THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
MR. DENNEY: May it please Your Honors. We now take up the discussion of the activities of the defendants List, Foertsch, and the deceased Boehme during the period April to October, 1941.
The defendant List was an able protagonist in fields ideological as well as military. This is indicated in a letter of 23 April 1941 written by Alfred Rosenberg, who was later appointed Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories, to Martin Bormann. Part of this letter stated:
Art objects generally do not come into the question as far as the Balkans are concerned, only there are Free Masonry archives and Jewish libraries and other relevant research bodies. In my opinion, only the same attitude as that prevailing in occupied French territory can be taken and what I requested was really only an expansion of an already existing regulation. For with General Field Marshal List, and likewise with the General Quartermaster of the Army, the work has already been begun and my men are already at work with these circles in Belgrade. And on command of General Field Marshal List, as well as of his Deputy General, these men will also be employed in closest relationship with the Security Service (SD) in Salonika. As you know, Salonika is one of the largest Jewish centers.
The capitulation was barely finished; yet List, the soldier, was making himself a party to the "cultural" work of the Third Reich.
Early in September 1941, List determined that matters in Serbia required a more forceful executive authority in that territory. With this in mind, List teletyped to OKW and OKH requesting that Boehme, at that time Commanding General of the 18th Mountain Corps, 12th Army, that he be assigned with his staff as Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia with supreme authority in that sector, directly responsible to List. List regarded Boehme as being "especially suited" for the position because he had "an excellent knowledge of conditions in the Balkans." This request was answered by a Hitler order of 16 September 1941 in which List was charged with the task of suppressing the insurgent movement in the southeast area, and Boehme was designated as Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia with executive power, directly subordinate to List. All military and civilian offices in Serbia were instructed to comply with Boehme's orders.
Upon receipt of the Hitler order, List, on 19 September 1941, advised the Military Commander in Serbia, the LXV Corps Command, and the German General in Zagrab, who was the liaison between the Croatian government and the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, that Boehme had received entire executive power in Serbia and that "all command authorities and forces of the Army existing there or to be transferred there are subordinated to him." He stated further, "Instructions for the carrying out of operations for the necessary protective measures will be given by me only to General Boehme, who is responsible for their being carried out."
One of the first acts of Boehme in his new post, for which List had stated he was "especially suited", was the publishing of an order, which he directed that the recipients destroy after dissemination, and which read as follows:
In March of this year Serbia shamefully broke her friendship treaty with Germany, in order to strike the German units marching against Greece in the back.
German revenge stormed across the country.
We must turn to new, greater goals with all our forces at hand. For Serbia, this was the sign for a new uprising to which hundreds of German soldiers have already fallen in sacrifice. If we do not proceed here with all means and the greatest ruthlessness, our losses will climb to immeasurable heights.
Your mission lies in carrying out reconnaissance of the country in which German blood flowed in 1914 through the treachery of the Serbs, men and women.
You are the avengers of these dead. An intimidating example must be created for the whole of Serbia which must hit the whole population most savagely.
Everyone who wishes to live charitably sins against the lives of his comrades. He will be called to account without regard for his person and placed before a court martial.
So it was that List's Corps Commander, now Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, set the same keynote as had von Weichs for the program of subjugation through terror which was to pervade in the Balkans for the ensuing years of the war.
Now that the chain of command has been clearly established, let us return momentarily to List's request of 14 September directed to OKW. His communication starts with the words "Threatening development of the overall situation in Serbia demands energetic measures." Later on, he states "the present command regulations are based on peaceful conditions and are unbearable under the present turbulent combat conditions". This request having been received at OKW, another order was issued, in addition to the Hitler order appointing Boehme mentioned above. After reciting that it had been established that the opposition to the occupying power was the result of a centrally directed mass movement and that each incident of insurgence against the German Wehrmacht, regardless of individual circumstances, must be assumed to be of communist origin, the order directed:
In order to stop these intrigues at their inception, severest measures are to be applied immediately at their first appearance, in order to demonstrate the authority of the occupying power and in order to prevent further progress. One must keep in mind that a human life practically counts for naught in the affected countries and a deterring effect can only be achieved by unusual severity. In such a case, the death penalty for 50 to 100 communists must in general be deemed appropriate as retaliation for the life of a German soldier. The manner of execution must increase the deterrent effect. The reverse procedure, to proceed at first with relatively easy punishment and to be satisfied with the threat of measures of increased severity as a deterrent, does not correspond with these principles and is not to be applied.
