Reymann was one of the commanding officers who like Mahlmann mentioned just now, belonged to the division under General Rendulic in Russia. The affidavit also deals with the Commissar order. He states, like the previous affiant, that never was there a Commissar shot, and he says in the last, but one paragraph in the middle:
"Moreover, on the occasion of conferences or visits to my command post Brigadier General Rendulic always directed us to treat all POWs humanely and in accordance with regulations."
This affidavit has been sworn to before a Notary in Iserlohn on the 25.9.47. This brings me to Rendulic Document 21, in Volume I, which I offer as Exhibit 20. This is an affidavit by one Hans Thoerner. The Tribunal will remember that there was discussion about the capture of a relative of Mr. Churchill on the occasion of a commando operation. This affiant, Hans Thoerner, describes in this affidavit this incident, and he has attached to the affidavit a copy of the letter written by Jack Churchill. Jack Churchill, in this letter thanks him for the good treatment and the kindness shown by the affiant while he (Mr. Churchill) was a prisoner. I need not read this affidavit.
I shall submit another document about the commando order. This is Document 22, and is Exhibit 21. This is again Peter Sauerbruch, 1-c in the 2nd Panzer Army, and he says that while he was serving with the 2nd Panzer Army, in other words during the period between August and November 1943, no commando operation occurred in the Balkans. Nor docs he know of any official order or directive on the part of the Army Group concerning commando operations.
The next document is Rendulic Document 2, Volume I, the Court will recall that map which shows what the position was on the evening 9 September 1943 after the Italian surrender, and I reserved the identification number 2-A. I now beg to offer this map as Exhibit 22.
I might point out that in the original there is the certificate signed by Dr. Rendulic but unfortunately on the photostat copy it is not contained.
The next document is also a sketch, Rendulic Document #3. I offer it also with the certification by Dr. Rendulic, as Exhibit 23. That sketch I have offered in order to describe the situation of all of the operations which we have described here before. It shows in particular that the 2nd Panzer Army at that time had to defend the whole coastal area in Albania, after Italy had surrendered.
THE PRESIDENT: You referred to it as a sketch?
DR. FRITSCH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it included in these you have given us?
DR. FRITSCH: No, Your Honor, please, I have not submitted it yet, but I thought it was contained in the document book. Is it not contained therein? May I offer it as a loose sketch?
If the Tribunal please, the next document might take me a little longer. Might I suggest that this is a good moment for the recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Your suggestion has received favorable consideration.
We will have our recess.
(Thereupon a 15-minute recess was taken).
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. FRITSCH: The next document which I will submit is Document Rendulic I, No. 23, which I am giving exhibit number 24. May I at this point emphasize the affair of the two Italian colonels who were treated according to a Summary court martial procedure. The affidavit which we have here, given by Willibald Utz, is a statement by the then Commander of the Division who describes the event in detail in this document. I shall read the affidavit.
"Ad rem:
"I remember that one or two Italian officers were shot, according to martial law, about the 1st of November 1943 or later. This happened because he or they had made common cause with an Albanian band as ringleaders and had taken part, with other Italian soldiers and officers, in sudden attacks on German troops.
"Here is as far as I remember, approximately, what happened:
"The mountainous district south and south west of Tirana had been at the end of 1943, from September onwards, for a long period, the hiding place of an Albanian partisan band whose leader was particularly active. Thus, from there, also the National Assembly of the Albanians in the former royal palace was shot at by guns. Also, more and more frequently, there were sudden attacks on vehicles on the "Southern road" from Tirana to Durazzo. Finally, this road fell entirely into the hands of the partisan band. Similar incidents occurred on the road Tirana-Elbasan (eastern border of this district) and on the road Elbasan-Durazzo (southern border). This was the reason why my division and parts of the neighbouring division (297) were commissioned to purge the mountain district in question from partisans.
"The above mentioned raids on motor vehicles took generally place in such a way that the motor vehicles were stopped in some way or other and the people were taken out of the vehicles. These people had to undress entirely, near the place, and, after that, were killed by shot in the neck.
Clothes and linen and luggage were always carried away by the bands.
