MR. FENSTERMACHER: I object to any accusations by the witness as to what constituted Balkan customs for hundreds of years. I submit that there can be no expert testimony on matters concerning the personality or culture of a people or of a nation.
I believe export testimony is admissible on technical and highly scientific matters, but I submit that we are not at all concerned with that type of material in this case. I am not aware of precisely what counsel for Felmy is trying to show by this type of testimony. I do not know whether he is suggesting that the Balkan peoples are somehow unique, and that their lives are of less value than the lives of any other nation.
I submit that the testimony is incompetent and completely immaterial.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: The principle has been rather liberal in the admission of evidence in this case. I do not feel that we should suddenly adopt a different attitude.
The objection will be overruled.
A It would be easy for the history of the Balkans to prove events of this kind. This was a first attack by the partisans on the Italians. The second took place near Leonidion on the edge of the Parnon mountains, on a weak Italian Garrison, perhaps a platoon strength of company strength, who were surrounded and forced to retreat to Nauplia.
The third rather large partisan attack was in Artemision. It is here on the map. There was a sawmill there which was secured by a platoon, led by a Sergeant. The Italians were attacked and taken prisoner. The Sergeant succeeded in escaping. I interrogated him at that time as an interpreter, in order to get some kind of insight into the partisan situation then.
The interrogation was particularly interesting because it showed to us quite clearly for the first time that also in this partisan movement which was just beginning, in the Peloponnes, the Communist elements were the stronger.
These attacks on Italians took place in the months of July and August. At that time no attacks on German troops were taking place.
Q Excuse me. In 1943?
A Yes, in 1943. The partisans who were still at the time rather weak on the Peloponnes, first carried on their fight exclusively against the Italians, and this could also be shown with numerous examples, but I limit myself to one single incident, which I still remember from the files.
About the end of July, a survey party in the neighborhood of Patras, was attacked by surprise and taken prisoner by partisans. The partisans thought that they were Italians, but when they saw their mistake, they treated the German prisoners with extreme friendliness, and gave them fruit and cigarettes, and sent them with a letter of apology back to the Commander, saying that it was a very regrettable mistake.
Q How do you explain that, Professor?
A This difference in the Greek attitude toward the two occupation powers, as it existed in the beginning, can only be explained from the whole historical conditions, and then one must continue from there.
Q Would you please do that, quite briefly?
A The Greek relations to Italy was for a long time burdened with fear of Italian Mediterranean expansion. Italy is near and Germany is far away from Greece. They were afraid that even after the war the Italian occupation power would remain in Greece, and it was assumed that a German occupation power would go away again. The Greek fear of Italy has historical roots, and through the religious contradiction between the Orthodox and the Catholic Church received even more drive from the conflict of 1923, which every Greek still feels to be a national humiliation. It is the so-called Corfu conflict as it was designated by historians and experts on international law.
It took place on the Albanian Frontier.
An Italian was wounded or offended or murdered, and thereupon Italy, in an extremely harsh manner, placed an ultimatum before Greece, and occupied the Island of Corfu temporarily. This opposition to Italy was then strengthened by the occupation of Albania on Good Friday, 1939.
Q Professor, would you please make this as brief as possible?
A Yes. That is more or less the Greek attitude toward Italy. The Greek attitude toward Germany is quite different. First of all one must think back that that country after the domination by the Turks was thrown off, for 3 decades was under Bavarian domination.
Q When was that?
A This was 1832 to 1862. The basis of the new state was the work of this Bavarian Administration, also the basis of the spiritual life mainly, and so it happened that these close connections came between the Greek and German scientists. Then in addition, King Constantin, married a sister of King William the II, and other things, and so one can say that in the first World War and afterwards, the Greek Royalists were predominantly pro-German. They are called in Greece simply the Constantinians, to differentiate between them and the Venizelists.
The "Constantinians" were strongLy represented in the Greek Officers' Corps.
At the beginning of World War II there then arose the strange position for Greece that she wanted to remain neutral. Italy was afraid of Greece; Greece was afraid of Italy and wanted to remain neutral, and had to rely on British help, and so the long, tragic situation, shown by the Albanian campaign in Italy, arose which the Greeks described to me again and again in discussions, this increased the tragedy.
Here I would just like to say one word which a Greek general once said to me, to illustrate the situation.
Q When was that?
