At this point the Defense again faces the task to disprove not prosecution arguments but mere assertions. Although the defendant in his direct examination has clearly shown the military necessity of destruction and his statements were confirmed by Witness Hoelter and by Witness Vogel. I would like to prove once again the military necessity of the destruction in the Finnmark and the evacuation of the population resulting therefrom. When the defendant as Commander-in-Chief of the 20th Mountain Army received the order to retire with this Army from Lapland to Norway behing the Lyngen Fjord, he decided to destroy important road junctions, the bridges, port installations as well as the houses evacuated by the closest possible concentration of the native population. He arrived at this decision by the following considerations:
1. The Army must be released from three fold encirclement by the enemy and must in the end be brought onto one road. This movement required route marches up to 1500 km. length and would last until well into the Arctic Winter. Snowdrifts and lengthy stopy in the move had to be expected.
2. In the beginning the movement took place, by necessity, in three columns which were separated by hundreds of kilometers of absolutely impassable territory and which could not possibly come to each others assistance. These three columns marched along the following roads:
a) from the Kirkenes area through the most northerly area of the Finnmark, on Highway 50
b) via Ivalo-Karasjek to the Prosanger Fjord (red arrow in the North, of the map)
c) from Central Finland to the Lyngen Fjord along the so-called border-road.
3. Each of the three columns was engaged in Lapland in heavy fighting with a superior pursuing enemy. The enemy's superiority was particularly pronounced in the most northerly Army group, the XIXth Mountain Corps at the Arctic Ocean.
4. It came as a complete surprise when it became apparent during the battles that the Russians could effectively make use of their superior numbers by bringing them into play even in tundra areas which had hitherto been considered impassable for formations of some size.
5. Both of the enemy forces, Russians and Finns had very good soldiers who were excellently equipped for the winter. They also had strong special units which were of great mobility in the snow, in complete absence of roads.
6. In addition, the Army, while engaged in battle, received the order to release first one and later three more of its best divisions for assignment to the Continent, i.e., about half of its troops. This had a very unfavorable influence on the consolidation of new positions at the Lyngen Fjord which were in their initial stages. These positions could not be completed before the latter part of Spring 1945.
7. The enemy was able to pursue on land on Highway 50 and partly also by way of two roads from Lapland which lead to this Highway, as well as by way of Northern Sweden. But with the passage of time one had also to expect a large-scale landing operation in the Southern Finnmark, for example in the Alta or Kvenangen Fjord.
The landing operation was not tied to any specific date. I have also proved that at Murmansk there was adequate shipping for a transport of considerable forces as well as battle-ships, cruisers, destroyers and aircraft-carriers which could at any time be reinforced by new convoys which actually took place.
8. Enemy pursuit by land of the decimated and weakened Army would, by necessity, put this Army into a difficult position particular when the retreat on Highway 50, which largely ran along the coast, was stopped and interrupted by snowdrifts, air-raids or firing from the sea. But the position was deemed to become beyond hope if on top of the pursuit by land a sizable landing were to take place in the South Finnmark. Moreover, the Army could not expect relief from any side and had only its own resources to fall back on.
I have given here only a short sketch of the situation which led and had to lead the defendant to the decision to carry out the destruction in the Finnmark. If during the course of the most difficult operation of the whole war a commander-in-chief, who is responsible for the execution of a certain task of war policy and for the safe conduct of his army, has, in a position as described above arrived at the conviction of the military necessity of large scale destruction in order to obtain through this measure whatever support and relief he can, one can hardly reproach him for such action.
It was part of the defendant's task to bring the Mountain Army to Norway as quickly as possible. Any delay would have led to the operation having to be carried out in the arctic Winter, thus endangering its success in this region even from purely atmospheric considerations. It was, however, the aim of enemy attacks to stop and destroy the Army.
