The connection between the Military Commander of Greece and the Second Panzer operating in Croatia and the evacuation of the islands at the Adriatic Coast is and remains incomprehensible.
All these obscurities are evidently based on a number of primary errors:
1. The prosecution misjudges the extent of the executive power of the defendant Speidel. I shall prove that it did not apply to the areas in which the mentioned events happened and, furthermore, that the emits which were carrying out these actions did not come under his command and, furthermore, that Speidel's competence did not extend in this direction at all.
2. The main reason for the prosecution's conclusion that the responsibility of the defendant was far reaching is the mere reason that he was in charge of "Maintenance of Peace and Order."
However, this task can, in a case of military commander, not apply to war areas and theatres. In those areas only the military authorities are the rulers. This basis rule is expressly stated at a number of points in the regulations about the command in the Southeastern area but Greece always was and remained a war theatre (fighting zone).
3. Speidel is mentioned as the holder of executive power. In this assumption the following has boon overlooked:
a) At no point the term "executive power' is properly explained by the prosecution.
b) It has furthermore been overlooked that, according to the degrees about the Southeastern Command and the regulations for the Military Commander Greece he, (the Military Commander Greece) only holds the executive power "if he has been entrusted with it." Not a single order has been submitted which describes the extent of this entrustment more explicitly.
c) It becomes, however, evident from the very nature of the matter that the military commander can in any case only be entrusted with the executive power in the areas under his administration.
This automatically excludes fighting areas and war theaters.
d) There are, furthermore, a number of orders which prove that the executive power of the defendant Speidel in the area remaining under his administration did not pertain to matters of the sphere under question here; I shall prove this to be so by aid of the documents through affidavits and witnesses.
c) The means at Speidel's disposal were in accordance with his subordiante comptence. I shall prove that the few military units under his control partly served an entirely different purpose and partly would not be any means have sufficed to carry out the executive power to the extent assumed by the prosecution. Thus apparently only his high sounding military title has led to a misinterpretation of the true extent of his competence. The truth of the matter is that this title was nothing but a conspicuous singboard advertising his representative position which, of necessity, had to deceive outsiders, inducing the Greek population, by lack of proper perspective about the true facts.
Only through this it can be explained that the witness Santos towards the end of his examination expressed the view: who else was supposed to see to it that the German troops behave and act according to international law if not the military commander? After all, he had the supreme position in Greece.
4. It would be a further basic error to charge the defendant Speidel with the responsibility for the actions reported by him or by others from the area under his command. The daily and monthly reports of the district and field commandanturas serve the purpose of informing the superior command of all events happening in the area to the possible degree. They do, therefore, not admit any conclusion as to the respon sibility of the reporting authority for any individual incident. Responsibility is only taken for the fact that the incident had actually happened.
This is especially valid for reports from the Ic area as the Ic task consists mainly in accummulating and passing on of nows for information of superior authorities. This I shall prove in detail.
In spite of this, I shall at this point try and outline my basic principles which I deem important for the exoneration of my client.
Regarding Count 1:
All these measures were taken during and in combat against armed bands within the war area.
By submission of documents and producing witnesses I shall prove that the defendant Speidel did not have a hand in this at any time during his term of office in Greece.
a.) As long as Speidel was Supremo Commander in Greece (12 October 1942- September 43) these tasks were dealt with by the Italians. At this time Speidel was only in command of a very small area at the Coast of Africa in which at that time no band activities had been reported.
b) During Speidel's activities as Military Commander Greece September 1943 - 15 May 1944 ) he had under his command not a single one of those units which were in charge of those areas from which any of the incidents have been reported.
We find the shooting of hostages under the caption, "Greece." The factual connection, however, only becomes evident if the military unit carrying out and responsible for the action is mentioned.
Only in a very few cases the prosecution documents mention merely the geographical term "Greece" without naming any military unit- but even here the context shows that another authority is in command which is not the defendant Speidel.
I shall prove conclusively that the higher SS and Police Leader did not even come under the Military Commander as far as police matters were concerned. Even here he came immediately under the Reichsfuehrer SS.
