Lastly, Document Exhibit 388, was also brought up against the Defendant. This document is a memorandum concerning a conference which was held between representatives of the XXI Corps and the Administration and Police Offices of Albania with regard to matters concerning Albanian territory. This memorandum naturally did not go beyond the Corps Staff and never reached the Army. Also, the matters discussed were in the province of the Military Commander, of the Higher SS and Police Leader, and of Minister Neubacher, none of whom was under the jurisdiction of the Army. Also, only the Higher SS and Police Leader was responsible for SS Division Skanderbeg which was still being formed. I wish to call attention to the fact that in this document, in an entry dated 11 April 1944, mention is also made of the evacuation of quarters for the formation of SS Division "Skanderbeg". Completed sections of this Division were on occasion tactically assigned to the XXI Corps and thus to the Army as well. With regard to the assignment of SS Formations to units of the Army, I wish to call attention to the KUHM Affidavit in Rendulic Document Book No. 32, Exhibit 33.
The SS-Division "Skanderbeg" is mentioned once again in Exhibit 440. In it, on 16 April 1944, the German Plenipotentiary General for Albania reports to his superior Military Commander for the South-eastern Area, that this Division had arrested 300 Jews in Pristina (Albania). There were not yet many units of the SS Division in existence. As shown by the previously mentioned Exhibit 388, it was still "being formed" a few days before this incident. It cannot be ascertained what SS office took the initiative in this operation against the Jews. At any rate, the matter was not within the province of the 2nd Panzer Army. The daily reports of the Military Commander were brought up at Army Staff Conferences concerning the military situation, only in rare instances, in which purely military reports were submitted concerning measures which were also of interest to the Army. As a result, the Defendant was doubtlessly not directly informed at all of the report concerning the arrest of the Jews.
The Military Commander for the Southeastern Area, who held the rank of a Commander-in-Chief of an Army and also his subordinates, the Plenipotentiaries-General in Albania and Croatia as well as the Military Commander in Greece, were solely responsible for representing the rights and obligations of the Occupation Power towards the population in accordance with the Hague Rules for Land Warfare. Thus, the requirements of international law were fully met. On the next to the last page of very extensive Exhibit 423, in the order for the "Regulations for the authority of the Army Groups and Armies with respect to Military Administration in the Occupied Territorities", there is an express statement to the following effect, I quote: "Headquarters Authorities and Troops are not authorized to issue orders to offices of the Military Administration." The Commander in Chief of the 2nd Panzer Army and his subordinate commanders were responsible only for their purely tactical duties and for the conduct of the troops who were completely in their charge. Control over the incident of the arrested Jews was not at all under the jurisdiction of the Defendant. On the other hand, the representative of the Military Commander for the Southeastern Area, the PlenipotentiaryGeneral in Albania, under whose jurisdiction the matter came, did in fact intervene at once, as proved by Thuengen's Affidavits in Geitner Document Book V.
Although Defendant Rendulic is in no way responsible for this matter, I have discussed it in detail, because, during the direct examination of the Defendant, the Tribunal displayed great interest in it and asked for clarification. On the basis of the preliminary hearing and of the documents, the Prosecution ought however to be fully conversant with regard to questions of the competency and the responsibility of the Military Authorities in the Balkans. I therefore cannot understand how it could raise the above-mentioned matter as a charge against the Defendant.
I will omit the succeeding pages and continue on page 110:
I have not yet considered a number of Prosecution Documents, which contain, above all, reports of retaliatory measures.