This was the answer of the Army High Command to List's plea for help in "turbulent combat conditions". The order was passed on by list to his subordinate units.
Not satisfied with the initial directive with reference to the killing of innocent people in the Southeast, an additional OKW order, signed by Keitel, came down on 28 September, 1941.
In this order it was directed that Military Commanders have hostages available at all times in order that they might be executed when German soldiers were attacked. The complete ruthlessness of the second Keitel order may be seen from the following provisions:
Because of attacks on members of the Wehrmacht which have taken place lately in the occupied territories, it is pointed out that it is opportune for the Military Commanders to have always at their disposal a number of hostages of different political persuasions, i.e.,
1) Nationalists,
2) Democratic Middle Class,
3) Communists It is of importance that among these are leading personalities or members of their families.
Their names are to be published. In case of an attack, hostages of the group corresponding to that to which the culprit belongs are to be shot.
Nowhere in this order did Keitel attempt to enlighten his commanders as to the means to be employed in identifying the "culprit". It was a matter of little concern to him, and the evidence will show that it concerned his field commanders even less. The manner in which this order was complied with will be detailed at greater length in the evidence which is presented to the Tribunal.
The 100:1 ration having been proclaimed, Boehme, on 4 October 1941, ordered the execution of 2100 persons, to be taken from the concentration camps at Sabac and Belgrade. Those to be executed were primarily Jews and communists. These killings were reprisals for the deaths of 21 German soldiers. On 9 October, 1941, the chief of the Security Police in Belgrade reported that 2100 Jews and gypsies were being executed by the Wehrmacht in reprisal for 21 German soldiers shot to death. The Security Police in this operation were to make available to the Wehrmacht the required number of victims. The report continues that 805 Jews and gypsies were taken from the camp in Sabac and the balance, 1295, were taken from the Jewish transit camp in Belgrade.
On 9 October 1941 , Boehme informed List of "an execution by shooting of about 2000 communists and Jews in reprisal for 22 murdered men of the 8th Battalion of the 521st Army Signal Communication Regiment".
A partial report of this action was made to List and Boehme by a Major who commanded the 2nd Battalion of the 521st Army Signal Regiment. The Major's report enclosed a report of the Lieutenant who commanded the company which carried out a portion of this action. The Lieutenant's report is dated 13 October, 1941. The report is sordid in its detail; the shooting of 2200 Jews in the camp at Belgrade had been ordered on 8 October, 1941. The action took place on 9 October in a forest seven miles from Kobin, and on 11 October near the Belgrade shooting range on the road to Nisch. No detail was overlooked, films and pictures were to be taken by an Army Propaganda Company. By issuing spades and other tools to the inmates who were to be executed, the atmosphere of a working party was simulated. Only three guards were placed on each truck to further allay the suspicions of the wretched victims. The prisoners were happy to be leaving the camp, if only for a day of work in the fields. The soldiers were able to execute only 180 on 9 October, and 269 on 11 October. The executions were accomplished by rifle fire at a distance of 12 meters. Five shots were ordered for the shooting of each prisoner. Articles of value were removed under supervision. They were later sent to the Nazi People's Welfare or the Security Police in Belgrade. The Lieutenant reported that the attitude of the prisoners at the shooting was calm and that following the killings the troops "returned to their quarters satisfied."
It was while List was Armed Forces Commander Southeast that concentration camps were introduced in that area. The Military Commander in Serbia, in a letter of 22 June, 1941, spoke of a "concentration camp which I had been ordered to erect." He spoke of the future inmates as "communists and other criminal types".