"When troops only started marching in view of this enterprise, the Southern group - marching still in close order - of the German troops which advanced in a concentric manner, was suddenly attacked, by fire from Italian guerrillas and suffered heavy losses. I do not exactly remember any longer the number of losses, but there were probably a hundred losses attended with Bloodshed, among them 30 dead, The Western and North Western group, too, suffered losses, When the concentric attack of the Germans made progress, the Albanian band leader, with the majority of his men, broke fighting, through the surrounding line towards East, at night time and by means of a sudden attack. But the Italian guerrillas who followed on the same road as rear--guard were caught by the reinforcement that had meanwhile arrived and were overwhelmed after a short fight. There were about 15 Italian officers and about 150 men. They were partly in old, torn uniforms, partly in plain clothes and were first, during the fighting, believed to be Albanians. Their ring-leader was the colonel who was later shot according to martial law. His adjutant - probably the second officer who was later shot according to martial law. -- The case was first investigated in detail by the department Ic of the division and cleared up by interrogation of the captured people. According to the provisions then in force it would have been necessary to shoot all prisoners. Out of pity with the misled people and out of humanitarian reasons I was not able to come to such a decision, reported the facts officially, protested against the provisions and asked not to comply with them. I was successful. I was promised that the majority of the prisoners were to be saved. Only the ringleaders as those who had misled their men, had to be executed. A summary court-martial was commissioned to make the necessary investigations. I do not know anything about the procedure in the trials as at that time I was absent; I was in the Eastern part of the mountain district, directing the fighting there, and all my time, day and night, was taken up by the fighting. Neither do I know where when and by whom the shooting, according to martial law, did take place."
The affidavit is signed by Willie Utz and was sworn to in Garmisch before an American officer.
We shall now turn to the next document. This is Document No. 24 which I shall submit as Exhibit No. 25. This is a document concerning the case Roncaglia which the Tribunal will remember. The exhibit is an excerpt of enclosures 187 and 148 to the War Diary of the 21st High Command, 2nd Panzer Army. I am reading this daily report which is addressed to the Command of the 2nd Panzer Army i.c. to the Ia Department.
"Reference: Measures against generals on the basis of a Fuehrer Order.
"1/ The following were captured:
"a/ General Rossi, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group West.
"b/ Major General Roncaglia, Commanding General XIV Army Command "2/ No generals have been shot up till now."
The daily report is dated the 19th of July 1943 and is signed on that date.
I shall now read a further report:
"II. 118th Infantry Division:"
This is a report from the General Command, 21st Mountain Army Corps, the Ia and dated 15 of September 1943. It reads:
"General Roncaglia, hitherto Commanding General of the Italian XIV Army Command captured without further incident and taken to Belgrade."
With reference to the same affair Roncaglia. I am submitting the document Rendulic I, No. 25, which is the original telegram from the Military Attache to the Ambassador in Rome. I am submitting it under Exhibit number 25 in the original and in the German translation. I beg your pardon, the exhibit number will have to be 26. I am reading the part which is of interest:
"General Ercole Roncaglia resides presently at Corso Cavour 32 Verona Italy."
The next document in this document book will be the document Rendulic I, No. 26, which I shall submit under Exhibit No. 27.
This is an affidavit which was given in Suessen on the 25th of September 1947. The affiant is Werner Pfafferott. This affidavit is sworn to. Werner Pfafferott comments on the occupation of Split and on the manner in which the Italians were dealt with.
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, for the time being I object to the introduction of this affidavit because it is not apparent to the prosecution at all who Werner Pfafferott is. It says merely that he lives in Magdeburg or Suessen/ Wuerttemberg. I don't know who the man is, what relevancy he has to the case; he does not give any statement where he served. I know that there are several Pfafferott's mentioned in documents but am I to assume that this is the same person that the defense has any reference to? And I believe that this man ought to identify himself more properly. Right now I can't make out who he is and merely calling him to Nuremberg to find out who he is would be more expensive than getting a supplementary affidavit stating his connection with the case.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you can accomplish the same thing by a professional statement of counsel.
MR. RAPP: That's what I -- would you repeat, your Honor, please what you have just said.