Regarding Count II:
What has been mentioned in connection with Count I is equally valid for Count II. As Speidel had nothing to do with combatting armed bands, he cannot be made responsible for the destruction mentioned in this connection. Apart from this, the prosecution has not in a single case submitted conclusive evidence for the destruction having been "wanton" and "without military necessity" or for Speidel having ordered or tolerated them. This the prosecution must still prove. It is not for the defendant to prove that the burned villages were destroyed "not wantonly" and "on account of military necessity." In almost all documents submitted by the prosecution itself, the statement keeps appearing that the burned villages had served a retreat for the bands and as ammunition dumps or that the inhabitants supplied the bands with information and food. Who, then, will call their destruction "wanton" or "not a military necessity?" Furthermore, in a variety of cases it must be assumed that the destruction was admissible according to international law as it was the immediate consequence of battle.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Regarding Count III.
a) I shall prove that Speidel never received the "Kommisar" order. This order applied exclusively to fighting units at the Eastern front; but Speidel never commanded any fighting units.
b) The same is valid for the "Kommando" order. There was no possible reason for sending such orders to Speidel. Neither as the Chief of the Luftwaffen mission (air force mission) in Rumania (October 1940 - May 1942) nor as Commanding Officer Southern Greece he participated in this program as he was excluded from field action.
c) Spedel had nothing to do either with the arrests and measures against the Italians. This also cames under the category, "Field action."
Regarding Count IV:
Here the defendant Speidel is charged with the following: murder, torture, terror, confinement in concentration camps, arbitrary forced labor for fortification, adduction of Greek civilian population for slave labor by troops under his command by his order.
The Prosecution, under letters "a-g", does not make mention of a single case which happened in Greece. I would, therefore, be justified to ask:
a) What individual cases is my client being charged with?
b) Which were the units that carried out these actions?
c) How far were these units under the command of the defendant Speidel?
The prosecution has not in any way made any exact statements regarding these questions, but only the following incidents can have been meant:
1) Concentration Camp Chaidari. This camp had been instituted by the Italians and later came under the police supervision of the higher SS and Police Leader who himself was responsible to the Reichfuehrer SS.
2) The Greer workers' transports:
I shall prove that there was a special authority in Greece dealing with allocation of labor acting independently and in no way responsible to Speidel. Furthermore, during his term of office, assignment of labor in Greece was on a voluntary basis.
3) Fortifications and military positions.
Speidel did not have to deal with such tasks as field action was not within his sphere of activities. It was solely the tasks of the combat unit. The assumption that Speidel supplied forced labor for such programs does not become evident anywhere.
4) No documents or other evidence have been submitted pertaining to torture and terror by troops under Speidel's command. Again this is a mere assumption.
I shall base my evidence on;
1) Hearing my client in the witness stand,
2) Examination of the co-defendants insofar as they will be put on the witness stand,
3) The submission of affidavits,
4) The testimony of witnesses, the number and names of which will be duly indicated to the High Tribunal, as soon as I can find out the details.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Is counsel for the defendant Rendulic prepared?
DR. FRITSCH (Counsel for defendant Rendulic): Your Honors, after this war for the first time in history soldiers and army officers are being brought before courts which are not composed of their own countrymen, but of members of the victor nations.
The defendants are not charged with violating their duties towards their own people but with violating general principles. These general principles have been compiled by the prosecution on the basis of Control Council Law No. 10 under the two conceptions, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This fact makes it highly necessary for the Defense to sift and to examine with extreme care the material submitted by the Prosecution.
In the main, the defendant General Rendulic is charged with two complexes in which he was active and by which he is supposed to have made himself punishable. The Balkans and Norway. Before going into details with regard to the charges against my client, I would like to point out the following which is a fundamental importance:
The judgment will have to deal in articular with the legal questions which are supposed to be valid as a basis for this trial and especially with these legal foundations wnich have been suparately set up for trials of this kind. The final plea will show in detail that Control Council Law No. 10 raised by the prosecution as the material foundation cannot in my opinion, fulfil this task. The principle of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla peona sine lege is generally recognised in all national legal provisions and the violation of this principle has already been determined in another trial before these military tribunals and has been described as particularly reprehensible.
Undoubtedly some of the provisions of Control Council Law No. 10 coincide with the facts constituting a crime laid down in the national penal codes and also in the German Reich penal code. Other facts set down in Control Council Law No. 10, such as the "killing of hostages" and participation therein do not observe this principle, so that application of this kind of facts constituting a crime is a violation of the legal principle quoted.