List himself recommended concentration camps in an order of 5 September, 1941. He stated that the relatives of those people resisting the Army should be transported to concentration camps.
Often has it been urged that the German Army had no knowledge of concentration camps, or at best that they had nothing to do with them.
It has been the repeated refrain of the German military men that such matters were beyond the scope and beneath the concern of a soldier, and that such affairs handled by Himmler and his subordinates. In the Southeast, the Army not only had knowledge of the camps; they were in charge of some of them. An order of 11 September, 1941 will show that the Concentration Camp Serbia, in Belgrade, was made subordinate to the Military Commander of Serbia on that date.
Again, in an order of 18 September, 1941, issued by Bader of the LXV Corps, it was stated, in connection with mopping-up operations, that "the entire male population above 14 years of age is to be arrested, to be sent to a concentration camp which the Division will install, and to be detained there."
Boehme, in an order of 33 September, 1941 to the 342nd Division, directed that unit to "...evacuate Sabac by surprise attack of the entire male population, ages 14-70, and take it to a concentration camp..."
Boehme further concerned himself with the transfer of the Jarak concentration camp from the 342nd Division to the 64th Police Reserve Battalion in an order of 27 September, 1941, which specified in addition that inmates would receive half rations -- only 200 grams of bread daily and 200 grams of meat weekly.
Early in October, Boehme ordered that a concentration camp be located in the Zasaviza area, capable of holding 30,000 inmates. This camp was to be "guarded by restricted forces and closed from the outer world". In the same order, he directed that inmates from another concentration camp be brought to work on this new construction project.
The evidence will show how the Army used the concentration camps as collection points for innocent people who were to be channeled into German industry or to be used for such other purposes as might be directed.
Two final references to List concern his later acts prior to his post being handed over to the defendant Kuntze. On 4 October, 1941, he issued an order in which it was directed that men in insurgent territory who were not encountered in battle were to be examined and "if they are only suspected of having taken part in combat, of having offered bandits support of any sort, or of having acted against the Wehrmacht in any way, to be held in special collecting camp.
They are to serve as hostages in the event that bandits appear, or anything against the Wehrmacht is undertaken in the territory mopped up, or in their home localities and in such cases they are to be shot." This was in keeping with the spirit of an earlier order which he had issued on 5 September, 1941, which provided in part fort Immediate ruthless measures against the insurgents, their assistants, and their relatives (hangings, burning down of localities participating, increased arresting of hostages, deportation of family members into concentration camps).We are now turning to the period from October 1941 until August 1942 where we are primarily concerned with the defendants Kuntze, Foertsch, the deceased Boehme and the believed to be deceased Bader.
The defendant Kuntze succeeded to the command of the 12th Army late in October, 1941. The measures which had been started under his predesessor, List, were continued with increased severity. Kuntze received periodic reports of the activities of the troops under his command. These reports recited the seizing and killing of "hostages" and the wanton destruction of villages.
On 2 November, 1941, a situation report was signed, on behalf of Kuntze, by the defendant Foertsch. This report gives as one of the reasons for the unrest in the southeast, refers to:
The fact that refugees expelled from the separated territories (from Croatia - 110,000; from Hungary - 37,000; from Bulgaria 20,000) who were transported across the frontier without means and without sufficient care.
The report then set forth the methods to be followed by Kuntze's subordinates in combating opposition. It was stated that he had charged Boehme with the suppression of Serbia and Croatia. He ordered that "all prisoners taken during combat or mopping-up operations will be hanged or shot to death" and that "for the time being, arrests are being made only for purposes of interrogation or to supplement reconnaissance."
In addition, he directed that all male civilians be temporarily collected in camps.
Late in November, or early in December, 1941, Kuntze went to Belgrade. Some notes were made on this trip. One of the items which concerned Kuntze was the question of resettlement. This memorandum provided:
The question of the resettlement of women and children of the insurgents, as well as other unreliable elements, is still being examined. The retention of these people in Serbia, south of the Danube, does not appear to be practical. There are still difficulties with respect to shelter, rations, and guard which oppose the transfer into the Banat.