I now wish to devote the following statements to these documents:
Retaliatory measures included either reprisal hostages or the burning of houses or villages. In reply to Counts III and IV of the Legal Brief of the Prosecution, I proved the legal basis and the permissibility of retaliatory measures. In it, I also proved that the retaliatory measures in the territory of the 2nd Panzer Army were not only carried out in complete agreement with the requirements and restrictions of strict international law, but also, over and above that, they satisfied all the requirements listed in the works of the authors of international law. In particular, I have also proved that the general and specific charges raised on Pages 31-33 and 44-49 of Part IV of the Legal Brief of the Prosecution, do not in one single case involve the territory of the 2nd Panzer Army, at the time that it was commander by the Defendant; and it is those very pages that contain the real charges which the Prosecution has to raise. The retaliatory measures in the territory of the 2nd Panzer Army, moreover, were strictly in keeping with the forms and the limits which the Prosecution in Part IV of its Legal Briefs on Pages 25-28, wishes to see respected. I would be very grateful to the Tribunal if it were to compare the statements listed on Pages 31-33 and 44-49 of Part IV of the Legal Brief of the Prosecution, and the requirements listed on Pages 25-28, with the execution of the retaliatory measures in the jurisdiction of the 2nd Panzer Army, as I have shown, and if the Tribunal were to examine them carefully.
I have also proved that the troops acted under orders and regulations which they had long before the Defendant arrived; and that the Army Order of 15 September 1943, (Page 7 of the English version, and Page 11 of the German) was nothing more than a collection of orders of long standing, with appropriate alleviating measures. This order can therefore never be considered as a handing on of orders. It did not have the slightest influence upon the conduct of the troops. If this order had not been issued, the situation would not have been altered at all, for it added nothing new.
Finally, I have shown that at all conferences and troop inspections, the Defendant had called attention to the necessity for refraining from all avoidable severity and for allowing moderation to prevail even if there were any orders to the contrary. In this connection, I refer especially to the affidavit of the former ordinances officer Markus, who accompanied the Defendant on all conferences and trips. The troops knew what the Commander-in-Chief's opinion was. There were no abuses of any kind.
It was only on rare occasions that the Defendant himself read the daily reports. Not a single one of the reports included in the documents has been initialed by him. Their main contents were reported to him in daily conferences concerning the military situation, or, if when he was on a trip in Army territory, an extract was sent him by telephone or by radio. He was doubtlessly generally aware of what was going on of events, even if it cannot be said that a specific instance was necessarily brought to his attention.
The picture which may have confronted the defendant evolves from a study of Exhibit 375 in connection with his statements while under direct examination. As already mentioned, I submitted a complete translation of this document of which only a very small part had been translated into English; this document contains daily reports of the LXIX Corps in the territory of which most of the reprisals were carried out since the main line led through that territory. These reports cover a period of 95 days for which only 32 daily reports are available. 63 reports are missing. The reports at hand have been selected by the Prosecution. But even the available reports show clearly that the number of railroads and bridges which were blown up and the number of dead and wounded as a result of assaults and raids on the railroad were larger than the number of hostages and that frequently there were 6 to 8 raids and bloody losses before reprisal measures were taken. But an accurate picture of existing condi tions can only be gained if the 63 missing reports and written reports on the losses incurred by the frequent blowing of railroads were also available.
These losses were seldom recorded in the daily reports because the ascertainment of figures took up too much time owing to the frequently difficult task of identifying the victims. Not a single one of these reports has been submitted. One can safely assume that the missing daily reports contained only raids, assaults and losses but no reprisals. If all reports were to be submitted the ratio would be considerably altered much in favor of the hostages and the special moderation in the execution of reprisal measures would become clear.
The same applies to other Corps areas. Only reports on reprisal measures are available not however, reports on raids or losses. Such reports were of no interest to the Prosecution which made the selection here as well. Upon examination of the number of reports submitted for the 392th, 373rd and 204th Divisions subordinate to the XV Corps or for the 118th, 369th and 7th SS Divisions of the V. SS Corps and the 100th, 181st, 297th Divisions of the XXI Mt. Corps and the 173rd, 187th and 1st Cossack Divisions of the LXIX Corps, one will realize that there are but few. The Divisions and Corps, however, dispatched four situation reports a day, i.e., 120 reports for each unit in a single month. Thus for all formations under Army Command from the Division and up, this amounted to about 2000 reports a month and accordingly during the whole period of the Defendant's command (10 months) 20,000 reports. But it is just these missing reports which contain information concerning the majority of raids, assaults and losses but certainly not concerning reprisal measures. Therefore, if we should occasionally find a report of reprisal measures from the Corps areas which mentions figures larger than those of German losses incurred, I beg to remind you that losses many times that number must have been contained in the missing reports and that in the case in question reprisal measures were also instituted only after several raids and losses.