Above all, the acts of participation contained in Article II of Control Council Law No. 10 go far beyond the forms of participation contained in the German Reich Penal Code and also in the wording valid prior to 1933. In particular fact of "conspiracy" as an act of participation, as set down in Anglo-American conception as defined in Article II of the Control Council Law No. 10, finds no support in the more subtle standards of German penal legislation. The defense, therefore, at the appropriate time will regard it as a special task from the legal point of view to deal with these questions in detail and if necessary, to submit evidence.
I would also like to refer quite briefly to another question here.
The defendant General Rendulic was released from a prisoner of war camp in the United States of America and immediately placed on trial. The defense, in it's presentation of evidence, will be obliged to deal with the question of whether this trial before this military tribunal is at all in accordance with the international principles laid down in the Hague Land Warfare Convention and the Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War.
Your Honors, the highest duty of a soldier in the armies of all countries is obedience towards his superiors and to the Laws.
General Rendulic was a soldier cf the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; naturally, after the affiliation of Austria to Germany which was universally welcomed Dy the German people, he did not, and could not, refuse to perform his duty as a soldier,and continued to serve his Fatherland. There is no need to go into details about the fact that he always fulfilled his duty or a soldier and obeyed the orders of his superiors, as far as he could reconcile them with his own general ideas of humanity and the fundamentals of law.
But the defense will also prove that whenever General Rendulic recognized faults in orders from his senior officers, he always carried them out or passed them on in a suitably altered form.
And now, the Prosecution brings against this man the serious charges of having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, charges which, in the opinion of the defense, are without sufficient substantiation.
As an introduction to its charges, the Prosecution stated in it's opening Statement that the defendant Rendulic ranked as a "Nazi-General". The mere fact that the defendant was a member of the NSDAP in Austria from May 1932 until the dissolution of the party in 1933, that is, one year and a quarter, cannot justify this description. The defense will prove that the reasons which caused him to join the party were of an entirely idealistic nature and that from inside Austria the defendant could no more envisage the development of the NSDAP than could the rest of the world.
The defense will also prove that, when later on, army officers were allowed to join the party, the defendant refused to become a member of the NSDAP.
If perhaps the Prosecution meant by their comment the conferring of the Golden Badge of Honor on the defendant by Hitler in September 1944, then the defense will show that this "Golden Badge of Honor" was at that time a decoration which did not of necessity have anything to do with belonging to the party and furthermore, the bestowal in the case in question had a purely military origin, because of the situation brought about by the Russian propaganda in Norway.
If the Prosecution chose this term to cause the rise of the defendant during the war from Colonel to General to appear in a special light, then the defense will also submit evidence to show that there can be no question at all of a "Phenomenal promotion"; on the contrary, the promotion was quite a normal one and was exclusively the result of the military capabilities and experiences of the soldier Rendulic and his successes in the Russian theatre of war.
I now turn to the two general charges, which can be dealt with under the terms "Commisar Order and Commando Order".
1. The Commissar Order.
According to the evidence submitted by the Prosecution, there seems to be no dispute about the fact that the so-called Commissar Order was, according to regulation, sent in writing only to the Armies and from there downwards to the lower-rank officers, that is, to the Corps and the Divisions. It had to be passed on orally. If necessary, I will produce the requisite proof for this fact and will also prove that the defendant who, when this order was issued, commanded an Infantry Division in Russia, neither passed on this order personally nor ordered it to be brought to the notice of the regimental commanders.
I will also prove that within the sphere of his division not one commissar was ever shot.
2. The Commando Order.
Here the defense will merely point out that the Prosecution has not proved that the defendant Rendulic received knowledge of this order in the Russian theatre of war, (for which it was not valid) and that he executed it or passed it on within the meaning of the charge. It is not the business of the defense to produce the negative proof of ignorance. Negativa non sunt probanda.
Nothing arises from the documents submitted for the assertion of the charge. As far as they are supposed to prove that the defendant knew of this order in his later official capacity in the Southeast. I will prove that when the defendant took over his new position in this combat zone the order had already been passed on some time before to his subordinate troops. I will also prove in general to this point and later on in particular that in a typical commando operation within the sphere of the Panzer Army this so-called commando order was not applied.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Dr. Fritsch, I think this is a suitable time for our morning recess. We will recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
DR. FRITSCH: On page 6 of the German text:
