The Greeks call this EAM, and it calls itself externally a National Liberation Movement. In this political masker organization a number of sub-organizations were included, mainly the ELAS: that is, it is a Greek abbreviation. It means National People Liberation Army. These are the military partisan units. Then came EPON, as the youth organization, which mainly carried on propaganda, also in the form of theater shows, etc. Then there is an organization which can be designated as a political secret police organization, the so-called OPLA, which, for instance, had to carry out the murder of the opponents. Finally there was the so-called Epimellitia; that was the so-called inspectorate which had to press goods from the population, food, etc. for use by the partisans. The supply depots which I have already mentioned belonged to this category. And so, therefore, the most important of these organizations was the ELAS, the armed partisan units.
Q. And what about EDES?
A. EDES was the nationalist organization. First of all, in all Greek agricultural areas there were various organizations; some of them were more directed toward the Left and some more to the Right. Then two groups arose out of this: the one group that was the EAM. ELAS, under Communist leadership, but this Communist leadership was first of all very clever and made out that it was Nationalist.
The second group was the Nationalist group, the EDES. The opposition between the two groups increased, very much, and finally a battle of life and death took place between the two. In this, the Nationalist organization EDES only dominated in one single district, namely in the Northwest of Greece. In the district around Epirus on the Albanian frontier. In all the other parts of Greece, the EDES was suppressed. On the Peloponnes I have already mentioned the incident of the Etakos group, and another even more important case is the National EDES group led by Col. Psaros here in this district. Psaros was overcome. He himself with about twenty of his officers was murdered by the EAM-ELAS and his followers were forced to continue fighting on the side of EAMELAS. Since that date, the situation was like this.
Apart from Epirus, there were only EAM-EIAS in Greece. The national groups who wanted to continue their fight against the Communists could no longer do this without support from the German occupation power, and so since about the time of the Italian capitulation, the national efforts were trying to build up self-protection corps and home guards. These were actually the beginnings of the Peloponnes free corps.
Q. Professor, you talked about nationalist camouflage which the ELAS very cleverly used. What influence, then, did this nationalist camouflage have on the Greek population as regards the relations towards the ELAS movement?
A. One can only answer this question with absolute exactness if one had been a partisan oneself with the EAM-ELAS. The fact is that since the beginning of 1944 for a Greek who thought politically it was without doubt that the leadership of the EAM-ELAS was consciously Communist. But how far a small farmer outside in the country thought about that, well that is another question.
EAM-ELAS did everything in order to carry on this national camouflage and to maintain it until the German evacuation and then, as is known, they let the mask fall quite openly and the following facts are notorious.
I don't need to state then in detail here. The massacres in Athens and everything which followed.
Q. Well then, what were the means they used in detail in order to carry on this camouflage successfully? Do you know anything about that?
A. First of all, there were the external designations; the organization EAM meant national liberation front; ELAS meant national peoples' liberation army; Epon meant entire Greek union of youth; and in addition where were the very odd code names which the partisan leaders gave themselves. They took names which came from the history of the Greek liberation battles or from Creek mythology and were covered with a kind of halo. And so the most important partisan leader was called Ares after the Greek god Ares-Mars. There was one who was called Canaris after the here of the wars of liberation. And others had other names from the wars of liberation.
Then in addition, there were the designations as battalions and regiments. They also took over the old regimental figures. For instance, a unit which was stationed in the neighborhood of Naoplia took the regiment number of the former regiment which was formerly stationed in Naoplia, and so forth, similar things.
Q. And does what you have just said only apply to the Peloponnes or in any other places?
A. That applies to Greece and one must also say it applies to the whole of the Balkans and also to Yugoslavia.
Q. Professor, you described to us the development of the band situation in the Peloponnesus. The main part of the LXVIII Corps, and the main band district in the Corps area. Would you now please tell us quite briefly for the sake of completeness about the other parts of the LXVIII Corps area? That is in Attica and Boeotia, and Erbea etc. How did the further situation develop?
A. The Peloponnes was the main territory of the Corps. In Attica and Boeotia, the danger from the partisans was not so great. This can be explained from the fact that the mountainous districts there were not so great and were more easy to negotiate.
