A. The plan of Attack.
By December, the plans for the invasion of Greece, known under the code name "Marita", had begun to take shape:
My plan therefore is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next month, (b) after setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send a task force for the occupation of the Aegean north coast by way of Bulgaria and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland.
To carry out the essential first step of persuading Bulgaria to permit the passage of German troops from Rumania to Greece, the defendant List was sent to Sofia, where he secured the necessary consent at a conference early in February, 1941. At the same time, Bulgaria agreed to join the Tri-partite Pact, and a time schedule was established, pursuant to which List, with his Twelfth Army, would commence the building of bridges across the Danube from Rumania into Bulgaria on the 28th of February, Bulgaria would adhere to the Pact on the first of March, and Lists's forces would move across the bridges into Bulgaria on the second of March. All of this happened according to schedule, and List's army started across Bulgaria toward the northern frontier of the Greek mainland. Simultaneously, diplomatic pressure on Yugoslavia was increased, and on the 25th of March the Yugoslav Premier and the Foreign Minister signed the Tripartite Pact at Vienna. Had all gone as planned, Yugoslavia's adherence to the Axis would have enabled List to attack from Bulgaria into Greece without fear that the Yugoslavs might invade Bulgaria and cut him off.
But for once, Hitler's time table was upset. The following day the Yugoslavs repudiated their government's adherence to the pact and the Premier was removed from office.
Yugoslavia "emerged on the morning of the 27th of March, ready to defend, if need be, her independence".1 The same day, Hitler and his generals met in council of war.
It was pointed out that the uncertain attitude of the new Yugoslav government not only represented a threat to List's rear in the attack against Greece, but would also constitute a potential menace behind the German forces which were being assembled for the attack against the Soviet Union. Hitler announced his determination "to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit." No diplomatic inquiries were to be made, no assurances by the Yugoslavian government were to be regarded, and the attack was to start at the first possible moment.
Political considerations played a large part in the plans. The old feuds between the Serbs and the Croates were to be capitalized to the 1. The words are those of Colonel H.J. Phillimore, Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom, before the International Military Tribunal.
Vol. 3, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 317.
utmost. Turkey was to be frightened out of her wits by the ruthlessness of the attack. The cooperation of the neighboring Balkan states was to be secured by territorial promises. Hitler said:
Politically, it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lightening like undertaking. In this way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croates will come to our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to these states; the Adriatic coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.
The military plans for a simultaneous attack against Yugoslavia and Greece, to replace the plans for the Greek campaign alone, were drawn up during the last few days of March, 1941. The plan for Yugoslavia was called "Operation 25", and was dove-tailed neatly into "Marita". List's Twelfth Army, in addition to pushing across the south Bulgarian frontier into Greece, was to send an armoured assault group across Bulgaria's western border into southern Yugoslavia with the objective of capturing the key city of Skoplje, and then continuing across southern Yugoslavia into Albania and joining forces there with the Italians. Another of List's armoured groups, under the well-known General (later Fieldmarshal) von Kleist, would push from Bulgaria into Yugoslavia in a northwesterly direction toward Belgrade. To complete the concentric operation, strong German forces were to be assembled at the southern Austrian border, and strike southward into Croatia, and a smaller force was to advance southward from Rumania toward Belgrade. The German Air Force, in addition to its normal support functions, was to destroy the city of Belgrade by attacks in waves at the very outset of hostilities.
B. The Invasion.
The plans were well-laid, German strength was overwhelming, and everything went like clock-work. At dawn on Sunday morning, April 6, Belgrade was mercilessly bombed, List attacked south into Greece and west into Yugoslavia, and the next day Scoplje was taken and Kleist started northwest toward Belgrade.
Soloniki fell on the ninth. On the 10th, the German Second Army, which had been assembled in southern Austria under the command of the defendant von Weichs, started south through Croatia at great speed and captured Zagreb. On the 11th, List effected a junction with the Italians in Albania. On the 12th, Yugoslavia's north front against von Weichs collapsed; the Germans had played cleverly on the ancient Serb-Croat enmity, and the Croates offered little resistance and began to clamor for independence. By Easter Sunday the 13th, Kleist's forces held all of Belgrade, and the Germans began a complacent division of the spoils between themselves and their satellite allies. The Yugoslav government capitulated two days later, and by the 16th of April large scale operations had come to an end. The campaign in Greece took longer, but the Greek forces in the north were forced to surrender by the 22nd of April, and by the 28th Athens had fallen. In anticipation of the campaign against Russia, now only a few weeks in the future, the Germans began pulling out of Yugoslavia and Greece as many troops as could be spared and transport could move, leaving behind only enough for security purposes and for the invasion of Crete which, under the cover name "Merkur", was to start out on the 20th of May.
C. Von Weichs and the 100:1 "Hostage" Ratio As appears from the foregoing account, the three principal military figures of the German campaign in southeastern Europe were von Kleist and the defendants List and von Weichs.