A That was approximately in March, 1944. He said: "the fact that you have conquered us is not degrading for us, but it is a shame, and one we can never forgive the Germans for, that they have placed our country under an occupying power which we have conquered in battle in Albania.
Q Might I interrupt here, Professor. You said formerly, the "Bavarian" administration; might I ask how that was interpreted? I just received a note that "Bavarian" was translated as "barbarian", which is not, of course, correct.
A It should be "Bavarian". I repeat, the Bavarian administration.
Then in June, 1943, the provincial population in the Peloponnes was also friendly toward the German people.
Q How can it be explained that six months later it was so fundamentally different?
A I confine myself to a few facts. The first attack on German soldiers took plane in about the second half of August
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: I think it would be desirable to give the year when you refer to a month.
A -- 1943. On the road from Olympia to Tripoli two German driver were shot, near Langadia. (Indicates on map). That was the first of that kind of incident, and it had an alarming effect. First of all, we thought that they had mixed us up again with the Italian drivers.
Q Why?
A Because until then no German soldier had been attacked and, therefore, as a precautionary measure it was ordered that on this one road from Vitina to Olympia, which ran through especially difficult mountain country, German soldiers were to drive only in convoys of four. The whole of the rest of the Peloponnesus, until the end of September, 1943, one could drive without military escort Approximately at the end of August, a second incident took place August 1943 - when the road from Vitina to Naseka was destroyed overnight. A German troop unit which reconnoitered the country found out that the population had fled, and they arrested three civilians. At that time I interrogated these three civilians. They stated the following. On the evening a strong partisan band appeared and forced, with threat of arms, the population to destroy the road. Then the partisans went away again and the population fled. Thereupon I told the civilians that the population should come back again to the village without fear. It was the village of Dara. The mayor was to contact us; the next day the mayor came and I talked to him. His statements confirmed the same picture.
That was the situation at the end of August 1943. A complete change then took place through the Italian capitulation, on the evening of the 8th of September, 1943. At that time, in the first days after the capitulation, it was not possible to disarm all the Italian troops, and the Italians have given large stocks of arms and ammunition to the partisans, and so the partisan movement received an enormous drive.
In any case, there were thousands of rifles, in my estimation; and in any case more than a hundred perhaps hundreds - of machine guns, and many mortars. Since then the partisans had mortars for the very first time. This military fact is the one pre-condition for the increase of the partisan movement. The other is, if I may put it like this, a psychological or a political factor. After the Italian capitulation, it was generally expected that in the shortest possible time Germany too would collapse and also it had been reckoned on the German side and people were considerably surprised when the war was prolonged more. And so the retreat of the Germans from Greece appeared to be only a question of days or weeks, and many more people joined the partisans.
Q How do you explain that psychologically, that after this more people joined the partisans. Was the reason economic or human or political? What was the main reason?
A The partisan movement was, at the very beginning, not politically clear. The reports which we received from July to September 1943 reported about Nationalist and Communist bands. It was also reported that fighting took place between the two groups both in Achaia and Taygetos (shows on map). And we also received reports that British liaison officers were trying to overcome these conflicts and to unite the two rival groups against the Germans. From October 1943, onwards, it became clear that the Communist group on the Peloponnesus was completely in command. The Nationalist groups in Achaia and in Taygetos were overcome, and the leader of the Nationalist group, the officer Telemadios Repadios, from Sparta, was conquered in Taygetos (shows on map), was taken prisoner, and there are contradictory reports about his end. Since that date, since about the end of October 1943, the partisan movement on the Peloponnesus was clearly Communist, and what remained of a desire for Nationalist resistance could no longer build up an independent partisan movement, but tried again to obtain some kind of support from the German occupation power.
A Professor, now would you please describe the further development of the band situation after the Italian capitulation, quite briefly?
A There were various band centers whose geographical position was predestined by the nature of the terrain. The Band Center I was in the mountainous country of Achaia, a territory very difficult to negotiate, with mountain peaks as high as 2,500 meters; the Band Territory No. 2 lays in Taygetos, a high mountain about 3,000 meters; Band Center No. 3, in the Parnon mountains; and Band Center No. 4, which was not so important, in the southwest. A Band Center 5, of very slight importance, was in the center of the Aygolis peninsula. In addition, the strong Communist organization must be mentioned in the port of Kalamata. These various groups, after the Italian capitulation, were then joined together more securely by the Communists. In the winter months, 1943-44, it was shown in the reports which we received that the beginning of a quasi-military organization was formed: military designations appeared such as battalions, regiments, and finally even brigades. And in this period also the first large attacks took place on German troops.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date that you gave just a moment ago as to the time of the formation of these particular units which you describe?
