with any number of superiors and subordinates in constantly changing positions, and during which he had to tackle the most complicated problems of warfare, and to prove such reminiscences with material of probative values The prosecution had many months in which to prepare its case.
The defendant and his counsel have received the evidentiary material of the prosecution only at the end of June and during the month of July 1947 in such a short period of time it is not possible to examine this material as thoroughly as one should and a.t the same time to collect the necessary rebuttal evidence especially since the latter is particularly difficult in view of the present situation in Germany and takes an unduly long time. As counsel for the defense I consider myself obliged to help to establish the truth. But I am also obliged to point out those circumstances which might make this even technically impossible for me.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: It is the opinion of the Tribunal that a prima facie case, at least, has been made against the defendant Rendulic in regard to the evacuation of the province of Finnmark, and the motion of his counsel to dismiss that portion of the count will be overruled.
Is counsel for the defendant Dehner prepared to make his opening statement?
DR. KLINNERT(For General Dehner): Your Honors, James W. Garner, the well known American teacher of International Law, Professor for International Law at the University of Illinois, author of the well known work "The International Law and the World War" gave a lecture in Berlin, on 30 November 1935, on the subject of "The International Law and the Wars of the Future". In this lecture Garner said in regard to international law during world bar I, 1914-1918, inter alia the following: I quote:
"Both sides maintained that many of the old standards dating back to a time in which conditions were either not applicable, illogical or ineffective and would therefore have to be discarded. Or they would have to be adapted, by way of additions, to the new conditions, or the new means of warfare, under which and by means of which the war was to be continued.
It is a fact that the laws of war were in a chaotic state; many points were not covered by any law at all, with regard to other points there existed no agreement as to what was lawful, and with respect to other points again the standards were hopelessly incomplete, illogical and badly suited to the new conditions under which the war had to be waged."
With a prophetic eye this lawyer, who is among the greatest teachers of international law of our centry, stated the following with regard to a future war which unhappily has become reality: I quote:
"The next great war -- in case we should unhappily have to live through one again -- will thus to a large extent have to be waged without fixed standards or under standards, which will be ineffective or imperfectly adapted to present conditions, unless in the meantime the existing standards are revised or supplemented by new ones ......"The world did not grant Garner's demands for a revision and a new setting up of the standards of International Law.
The standards of International Law have not been supplemented or strengthened. They have not been revised. It was not ascertained which parts of the laws of war were still valuable and useful.
On the strength of these facts the following questions arise:
Is it possible at all for a charge to be based on standards which have been termed hopelessly incomplete, hopelessly illogical and hopelessly ineffective by one of the greatest teachers of International Law?
And would it not be an injustice to base a condemnation on such standards?
Prior to the examination of the evidence the following task must therefore be fulfilled:
The Laws of War that are laid down in the Hague Convention and in the text books of International Law, must be analysed with regard to all their finer points. First of all one must ascertain, which parts were still generally valid during the last war. Only when this is established could the Tribunal arrive at a just decision.
I am expressly using the word "could", for establishing this point only does not suffice.
No punishment without a wrong being committed.
This is a universally valid legal maxim of all penal systems.
This legal maxim is valid in particular in ail countries guided by English and American Law.
It is true that on principle ignorance of a law is no excuse for a punishable act.
This maxim, however, does not possess unrestricted validity even as far as the penal law of individual states is concerned, American law especially knows of exceptions to this rule. In this context I refer to Winthrop "Military Law and Precedents" edition 1920. On page 29 of this work Winthrop cites some examples in which ignorance of the legal norms excludes culpability.
Owing to the chaos concerning the validity of the legal standards in International Law, this maxim can, however, find no application at all in International Law.
Otherwise this would mean demanding a better knowledge of the standards of International Law from a soldier than from the recognized authorities on International Law.
General Dehner, who is represented by me, could thus only be punished,
a) if violations of those norms of the Laws of War car be proved whose general validity was still recognized during the last war by those nations abiding by International Law, and,
b) if it is established that General Dehner was also conscious of this.
It is therefore necessary to subject the Laws of War as laid down in the Hague convention to a very searching analysis.
For this reason I cannot by any means agree with the Prosecution if in their Opening Statement they say:
"Nor--- can the true meaning of this case be drawn from learned arguments by counsel, analyzing and refining the laws of war as they are written in the Hague Conventions and in textbooks on international law."
(Page 10 of the German and page 11 of the English record) But I can even less agree with the Prosecution if in its' Opening Statement it further says that questions of evidence are of secondary importance.
The questions of evidence play a very considerable part, particularly in view of the confusion which predominated in matters of international law during the last world war.
In peace time it is, as a matter of principle, forbidden to kill a human being, not so in war time. Even the killing of hostages may be legal, as even the Prosecution has stated.
Destruction of foreign property, also, is not always illegal in case of war.
Therefore, the facts have to be thoroughly established in order to answer the question, whether the few norms of laws of war which still have general validity, have been violated.
It is not sufficient, therefore, when the prosecution presents evidence for the fact that hostages have been killed, and that inhabited localities have been destroyed.
Instead, the prosecution will have to present in all cases the pertinent circumstances, especially the reasons leading to the killing of hostages and destruction of inhabited localities.
The documents which have been submitted, especially the teletypes do not show this in any way.