III. The Fighting in the Balkans.
In the view of the defense, the fighting in the Balkans cannot be properly evaluated from the perspective shown here by the prosecution. It will, therefore, be the task of the defense to describe the general conditions in the Balkans, conditions, which cannot be compared with those general in Europe. In this connection it will be necessary, for the maintenance of historical events to refer to the former fighting and to the situation at that time in the Balkans. To understand the connections it will also be necessary to observe more closely current events in the Balkans. The defense states here, that it will ask for the support of the Tribunal in obtaining from the General Secretary of the United Nations the records of the inquiry into the current events in the Balkans, as far as they deal in detail with the method of warfare. The defense wishes to present in this connection as clear arid as graphic a material as possible, but realises that this desire is beset with enormous difficulties. It will, therefore, often have to produce only general data, but these, as for example the fact of the recent large excommunicztion by the Holy Seat, will throw significant light on the confused happenings and the now usual methods of fighting in the Balkans.
One of the chief preliminary questions will be to go into the entirely unfounded claim of the Prosecution that the partisans, regardless of their leanings, were belligerents, and that the statement in German orders describing them as partisans or bandits was wrong. The claim of the prosecution that the partisans openly carried arms, observed the laws and customs of war, and that the groups of partisans were under a unified and responsible command and wore uniforms or insignia recognisable at a distance, - this prosecution assertion will be confronted by the defense assertion that this was not the case. There can be no doubt that according to General knowledge of the methods of warfare in the Balkans, the defense assertion takes prima facie precedence, and the prosecution must therefore bring the corresponding evidence for its assertion.
When necessary for the defense, the illegality of the warfare carried on by Tito and the other groups of partisans will be proved, as will also the fact that at least until the middle of 1944 the Allies did not recognize the various kinds of partisan units within the sphere of the 2nd Panzer Army as belligerents.
Before the defense deals with the individual charges, it will be shown that the defendant did not arrive in the Balkans until the end of August 1943 and remained there until the end of June 1944. Especially important in the view of the defense is the statement that General Rendulic came into a situation which had arisen without his help, it will prove that with the means at his disposal it was quite impossible for him to regulate his own actions and those of his troops on completely new lines.
With regard to the general charges made by the prosecution, on these questions, the defense sub-divides them as follows:
a) Treatment of reprisal hostages.
b) Treatment of franc-tireurs, especially of the Italian forces.
c) General behaviour towards the civilian population.
A) The defense has already pointed out that the admission of a fact such as the "killing of hostages" in this short form as contained in Article II 1b of Control Council Law No. 10 must arouse legal doubts. And in this respect I will also refer to the statements of my colleague, Dr. Laternserm who in my opinion, has already proved that the Control Council Law only refers to the so-called treaty hostage (Vertragsgeisel) of classical international law, a hostage taken according to international treaties. But I will, however, prove that the hostages taken in the area of the defendant's army were persons taken by the troops in their zone as a security measure against unlawful actions by hostile sections of the civilian population. And I will also prove that these measures were in accordance with the American "Rules of Land Warfare," dated 1940 which contain the provision in article 358. I quote:
"Those forces and sections of the populace committing illegal acts may be subjugated with legally appropriate reprisal measures. Hostages taken and held for the declared purpose of ensuring security against unlawful acts by hostile forces or the population may be punished or killed if the unlawful acts are committed in spite of this measure."
Even if the Control Council Law does not refer exclusively to the hostage in the meaning of classical international Law, it also would not express the prevailing view of international law but would contradict this view. The defense will prove that within the sphere of General Rendulic's 2nd Panzer Army no illegal killing of reprisal hostages was carried out.
And in factual connection the following can be pointed out here:
It will not be difficult for the defense to prove that within the sphere of the defendant General Rendulic's Army high command expiation measures only took place on a very small scale. And here the fact must be taken into account that mostly 12, and for a time up to 16 German divisions, were continuously in action and within a very large area. The defense is able to prove that the reprisal figure stated by the prosecution was in no way applied, but that if reprisal figures were drawn up, the combat conditions of the 2nd Panzer Army necessitated these being kept at a considerably smaller ratio, and that this ratio, however, must be taken as the justifiably lowest possible limit in view of the military necessity. The defense will bring evidence to show that the defendant mitigated Hitler's so-called Expiation Order and never insisted on the observation by his troops of the ratios demanded by Hitler and always approved of the far smaller ratios reported. Furthermore the defense will prove that the defendant never issued a single initial expiation order. The measures so executed were in no way contrary to the customs of war and to the law of war.
b) A large area of the Balkans, under the command of the 2nd Panzer Army later on, the whole coast, was mainly occupied by Italian troops as can be assumed to be known to the Tribunal.