All Jews and gypsies are to be transferred into a concentration camp at Semlin (at present there are about 16,000 people there). They were proven to be the bearers of the communication service of the insurgents.
On 20 December, 1941, Kuntze's subordinate, the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, Bader, who had succeeded Boehme earlier in the month, issued an order to his troops. After reciting that there had been proper compliance with the prior orders concerning reprisals, he stated:
The reprisal measures will be continued further. In order to exclude any existing doubts concerning them, I am referring to the fact that these groups of prisoners are to be differentiated: Reprisal prisoners are persons who, for reason of their attitude, are destined for reprisals for German human lives, for example, communists not encountered with weapons, gypsies, Jews, criminals, and the like.
Hostages are persons who play a role in public life and on the basis of their personalities exercise a certain influence on the population in their realm of activity. They comprise the most varied strata of the population. They guarantee with their lives the public peace, order and security in their part of the country.
Prisoners of the unit are persons who are taken in the course of an operation, as suspicious. They require a further examination by the administrative sub-area headquarters authorities. They will either be released or transferred to the reprisal prisons.
It is clear that there was to be no change, save for the worse, under Kuntze as Armed Forces Commander Southeast, in the matter of "hostage" takings and retaliatory killings.
The policy as set forth was implemented by further orders of the German division commanders. Hoffman, the Commanding General of the 342nd Division, on 6 January, 1942, issued an order to his troops which provided "Communists, in any event, will be shot immediately after a short interrogation; only in special cases will they be brought back to the Division."
A particularly harsh policy was established by Kuntze made effective on 6 February, 1942. He called for detailed reports on counter measures taken by subordinate units. He further directed that persons who loitered around the battle field should be considered as having taken part in the battle and therefore should be shot.
With the advent of spring, Kuntze anticipated increased activity from the people of the occupied area. With this in mind, he issued an order on 19 March 1942. He emphasized the degree of importance which he attached to the regimental commanders and stated that Himmler's secu rity units and the Serbian police should cooperate closely with the German troops.
He directed that "captured insurgents are to be hanged or shot as a matter of principle. If they are used for information purposes, this only postpones their execution. In an appendix to the same order, he advised "It is better to liquidate 50 suspects than lose one German soldier." He dictated that in areas which had been mined, the Serbian population, among others, should be used to clear the terrain. And appeared there again the 100:1 ratio in the event death came to any German.
Later in March, on the 23rd, Kuntze sent a teletype to Bader, in which he agreed that inserrectionists not captured in battle should be deported for work in Norway. He failed to explain how the identity of those to be deported could be established.
Kuntze had more to say about forced labor on another occasion. Bader, in an order of 25 March, 1942, mentioned an earlier order of Kuntze, dated 18 March, which directed:
Persons who are arrested because of being suspected of supporting or collaborating with the insurgents arc to be handed over to concentration camps; whore they arc to be interrogated (by the SS) who will make further disposition, for example, handing over as forced laborers in the German interest sphere.
From this same order, it is evident that three concentration camps were presently available in this area at Sabac, Belgrade-Delinjo, and Nisch, with a fourth to be opened shortly at Semlin.
Kuntze advised OKW from time to time of the success of the measures he was directing in the Southeast. On 7 April 1942 he informed them that since 1 September 1941, 11,522 of the enemy had been shot in battle and 21,809 persons had been killed in retaliation measures. On 23 June 1942 Kuntze advised OKW that a total of 37,477 had been shot in battle or in way of reprisals, as of that date, in Serbia and Croatia.
He mentioned that the mayor of Crete had been slain and, in retaliation persons sharing in the guilt and a number of hostages were shot.
Kuntze left his post as Armed Forces Commander Southeast on 8 August 1942, but before leaving he knew that there had been more than 45,000 people killed by the Germans in Serbia and Croatia during the period September, 1941, through July, 1942. He knew that people were being deported to labor in the German war economy, both in the Reich and in Norway. He knew that he had done his work well and faithfully in the service of Hitler.