The reported reprisal measures were partly also carried out by the Croat authorities for their own purposes. These incidents were only included in the reports as incidents which had occurred in the area of the reporting authority but they did not involve Army troops and could not have been caused or prevented by them.
From the end of December 1943, the decision with regard to reprisals even for raids on troops and Army installations passed altogether into the jurisdiction of the Croat and Albanian authorities. Therefore the troops and the Army were relieved of all responsibility for reprisal measures.
I have shown that the documents at hand provide sufficient evidence that in the area of the Second Panzer Army, reprisals were carried out with great moderation and never beyond the scope of absolute military necessity.
But I have also shown that no detailed correct picture of conditions can be given by the available documents and that a correct picture can only speak in favor of the troops and the Army. It may seem understandable that Prosecuting Authority would submit only documents which may be expected to support the charge. But such a procedure can only be justified if Prosecution and Defense submit independent evidence and when Prosecution and Defense enjoy equal freedom and privileges as happens in nearly all regular proceedings. But in the case at hand all documentary evidence was solely in the possession of the Prosecution which, as has been shown has selected and submitted only evidence which it considered suitable for prosecution purposes.
Therefore, the Defense finds itself in the difficult position of having to rely, in the main, on prosecution documents. Thus the defense appreciated all the more the Tribunal's decision to make available a number of new documents. Although these documents are few in number, they have shown the value of a document which has not only been selected from the Prosecution angle as compared to the others. Unfortunately, I must state that among these documents there is none from the Staff of the Second Panzer Army and that the war diary of this Army has not been made available in contrast to that of other commands although the former has been proved to be still in existence and to contain conclusive evidence.
As request for the handing over of this journal which was made by the Defense some time ago has unfortunately been turned down.
Thus the difficult position of Defense Counsel for Defendant General Rendulic which results from lack of documents was not improved by the new documents. I think that by my statements concerning Exhibit 375 I have sufficiently illustrated the value and significance of Defense documents for the defense of a person who has been indicted on the strength of documentary evidence alone. Only when I become completely aware of the described position with regard to evidence, did I understand the passage in the Opening Statement by the Prosecution (page 11): I quote:
("Indeed, as this case progresses, it will rapidly appear that the evidentiary questions are of secondary importance".)
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: We will take our morning recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
COURT NO. V, CASE NO. VII.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE BURKE: (presiding) You may proceed, Dr. Fritsch.
DR. FRITSCH: Am I in agreement with the Tribunal in stating that I have 37 minutes left in which to read.
JUDGE BURKE: Approximately 37 minutes. Judge Wennterstrum will continue to keep track of the time.
DR. FRITSCH: I shall now deal with the problem of Norway.
I can do no better than to start my statement concerning the count of the indictment referring to Norway by summing up the result of the inspection by the Tribunal, the Prosecution and myself. We are grateful for the proof which we were given that this large tract of land which may almost be called uninhabited cannot be compared with any other European country. This territory is approximately of the size of Holland and Belgium together and has a population of round 62,000 people. The settlements are widely scattered and only few compact places such as Kirkenes and Hammerfest may be looked upon as villages and towns. Houses are mostly wooden structures which are far less substantial than solid stone buildings, but on the other hand they can be rebuilt far more easily. In this territory, the life of more than 200,000 German soldiers was at stake at the beginning of the Winter 1944. These lives had to be weighed up against a minimum of assets and a certain amount of clearly temporary discomfort to the native population. At this point the question arises in due consideration of all interests involved whether there existed a military necessity to carry out measures of destruction and whether this destruction can be brought into harmony with the provisions of International Law.