THE PRESIDENT: I said perhaps you could accomplish the same thing by the professional statement of defense counsel.
MR. RAPP: Yes, if defense counsel, knows it and states here in court that this man has this particular position and how it fits into this case, I am certainly willing to accept this but as it is right now I think defense counsel ought to elaborate on it.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honors, the residence of the affiant Pfafferott is mentioned in the affidavit and the name "Pfafferott" has repeatedly appeared in documents hero. I can state here that the affiant is the same man Pfafferott who is mentioned in the documents. He was at that time the Chief of Staff with the 15th Mountain Corps but, of course, I am very willing in the event that this statement is not sufficient for the prosecution to submit a further supplementary affidavit by the affiant Pfafferott.
THE PRESIDENT: That satisfies the Tribunal if it is agreeable with the prosecution.
MR. RAPP: It is perfectly agreeable with us, your Honors.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. FRITSCH: Pfafferott comments here on the situation in Split. May I assume that the events there are still present in the minds of the Tribunal from the examinations? It is important here that Pfafferott testifies here that there was no force used against the Italians but that instead one tried to influence them by propaganda measures so that they should not continue to fight as frano-tireurs. I believe there is no need for me to read this affidavit in detail.
I now offer Document No. 27, as Exhibit 28. This is an affidavit by Peter Sauerbruch. He was Ic of the 2nd Panzer Army. He comments on the question of labor recruitment. May I read the third passage where it says:
"I know of no cases in which able bodied people were deported for forced labor to Germany. The Army was opposed to the deportation of people, especially since the allied Croatian government itself urgently needed labor for Wehrmacht purposes. For this reason, the supplement "to Germany" was also omitted from the overall labor allocation order for evacuated sections of the population."
The affidavit was given on the 11th of October 1947 before me at Nuremberg and it was sworn to by me.
The next document which I offer is Document Rendulic I, No. 28, and it will get exhibit number 29. This is a photostat from an enclosure to the War Diary of the General Command of the 15th Mountain Corps for the period from June to July 1943. It deals with the operation "Panther". I wish to point out that this is a document which I had given the identification number "3-a" and it will now receive exhibit number 29. I shall read the document, passage 1, under the heading "Enemy Losses."
"882 counted dead, numerous wounded taken along, 191 prisoners, 21 deserters, 96 evacuated."
May I point out to the Tribunal that this document is headed, "Closing Report 'Panther' "? 96 evacuees are mentioned here.
In connection with the so-called forced evacuations I shall submit a further document which is Rendulic I, No. 29, and that will receive exhibit number 30.
The then I-c, Peter Sauerbruch comments on these problems, particularly where they concern the evacuation of the Albanian coastline. I am going to read the third passage:
"As only the Albania authorities were able to ascertain which persons were actually duly registered local residents, the Albanian Police was charged with the task of checking on the coastal strip. In the course of these check ups, the Albanian population repeatedly committed excesses against the persons arrested, whom they considered to be the representatives of the insidious Communist agitation. For, at what time, the Albanian population lived under the constant fear, Tito's expansionist plans might extend to the Albanian regions."
The affidavit is signed by Peter Sauerbruch on the 11th of October 1947 before me and certified by me.
As a proof in this same complex of questions I am submitting Document No. 30 which is an affidavit by Heinz Walter Toop. It will receive exhibit Number 31. This affidavit shows that Toop was Lieutenant Colonel and I-a of the 297th Infantry Division during the period of the 9th of September 1943 to the end of January 1945. I am going to read from the second passage of the affidavit.
"It would have been intolerable to leave unreliable and uncontrollable elements at large in the Albanian coastal regions. The German forces in Albania were numerically only small so that even in the open constal strip which afforded a clear view any civilian who was not absolutely reliable and well known had to be considered a danger to the security of the troops and their defensive strength. That danger was even greater in the jungle-like river regions and in the South of Albania where the mountains reached right down to the sea."
I shall then skip the next sentence which doesn't say anything of great importance and I shall continue:
"The idea to evacuate certain coastal areas by force was rejected.