But also the enemy's numerical superiority and his great mobility demanded that all efforts should be made to evade a clash with all its uncertainties and dangers which had become especially pronounced under existing conditions. The destructions were meant to render the enemy's pursuit more difficult, they were mean to stop and slow down his movements in order to put distance between the German troops and those of the enemy and to guarantee them a safe retreat without fighting. Destruction along Highway 50 alone, could, however, how have had this result because this road had only few bridges across the few and small rivers of the country, bridges which could easily be repaired in a very short time. Therefore quarters had to be destroyed as well in order to render in the Arctic Winter the pursuit by strong forces impossible or at least costly and risky.
Destruction had also to be carried out at distances from the main road, because in this narrow and thinly populated strip of land, remote settlements are of no lesser importance than those along the main road. One had to reckon with the enemy making use of them because they were a vital though tedious factor in these winter conditions.
The destruction of roads and quarters was a natural means of war, a foregone conclusion, the application of which by the Mountain Army constituted under existing conditions an urgent military necessity.
Under the conditions created by the destruction pursuit by the enemy could have taken place only slowly and, to begin with, with only small forces. By this destruction the Army succeeded in gaining relief in its critical position, a relief which was of vital importance for it.
If there is such a thing as a classic example for a military necessity thus for the justification of destruction, it is this very case.
In fact the Russians did not pursue the Army farther into Norway and did not carry out any landing operation either. It cannot be ascertained whether they were deterred from such intentions by the expected, and realized destruction, which the enemy knew well to be of decisive importance for the condition of the War during winter in the Finnmark.
During a war one can never be quite certain of the enemy's intentions. In the best case one can consider them in the light of possibility and probability. That was the position of the 20. Mountain Army. But all basic conditions for the possibility and the probability of a pursuit existed. If there was one or the other person outside of the staff who had formed an opinion on the probability or improbability of a pursuit, he had done so without perusal of the material in the possession of the Army Staff, merely as a private individual and not under the full weight of the responsibility for the fate of a whole army. But a commander-in-chief who carries the burden of such a responsibility must judge more conscientiously and carefully than a man free of responsibility. The decision whether the plea of military necessity is justified or not can only be made by a study of conditions at the time under review and never from the point of the actual course of subsequent events. I have proved this in my reply to part I and II of the Prosecution Brief, in the section "Military Necessity".
The defendant decided on the carrying out of the above-mentioned destruction only by reason of the position of his army and its task. The Fuehrer order which was received on 28 October, ordered the same measures and also the compulsory evacuation of the civil population. This was the second evacuation order. The defendant could not ignore the military necessity of evacuation quoted by Hitler particularly since at that time the seriousness of the position was brought home to him more than ever by the unexpectedly high number of battle casualties. Ascertainment of a military necessity is always the result of weighing the position. The defendant could not possibly deny his superior the right to decide whether or not there existed a military necessity and to order the corresponding measures to be taken, since this superior had a larger share of responsibility and wider field of vision than he himself. Furthermore he was in no position to refute Hitler's political arguments such as the argument of the necessity of preventing the establishment of an Exile-Government in the evacuated part of Norway.
Such an ExileGovernment would have its repercussions on the whole of Norway and on the defense of the country. In this respect Hitler's order was not contrary to International Law either, especially since the political motives came under the heading of necessity of war in its wider meaning (Hague Rules for Land Warfare, art. 23g). He also had to take into account that the order for evacuation of the population had been given for the second time and that the instigator for this measure was the Reich Commissioner who supervised the execution of this second order. There could never have been an excuse for non-compliance with this order for evacuation.
The Prosecution was in no way able to prove its statement concerning a ruthless execution of the evacuation and any kind of connection between the Defendant and individual abuses which doubtlessly occurred. One need only read the statements of the witness for the Prosecution. Section 7 of Defendant Generaloberst (General) Rendulic's order, dated 29 October 1944 is perhaps the best proof for the manner in which he wished the evacuation to be understood and carried out by his Commanders. This section reads as follows: I request that all authorities concerned carry out this evacuation as a relief measure for the Norwegian population.