In all wars in the past, it was generally customary for a retreating Army to destroy roads, bridges and railroads.
Destruction is a natural weapon of war. Rules and regulations for this weapon are laid down in detail in the tactical regulations of all Armies. It is the purpose of this weapon to obstruct the enemy and render his objectives more difficult for him. Destruction of roads and transport installations reacts above all on the enemy's movement and advance by stopping him and delaying him until the created obstacle has been removed. The time required for such operations is largely determined by the nature of the destroyed objects as well as the size and extent of this destruction.
But destruction had not only its repercussions on the enemy's movements but on the possibility of existence in the destroyed area. This was aimed at and caused by the destruction of housing facilities at a time when housing was of decisive importance due to the time of the year and the weather. Whereas the destruction of roads and transport installations was practiced during every retreat in every war, the destruction of quarters naturally took place only in Winter and in regions where prolonged temporary housing of large formations is not possible. The burning of all localities by the Russians in 1812, cost Napoleon two thirds of his army. The burning of all quarters not absolutely necessary for the population crowded together in a small area, which was carried out by the Germans during the 1941/1942 Winter Campaign, was one of the decisive factors which at the time saved the German Army from disaster.
No one can doubt the military necessity of such destruction while retreating before a superior enemy. Even in the codification of the rules of warfare, allowance was made for such cases.
Thus the Hague Rules for Land Warfare, in article 23g, declare destruction to be admissible if the necessity of war urgently demands it.
Little proof is needed to show that the destruction of roads and transport installations played a specially important part in the retreat from the Norwegian Finnmark just as for the fact that life in this area is impossible in Winter without billets which can be heated and that the destruction of quarters must have a decisive effect on military operations.
Thus we must now find out whether there was any necessity for the 20th Mountain Army to carry out this destruction in the Finnmark. The Prosecution has asserted that this destruction was not necessary. But it has too late recognized the problem of Norway or not at all because it relied in the main on the atrocity stories in dubious Norwegian reports and it omitted or was unable to produce, conclusive evidence concerning the absence of military necessity for the destructions, as asserted by it. One of the Prosecution witnesses, the Norwegian General Dahl was very reticent. A noble character he realized, beyond a doubt, the relative importance of his own judgment in this matter for after all he mainly knew about the war out of books and was not in charge of any unit in combat with the enemy.
The other witness, the German General Jodl stated that he had not considered the destruction a necessary one because he did not expect the Russians to take up the pursuit. When asked why then he obeyed the order to carry out destructions, he answered that he had done so because one could not be absolutely certain whether the Russians would take up the pursuit or not. The next question whether he considered the destruction necessary if the Russians were to pursue the German troops, he answered in the affirmative.
At this point the Defense again faces the task to disprove not prosecution arguments but mere assertions. Although the defendant in his direct examination has clearly shown the military necessity of destruction and his statements were confirmed by Witness Hoelter and by Witness Vogel. I would like to prove once again the military necessity of the destruction in the Finnmark and the evacuation of the population resulting therefrom. When the defendant as Commander-in-Chief of the 20th Mountain Army received the order to retire with this Army from Lapland to Norway behing the Lyngen Fjord, he decided to destroy important road junctions, the bridges, port installations as well as the houses evacuated by the closest possible concentration of the native population. He arrived at this decision by the following considerations:
1. The Army must be released from three fold encirclement by the enemy and must in the end be brought onto one road. This movement required route marches up to 1500 km. length and would last until well into the Arctic Winter. Snowdrifts and lengthy stopy in the move had to be expected.
2. In the beginning the movement took place, by necessity, in three columns which were separated by hundreds of kilometers of absolutely impassable territory and which could not possibly come to each others assistance. These three columns marched along the following roads:
a) from the Kirkenes area through the most northerly area of the Finnmark, on Highway 50
b) via Ivalo-Karasjek to the Prosanger Fjord (red arrow in the North, of the map)
c) from Central Finland to the Lyngen Fjord along the so-called border-road.