A I said, Your Honor, that from the reports which were received by the 68th Corps this organization was shown to have formed in the winter months of 1943-44.
Q Were the battalions and regiments such in our sense of the words, or what did you understand by these terms at that time?
AAt that time we received a very interesting report. A German NCO of our corps staff, Ruff by name, was captured in or near Sparta by the partisans.
During October and November 1943 he was in a socalled "Headquarters" of the bands in the north of Taygetos. In these villages Kastania and Neo-Chorion. And then he succeeded, after about six weeks, in escaping, and he gave us a very detailed report about the situation with the partisans, about the organization, the food and the propaganda. Since we then heard later on from other reports that there a regimental staff was supposed to be stationed, it was quite clear that this designation had nothing to do with what in a regular army one called a regiment.
Q. Professor, when, in the subsequent period, did you hear about individual cases of band attacks from your own activity?
A. I know the full reports about band attacks. I myself was once involved in an attack on the road between Vitina and Sparta. But I would like to mention too larger band attacks which took place in the months October, November 1943. The one attack or skirmish took place near Kalavrita, which is here on the map (indicates). The second was near Eleusis and Thebes, near the Kiteron mountains. Those were surprise attacks in which presumably hundreds of partisans took part. The other actions were much smaller, and they were mainly raids on motorized convoys.
Q. Would you please tell us something quite briefly about the raid which you yourself experienced?
A. We were driving with a supply convoy with about 10 or 11 trucks from Gythion, and about half-way between Gythion and Sparta we were suddenly fired upon, from the right. We jumped out of the trucks and hid, and shot back. The partisans were probably at a distance of about 400 to 600 meters. They had machine guns--no trench mortars. The firing lasted about ten minutes and then our convoy was able to continue. One truck was shot up. There were no other casualties.
Q. How do you explain the partisans' retreat?
A. The partisans never fought properly with regular German troops. Therefore, every so-called partisan operation was a "drive into the blue." From immediate knowledge I can say this because for three weeks I myself took part in such a partisan operation. At that time I went on foot with a mountain light-infantry company through the Taygetos mountains in order to get a real, personal impression of the situation.
The march took the following route: from Sparta on the east edge of the mountains toward the south; down as far nearly as Cape Matapan; then over on the west coast and along the west coast northwards as far as Kalamata, and from Kalamata northeast to Taygetos; back again to Sparta. The enemy who, according to very clear reports, was very strong ly situated in Taygetos, never faced us for battle.
In two places there was only a very light exchange of fire. The first time it was near the monastry of Panajia Tatrissa, just above Kastania. The second time it was from the slopes of the Taygetos range near Allagonia and Neo-Chorion. And so the result of such a partisan operation--or this partisan operation--was such that the partisan units were thrown into confusion and that we took a few prisoners and detected a number of supply depots. They were oil depots of the EAM organization and in one place, as a kind of transient supply depot, a large herd of sheep, about 300 to 400 head.
Q. You just said the first raid which you yourself experienced took place near a monastary. Did the partisans have any kind of connection with this monastary?
A. If one talks about Greek or even Serbian monastaries, one must be quite aware that the majority of these monastaries are no longer inhabited today, or are only inhabited by a very few, very old Monks. In the Balkans, Monks are gradually disappearing. We received at the Corps numerous reports, all of which confirmed that the monastaries were used by the partisans. I know that in the monastary of Panajia-Tatrissa, which had been uninhabited for some time by Monks, I knew that there partisans had taken shelter, and that is how the battle took place there, the skirmish.
Q. And so therefore this was not an individual case with the monastary, but it was more or less a general policy?
A. According to the reports which we received, one must assume that, but this one case I know of as an eye witness.
Q. Professor, then would you please tell us quite briefly something about the partisan organizations which were on the Peloponnesus? You have already mentioned the EAM. During the course of the trial we have heard a lot about the right organization, the EDES. What about this organization on the Peloponnesus?
A. The EAM organization is a completely parallel matter with the corresponding Yugoslav organization. There, there is a political masker organization.