One glance at the map shows the difference. Here there were relatively smaller partisan groups in the mountainous districts, mainly in Parnass in Helikon, in Kitheron, and then the island of Euboea and a smaller one in Parnass. There were also certain partisans, certain attempts to form a partisan movement on the islands. They mainly occupied themselves with obtaining the olive oil from the district of Lapolia. This was the main oil-producing district of Greece, and they tried to smuggle this oil to Athens and there to sell it and in this way to finance the EAM-ELAS organization. We tried to stop these oil transports of EAM-ELAS.
Q. Can you tell us anything else about the development of the situation out there? Did it continue exactly the same way as on the Peloponnes or did it develop differently?
A. Well, the situation of course was not so difficult, one could say.
Q. What about raids in this area?
A. Raids also took place but not so many and not so serious. Therefore, there was no fundamental difference but a rather more gradual one.
Q. The fighting was mainly determined by the terrain there.
A. Yes, by the terrain. Here, for instance, that is a plain or just with slopes, small hills, much more easily controlled by regular troops than the mountain district of the Peloponnes.
Q. Professor, you mentioned previously quite briefly the supply of the ELAS bands. How did they obtain their supplies or how were they supplied?
A. We received reports about British supplies by air and by submarine. These supplies were not very great. I myself at tho end of September, 1943, saw English-American tinned foods in the Peloponnes. The main source of partisan supply was that confiscated from the population.
Q. And how did that come about?
A. The mayor of Dara told me about that in the conversation which I have already mentioned. In the two months-in the approximate two months in which the partisans had appeared there, his village had to deliver up about fifty sheep.
Q. And was it always done officially like that so that the partisans went to the Mayor and asked for deliveries from his district?
A. Well, I can only say that I haven't really seen it.
Q. Do you know it from reports or -
A. Yes, of course. We had very many reports and I also heard very many eye-witness accounts of it.
Q. Well, what did they say?
A. Well, it was made in a rather disordered manner. Of course, all the Nationalists were treated very harshly and therefore fled away from the villages and tried to get to Athens. The enormous population of Athens and Epirus up to 2,000,000 inhabitants can mainly be traced back to this political fact.
Q. Well then, Professor, this can conclude your description of the development of the band situation at the time when you were there as a member of the LXVIII Corps in Greece, and I now ask myself how can this whole partisan problem be explained? Is it founded on the appearance of the occupation power alone, first of all the Italian and then the German? But there are also other occupied countries in which a partisan movement does not immediately arise, at least to this extent. Can it perhaps be explained historically and that is why I want to ask you as a historian and as an expert, particularly in this sphere of the Balkans and Greece especially to tell us quite briefly the historical--development.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: May I suggest that it be done as you have requested, somewhat briefly? The members of the Tribunal have some idea of the operations and if you will just omit the details and give us a final conclusion, it will be helpful.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Very well your Honor.
Q. Please, Professor, the general development in outline.
A. The experience of history shows that the character of the people and the attitude towards an occupation power is completely different. There are peoples who rely on former loyalty who are conscious that there is a clear difference between the bulk of the civilians and the members of the armed power, and that only members of the armed power carry the arms. This last difference can be explained. For instance, a man of the balkans, which for centuries was under Turkish domination, and who was forced to fight during this time against the Turks, one cannot demand this differentiation from a man of this kind. The population of those Balkan countries -- and it is shown even stronger in Yugoslavia than in Greece -- in inclined to regard the war as an affair of the whole population.
Q. I would like you to give a brief general historical development of the band position in the Balkans, quite briefly.
A. Of course, in the 19th century wars, there are numerous proofs of how the civilian population participated in warfare. And of how the prisoners were treated in such a way as had nothing to do with what we call international law. I would just like to mention one point, for anyone who knows the Balkans, the horrible may in which the Greeks treated the Turks is well known. It is a manner of executing a person. They used to run a wooden post into the prisoners abdomens, a pointed stick, and to run it in so far that the body itself went on falling from its own weight. In the war between the Serbs and the Turks, and this method of executing the prisoners has been typical in thousands of cases for centuries.
Not only all the history books are full of this but the songs of the heroes of the Serbs and of the Albanians glorify these things, and also the cutting off the heads of captured enemies. Perhaps I could mention one case from Greek history here. In the Greek war of liberation that is from 1821 until 1828, there was a bishop Antimos in Helos. He only allowed these people from his congregation to partake in the Lords supper who had killed a Turk. I could go on with these kind of stories.