3. Each of the three columns was engaged in Lapland in heavy fighting with a superior pursuing enemy. The enemy's superiority was particularly pronounced in the most northerly Army group, the XIXth Mountain Corps at the Arctic Ocean.
4. It came as a complete surprise when it became apparent during the battles that the Russians could effectively make use of their superior numbers by bringing them into play even in tundra areas which had hitherto been considered impassable for formations of some size.
5. Both of the enemy forces, Russians and Finns had very good soldiers who were excellently equipped for the winter. They also had strong special units which were of great mobility in the snow, in complete absence of roads.
6. In addition, the Army, while engaged in battle, received the order to release first one and later three more of its best divisions for assignment to the Continent, i.e., about half of its troops. This had a very unfavorable influence on the consolidation of new positions at the Lyngen Fjord which were in their initial stages. These positions could not be completed before the latter part of Spring 1945.
7. The enemy was able to pursue on land on Highway 50 and partly also by way of two roads from Lapland which lead to this Highway, as well as by way of Northern Sweden. But with the passage of time one had also to expect a large-scale landing operation in the Southern Finnmark, for example in the Alta or Kvenangen Fjord.
The landing operation was not tied to any specific date. I have also proved that at Murmansk there was adequate shipping for a transport of considerable forces as well as battle-ships, cruisers, destroyers and aircraft-carriers which could at any time be reinforced by new convoys which actually took place.
8. Enemy pursuit by land of the decimated and weakened Army would, by necessity, put this Army into a difficult position particular when the retreat on Highway 50, which largely ran along the coast, was stopped and interrupted by snowdrifts, air-raids or firing from the sea. But the position was deemed to become beyond hope if on top of the pursuit by land a sizable landing were to take place in the South Finnmark. Moreover, the Army could not expect relief from any side and had only its own resources to fall back on.
I have given here only a short sketch of the situation which led and had to lead the defendant to the decision to carry out the destruction in the Finnmark. If during the course of the most difficult operation of the whole war a commander-in-chief, who is responsible for the execution of a certain task of war policy and for the safe conduct of his army, has, in a position as described above arrived at the conviction of the military necessity of large scale destruction in order to obtain through this measure whatever support and relief he can, one can hardly reproach him for such action.
It was part of the defendant's task to bring the Mountain Army to Norway as quickly as possible. Any delay would have led to the operation having to be carried out in the arctic Winter, thus endangering its success in this region even from purely atmospheric considerations. It was, however, the aim of enemy attacks to stop and destroy the Army.
But also the enemy's numerical superiority and his great mobility demanded that all efforts should be made to evade a clash with all its uncertainties and dangers which had become especially pronounced under existing conditions. The destructions were meant to render the enemy's pursuit more difficult, they were mean to stop and slow down his movements in order to put distance between the German troops and those of the enemy and to guarantee them a safe retreat without fighting. Destruction along Highway 50 alone, could, however, how have had this result because this road had only few bridges across the few and small rivers of the country, bridges which could easily be repaired in a very short time. Therefore quarters had to be destroyed as well in order to render in the Arctic Winter the pursuit by strong forces impossible or at least costly and risky.
Destruction had also to be carried out at distances from the main road, because in this narrow and thinly populated strip of land, remote settlements are of no lesser importance than those along the main road. One had to reckon with the enemy making use of them because they were a vital though tedious factor in these winter conditions.
The destruction of roads and quarters was a natural means of war, a foregone conclusion, the application of which by the Mountain Army constituted under existing conditions an urgent military necessity.
Under the conditions created by the destruction pursuit by the enemy could have taken place only slowly and, to begin with, with only small forces. By this destruction the Army succeeded in gaining relief in its critical position, a relief which was of vital importance for it.
If there is such a thing as a classic example for a military necessity thus for the justification of destruction, it is this very case.