Such an evacuation would have been technically possible but as there were only few inhabited places in Albania it was to be expected that the inhabitans would either return to their homes or if they were unreliable elements would take to wandering about in the vicinity of their homes, thus becoming a burden to the troops.
"The least our own troops could demand for their protection was that persons who had been proven to be unreliable elements should be removed by force. Those persons were selected partly by agreement with the Albanian authorities, partly in collaboration with leading Albanian figures whoso loyalty was established."
May I then read from the next passage?
"To sum up, it can be said that in tackling the problem of protecting the troops from interference by the population Albania was always treated as a friendly country and the population was not unduly molested. What measured were actually carried out were, in my opinion, the minimum of what a belligerent power had to do for the security of its troops and installations and their state of preparedness and, in my opinion, these measures were an absolute military necessity."
Then there is another passage which I would like to read, the next but one, that deals with the capitulation of the Italians:
"The capitulation of the Italians was carried out without haste, calmly and in an honorable manner. Whoever continued to fight after the capitulation had, in my opinion, no further claim to be treated as a soldier, the more so because the remainders who fought on used to work together with partisan bands on principle and to continue the fight together with them. However, where Italian units were taken prisoner after a preceding fight even they were in spite of this treated according to the rules of war like regular soldiers."
In the last passage the witness deals with the conditions and effects and the development of the capitulation. I don't believe it is necessary for me to read this passage. The affidavit was given in Herne on 23 September 1947 and sworn to before a notary.
May it please the Tribunal, the next document which is Document Rendulic I, No. 31, is an affidavit by Freiherr von Buttlar and for the moment I merely give it an identification number 32-A. I am not vet submitting it as evidence.
The next document -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Fritsch, the Secretary-General's office advises me that the noting of a document for identification with the letter "A" sort of confuses their record. If you can refer to it as Exhibit 32 and indicate that it is not now being offered in evidence but to indicate that it will be later offered, perhaps that will clarify the records of the Secretary-General's office and the Archives' Office.
DR. FRITSCH: Certainly, your Honor; I only did it this way because it was up until now handled in this manner but, of course, I am very glad to follow the suggestion of the Tribunal.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I may like to ask the Assistant SecretaryGeneral if the objection from the Secretary-General's office is based on the fact that the prosecution has used the letter "A" to identify documents or merely because it confuses the issue as such. The reason I ask if documents are offered with the exhibit number and no additional identification, I may take a document down with me having it entered in my document book and I would have to wait sometimes -- at the present I think probably three to four days --to get the record to read whether or not this document was actually offered in evidence or not. I think it would be possibly more convenient for the Tribunal, the prosecution and the defense if we could have allocated to defense counsel a certain letter of the alphabet behind the number if a document is offered for identification only. Therefore, I want to know whether the objection pertains to the letter "A" because we have used them or just generally to any letter.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: It would be much more convenient for us, Your Honor, if we could, reserve this number--No. 32 in this case--that is, reserve the exhibit number for future reference.
MR. RAPP: Well, I appreciate that. That has already been stated, but I wonder if the Secretary General appreciates the fact that that entails a certain amount of more work for us, and I wonder if we possibly could settle that outside of the Courtroom if the Defense, and Prosecution, and a representative of the Secretary General get together and find out just what the difficulties are, if that meets with the approval of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has no objection, as to how you mark the exhibit. I wish to call to the attention of the counsel, both the Prosecution and the Defense, that this matter has been referred to me, and it has been mentioned by a representative of the SecretaryGeneral's Office.
MR. RAPP: Very well, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: For the time being, then, shall we leave this 32-A, or...
DR. FRITSCH: Well, I'm not quite sure now, Your Honor, how we are to handle it. I would be very much obliged though if for today we could just leave it as it was up until now. From the letter A we can immediately see that something else had to be done.
THE PRESIDENT: We will leave it 32-A for the present, and before you have any other documents of this character work out something to the satisfaction of all concerned.
You may proceed.
DR. FRITSCH (Direct-examination Continued):
I shall submit a further document, which is Document Rendulic No. 1, No. 32, and it will be Exhibit No. 33. It is an affidavit by the Chief of Staff of the 5th SS Mountain Corps, by Otto Kumm. The affiant signed the affidavit in Dachau before an American interrogator. The date is the 19th of September 1947; the affidavit was given in the same form as we see it here.