Q. Well just to conclude this subject, I would like to ask you the following general question. In regard to the band situation; did the development in the Balkans and in Greece develop differently from the rest of Europe?
A. The Balkanian band situation in the -
Q. What do you mean by Balkanian?
A. These occurrences which I have just described were more strongly shown in the Balkans. Since there was a Serbian state or again existed in 1894, in these 140 years, there were 13 governments. Out of these 13 governments, one single one reached a natural end through the natural death of the ruler. The others through the dismissal, overthrow, and therefore in the history of Central and Western Europe; there is no parallel to this.
Q. And this brings to an end this subject. Professor, now I would like to go briefly into the reaction to the band attacks within the LXVIII army corps, I mean the reaction from the military side. Do you personally know anything about a reprisal quota order according to which for every killed German soldier, 40 up to a hundred people, Greeks or others, must be shot?
A. I myself never saw such an order. In the staff circles, it was said that such a general order existed, and that it was rather old. That is, it was before my time, before I arrived in Greece.
Q. Do you know whether this order was carried out within the area of the LXVIII Corps and especially by General Felmy?
A. I don't know of any one single case in which General Felmy carried out such an order or a similar order, that is in the sense that he personally gave such an order for this.
Q. And is your testimony now referring just to this order or do you want to say generally that General Felmy, as far as you know, never gave an order for retaliation measures in a certain ratio?
A. My testimony is a general one.
Q. Witness, now we come to another subject. How then was the attitude of the Greeks amongst themselves? Were the Greeks , first of all, only opposed to the Italians and then to the Germans, or were there terror acts and atrocities against their own people?
A. The fighting between the two political partisan groups, between the left and the right, was then mercilessly carried out. I have already mentioned the most important facts and in connection with this, very, very many Nationalists were murdered by the Communists. According -- well, if I might continue, after the German evacuation, it became very obvious after the British investigation committee Sir Walther Citrine, the EAMELAS kidnapped 15,000 hostages; 4,000 of them died. Mr. Churchill found out that in the months of December , 1943, and January 1944, 20,000 Greeks fell victim of this terror and the latest statistics of the Imperial Greek Government -
Q. Pardon me , which year?
A. 1944-45.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: We will take our morning recess.
(A recess was taken.)
TEE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE BURKE: You may continue, Dr. Torgow.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
First of all, I would like to make a technical remark. I have been informed that the following sentence has not been translated:
"In the Balkans the putting on stakes of the enemy is a fixed procedure."
Q Did you say that, Doctor?
A Yes, in the Balkans that is called "Putting on Stakes", and that is the procedure which I have tried to describe.
Q Professor, just before the recess we had discussed the question whether or not the Greek civilian population objected against the terror and the cruelties of the bands. Could you please give us your comments on that?
A The peace loving Greek peasants tried to do this. First of all, these people joined the National Partisans. Those National Partisan groups were not as well organized as others because the experience in organization which the Communists had was lacking there. Thus, it happened that in their battles against the Communist EAM/ELAS movements they were inferior and, therefore, defeated. The decision about this was made approximately in October, 1943. Since that time, the National Partisan organizations on the Peloponnes have disappeared altogether. For the population which wanted to oppose Communism there were only the following possibilities They could either escape to the larger towns where there were German garrisons. As can be easily understood, only a few people had an opportunity to do this. Some members of the intelligentsia did that. The second possibility was an attempt to organize self-protecting units, under arms, so-called Civil Defense Units.
That was at the time only possible in conjunction with the German occupation forces, Thus it happened that the peloponnes Volunteer Battalions were finally organized.
Q Can you give us more detailed information about the organization and development of those units?
A First of all, I would like to state that I, as an interpreter, was present at all discussions of importance and interpreted there.
Q With whom did the discussion take place?
A There were, above all, conversations with the leader of these volunteer battalions who was General Papadongonas. Also with other officers of his staff. To name only the most important ones: The chief of staff, major in the general staff, Pagolaris. His name was Stiljanos Pagolaris. He has to be kept distinguished from General Constantin Pagolaris. Then there was Major Stoupas. Furthermore, the three Brothers Bretakos who are still alive. I had mentioned already that there were four Brothers Bretakos in Sparta. One of them was a professional officer. His Christian name was Telemachos and he had organized that National EDES group which was later annihilated by the Communists. The other three brothers, who are still alive, Leonidas, Panajotis and Eleftorios, became the leaders of the free corps movements in the District of Sparta.