Mr. Fenstermacher will take up the opening statement at this time, Your Honors.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: May it please the Tribunal, we take up now the occupational period, August 1942 until August 1943.
By the 8th of August, 1942, when Generaloberst Alexander Loehr replaced Kuntze as Commander-in-Chief of the 12th Army and Armed Forces Commander Southeast, the German reprisal machinery was completely set up and functioning. It remained only to keep the existing machinery running and, if possible, to increase the efficiency with which the retaliation measures were carried out.
The defendant Foertsch, who had served as Chief of Staff under both List and Kuntze, remained in the same capacity throughout the twelve months period of Loehr's supreme command in the southeast. General Bader, the Commanding General in Serbia under Kuntze, also stayed on. A few weeks before Loehr arrived in the southeast, the defendant Geitner arrived in Serbia as Chief of Staff to Bader.
To pacify the civilian inhabitants, Bader and Geitner divided Serbia into various field headquarters areas which corresponded in the main to the larger cities and important strategical points throughout the country. The field headquarters areas were in turn sub-divided into smaller territorial units known as district commands. This was the organizational machinery which General Bader utilized for the security of Serbia.
When a telephone line was cut or railroad tracks torn up or a mine blown shut or shipping on the Danube mined -- whether by partisan units in the course of legitimately planned actions, or by unknown persons -the reprisal machinery swung into action. The discrit command notified field headquarters of the incident and field headquarters in turn notified Geitnwr, Bader's Chief of Staff in Belgrade, suggesting that certain stated reprisal measures be taken in retaliation. Geitner and Bader would either approve the proposals of field headquarters or issue new orders to cover the case. In either event, the district command was notified, orders were issued and carried out, and reports were sent back up through the established channels. The reprisal orders were almost invariably the same. To insure the consistent execution of the German program and to prevent delay, as well as to avoid the confusion that might ensue from the exercise of individual decision by the German mind, a retaliation code was established for the guidance of all concerned. An arithmetical table was so easy to follow -- even t he slowest and dullest Battalion or Company Commander could comprehend its ready meaning. What did it matter that the ratio of Serbs to Germans seemed high or that innocent people would necessarily suffer for the deeds of persons whom the Germans were unable, or did not even try, to apprehend? Weren't the Germans a superior race, and wasn't it better that 99 innocent men -- either hostages or so-called reprisal prisoners -- should die than that one guilty person go free?
With the precedents that Weichs, List, Boehme, Kuntze and Foertsch had established before them, Bader and Geitner on 28 February, 1943, devised a more detailed table of retaliation quotas to take care of an increased number of factual possibilities which new conditions had brought to the fore:
For one German, or one Bulgarian Occupational Corps member, killed -- 50 hostages are to be executed.
For one German, or one Bulgarian Occupational Corps member, wounded -- 25 hostages are to be executed.
For the killing of a person in the service of the occupying power, regardless of his nationality, or a member of the Serbian Government, High Serbian Official (district supervisor or mayor), official of the Serbian State Guard, or member of the Serbian Volunteer Corps -- 10 hostages are to be executed.
For the wounding of any person in the previous categories -- 5 hostages are to be executed.
For an attack against important war installations, up to 100 hostages are to be shot to death, according to the seriousness of the case.
That these retaliation quotas were no idle German boast or mere paper threat is made quite clear by the literally dozens and dozens of both orders and reports that poured in to, and went out from, Geitner's own hands:
15 December 1942 -- "5 D.M. followers shot in retaliation for the German sergeant shot to death near Zlotovo."
25 January 1943 -- "Since the Organization Todt drive Braun had not returned as of 1 January 1943, a total of 50 followers of Draja Mihailovic and communists were shot to death," 10 February 1943, near Gr. Milanovac -- "25 Communists arrested, 10 shot to death in reprisal for murder of mayor."