The Greeks call this EAM, and it calls itself externally a National Liberation Movement. In this political masker organization a number of sub-organizations were included, mainly the ELAS: that is, it is a Greek abbreviation. It means National People Liberation Army. These are the military partisan units. Then came EPON, as the youth organization, which mainly carried on propaganda, also in the form of theater shows, etc. Then there is an organization which can be designated as a political secret police organization, the so-called OPLA, which, for instance, had to carry out the murder of the opponents. Finally there was the so-called Epimellitia; that was the so-called inspectorate which had to press goods from the population, food, etc. for use by the partisans. The supply depots which I have already mentioned belonged to this category. And so, therefore, the most important of these organizations was the ELAS, the armed partisan units.
Q. And what about EDES?
A. EDES was the nationalist organization. First of all, in all Greek agricultural areas there were various organizations; some of them were more directed toward the Left and some more to the Right. Then two groups arose out of this: the one group that was the EAM. ELAS, under Communist leadership, but this Communist leadership was first of all very clever and made out that it was Nationalist.
The second group was the Nationalist group, the EDES. The opposition between the two groups increased, very much, and finally a battle of life and death took place between the two. In this, the Nationalist organization EDES only dominated in one single district, namely in the Northwest of Greece. In the district around Epirus on the Albanian frontier. In all the other parts of Greece, the EDES was suppressed. On the Peloponnes I have already mentioned the incident of the Etakos group, and another even more important case is the National EDES group led by Col. Psaros here in this district. Psaros was overcome. He himself with about twenty of his officers was murdered by the EAM-ELAS and his followers were forced to continue fighting on the side of EAMELAS. Since that date, the situation was like this.
Apart from Epirus, there were only EAM-EIAS in Greece. The national groups who wanted to continue their fight against the Communists could no longer do this without support from the German occupation power, and so since about the time of the Italian capitulation, the national efforts were trying to build up self-protection corps and home guards. These were actually the beginnings of the Peloponnes free corps.
Q. Professor, you talked about nationalist camouflage which the ELAS very cleverly used. What influence, then, did this nationalist camouflage have on the Greek population as regards the relations towards the ELAS movement?
A. One can only answer this question with absolute exactness if one had been a partisan oneself with the EAM-ELAS. The fact is that since the beginning of 1944 for a Greek who thought politically it was without doubt that the leadership of the EAM-ELAS was consciously Communist. But how far a small farmer outside in the country thought about that, well that is another question.
EAM-ELAS did everything in order to carry on this national camouflage and to maintain it until the German evacuation and then, as is known, they let the mask fall quite openly and the following facts are notorious.
I don't need to state then in detail here. The massacres in Athens and everything which followed.
Q. Well then, what were the means they used in detail in order to carry on this camouflage successfully? Do you know anything about that?
A. First of all, there were the external designations; the organization EAM meant national liberation front; ELAS meant national peoples' liberation army; Epon meant entire Greek union of youth; and in addition where were the very odd code names which the partisan leaders gave themselves. They took names which came from the history of the Greek liberation battles or from Creek mythology and were covered with a kind of halo. And so the most important partisan leader was called Ares after the Greek god Ares-Mars. There was one who was called Canaris after the here of the wars of liberation. And others had other names from the wars of liberation.
Then in addition, there were the designations as battalions and regiments. They also took over the old regimental figures. For instance, a unit which was stationed in the neighborhood of Naoplia took the regiment number of the former regiment which was formerly stationed in Naoplia, and so forth, similar things.
Q. And does what you have just said only apply to the Peloponnes or in any other places?
A. That applies to Greece and one must also say it applies to the whole of the Balkans and also to Yugoslavia.
Q. Professor, you described to us the development of the band situation in the Peloponnesus. The main part of the LXVIII Corps, and the main band district in the Corps area. Would you now please tell us quite briefly for the sake of completeness about the other parts of the LXVIII Corps area? That is in Attica and Boeotia, and Erbea etc. How did the further situation develop?
A. The Peloponnes was the main territory of the Corps. In Attica and Boeotia, the danger from the partisans was not so great. This can be explained from the fact that the mountainous districts there were not so great and were more easy to negotiate.
One glance at the map shows the difference. Here there were relatively smaller partisan groups in the mountainous districts, mainly in Parnass in Helikon, in Kitheron, and then the island of Euboea and a smaller one in Parnass. There were also certain partisans, certain attempts to form a partisan movement on the islands. They mainly occupied themselves with obtaining the olive oil from the district of Lapolia. This was the main oil-producing district of Greece, and they tried to smuggle this oil to Athens and there to sell it and in this way to finance the EAM-ELAS organization. We tried to stop these oil transports of EAM-ELAS.