The affiant deals with a Waffen-SS unit, which was subordinate to a Wehrmacht unit, and he points out that the reason for the subordination was an agreement between the Reich Fuehrer SS Himmler and the Commander in Chief of the Army, General von Brauchitsch, concluded in the year 1941. He continues to say: "In above agreement it was provided that members of the SS could only be tried by SS courts and members of the Army could only be tried by Army courts. As far as I am able to recall, this agreement was adhered to. The Commandant of a Wehrmacht Army was therefore neither able to exert any influence on legal proceedings against a member of the Waffen-SS, nor to confirm a verdict given by a court of the Waffen-SS. In summing up it must therefore be stated that the units of the Waffen-SS, which were subordinate to an Army unit, were only subordinate to same in regard to tactics, not however, in regard to jurisdiction or discipline."
May it please the Tribunal, I unfortunately have one more document today, which I would like to submit for identification only. And if I may ask for an exception and be allowed to give this document No. 33 once more the Exhibit No. 34-A, I assure the Tribunal that it will be the last instance.
MR. RAPP: I would like to sponsor Defense Counsel's request, if that is possible.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. FRITSCH: May it please the Tribunal, the next document which I will submit is Document Rendulic I, Supplement No. 125. This will receive Exhibit No. 35--three, five. The Tribunal will recall that on direct-examination I pointed out that this document is Document No. NOKW-658, and, as such, it is contained in the documents of the Prosecution. I have only reproduced it here again in order to be able to submit those parts of the document which the Prosecution has not submitted. There is nothing else that I want to say in connection with this document.
THE PRESIDENT: In referring to Exhibit No. 35, Judge Burke and I, at least, did not get the reference to the particular document.
Is it in your next Book?
DR. FRITSCH: Yes, it is contained in Supplement I, and it is No. 125. It is the first document in the supplementary document book. The cover page says "Document Book No. I Supplement." Your Honor, I don't dare submit the next document, which is No. 126, because that would break my promise not to submit a further identification document, but unfortunately I am not in a position to submit this document as evidence because so far it is not complete. Therefore, I shall have, at this point, to conclude the presentation of my documents. I would, however, like to stress that the Translation Department has promised me to balance of the translated documents within a very short period of time so that I shall be able, for sure, to submit all evidence during my case in chief, which I have available at the moment. I would now like, with the permission of the Tribunal, to turn to the problems of Norway. I have, for purposes of identification, fixed a map on the wall here, a map of Norway. It is unfortunate that I cannot submit a better map, but I think that, on the whole, we don't need that map, and when we do, it will be sufficient.
Q General, how did your assignment in the Nordic area come about? I think, to begin with, you were sent to Northern Finland. How did that come about?
A In the Spring of 1944 the Finns had entered into negotiations with the Russians, and these negotiations did not lead to any results. In June of the year 1944 a Russian offensive had started. This had taken place on the Southern Finnish frontier along Lake Ladoga and the Finnish border. This offensive had a number of successes in the beginning. The moral in Finland had so far been quite a depressed one, and it was to be expected that the Finns would enter into new negotiations with the Russians. In this situation General Dietl had an airplane accident. Up till then he had been the Commander in Chief of the XXth mountain in Lappland. General Dietl was a personality who was much esteemed in Finland.
I believe all this took place on the 23rd of June. During the night, or the 24th of June, I received the order to report on the 24th of June at the Fuehrer's Headquarters. On that day I was given the post of the Commander in Chief over the XXth Mountain Army in Lappland.
Q That was the relation between Germany and Finland at that time?
A Germany and Finland waged a common war against Russia. The German mountain Army and the Finnish Army fought side by side on the Finnish border, In spite of this there was no pact or alliance between those two countries. The two countries only acted out of a common interest against the common enemy on the basis of military agreements.
Q That was the military situation generally when you arrived in Finland?