Italy's exit from the war resulted in a particularly critical situation for the defendant General Rendulic's 2nd Panzer Army, because apart from the partisans, a new enemy had arisen in the Italian troop units. These units, as can be proved, were numerically superior to the German units, and in addition there was the possibility of an Allied landing in the Balkans. In this situation, the defendant General Rendulic concluded with the competent italian army officer a legally effective capitulation in accordance with international law, the details of which will be proved by witnesses and documents. In case further difficulties were caused by the behaviour of the italian troops, the defendant Rendulic, as a responsible army commander, was authorized to provide measures and if necessary to threaten their use, in order to guarantee the execution of the conditions agreed to by the Italians. The Prosecution, however, has provided no proof for its assertion, that the defendant ordered expiation measures against the Italians, and that his troops carried out such measures. The defense will prove that the Prosecution obviously misinterpreted an order by the defendant, which misinterpretation was probably aided by a wrong translation.
The defense will furthermore refute the assertions of the Prosecution that 300 captured Italian officers from the Bergamo division were shot to death. It will bring evidence to show that the Italians fighting against the German Wehrmacht after the capitulation were franc tireurs, and that those Italians who gave arms to the partisans after the capitulation were treated no differently from the way in which would have been German soldiers if they had committed the same offense.
In so far as Italian officers of the Italian division named were shot at all, the defense will prove that contrary to the OKW order merely a fraction of the named figure was sentenced to death and executed after a regular trial according to martial law.
It is not clear What sort of evidence the prosecution wants to submit with the document containing the order by the Defendant Rendulic concerning the Italian General Roncaglia. The defense states again, that it sees no need to go further into such prosecution assertions as these, if the prosecution itself does not produce corresponding evidence to support its statements. In any case, the defense would be able to prove that the order arose from absolute military necessity and in addition that General Roncaglia left the defendant Rendulic's sphere of command alive.
c) As far as the defendant is charged with the operations "Panther" and "Hafenfahrt", the defense will show that the order to send members of the civilian population for work in Germany was an affair of the German and Croatian civilian authorities, and did not come within the competence and the sphere of decision of the 2nd Panzer Army. The defense will prove further that when raids took place in combat zones, the troops only took those unreliable people who endangered the security of the troops. IV. Norway.
With regard to Norway, I would like to mention a few general facts in advance:
The question of the evacuation and destruction in Finmark must be considered from two points of view:
1) With regard to the military necessity of the destruction and with this also the evacuation, and
2) with regard to the treatment of the population during the evacuation.
In the view of the defense, the prosecution have neither been able to prove original treatment during the evacuation nor the non-existence of a military necessity for evacuation and destruction, so that even the destructions must still be regarded as in accordance with Article 23 of the Hague Land Warfare Convention, and therefore does not constitute an offense. The defense therefore moves that the Tribunal rule that proceedings against General Rendulic, in so far as criminal actions during the evacuation and destructions of Finmark are maintained, be suspended, and that this count without the possibility of a new charge, be stricken from the indictment. The reasons for my motion are:
The best proof for the manner in which the defendant General Rendulic wanted the evacuation to be carried out, is his order of 29 Oct. 1944, which has been submitted by the prosecution as exhibit No. 504, in document book 22 on page 9 of the German, and on page 10 of the English book. Under point 7 of this order he expressly directs that the evacuation is to be carried out as a welfare measure for the population and that the Norwegians were to be safeguarded. From the report of the evacuation staff, dated 25 Nov. 1944 exhibit No-506 Prosecution Document-Book 22 page 14 of the German and page 16 of the English text, which cannot be doubted in any manner and the verdict of which is very sincere, it can be seen that the evacuation was carried out very carefully and considerately, and counsel for the defense believes that he can establish that this evacuation was carried out differently from any other of the many evacuations which took place during the war and especially also after the war. That also in this case mistakes were made at one or the other point must be considered the result of the tactlessness and incompetence of various subordinated offices, and as the report itself states, such mistakes were unavoidable. With the exception of the hints, which occur in above mentioned report, the defendant was never informed about that. The fact that the events which occurred on the ships are not part of the responsibility of the defendant Rendulic can be s en from the documents presented by the prosecution as well as from the fact that the Navy was not under the jurisdiction of the commander-in-chief of the 20th Mountain Army.