Q Professor, the name of Colonel Papadongonas has been mentioned here on frequent occasions. Who was Papadongonas?
A For many, many days I was together with Papadongonas. All discussions and conferences that took place with him I have interpreted. Papadongonas was a very clear cut character.
He was the prototype of a Royalist "Constantin" officer. He was an old follower of King Constantin. He was very friendly inclined towards England and, in discussions with us Germans, he did not hide this fact. Just as, on the other hand, he was convinced that the struggle against Communism, according to the situation as it prevailed at that time, could only be carried out in connection with the German occupation troops. He hated Communism to the utmost and was prepared to work together with Germany in this struggle against Communism, but only where this one point was concerned.
Q Did he, at an earlier time, make comments of the same type against Communism?
A In August, 1943, when he approached us with such suggestions ......
Q This is a misunderstanding. I mean, much earlier.
A He was well known as an opposer of Communism.
Q After the first World War, I mean?
A Colonel papadongonas was a member of the small British expeditionary group which, after the first World War, was committed in the Odessa area and fought against the Bolshevics.
Q Will you please continue now?
AApproximately towards the end of August, 1943, this officer, who, at the time, lived in Kalamata, which was the main nest of resistance of the Communists, proposed to the 117th Light Infantry Division to organize a Civil Defense organization. This was intended to secure Messenia and the whole of the Southern Peloponnes. The division contacted the corps and two conferences resulted from this question. The following people participated in these conferences:
Colonel papadongonas and Colonel Georgiu of the Greeks. The German participants were the 1-C of the Corps and the 1-C of the divisions, another interpreter and myself, and an Italian liaison officer participated in the first conference. Regarding the second conference which took place, after the Italian surrender, General von Le Suire, he was the commander of the 117th Light Infantry Division.
Q One interpolation. Why did Colonel Papadongonas not contact the corps directly?
A That could easily have been by accident. The division was stationed in Tripolis which was the central point of traffic in the Peloponnes, whereas the corps was stationed in the very isolated Vitina Valley. Thus it was quite natural that the Greek approached the German command in Tripolis, first of all, with his suggestions.
Q What course did these conversations and conferences take?
A Colonel papadongonas made the following suggestion. He described how the Partisan,problem was not a purely military one, and, therefore, could not be solved with purely military means. He stressed even at that time that the EAM/ELAS movements wore of a Communist nature and he stated that non-Greek forces alone could not cope with this problem.
Q Why not?
A Because we did not know the conditions of the country and the personalities concerned well enough. After all, we were not in a position to know who was a Communist and who was not. Therefore the conclusion he drew was that the Communist EAM - ELAS movement could only be eliminated by Greek troops. He suggested to organize a battalion of one thousand Greeks, they were to be reliable Nationalists and he was to select the officers and N.C.O. The German occupation forces were to make 1,000 rifles available, machine pistols were valuable, but not entirely necessary. That was before the Italian surrender and at that time the bands were poorly armed, mortars or heavy weapons were not at their disposal. He set the following conditions: this battalion was to be exclusively a Greek unit, it was not to be under any German command, but it was to work together with the German occupation forces through a liaison officer. Furthermore these troops were to fight in the event of an invasion not against the British or Americans and in this case, he assured on his word of honor that they would remain neutral.
Q And what was the German attitude toward this proposal?
A There were two different opinions. The Corps and General Felmy on the one hand and the division and General von LeSuire on the other. General von LeSuire, who was present at the second conference, answered Colonel Papadongonas proposal with the following demand, the units were to be directly subordinate under Germany's command and he demanded the assurance that in the event of a movement to the other side against the British and Americans, this battalion was to swear faithful allegiance to the Germans. Furthermore he only wanted to make available 400 rifles instead of 1,000. Colonel Papadongonas refused, above all he refused to give an assurance that in the event of an invasion these units would be fighting against the Allies in case of a lauding. He stated that the common interest between these units and German occupation forces only extended to the extermination of Communism.
Q When did this second conversation take place?
A This took place a few days after the Italian capitulation sometime in November, 1943. This basic point of view of Colonel Papadongonas did not find any understanding with General von LeSuire and that is why for the moment the whole plan could not be carried out and it was only realized a few months later.