A On a front of about 1200 Km East of the Finnish Eastern border there was the XXth mountain Army from the Arctic sea towards the middle of Finland, and then came the Finnish Army. There was no common leadership. The Finnish Army was led by the Marshal of Finland, Freiherr von Mannerheim. The front of the Mountain Army was comparatively quiet. A war of position of a normal kind was going on here. The Army itself was stationed in two large groups, with two corps in the South of Lappland, that is the middle of Finland; and one corps was on the coast of the Arctic Sea. Between those two large groups there were no other forces. The width and depth was 400 Km, and this area was rocky or jungle-like. For all practical purposes it was not possible to cross it.
Q Was this question of terrain which you just mentioned of any special significance and importance concerning the battles and the later events ?
A Yes, it was of quite decisive importance. In the whole area of Lappland, which is the Northern part of Finland, and the area of my Army, three-quarters of the country was covered with jungles, which could not be negotiated. The area was rocky or swampy. Towards the North, up to the Arctic Sea, there was tundra and entirely rocky areas. This was very important considering the fact that the area could not be negotiated because there were only very few roads in this area. In Lappland there were, for all practical purposes, only three highways-the so-called Arctic Sea highway which ran from North to South through Lappland and which was about 600 Km long; and in the South of Lappland there were two highways, each of which led to one of the corps stationed there. All these highways met in Rovanjemmi, which is in Southern Lappland, a locality near the polar circle and from there two roads led to the Swedish frontier, to the so-called frontier highway which went along the Swedish frontier to Norway to the Lyrgen fjords.
Q how did the political situation in Finland develop after all that?
AAt the beginning of August the Finnish Government had resigned, and the Finnish President had founded a new government. The head of this government was Mannerheim. This government soon entered into new negotiations with Russia. The Finns loyally informed us of this pact. We expected that this time the negotiations with the Russians would lead to success. We expected that Finland would leave the alliance.
Q That would be the situation then confronting the XXth Mountain Army?
A The situation had necessarily to be extremely difficult if one considers the fact that from the Arctic Sea, on the Eastern coast of Finland, the front led down to the South and that in the centre of Finland the German Mountain Army was joined by the Finnish Army, then in the event of Finland's leaving the alliance very suddenly a deep, open, uncoverered flank would arise; which was 400 Km deep.
This would be even more dangerous because the best roads from Southern Finland, led to unprotected road junction of Rovanjemmi, and to the Swedish frontier highway. The loss of Rovanjemmi to strong Russian motorized forces and that fact that these forces might reach the Swedish frontier highway, which then led straight to Norway, had to lead to a catastrophe, for the mountain army.
Q Were any provisions prepared for these events, and, if so, which ones?
A Naturally, everything possible was prepared. The proper forces were withdrawn and put up in preparedness. We had to block the roads which led from Southern Finland. We had to dynamite all bridges and mine the roads to the greatest possible extent. All this we had to do to prevent, wherever possible, the enemy breaking into the practically unprotected flank of the army. Of course this could only be prepared in order not to provoke the Finns and also possible not to provoke the Russians. But it was prepared in the smallest detail.
Q Now, was anything known about the armistice conditions which were to be expected on the basis of the negotiations?
A No, unfortunately nothing was known about this. We did know, from the negotiations which had taken place earlier, that they had not been successful because of two conditions which the Russians had imposed. The first condition was that the Russians wanted to occupy Finland; the second condition was that the Russians demanded that the Finns were to fight against us. He tried to do everything to get clues about the terms of the armistice because that would be extremely important to know in good time. We were not successful in our attempts, and as late as the 2nd of September, the day when the Finnish Army signed the armistice conditions, I had a long talk with Mannerheim, in which, of course, we did not discuss the armistice which was already a fact. But I thought that I was right in the impression that the Finns would, this time, accept the condition to fight against us.
Q And how did the situation actually develop?
A On the 3rd of September the armistice between Finland and Russia was concluded. Finland broke off all relations with Germany and demanded that the German troops be withdrawn from Finland within 14 days.
Q Was this demand to withdraw the troops within 14 days feasible from a military point of view?