I consider it necessary to point out that Hitler had to give the order for the evacuation twice before it was actually carried out by the 20th Mountain Army. In the Beginning, the defendant Rendulic did not consider the evacuation as absolutely necessary. At that time he did not yet know of the overwhelming deployment of forces of the Russians who were by far superior in strong h, a deployment which would scarcely have been thought possible in this territory. At that time he did not know either that he would soon have to send off more than half of his Army for operations on the continent.
To ignore the second evacuation order, which had been solicited by the commissioner of the Reich or to carry it out in like manner as the first, proved to be impossible for the defendant Rendulic. On one hand he was in a way constantly under the supervision of the commissioner of the Reich, who saw to it that Hitler's order was carried out, and on the other hand, and that was of decisive importance, Hitler gave as the reason for his repeated order the military necessity. At that time, on 28 October 1944, the Army had already clearly recognized the entire impact of the superiority of the Russian Forces and the danger, which was constituted by the Fins. The 19th Corps alone had at that tine lost more than 6 000 men. Furthermore, on or about this date the first orders to relinquish troops had been received. Under these circumstances it was impossible for the commander-in-chief of the 20th Mountain Army to reject the idea to by destruction would make it difficult or even impossible for the enemy to advance. In view of this attitude the condition which appears in Article 23 of the Hague land Warfare Convention must be considered attained, as it states, that the destruction or confiscation of enemy property is permissible, if the necessities of the war should make such action incumbent.
Furthermore, in every Army throughout the entire world there would in any case, in which it was doubtful whether or not it was a military necessity, the judgment of the superior authority be decisive and must be decisive, especially since Hitler had issued this order clearly referring to this military necessity. One must also point out that the commander-in-chief of the 20th Mountain Army had been given besides these purely military reason an important political reason for the evacuation and the destructions in the Finmark. Hitler wanted to prevent the Norwegian exile government from settling in Finmark. It was clear that such an event must influence the life of the German troops in Norway and the defense of the country to a great extent. Although the defendant Rendulic was not responsible for the evaluation of political questions he was nevertheless bound to assume that although this matter fell within the scope of Article 23 G of the Hague Convention, which does not speak of military necessities but of the much broader concept of a "necessity of War." Thus it is apparent that this term covers also political measures which are important to the conduct of the war. To carry out the evacuation order was made easier for the defendant as commander-in-chief of the 2-th Mountain Army by the fact that in view of his accurate knowledge of the Finmark he could assume that these destructions could not ca.use any undue damage. In an area of the extent of Belgium and Holland together there were living only 62 000 people. Although the calculations of the Norwegian government with regard to damages have resulted in an amount which although regrettable cannot be considered unduly high. Such damages and frequently even greater damages were caused in a single air-raid against a German-English or French town. It has not been possible for the prosecution to prove by the testimony of the witnesses which it has called namely:
1. That there was no military necessity for the destruction and for the evacuation.
2. That the evacuation was carried out in an incompetent manner in violation of the laws of humanity. The two generals whose testimony we have heard, expressed the opinion, which, however, they based merely on assumptions, that they did not consider the evacuation necessary. Both generals did say, however, that one could count on the possibility of a Russian advance. One of them stated, that the destructions had been justified if one counted on such a possibility.
The focal question when dealing with the evacuation and the destructions in Finmark is decisive whether or not these measures were justified by necessity in the sense and meaning of the Hague Convention.
The literature on international la.w of the Anglo-American legal circles, which is here of decisive importance, is particularly and uniformly expressive with regard to this question. Thus Professor Fenwick states in his book "international Law", Second Edition 1934, page 483: "General destruction of property as a means to cover the retreat has, however, been common usage in the conduct of wars." He backs this view, amongst others, by mentioning the destruction of a. large territory from Atlanta to the Sea as well as the destruction of the Shenandoahvalky by General Sherman in 1865. Professor Fenwick even stresses that Article 23 G of the Hague Regulations leaves it to the Army which is engaged in warfare to decide which circumstances would make such measures a military necessity.
The leading author on international law Professor Lauterpacht writes in his essay, which appeared in the British Annual for International. Law 1944. On page 74:
"Such actions, as general devastation . . . . . can offer sufficient reasons for condemnation and protests; . . . .after the conclusion of the war they may justify the imposition of collective sanctions either by way of reparations or by other measures to be distinguished from condemnations in individual cases of a criminal nature.