On 14 May 1943 the War Diary of the 104th Jaeger Division contained this entry:
"The Division applies to the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia for the shooting to death of 125 communist hostages and the evacuation of the villages of Kamendo and Dubona in reprisal for the attack on the railroad patrol Drazanj."
7 August 1943--"As retaliation for the surprise attacks in the Runjkovao-Leskovac District, on 16 and 28 July 1943, in which two members of the German customs border guard were killed and two were wounded, 150 communist reprisal prisoners were shot."
15 August 1943--"15 Communist reprisal prisoners shot in retaliation for murder of a mayor and the burning of threshing machines."
16 August 1943--"In retaliation for the killing of the leader of a mixed harvesting crew on 7 August 1943, 50 communist reprisal prisoners were shot".
On occasion they even returned to the earlier and higher quota of 100:1 for each German soldier killed. A proclamation by Bader of 19 February 1943 stated:
In the forenoon of 15 February 1943 a passenger car of the German Wehrmacht was attacked by partisans on the road Petrovan-Pozarevac near Topanica. The four passengers, two officers, one non-commissioned officer and one enlisted man were murdered and robbed. The vehicle was set on fire.
As a reprisal measure 400 communists have been shot to death today in Belgrade. The village of Toponica was partly burned down. Several hundred persons arrested, who were seized in the district area Pozarevac will not return to their villages but will be given worthwhile employment elsewhere.
The perpetrators of the attacks for which reprisal measures were instituted were frequently unknown to the Germans. Sometimes, however, the attacker was caught in the act or his identify became known. But even knowledge or apprehension of the guilty offender did not rule out or prevent the application of the retaliation table--the hostages had to shot anyway in order to set an example. The following entry for 24 December, 1942, in the War Diary of the 704th Infantry Division , a unit subordinate to Bader, makes this last fact very clear:
Lieutenant Koenig, Executive Officer, II Battalion, 724th Grenadier Regiment and 2nd Lieutenant, Dr. Engelhardt, Battalion physician of the II Battalion, 724th Grenadier Regiment, were fired on in Mladenovac at 1413 hours by a 20 year old woman who was assumed to be a communist.
They were severely wounded (shot through lung and stomach) and immediately transferred to the military hospital in Belgrade. A former Chetnik leader was also shot to death by the woman while trying to arrest her. Later she shot herself. The 724th Grenadier Regiment ordered the encirclement and search of Mladenovac. 72 men and 52 women were arrested. A part of the population fled immediately after the attack on the officers. Local police and Serbian State guards participated in the military measures without causing trouble. 3 pistols were found.
The Division applies for authorization to shoot in reprisal 50 hostages and/or all people detained as retaliation prisoners.
The reply of Bader and Geitner to the division's incredible application is apparent from the entry in the division's War Diary on the following day:
49 men and one woman shot to death in Mladenovac for the attack on two officers of the II Battalion, 724th Grenadier Regiment. 2nd Lieutenant Dr. Engelhardt died in the military hospital in Belgrade. The Division applies for authorization to shoot an additional 25 hostages and/or all people detained as retaliation prisoners from the district of Mladenovac. The execution will be carried out by the SD in Belgrade.
At least 75 innocent persons, perhaps more if the division's request to shoot all retaliation prisoners held in the Mladenovac district was honored, were killed in spite of the fact that the guilty party was known. This was German justice in Serbia on Christmas Day, 1942. Can any doubt remain that German policy in the Southeast, as in Poland and the East, was designed and calculated to decimate the native populations for generations and generations?
But if the saboteur or attacker was really unknown--that is, if even the easily convinced Germans were too baffled to hazard a guess as to the "culprit's" political affiliation--then an equal number of both Draja Mihailevic followers (D.M.'s as they were called) and Partisans would be shot. The German reports are full of examples of such arbitrary and indiscriminate executions. On 27 June 1943, Bader ordered:
15 communist and 15 D.M. hostages are to be shot to death in reprisal for the attack and destruction of mines near Aleksi-nac on 8 June 1943.