Generally speaking the following can be said with regard to the documents which have been submitted as evidence against General Dehner, especially with regard to the daily reports:
These documents have no probative value according to the regulations concerning evidence of the American rules of procedure, for the following reasons:
1. They do not constitute the best evidence which could be presented by the prosecution, but instead "secondary evidence" which is not admissible:
I quote: "The best evidence must be produced of which the case is susceptible." (Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 1920, page 321.)
2. It does not suffice, therefore, that the prosecution submits that their evidence consists of captured documents.
Instead, the prosecution has to prove, that General Dehner himself, either wrote them (daily reports), received them, or was informed of their contents. Such a proof would be necessary even if - which is not however the case - these documents had been captured amongst General Dehner's effects. I quote:
"Neither is it sufficient to show merely that the letter or telegram was found in the possession of the person in question, without further showing that he wrote, received or knew of such writing". End of quote.
(Wharton, Evidence in Criminal Cases 1935, Vol. II, page 1394.
To refute these ay statements the regulations of Ordnance No. 7 could be quoted, according to which Military Tribunals are not bound to any rules concerning evidence. In this connection I would like to point out the attitude of two judges, who even today are members of the Supreme Court. These two judges have expressed the following attitude in connection with this question in the case of Yamashita:
Mr. Justice Rutledge has said:
"The rules of evidence are not only a matter of evidence. They go to the basis right of defense." (Case Yamashita, page 12.)
I quote further: "They go also to the basic standarts of trial", end of quote. (Case Yamashita, Page 2.)
Mr. Justice Murphy has said: "The punishment should be based upon charges fairly drawn in light of established rules of international laws and recognized concepts of justice." (Case Yamashita, Page 12.)
In this connection the Prosecution further submitted, they did not believe it would be refuted; that:
1. the killings charged in the indictment actually took place, 2. they were carried out by troops under the command of these defendants, and 3. they were actually ordered by the defendants.
These statements of the prosecution do not apply under any circumstances to General Dehner, whom I represent.
To begin with, it will certainly be refuted that all killings alleged in the indictment did actually take place. The Prosecution did not present full evidence for these allegations.
Furthermore, it will certainly be refuted that, inasmuch as the killings with which General Dehner has been charged, took place at all, they were carried out by troops under the command of General Dehner.
Thirdly, it will be fully refuted that General Dehner did ever at any time order an execution. Instead, the allegation to this effect by the Prosecution will be confronted by an allegation of the Defense that General Dehner had never ordered any execution. This can be seen from the very presentation of the Prosecution. The orders which have been submitted by the Prosecution in this connection were already valid at the tine when, in August 1943, General Dehner took over the command of the LXIX Corps. The order of the 15 Sept. 1943 was passed on by General Dehner's deputy, without the former's knowledge, while he was on leave.
According to these orders the divisional commanders were exclusively responsible for the reprisal measures and the executions of hostages.
As my colleague, Dr. Laternser, has already shown in detail, the court will have to go deeply into the question to what extent General Dehner can be at all punished for actions which his subordinates committed without his orders and during his absence. For all actions committed by General Dehner in his capacity as Commanding General of the LXIX Corps, were committed pursuant to orders of his superior military authority.
I do not want to repeat the statements which my colleague, Dr. Laternser, has made here, but instead I wish to point out the following points: This question cannot be decided on the basis of the principles of either the American or the German Penal Law, but solely according to the principles of international law. International law, however, is completely void of any norm, such as is defined in Article II, No. 4 b, of Control Council Law No. 10 of 20 March 1945. International law does not know of any norm establishing that a soldier should not base his actions on superior orders. Therefore, the court will have to go deeply into the question to what extent the Control Council could establish the norm of Article II, No.
4 b of Control Council LaW No. 10, dated 20 Dec. 1945 with retroactive power. In case that the Tribunal should want to base this decision on the principles of the American Penal Code, I should like to draw attention to the writings of William Winthrop in his work "Military Law and Precedents". In this book, it is stated - on page 296 that auctions of a soldier, committed pursuant to written or oral orders by a military superior, are not punishable.
In this connection the Prosecution has referred to the stipulation of Art. 47 of the German Military Penal Code and stated that the law of the German Army itself says that every soldier is in duty bound to refuse the carrying out of orders the criminal nature of which is known to him. The Prosecution has, however, not taken into account here the following point of view for the application of this stipulation. This stipulation always presumes the possibility of refusing to carry out an order. If this possibility were not open to the soldier, then his refusal would result in strict punishment for failing to carry out orders, without examining the legality of the order and the illegal act which had been ordered could not be prevented. The common soldier can refuse to carry out a criminal order given to him by a lieutenant, because he then has the possibility to complain to the superior of the lieutenant. The lieutenant can refuse to carry out a criminal order given by a staff officer, because he has then the possibility to turn to the superior of the staff officer. This possibility, however, does not exist if orders of any kind, the illegality of which should now be proved, have been issued by the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht. And this possibility does not exist under any circumstances, if these orders have been issued by a dictator, who unites in his hand all the powers of tho state, as in the case of Hitler, a dictator who would, in fact, have had the orders issued by him carried out by using every means at his disposal. What was General Dehner to do in the face of the orders given him? How could he have prevented their being carried out, and after his Septem ber leave those orders had already been carried out.