The report concerning the execution of the evacuation, dated 25 November 1944 gives an unembellished picture of the evacuation, as it appeared to the High Command of the 20th Mountain Army. The decisions to carry out the destruction and complete the evacuation were not lightly made by the Defendant, as is clearly shown by the fact that both must have presented a serious hindrance to his intention to establish good relations with the Norwegian population, after taking over the supreme command in all of Norway. If even for this reason alone, it will be easy to realize that he did everything to carry out the evacuation as considerately as possible in view of the circumstances.
The inner truth therefore is contained in his statement that he would have taken severe measures against any abuse committed by his own troops, if it had come to his attention.
It is a foregone conclusion that the destruction in the northern part of Finnmark and the evacuation were of necessity already completed, by the time that it became clear in the second half of November that the Russians would not push forward on Highway 50. In Southern Finnmark, however, the work of destruction had to be continued in spite of this fact, because it was still expected and had to be expected that there would be a Russian-Finnish offensive on both sides of the SwedishFinnish border and a Russian-Allied landing in Southern Finnmark.
During the entire period that the Defendant was Commander-in-Chief in Norway, this probability was always acute. During this period, clear information about Russian movements could never be obtained, because it was not possible to carry out air reconnaissance over the Murmansk railroad and the Murmansk area. At the beginning of December 1944, the OKW informed the Mountain Army that one Russian division which had at one time been at the Army fron in Lapland, had been located on the front in East Prussia. This information had no significance, however, in determining the intentions of the Russians, because previously there had been more than 30 Russian divisions at the Finnish front, and, facing the Mountain Army in Lapland, a similar number of divisions, of whose whereabouts nothing was known.
The reason that I now go into particular detail concerning the destruction of the two cities of Kirkenes and Hammerfest, is that it is actually on the basis of the destruction of Hammerfest that the Prosecution believes it can deduce special arguments against the defendant. With reference to the destruction of Kirkenes, I merely have to refer to statements by witnesses, from which it becomes clear that Kirkenes was not destroyed as a result of the general operation, but that the destruction was probably due solely to the battles that took place there and to air-raids by the Russians.
Moreover, the Honorable Tribunal will probably remember from its inspection of Kirkenes, that it was actually the stone buildings that had remained standing, a fact which it itself would not have been consistent with the aims of the destruction operation.
Since the Prosecution asserts with such emphasis that there had been no justification for the destruction of Hammerfest, I wish to call attention again to the fact that the Mountain Army absolutely had to count on the probability of an enemy landing in Southern Finnmark. This landing was not restricted to a particular season of the year because even in fjords, the sea never freezes up and snow-falls in the coastal area are usually light. The probability of such a landing became greater and greater as the season advanced and as it became more and more difficult for the Russians to thrust ahead by land.
Such a landing was also possible in connection with the landing of the Allies in the Narvik area of which one had constantly to be afraid.
Hammerfest was the natural naval base and starting point for a landing in the Alta and Porsanger Fjord. The city and its port also were the natural clearing place, after a successful landing, for the transportation of supplies to the various Fjords, which could only be carried through on small crafts.
The movement of the mountain army was not concluded until January. By that time only part of the city was destroyed. The destruction continued, however, after the defendant had left Norway on 14 January 1945. This is proof that even after he had left Norway this destruction was considered necessary. How much more justified must the conviction of this necessity have been in the time prior to his departure.
Concluding the question of destructions in Norway I want to refer again to paragraph 4 of the Rules of Land Warfare, as I have done it in my opening speech and especially with regard to these questions I want to quote the leading author of international law, Professor Lauterpacht, who, on page 74 of his article in the British Yearbook of International Law for 1944 states:
"Such acts as general devastation.....may supply ample reason for condemnation and protest.....they man, at the end of the war, justify the imposition of collective sanctions by way of compensation or otherwise as distinguished from individual penalties of a criminal nature. But criminal proceedings before the municipal courts of the victor may seem to many a questionably method removing outstanding doubts and laying down authoritatively the existing law on subjects of controversy.