In fact the Russians did not pursue the Army farther into Norway and did not carry out any landing operation either. It cannot be ascertained whether they were deterred from such intentions by the expected, and realized destruction, which the enemy knew well to be of decisive importance for the condition of the War during winter in the Finnmark.
During a war one can never be quite certain of the enemy's intentions. In the best case one can consider them in the light of possibility and probability. That was the position of the 20. Mountain Army. But all basic conditions for the possibility and the probability of a pursuit existed. If there was one or the other person outside of the staff who had formed an opinion on the probability or improbability of a pursuit, he had done so without perusal of the material in the possession of the Army Staff, merely as a private individual and not under the full weight of the responsibility for the fate of a whole army. But a commander-in-chief who carries the burden of such a responsibility must judge more conscientiously and carefully than a man free of responsibility. The decision whether the plea of military necessity is justified or not can only be made by a study of conditions at the time under review and never from the point of the actual course of subsequent events. I have proved this in my reply to part I and II of the Prosecution Brief, in the section "Military Necessity".
The defendant decided on the carrying out of the above-mentioned destruction only by reason of the position of his army and its task. The Fuehrer order which was received on 28 October, ordered the same measures and also the compulsory evacuation of the civil population. This was the second evacuation order. The defendant could not ignore the military necessity of evacuation quoted by Hitler particularly since at that time the seriousness of the position was brought home to him more than ever by the unexpectedly high number of battle casualties. Ascertainment of a military necessity is always the result of weighing the position. The defendant could not possibly deny his superior the right to decide whether or not there existed a military necessity and to order the corresponding measures to be taken, since this superior had a larger share of responsibility and wider field of vision than he himself. Furthermore he was in no position to refute Hitler's political arguments such as the argument of the necessity of preventing the establishment of an Exile-Government in the evacuated part of Norway.
Such an ExileGovernment would have its repercussions on the whole of Norway and on the defense of the country. In this respect Hitler's order was not contrary to International Law either, especially since the political motives came under the heading of necessity of war in its wider meaning (Hague Rules for Land Warfare, art. 23g). He also had to take into account that the order for evacuation of the population had been given for the second time and that the instigator for this measure was the Reich Commissioner who supervised the execution of this second order. There could never have been an excuse for non-compliance with this order for evacuation.
The Prosecution was in no way able to prove its statement concerning a ruthless execution of the evacuation and any kind of connection between the Defendant and individual abuses which doubtlessly occurred. One need only read the statements of the witness for the Prosecution. Section 7 of Defendant Generaloberst (General) Rendulic's order, dated 29 October 1944 is perhaps the best proof for the manner in which he wished the evacuation to be understood and carried out by his Commanders. This section reads as follows: I request that all authorities concerned carry out this evacuation as a relief measure for the Norwegian population.
The report concerning the execution of the evacuation, dated 25 November 1944 gives an unembellished picture of the evacuation, as it appeared to the High Command of the 20th Mountain Army. The decisions to carry out the destruction and complete the evacuation were not lightly made by the Defendant, as is clearly shown by the fact that both must have presented a serious hindrance to his intention to establish good relations with the Norwegian population, after taking over the supreme command in all of Norway. If even for this reason alone, it will be easy to realize that he did everything to carry out the evacuation as considerately as possible in view of the circumstances.
The inner truth therefore is contained in his statement that he would have taken severe measures against any abuse committed by his own troops, if it had come to his attention.
It is a foregone conclusion that the destruction in the northern part of Finnmark and the evacuation were of necessity already completed, by the time that it became clear in the second half of November that the Russians would not push forward on Highway 50. In Southern Finnmark, however, the work of destruction had to be continued in spite of this fact, because it was still expected and had to be expected that there would be a Russian-Finnish offensive on both sides of the SwedishFinnish border and a Russian-Allied landing in Southern Finnmark.