Q How did it happen that it was eventually realized, through whom?
AAfter the conference, which I mentioned, this ended with a bitter clash between Colonel Papadongonas and General von Le Suire. Colonel Papadongonas took his leave with the words, in a few months we Germans would see that he was right in his prediction. By this he meant that the partisan problem could not be solved with purely military means and toward the beginning of November he came to Athens and again visited our official offices. Together with this, the three brothers took orders from Sparta, thus it happened that negotiations were taken up again. However, this time the 117th Light Infantry Division did not participate.
Q And what was the result of these conferences?
A In the meantime in several places on the Peloponnes several defense units had been organized. As the main ones there was one in Gythion and also one in Sparta was organized by the brothers Bretakes, one in Molai, one in Monimassia and one in Philiatra and also one near the district of Levki and Major Steupas organized small units for self protecting purposes for his farmers province. These are the most important groups, but they were disjointed. In the meantime the danger of the partisans became more and more threatening and the serious surprise attacks near Eleusis had occurred and the ones near Kalavrita. That was in October, 1943 and the highways could only be used in convoys, armed convoys, and the situation had within a few weeks of the Italian capitulation changed completely. The question which arose now was what could be done and so General Felmy took up once again the proposal made by Colonel Papadongonas. He had full understanding for the political stipulations and restrictions made by Colonel Papadongonas. He showed in that, and Colonel Papadongonas stated it quite frankly, a proof of his human decency.
Similar conferences with Colonel Papadongonas in Athens took place after this and in January 1944 yet another large partisan operation had been planned in the Taygetes mountains and also in the Parnon mountains, which was the so-called operation "Amsel" where as I said I myself participated. As I mentioned, the results were small and I forgot to mention that in the Parnon mountains near Kesmas more than 100 national hostages, who were captives of the EAM/ELAS had been liberated. I myself interrogated one of these liberated captives later in Athens. He was an attorney from Molai, after this operation "Amsel" a resolution was made that the civil defense units of the Greeks should be supported in every possible manner and that they were to be supported in such a way that no other relapse would occur. Before Christmas 1943, such a relapse had broken out in Molai, the national civil defense organizations had been overtaken by the EAM/ELAS and about 200 Greeks had been massacred. Then there were negotiations with the Greek government agencies and with the 117th Light Infantry division, which later on did not show any understanding f or the political element of the situation. The civil defense organizations were reorganized and were organized in gendarmerie battalions, that was the official designation used. The law used by the Greek defense ministry of the Interior in February, 1944 formed the local basis for these organizations. After that, it was determined how these men were to be armed through an order of the corps and the supplies were taken over by the commander of the ordinary police. The work of those battalions, these volunteer battalions, was the following: there was a staff in Tripolis under Colonel Papadongonas. The 117th Light Infantry division only agreed to Colonel Papadongonas; choice after serious debates. There were battalions in Tripoli, in Sparta in Cythion and one battalion was stationed in Meliata and Kalamata and this was intended to be extended to become two battalions.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. Professor, you have already mentioned that Colonel Papadongonas could not be given any orders from German agencies. Could General Felmy order Colonel Papadongonas to carry out reprisal measures?
A. When I described how these volunteer battalions were organized and developed I emphasized that the Papadongonas plan was, at first, not carried out because General von Le Suire would not agree to the volunteer battalions' being independent. I said that later on General Papadongonas was given this independence inasmuch as the deviating opinion of General von Le Suire was simply ignored. By this I mean the Corps simply ordered how the channels of command were going to be.
Q. Just a brief supplement to characterize Colonel Papadongonas: Was he a puppet -- a Quisling, as the expression has been used?
A. If Colonel Papadongonas had been a Quisling the 117th Light Infantry Division would probably have not made any difficulties. However, Colonel Papadongonas was in every aspect the exact opposite of a dependent nature. He had a clear-cut point of view, and he was through and through honest and decent. He maintained the point of view that there was aggressivism on the German side and aggressivism on the Greek side and that, for some part of the way, these two nations could go together -- that is to say, just where Communism was concerned -- no further.
Q. In this connection I would like to ask you another question: How about the Greek Government? Was the Greek Government a so-called "quisling" Government?