Total war has altered the complexion of many a rule. At a time when the "scorched earth" policy, with regard to the belligerent's own territory, has become part of a widespread practice, general destruction of property ordered as an incident of broad military strategy will not properly form the subject matter of a criminal indictment."
In conclusion I must discuss two documents which have been presented by the prosecution in cross-examination.
One single time hostages were taken in Finland for the protection of the army hospitals fully occupied with wounded and for the release of some prisoners which had been captured illegally. For practical reasons I cannot give any details about the conditions which led up to this situation. The special character of the situation is, however, sufficiently illustrated by the fact that in spite of the state of war existing since the 15 September 1944 the mountain army tolerated Finnish troops undisturbed in their rear, in the hospital city of Tornio, and that as late as the beginning of October a Finnish liaison staff (Colonel Willamo) was with the army. This also became evident from the last paragraph of the cross-examination document exhibit No. 607.
The surprise attack of the Finns carried out on the 1st of October against the army hospitals and a small force of guards was made in violation of good faith.
The hostages were taken in order to effect the liberation of the army hospitals illegally occupied in violation of good faith and of the guards captured.
Any fight for the army hospitals had to be avoided since they were wooden buildings. Under the given circumstances taking of hostages was doubtlessly permissible under international law. The purpose was achieved and the hostages were released again. The defendant discussed the fact of this taking of hostages during the cross examination. If the prosecution believes to find a contradiction between this statement, which describes the actual fact of the taking of hostages and its purpose, and the documents exhibits 607 and 608, presented afterwards, a comparison between this testimony and the two documents will reveal the opposite.
With regard to the number of hostages, one cannot ask the defendant to remember it exactly, especially since the two exhibits 607 and 608 state two different figures (120 and 300). To draw from this the conclusion that it proves lack of credibility can only be interpreted as a result of the subjective attitude of the prosecution. The testimony following exhibits 607 and 608 is in the English Transcript page 5445-50.
Your Honor, the High Tribunal!
The defense based its evidence especially on the testimony of the defendant in the witness stand. Although in addition to this document and evidence brought in by witnesses have in most cases substantiated the statements made by the defendant, the personality of the defendant, his attitude towards the facts charged against him and the question of his trustworthiness ought to play an important part. For this reason I consider it necessary to make some statements concerning the person of the defendant:
In May 1932 the defendant joined the National Socialist Party. This can be explained through the conditions prevailing at that time in Austria, where the great majority of the people was looking for a way out of the unbearable conditions and did not consider the dictatorship of Dollfuss the proper means towards this goal. At that time nobody could even suspect the development the Party would take later on. When, thirteen months later the Party was dissolved in Austria, his membership ceased for good.
He never worked for the Party nor did he hold any office there, and especially, he was not illegally active after the Party had been dissolved.
At this point I would like to counter a charge made by the Prosecution, the Prosecution who suddenly, without any basis and without having stated so before, charged that the defendant Rendulic had after the Anschluss again joined the National Socialist Party. This is incorrect.
Their lack of incorrectness can be shown only from the fact alone that the defendant at that time was immediately taken over into the armed forces and, until shortly before the end of the war, members of the armed forces could not at the same time be active members of the Nazi Party. For the rest he has stated himself that he never had a desire to join the Nazi Party again.