During the entire period that the Defendant was Commander-in-Chief in Norway, this probability was always acute. During this period, clear information about Russian movements could never be obtained, because it was not possible to carry out air reconnaissance over the Murmansk railroad and the Murmansk area. At the beginning of December 1944, the OKW informed the Mountain Army that one Russian division which had at one time been at the Army fron in Lapland, had been located on the front in East Prussia. This information had no significance, however, in determining the intentions of the Russians, because previously there had been more than 30 Russian divisions at the Finnish front, and, facing the Mountain Army in Lapland, a similar number of divisions, of whose whereabouts nothing was known.
The reason that I now go into particular detail concerning the destruction of the two cities of Kirkenes and Hammerfest, is that it is actually on the basis of the destruction of Hammerfest that the Prosecution believes it can deduce special arguments against the defendant. With reference to the destruction of Kirkenes, I merely have to refer to statements by witnesses, from which it becomes clear that Kirkenes was not destroyed as a result of the general operation, but that the destruction was probably due solely to the battles that took place there and to air-raids by the Russians.
Moreover, the Honorable Tribunal will probably remember from its inspection of Kirkenes, that it was actually the stone buildings that had remained standing, a fact which it itself would not have been consistent with the aims of the destruction operation.
Since the Prosecution asserts with such emphasis that there had been no justification for the destruction of Hammerfest, I wish to call attention again to the fact that the Mountain Army absolutely had to count on the probability of an enemy landing in Southern Finnmark. This landing was not restricted to a particular season of the year because even in fjords, the sea never freezes up and snow-falls in the coastal area are usually light. The probability of such a landing became greater and greater as the season advanced and as it became more and more difficult for the Russians to thrust ahead by land.
Such a landing was also possible in connection with the landing of the Allies in the Narvik area of which one had constantly to be afraid.
Hammerfest was the natural naval base and starting point for a landing in the Alta and Porsanger Fjord. The city and its port also were the natural clearing place, after a successful landing, for the transportation of supplies to the various Fjords, which could only be carried through on small crafts.
The movement of the mountain army was not concluded until January. By that time only part of the city was destroyed. The destruction continued, however, after the defendant had left Norway on 14 January 1945. This is proof that even after he had left Norway this destruction was considered necessary. How much more justified must the conviction of this necessity have been in the time prior to his departure.
Concluding the question of destructions in Norway I want to refer again to paragraph 4 of the Rules of Land Warfare, as I have done it in my opening speech and especially with regard to these questions I want to quote the leading author of international law, Professor Lauterpacht, who, on page 74 of his article in the British Yearbook of International Law for 1944 states:
"Such acts as general devastation.....may supply ample reason for condemnation and protest.....they man, at the end of the war, justify the imposition of collective sanctions by way of compensation or otherwise as distinguished from individual penalties of a criminal nature. But criminal proceedings before the municipal courts of the victor may seem to many a questionably method removing outstanding doubts and laying down authoritatively the existing law on subjects of controversy.
Total war has altered the complexion of many a rule. At a time when the "scorched earth" policy, with regard to the belligerent's own territory, has become part of a widespread practice, general destruction of property ordered as an incident of broad military strategy will not properly form the subject matter of a criminal indictment."
In conclusion I must discuss two documents which have been presented by the prosecution in cross-examination.
One single time hostages were taken in Finland for the protection of the army hospitals fully occupied with wounded and for the release of some prisoners which had been captured illegally. For practical reasons I cannot give any details about the conditions which led up to this situation. The special character of the situation is, however, sufficiently illustrated by the fact that in spite of the state of war existing since the 15 September 1944 the mountain army tolerated Finnish troops undisturbed in their rear, in the hospital city of Tornio, and that as late as the beginning of October a Finnish liaison staff (Colonel Willamo) was with the army. This also became evident from the last paragraph of the cross-examination document exhibit No. 607.
The surprise attack of the Finns carried out on the 1st of October against the army hospitals and a small force of guards was made in violation of good faith.
The hostages were taken in order to effect the liberation of the army hospitals illegally occupied in violation of good faith and of the guards captured.