Another order of the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, this time of 13 August 1943, stated:
In retaliation for the murder of two and the wounding of two German soldiers by insurgents on the highway at Pozarevac, 9 August 1943, 150 reprisal prisoners are to be shot.
Since the political origin of the perpetrators cannot be definitely established, 75 D.M. and 75 communist reprisal prisoners are to be executed.
To cope with the gigantic problem of hostage supply posed by this wholesale reprisal program, the district commands turned for assistance to their well-trained and widely-experienced co-workers in mass crime, the SD. With the help of native collaborators the SD had prepared lists of "suspects"-- relatives of men who were absent from a village or immigrants without valid reason from another village, "persons of a hostile altitude", and the like -- the definition was uncertain and ambiguous and no one quite knew how his name got on or remained off the lists. One thing, however, was sure -- there was no investigation and no trial and no appeal from the German judgment of inclusion. From time to time, as the available supply of hostages dwindled in the face of an astounding number of mass executions, troops of the districts commands and SD detachments would stage "special actions" to round up additional victims. Large hostage camps were constructed at various strategic places -- their locations were changed from time to time to make for more efficient administration and quicker executions -- and when the orders came, the hostages would be shot, Either at the hostage camp itself or on the site of the attack. In general, retaliation victims were supposed to be residents of the village in or near which the attack allegedly occurred. But if a sufficient supply of hostages or retaliation prisoners was not on hand in a particular district camp, then the balance of persons necessary to satisfy the hostage quotas would be shot from the central camp in Belgrade. With a macabre fascination for mathematics and a consuming passion for everything smacking of rote, the Germans enforced the code firmly, precisely, exactly -- no matter where the hostages were from.
Two examples will suffice. On 28 May 1943, Bader issued the following order to Field Area Headquarters 610:
A total of 100 D.M. hostages is to be shot to death in retaliation for the murder of three members of the Russian Protective Corps near Konarevo, wounding a member of the Russian Protective Corps near Ivanjica on 11 May and for the murder of two members of the Serbian Volunteer Corps near Vezania.
Since D.M. Hostages are not available at the present time in the camp of Field Area Headquarters 610, they are to be made available from other camps by the Commander of the Security Police.
On the same day, 28 May 1943, Bader signed and Geitner distributed a similar order to Field Area Headquarters 809:
150 communist hostages are to be shot to death in retaliation for the murder of three members of the German customs border guard near Vucje on 15 May 1943.
Since there are no communist hostages available at present in the camp of Field Area Headquarters Nisch, they are to be made available from other camps by the Commander of the Security Police.
Nor was there ever any jurisdictional conflict between the district commands and the SD over the sheer physical task of executing these thousands of retaliation victims. Generally losses of the military were avenged by the military themselves. Police units usually furnished the execution squads in reprisal actions for their own losses, as well as for attacks on other soldiers and installations under German protection. Both groups were ready and willing to participate in the mass massacres. If a particular hostage camp was administered by the SD rather than by a temporarily under--manned district command, then its personnel would supply the trigger men. There was no set rule; both organizations cooperated to do the job at hand. Tho orders for the actual executions, however, invariably came down through the military Bader-Geitner chain of command. The SD did not exorcise a concurrent jurisdiction. In those matters it was subordinate to, and took orders, from the Wehrmacht commander in whose fields area headquarters or district area it was stationed and operating. An entry in the War Diary of the 104th Jaeger Division for 4 April 1943 states;
By order of the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, in reprisal for the murder of the Organization Todt man shot to death by communists 8 km.
south of Pozarevac, 78 hostages wore shot to death in Pozarevac by the SD.
While Geitner was having conferences with SD leaders and the subordinate troop commanders on such diverse subjects as conditions at the Semlin concentration camp where "up to 100 persons were dying daily", on "the execution of invalids, sick or pregnant women, or people over 60, male or female", if they took part in combat, "with or without weapons", against the Germans, on the deportation of the male population of whole areas for labor in Germany, and kindred subjects, Foertsch at Supreme Headquarters also kept occupied with current business. To him and to Loehr came the daily, weekly and monthly reports from their vast Southeastern empire -- from Bader and Geitner in Serbia, from General Lueters, the German Commander in Croatia, from General Brauer on the island of Crete, and from various other commanders on the Peloponnese peninsula.