"For the defendant as for so many others, the development of the Party was a serious disappointment, especially when he saw its damaging effects in Austria after March 1938, when the Party treated this country as if it were a newly acquired colony. The defendant recognized that the persons responsible for all the evils and abuses were the functionaries of the Party and he decided to take up the fight against them whenever the occasion would arise. He put this resolution into effect, at first in a small way and later on, when he rose to more important positions, against their most powerful and influential functionaries in Croatia, Norway, East Prussia and finally also in Austria. He exposed himself in a dangerous way through his activities. No. "Nazi General" would have acted like he did, nor would anybody who was anxious to win the favor of the Party and wanted to be furthered by it.
I also proved that the promotions of the defendant were as bad as they could be in spite of his achievements before the enemy which were a series of constant successes. The prosecution had ample opportunity to investigate the personal affairs of the defendant and arrived at the correct result in its opening statement.
One page 63 it states: "His excellent achievements during the war brought him the highest German orders and directed Hitler's attention to him and doubtlessly led to his being made the Commander of the second panzer army.
He made his own career and nobody promoted him. When, after giving up the second panzer army he led another army and three army groups, it was the tasks demanded of him were always crucially difficult, and he always brought them to a satisfactory solution. He did, however, not get any thanks, especially from the moment, when Hitler himself decided about his assignment, he did not receive any promotion, distinction or donations which were given very generously to other leaders. He, however, did not receive the slightest thing".
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You still have only 7 minutes, Dr. Fritsch.
DR. FRITSCH: "If we consider his military career during the war, we find that it constitutes a series of greatest achievements and successes in the highest military leading positions, without his having received any outward recognition as did so many others. Hitler recognized his great talents and exploited him thoroughly. The Party, however, kept silent, because he had no connections there and because, on account of his fight against its functionaries it could only consider him an enemy.
At this occasion I cannot refrain from pointing out the following:
From the fact that some officers were characterized as National Socialists in their evaluation or had defined other persons as "National Socialists", the prosecution sought to draw conclusions about the National Socialist attitude of the persons judging and those judged. By mere chance, by presenting rebuttal exhibit 649, the defense has the possibility to prove the incorrectness of such conclusions. This exhibit 649 which is a printed form, lists, in the printed column for the evaluation the points about which, according to the order, the person making the evaluation will have to state his opinion.
It says there: "Value of the personality, National Socialist attitude, conduct before the enemy, achievements in the line of duty, mental and physical talents and abilities, infantry experiences, acquired when and where." Thus judgment had to be passed with regard to the attitude towards National Socialism. If this attitude would have received a negative judgment, the person who was to be judged, would, naturally, have gotten into trouble. It was, therefore, humanly understandable, if some phrases were made about his positive attitude regardless of his real attitude. If one studies the officers condemned on occasion of the attack on Hitler on 20 July 1944, one will find in the case of everyone of them a positive evaluation of their attitude towards National Socialism.
I come now to the close of my statements.
For the judgment of the offenses claimed by the prosecution, documents have been presented to the High Tribunal during the course of several months, which the prosecution has selected on the basis of probably two years of preliminary work. The defendants, on the other hand, had essentially only those documents and their own memory to refute that evidence. It is in the nature of the matter that in the case of a field of tasks like that of the defendant General RENDULIC, who fought in all theaters of war except Italy, one can impossibly prove every situation by memory. The High Tribunal will have to take this especially into consideration. The defense is convinced that inspite of this, every charge of the prosecution has been refuted by a counter-evidence, which excludes any reasonable doubt as to its correctness. Naturally this could have been done even more thoroughly and more convincingly, if the defence had had the same possibilities as the prosecution. The defense proved that this was not the case.
The necessity results that in judging the reasons and counter-reasons these difficulties too, which would never arise in a normal procedure will have especially to be considered. This is particularly important for the case of General RENDULIC, because there are only very few documents from his office and because, naturally, they have definitely been selected according to the points of view of the prosecution. The defense could base its evidence only on documents which it happened to find in other offices.
The decision rests in the hands of this High Tribunal.