Q. Can you tell us anything else about the development of the situation out there? Did it continue exactly the same way as on the Peloponnes or did it develop differently?
A. Well, the situation of course was not so difficult, one could say.
Q. What about raids in this area?
A. Raids also took place but not so many and not so serious. Therefore, there was no fundamental difference but a rather more gradual one.
Q. The fighting was mainly determined by the terrain there.
A. Yes, by the terrain. Here, for instance, that is a plain or just with slopes, small hills, much more easily controlled by regular troops than the mountain district of the Peloponnes.
Q. Professor, you mentioned previously quite briefly the supply of the ELAS bands. How did they obtain their supplies or how were they supplied?
A. We received reports about British supplies by air and by submarine. These supplies were not very great. I myself at tho end of September, 1943, saw English-American tinned foods in the Peloponnes. The main source of partisan supply was that confiscated from the population.
Q. And how did that come about?
A. The mayor of Dara told me about that in the conversation which I have already mentioned. In the two months-in the approximate two months in which the partisans had appeared there, his village had to deliver up about fifty sheep.
Q. And was it always done officially like that so that the partisans went to the Mayor and asked for deliveries from his district?
A. Well, I can only say that I haven't really seen it.
Q. Do you know it from reports or -
A. Yes, of course. We had very many reports and I also heard very many eye-witness accounts of it.
Q. Well, what did they say?
A. Well, it was made in a rather disordered manner. Of course, all the Nationalists were treated very harshly and therefore fled away from the villages and tried to get to Athens. The enormous population of Athens and Epirus up to 2,000,000 inhabitants can mainly be traced back to this political fact.
Q. Well then, Professor, this can conclude your description of the development of the band situation at the time when you were there as a member of the LXVIII Corps in Greece, and I now ask myself how can this whole partisan problem be explained? Is it founded on the appearance of the occupation power alone, first of all the Italian and then the German? But there are also other occupied countries in which a partisan movement does not immediately arise, at least to this extent. Can it perhaps be explained historically and that is why I want to ask you as a historian and as an expert, particularly in this sphere of the Balkans and Greece especially to tell us quite briefly the historical--development.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: May I suggest that it be done as you have requested, somewhat briefly? The members of the Tribunal have some idea of the operations and if you will just omit the details and give us a final conclusion, it will be helpful.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Very well your Honor.
Q. Please, Professor, the general development in outline.
A. The experience of history shows that the character of the people and the attitude towards an occupation power is completely different. There are peoples who rely on former loyalty who are conscious that there is a clear difference between the bulk of the civilians and the members of the armed power, and that only members of the armed power carry the arms. This last difference can be explained. For instance, a man of the balkans, which for centuries was under Turkish domination, and who was forced to fight during this time against the Turks, one cannot demand this differentiation from a man of this kind. The population of those Balkan countries -- and it is shown even stronger in Yugoslavia than in Greece -- in inclined to regard the war as an affair of the whole population.
Q. I would like you to give a brief general historical development of the band position in the Balkans, quite briefly.
A. Of course, in the 19th century wars, there are numerous proofs of how the civilian population participated in warfare. And of how the prisoners were treated in such a way as had nothing to do with what we call international law. I would just like to mention one point, for anyone who knows the Balkans, the horrible may in which the Greeks treated the Turks is well known. It is a manner of executing a person. They used to run a wooden post into the prisoners abdomens, a pointed stick, and to run it in so far that the body itself went on falling from its own weight. In the war between the Serbs and the Turks, and this method of executing the prisoners has been typical in thousands of cases for centuries.
Not only all the history books are full of this but the songs of the heroes of the Serbs and of the Albanians glorify these things, and also the cutting off the heads of captured enemies. Perhaps I could mention one case from Greek history here. In the Greek war of liberation that is from 1821 until 1828, there was a bishop Antimos in Helos. He only allowed these people from his congregation to partake in the Lords supper who had killed a Turk. I could go on with these kind of stories.
Q. Well just to conclude this subject, I would like to ask you the following general question. In regard to the band situation; did the development in the Balkans and in Greece develop differently from the rest of Europe?