Croatia by this time was in an uprear. Tito's Partisans were growing stronger by the minute. By the end of 1942 they could boast of having called a Congress, of a government of their own which exercised control in an area 250 km by 100 km., of a regular civil and military administration within that area, and of an armed force numbering almost 100,000 men skillfully organized into brigades, battalions and companies. Lueters was completely unable to cope with the problem. He gave the usual orders for the execution of hostages, the burning of villages, and the arrest of "suspects" and relatives of "bandits", but to no avail. As the practical-minded Lueters himself pointed out, the existing techniques and methods were wrong since "in any case, cleaning-up or retaliatory action against the civilian population the innocent are seized, the guilty having earlier taken to the woods". Nor should captured partisans be shot as a matter of course, pleaded Lueters. Perhaps if they were given fair treatment many of them would desert -at least that now approach ought to be tried."
But Lueters' complaints fell on deaf ears at headquarters. Orders continued to come through Foertsch from Loehr that they would assume responsibility for what their subordinate commanders did, that no one would be held responsible for having employed harsh methods, that "individual soldiers should not be prosecuted for being too severe with the native inhabitants", and that commanders who failed to take retaliatory measures for reasons of negligence or softness would be held responsible. In spite of the fact that the German intelligence service reported the presence of partisan troop units, with the names of their leaders, the various insignia of rank worn, the size of their battalions and companies, their weapons, and other details, captured partisans continued to be executed after a brief interrogation. The reports are full of references to "temporary prisoners", as the partisans captured-but-not-yet-executed were called:
3 August 1942-- "In mopping-up, 39 temporarily arrested persons shot."
5 August 1942-- "In west Bosnia another temporarily arrested. 8 persons shot."
17 August 1942-- "In Syrmia, 90 persons shot in reprisal, 65 temporarily arrested."
29 August 1942-- "In Samarica, 262 persons temporarily arrested, of this number 20 shot immediately.
There was no trial, hearing or court martial for these men who fought as honorable and patriotic soldiers for their nation. The orders distributed to the lowest of units were unmistakably clear Lueter's directive to his troops of 7 January 1943 is representative: "Execute and hang partisans, suspects and civilians found with weapons. No formal proceedings are necessary". No wonder that Foertsch could report to OKH in Berlin that up to 24 August 1942, 49,724 and up to 8 September 52,362 "insurrectionists" had been shot in battle or by way of reprisals.
Just as it was in Serbia, the German directives in Croatia were by now the old familiar ones -- comb whole areas, seize the entire male population capable of bearing arms for deportation to Germany for la ber, choose "unreliables" as hostages to be executed in case of attacks on convoys or communication lines, enter into negotiations with the enemy for the exchange of wounded, the better treatment of prisoners, or recognition of their belligerent status.
Instead treat captured partisans as criminals to be hanged after all possible information had been drained from them, with or without torture. In Croatia, just as in Serbia, the revolt continued to gain momentum. By the middle of 1943, with the Allies advancing in the Mediterraen Theater, the German Commanders realized that what was going on in the Balkans was really a war.
During the period of General Loehr's supremo command, on 1 January 1943, the 12th Army went out of existence, or more accurately from a practical standpoint, it changed its name. Loehr's headquarters was redesignated Amy Group "E", and until August, 1943 it remained the supremo headquarters for the southeast theater. The change, however, was of little practical significance; Loehr continued to command and Foertsch continued as his Chief of Staff. In Serbia, Bader and Geitner were still subordinated to Loehr.
The structure of Army Group "E" is shown on Chart "C" of the prosecution's pamphlet. To almost every rule there is an exception, and the Court will note that here we have an army group to which no army was subordinated; instead, this army group commanded a heterogeneous col lection of corps, Military Commanders, "fortress" commanders, and others.