A. The individual Greek ministers were of varying types. I myself consider as a absolutely honorable man beyond any doubt the Greek Minister Louvaris, who was a man of international reputation. He had only taken over this difficult task under the German occupation because of his own personal feeling of responsibility.
He always made frank and open difficulties for us, and he never hid his point of view when he was of a different opinion. A similar case is the Prime Minister Rallis, but with certain restrictions. The other ministers were not very clear cut and strong characters. There is one man whom I would like to mention as having shown backbone against us Germans; he was Secretary of State Colonel Pakojanis.
Q. Did you have any discussions with other Greek ministers bout the organization of volunteer units?
A. Yes, I mentioned Pakojanis, Taboularis -- also, the General Constantin Taboularis with whom I talked. He is the very Constantin Taboularis who later on excelled as the co-worker of the British Generals Office.
Q. Did any negotiations take place with the partisan units? I mean the EAM/ELAS movements.
A. To the best of my knowledge there were never any negotiations of any kind with these units within the Corps area. Concerning EDES, at first we took up contact with them at a time when there were small EDES movements on the Peloponnas -- in August and September 1943. Then there were vague attempts to contact them. In September, 1944, which was immediately before the German withdrawal--with the EDES General Zervas, who pursued the aid of opening for the EDES movement the road leading to the capital of the land, Athens, --in order to prevent Communist terror in the capital of Athens between a German evacuation and the British taking over. Concerning this I do not know any details about this contacting of the Zervas movement; I only know of this fact through indications of the then Ic, Major von Stettner.
Q. Professor, this brings us close to the events which occurred at the time of the German evacuation of Greece. Will you please, as a introduction, describe quite briefly the development of the general political and economic situation up till that date?
A. The economic situation was in many aspects similar to the present situation of Germany--such things as a lack of housing, rising of prices, black-marketing, etc. In Athens and Pyraeus a copulation of about two million people was concentrated.
Q. How many inhabitants were there altogether in Greece?
A. Roughly seven million. After the political desertion of Romania and Bulgaria in August 1944 it became obvious that the German troops would eventually have to evacuate Greece and the Balkan area. That was a desperate situation for the National Greeks. They did not love the Germans, but to them they still represented the protection against Communist terror--at least the larger towns were opened. Therefore, all Greeks were horrified when they reflected that after the German evacuation there would be a certain vacuum until the British arrived, and that during this period the Communist ELAS movements which approached Athens from all sides, according to our information, would take over the capital and that this would finally result in a "blook bath." Some prominent Greeks of a national attitude approached us from all sides with the purpose of making us come to an agreement with the British in order to -
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Your Honors please, there is not a single word in the whole Indictment charging the Defendant Felmy with any alleged crimes in connection with the evacuation of Athens. I submit that all of this testimony is irrelevant and immaterial.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The Tribunal has permitted great lattitude thus far; but there should be a limit beyond which even this Tribunal will not go. I think you should confine yourself to matters of some materiality.
The objection will be sustained.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. Professor, will you please, then, very briefly restrict yourself to the main issues and tell us only what you can relate from your own observations?
A. I know, from my own observations, that several prominent Greeks made representations to General Felmy, and these people wanted an agreement to come about of the type which I described before. This agreement did not come about. The only thing that happened was that Athens was declared an open city. General Felmy consciously and deliberately spared Athens by not carrying out numerous orders for its destriction. I was an eye and ear witness, and I can testity as follows: I myself made available large stocks of clothing and food for the suffering population to Minister Louvaris, which, according to orders, we were to have included. Another question was the problem of strengthening the Greek Government executively and altogether strengthening and backing up the Greek Government. I believe that in this particular aspect General Felmy did an enormous service to the Greeks--even if partly in the well-thought-out German interest. The SS Cirles had the following plans; Briefly, before the German evacuation, -
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, I understood that my objection to this testimony in connection with the evacuation of Athens had been sustained. I put my objection again.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE; Your objection was sustained, and the Tribunal is of the same opinion still.
BY BR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. Witness, you frequently accompanied General Felmy on his official trips, and while you were a member of the Corps Staff you frequently spent time with him. I would assume that you gained an expert picture of his personality and that you have your opinion.
What was General Felmy's attitude towards the Greek population?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, I object to any personal characterization by the witness in this regard.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: We will accept his views for what they may be worth.