That concludes my closing statement. I only ask that for the record I be permitted to see to that a rectification is made. I did not hand in my plea only in February, as it has been assumed, but I have handed it in on Saturday, 24 January, 9:00 a.m., and I received the translation only yesterday.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Very well, Dr. Fritsch; the record will so show.
We will proceed.
DR. SAUTER: (Counsel for defendants Lanz and von Geitner): Your Honors, I handed in my plea on the 26th of January 1948 for translation. Apart from that, I got the exhibit list for Geitner which the Tribunal desired and, apart from that, for the case of Geitner, I made a survey concerning the defense material which was submitted for Brigadier General v. Geinter and I handed in also a survey concerning the witnesses to which I draw the Tribunal's attention especially, because here you have in one great survey in a very clear way the whole result of the defense for Geitner.
I assume that the Tribunal will have no objection that I treat the cases Geitner and Lanz at the same time.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The Tribunal has no objection to your proceeding in that fashion.
DR. SAUTER: If it please the Tribunal;
"The good soldier in any modern army must preferably posses 3 qualities:
The first is bravery, ready at any time to sacrifice his own life in the protection of his homeland against attacks; the second is loyalty, which the soldier vows to his flag, loyalty toward his fatherland and the Head of the State, loyalty toward his military superiors and his comrades; but the third and perhaps more important is obedience, which the soldier, too, by taking his military oath solemnly swears to his flag; that obedience, which the second President of the German Reich v. Hindenburg, called the "Basis of the Wehrmacht" in figure 4 of the "Duties of the German Soldier" stated by him on 25.5.1934.
This obligation to obedience is not a particularity of the German Army; it is characteristic for the armies of all states. Montgomery for instance has declared on 26 July 1946 in Portsmouth: As a servant to the nation the Army stands above politics and that must remain so. Its devotion is for the state and it would not befit the soldier to change his devotion because of political opinion. It must be clear that an army is not a conglomeration of individuals, but a fighting weapon, formed by discipline and controlled by its leaders.
The essence of democracy is liberty, the essence of the Army is discipline! Never mind how intelligent a soldier is. The Army would desert the nation, if it were not used to obey orders instantaneously.
This obedience, by the way, is not only asked of the common soldier, but also of the supreme Commander of an army and it is interesting that, for instance, Clemenceau in his famous book "Greatness and Tragedy of Victory", Union - Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, raises only the one reproach against Foch, Marshal of France and supreme Commander of all Allied Armies in 1918, that of disobedience towards the political leadership. "His faith in this most important and highest duty, obedience, did not stand the test. He dud not possess the understanding for that unflinching devotion to duty, which lends greatest moral and mental firmness to the soldier."
I feel quite sure, by the way, that also the American Army would not have granted its soldiers the right to refuse an order by his General Staff or from the President of the United States as the Commander in Chief of the American Army on the ground that the order violates international law or humanity according to his personal opinion.
This solemnly sworn duty to obedience the Generals accused here have fulfilled, and therefore they are being accused, only therefore, for no other reason. The trial against the German Generals who were active in the Balkans shows the tragedy of the obedient German soldier. These generals have without exception served for 5 years abroad during the war, for 5 years these generals have fulfilled their duties under the eyes of the Serbian and Greek, the Russian and French populace; in all these countries it is known that for months these German Generals are being tried here, and still not one witness has risen to testify for the Prosecution and not one witness could be found, who could have raised any reproach against these generals, who could have accused them of acts of plunder or personal aggrandizement or of brutal acts or cruelty and the like. It is therefore a fact: the crime, with which they are charged by the Prosecution is to be found in the fact that they carried out the orders of their highest superiors.