A. The Balkanian band situation in the -
Q. What do you mean by Balkanian?
A. These occurrences which I have just described were more strongly shown in the Balkans. Since there was a Serbian state or again existed in 1894, in these 140 years, there were 13 governments. Out of these 13 governments, one single one reached a natural end through the natural death of the ruler. The others through the dismissal, overthrow, and therefore in the history of Central and Western Europe; there is no parallel to this.
Q. And this brings to an end this subject. Professor, now I would like to go briefly into the reaction to the band attacks within the LXVIII army corps, I mean the reaction from the military side. Do you personally know anything about a reprisal quota order according to which for every killed German soldier, 40 up to a hundred people, Greeks or others, must be shot?
A. I myself never saw such an order. In the staff circles, it was said that such a general order existed, and that it was rather old. That is, it was before my time, before I arrived in Greece.
Q. Do you know whether this order was carried out within the area of the LXVIII Corps and especially by General Felmy?
A. I don't know of any one single case in which General Felmy carried out such an order or a similar order, that is in the sense that he personally gave such an order for this.
Q. And is your testimony now referring just to this order or do you want to say generally that General Felmy, as far as you know, never gave an order for retaliation measures in a certain ratio?
A. My testimony is a general one.
Q. Witness, now we come to another subject. How then was the attitude of the Greeks amongst themselves? Were the Greeks , first of all, only opposed to the Italians and then to the Germans, or were there terror acts and atrocities against their own people?
A. The fighting between the two political partisan groups, between the left and the right, was then mercilessly carried out. I have already mentioned the most important facts and in connection with this, very, very many Nationalists were murdered by the Communists. According -- well, if I might continue, after the German evacuation, it became very obvious after the British investigation committee Sir Walther Citrine, the EAMELAS kidnapped 15,000 hostages; 4,000 of them died. Mr. Churchill found out that in the months of December , 1943, and January 1944, 20,000 Greeks fell victim of this terror and the latest statistics of the Imperial Greek Government -
Q. Pardon me , which year?
A. 1944-45.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: We will take our morning recess.
(A recess was taken.)
TEE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE BURKE: You may continue, Dr. Torgow.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
First of all, I would like to make a technical remark. I have been informed that the following sentence has not been translated:
"In the Balkans the putting on stakes of the enemy is a fixed procedure."
Q Did you say that, Doctor?
A Yes, in the Balkans that is called "Putting on Stakes", and that is the procedure which I have tried to describe.
Q Professor, just before the recess we had discussed the question whether or not the Greek civilian population objected against the terror and the cruelties of the bands. Could you please give us your comments on that?
A The peace loving Greek peasants tried to do this. First of all, these people joined the National Partisans. Those National Partisan groups were not as well organized as others because the experience in organization which the Communists had was lacking there. Thus, it happened that in their battles against the Communist EAM/ELAS movements they were inferior and, therefore, defeated. The decision about this was made approximately in October, 1943. Since that time, the National Partisan organizations on the Peloponnes have disappeared altogether. For the population which wanted to oppose Communism there were only the following possibilities They could either escape to the larger towns where there were German garrisons. As can be easily understood, only a few people had an opportunity to do this. Some members of the intelligentsia did that. The second possibility was an attempt to organize self-protecting units, under arms, so-called Civil Defense Units.
That was at the time only possible in conjunction with the German occupation forces, Thus it happened that the peloponnes Volunteer Battalions were finally organized.
Q Can you give us more detailed information about the organization and development of those units?
A First of all, I would like to state that I, as an interpreter, was present at all discussions of importance and interpreted there.
Q With whom did the discussion take place?
A There were, above all, conversations with the leader of these volunteer battalions who was General Papadongonas. Also with other officers of his staff. To name only the most important ones: The chief of staff, major in the general staff, Pagolaris. His name was Stiljanos Pagolaris. He has to be kept distinguished from General Constantin Pagolaris. Then there was Major Stoupas. Furthermore, the three Brothers Bretakos who are still alive. I had mentioned already that there were four Brothers Bretakos in Sparta. One of them was a professional officer. His Christian name was Telemachos and he had organized that National EDES group which was later annihilated by the Communists. The other three brothers, who are still alive, Leonidas, Panajotis and Eleftorios, became the leaders of the free corps movements in the District of Sparta.
Q Professor, the name of Colonel Papadongonas has been mentioned here on frequent occasions. Who was Papadongonas?
A For many, many days I was together with Papadongonas. All discussions and conferences that took place with him I have interpreted. Papadongonas was a very clear cut character.