A That demand could not be carried out. The demand obviously had the purpose of forcing the Finns to fight against us. In order to evacuate Finland, the troops had to carry out marches of 800 to 1000 Km--marches on foot. This would have meant marching unceasingly for 5 to 6 weeks. Such an enormous effort could not be expected of the troops in such a climate and at that time of the year and in such a terrain as I have described. The soldiers would have been able to bear up under this effort, but the horses would not have been able to do it. And the mountain Army had very many horses because everything had to be carried out on horseback. In addition we have to consider the fact that there were many stores which had to be carried off, and, finally, we have to consider that the troops just didn't march off like that. The enemy would prevent them from marching off and involve them in combat actions which actually did take place. The combat actions which took place, in order to get the fountain Army out of that area, took 5 to 6 weeks, and if one is fighting one cannot, after all, march. It was more than three months until finally the last man of the German Army had left Finland, and we tried to expedite matters as much as we possibly could, especially in consideration of the approaching winter.
Q General, you will remember that a representative of the Prosecution has stated here that this period of 14 days was better than no time at all? Would you consider that statement correct?
AAnybody who has any insight into the conditions of the roads there, the fighting situation, and what the leadership of an Army needed, would probably not make such a remark. Those 14 days to us only meant that we could evacuate to Germany the depots and the medical stores which we had in Southern Finland.
We could not do anything with these stores there because we had so much that we didn't know what to do with it all. After all, the Army had been provided for for a period of nine months. These 14 days had no influence at all on the condition of the Army; it had even less influence because the Russians did not feel themselves bound by this time limit. They attacked already as early as the 8th of September.
Q General, will you, very briefly, indicate the next event which occurred so that we may gain a picture of the situation?
AAs peculiar as this might sound, when we were concerned with a retreat we were first of all, busily engaged in building up a new front, a front with a depth of 400 Km. be succeeded in doing this in 4 to 5 days. Then, we started transporting and evacuating. On the 7th of September the first troop movement was carried out. We succeeded in withdrawing the two Soughern corps without the Russians knowing it. The Russians followed, and from that date on they attached continuously. Crises developed. The troops had already marched off had to return in order to relieve the others. But, on the whole, our movement was successful. The obvious purpose of the Russian attacks was to tie us and the Army down, to force us to fight, and to destroy us with their superior forces. From the point of view of military leadership the Russian actions were entirely correct. It was the Russian endeavor to use all available means to reach the road junction of Rovanjemmi, in order to overtake us from the rear and thus reach the highway near the Swedish frontier before we could. The battle, to prevent this Russian intention, which sometimes lasted for hours, meant to us existence or non-existence of the Army. And it succeeded.
Q Did the Russian attack now remain restricted to the Southern parts of the Army?
A No, 3 weeks later an especially well prepared attack was made against the XIXth Corps on the Arctic Sea. This was a mistake on the part of the Russian leadership, which was incomprehensible to me. It was a mistake to carry out these two attacks at different times so that it became possible for us to counter the Russian superiority by withdrawing forces from the Southern group and putting them at the disposal of the Corps near the Arctic Sea, and thus support this Corps. These forces succeeded in relieving the XIXth Corps and getting it out of the Russian encirclement.
Q General, is this the XIX Army Corps which was east of Kirkenes?
A Yes, this was the XIX Corps which was east of Kirkenes, about 150 Km east of Kirkenes.
Q Who commanded it?
A The General of the Mountain Troops, Jodl, who appeared here as a witness for the Prosecution.
Q And now when did the first order arrive to evacuate Northern Norway?
A To the best of my recollection that must have taken place towards the latter half of September.
Q And how was this order carried out?
A We carried out this order very loosely. The Army order at that time, was to retreat towards approximately the center of Lappland, and there to halt. We felt strong enough to defeat all attacks in this position, and we made this evacuation a voluntary one by supporting those Northern Norwegians who wanted to get away.
Q Did this situation change later on, and, if so, for what reasons?
A This situation changed later for several reasons. Principally on the 4th of October we received an order saying that we were not to remain in Lappland, but instead the Army was to be led back to a position near the Lyngen-Fjord in Norway. That meant to us a movement of about 800 to 1000 Km, which would necessarily last far into the Arctic winter.