What has brought these defendants into the dock is not any criminal way of thinking, but exclusively their obedience towards military orders of the head of a state, who under the conditions prevailing then combined a mass of power in his person, which never before would have been thought possible. Hitler was, as various Nuernberg judgements have also already recognized, not only the Commander in Chief of the whole army, but also the supreme judge and the absolute legislator. And the question around which this trial revolves, is, whether it was the duty of a German General to refuse an order coming from this all powerful head of state, even in the midst of the hardest war, and in spite of the danger thereby to lose his right and position, possibly his life. For that much must be clear at the close of this trial, even to a foreign judge, if the Prosecution were proven right in this trial, then the result would be that these generals have been sentenced to death in advance, no matter how they might have acted: Either they defied Hitler's orders during the war, then they risked then to be shot, or to get into a situation that would force the gun for suicide into their hands, or they felt bound by their oath to the flag and obeyed the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, then they risked to be hanged after the war by the Americans.
The difficulty to arrive at a just verdict under these circumstances is also heightened by various facts that cannot remain unobserved. a) It was very difficult for a German, who during the war lived in Germany, to follow and judge the development of the last 12 years. The German press and radio were not free, but forced to report only what the government wished and the way the government wanted it reported.
We know today that the information service and the propaganda in Hitler-Germany was untrue and mendacious, that the people were misled systematically and lied to and that the truth was suppressed and snuffed out. This system was the more fatal as the German people had been for years cut off from all news sources abroad and did receive no enlightenment from there. The spreading of Anti-Hitler news led into the KZ and into penal servitude, even if it occurred only within the family circle, and the listening to foreign broadcasts was threatened with barbarous penalties. Not seldom the death sentence was pronounced for that. How should the German, dwelling within his country, have learned what went on in Germany and in the world, what the real aims of the Hitler-regime were, what this system was driving at. There can be no doubt that the Hither-order No. 1, which for instance was posted in all offices of the Army and was hammered into the minds of all soldiers, meant, that nobody should learn anything unless he be officially concerned with the matter, and further, no one should learn more and not sooner than was absolutely necessary. We know from the great trial at Nuernberg that this secrecy was carried out so consistently and rigorously that for instance the Reichs Foreign Minister repeatedly received knowledge of diplomatic negotiations with countries abroad only after the treaties desired had already been concluded and it is significant, for instance, that the Chief of the German Navy learned about the invasion of Denmark on the following day through the radio. It also is well known today, on the basis of what has been revealed since the armistice, that for instance Hitler even in his political testament, which was published in January 1946, claimed: "It is untrue that I or anybody in Germany wanted war in 1939;........ I never wished a new conflict with England or much less with the United States." This was written in 1945 in the face of death by the same Hitler, of whom we know today, that for instance already at a secret conference on 23 November 1939 he declared to the highest leaders of the Army:" The resolution to strike has always been within me.
I shall attack and not capitulate." Considering this attitude of the Head of State one cannot he surprised that even high officials and Generals were not informed at all on the true aims of Hitler and never learned the most important matters and connections, although standing in high and responsible position.
Under such circumstances it is clear, how infinitely difficult it is for a foreign tribunal to form a picture here on the historical development of a foreign country and its conditions and circumstances during the last 12 years and to gain a picture that will stand before history, if even the Germans, who experienced this development here in the country, received only during the last two years, gradually and step by step, information on this development, through communications from abroad and through the statements of the Nuernberg trials.
b) For the sake of justice further, it surely is also not a favorable portent for the verdicts to be pronounced here at Nuernberg that these trials are all exposed to be pronounced here at Nuernberg that these trials are all exposed to the danger of in the last analysis assuming a political character and of being used for political purposes, as the Courts may be bent upon preventing such a development. It has been said that history is being written here in Nuernberg, objectively true history; the fate of the individual defendants is immaterial behind the necessity to open the eyes of the whole world and above all of the German people, to reveal the unvarnished truth and to give the German people the possibility to recognize the mistakes of the past and learn for the future.
But beside this aim many entertain other thoughts, namely, also to prove through these Nuernberg trials that Germany alone is guilty of the war and that the manner of German war conduct and administration was entirely criminal. This point of view has often enough been emphasized by the competent authorities.