After the capitulation of Yugoslavia, Kleist departed almost immediately to head an armoured group in the attack on Russia. List remained as Supreme Commander of the armed forces in the southeast, and his actions in this capacity will shortly be described.
The defendant von Weichs and his Second Army were scheduled for ultimate employment on the Russian front, but did not take part in the initial attack. Von Weichs remained in Croatia until the latter part of May, while List completed the conquest of Greece and Crete. In the meantime, the puppet government of Croatia, headed by Pavelic, was being established, and von Weichs participated in the recruitment and organization of Croatian militia units, known as "ustashi", who were strongly anti-Serbian and whom the Germans were counting on to maintain security in Croatia.
Thereafter, von Weichs and his Second Army headquarters departed, and von Weichs did not return to the Balkans until August 1943. Short as was his stay in the southeast in 1941, he left an indelible imprint as the result of his methods of "pacification".
Just after the German attack on the Soviet Union, the Russian radio broadcast a report that, as a result of the alleged murder of two German soldiers in Belgrade, 100 Serbs had been shot to death. The defendant List, upon making inquiry, learned that no such episode had in fact occurred in Belgrade at that time, but that the Russian report was undoubtedly based on an episode which had occurred in April, 1941, in the course of von Weichs' southward march. As a result of the incident, von Weichs had issued on the 28th of April, 1941, the following order, distributed throughout the Second Army down to battalion level:
The increase in malicious attacks on German soldiers necessitates most stringent counter-measures. Only immediate and ruthless measures guarantee the maintenance of peace and order and prevent the forming of bands.
1) A Division sent out a detachment to carry out the disarmament of a Serbian village. The leader rode on ahead with another officer and a Wachtmeister, whereupon he was overtaken by a Komitadschi band (in Serbian uniform) and was shot to death. His companions were seriously wounded. This occurrence gives us cause to make the following statements:
a) After conclusion of the Armistice there is no Serbian soldier in the whole area who is authorized to carry arms.
b) Whoever is found in Serbian uniform with weapon in hand transgresses the bounds of International Law and is to be shot to death immediately.
c) If in any area an armed band appears, then even those men capable of bearing arms who are seized because they were in proximity of the band are to be shot to death, if it cannot immediately be ascertained with certainty that they were not connected with the band.
d) The bodies of all persons shot to death are to be hanged and left hanging.
e) Arresting hostages after a surprise attack is wrong and is by no means to be taken into consideration. On the contrary, action is to be taken only according to letters a) to d).
2) As preventative protection of the troop against such malicious surprise attacks, I give the following orders: These orders are given in part.
* * * * * * * * * * *
d) In the endangered villages, placards are to be posted wherein the population is notified of the serious consequences to be expected from surprise attacks (the posters will be sent separately).
e) In all localities of the endangered area which are occupied by troops, hostages are to be taken immediately (from all classes of the population) who are to be shot to death and hanged after a surprise attack. This measure is to be made public in the villages immediately.
3) In cases of surprise attacks on the troops, the Division Commanders should examine in detail whether the troop leader in question is to be blamed. In the reports of the Division, regarding encountered surprise attacks, there should always and immediately be a statement to the effect that the attacks were atoned by ruthless measures and account be given as to the manner employed.
The placards which were posted in Serbian villages as a result of this order read as follows:
By a mean and malicious surprise attack, German soldiers have lost their lives. German patience is at an end. As atonement, 100 Serbs of all classes of the population have been shot to death. In the future, 100 Serbs are to be shot without consideration for every German soldier who comes to harm as a result of a surprise attack conducted by Serbs.
Irrelevant as any such circumstance might be, there is nothing to indicate that von Weichs received any directive or suggestion from above calling for the issuance of any such order. It appears that he conceived the order in his own mind and issued it on his own initiative.
It epitomizes the German terror which raged in the Balkans for the next three and one half years. It embodies the two fundamental policies which List and his successors applied: That the enemy should be denied even the bare right of continued resistance and his troops no longer be recognized as belligerents entitled to the protection of the laws of war, and that attacks against German soldiers should be suppressed by executing civilian "hostages" at the astonishing ratio of 100:1. The only important respect in which subsequent practice departed from von Weichs' precedent was that his injunction that "hostages" should not be arrested after an attack, but should always be taken in advance and executed after the attack, was found to present serious inconveniences. With a required ratio of 100:1, it was impossible to keep enough hostages on hand to meet all contingencies, and in subsequent months the Germans repeatedly transgressed this rather formal and academic restriction which von Weichs had laid down.
THE OCCUPATION: LIST AND KUNTZE (April 1941 - August 1942) As von Weichs and Kleist withdrew from the Balkans and turned their attention to Russia, the German High Command drew up blueprints of the military occupational administration for southeastern Europe, which List was to head.
To understand the organization which was created, we must first look at map "A" in the prosecution's explanatory pamphlet, which shows the partition of Yugoslavia effected by Germany and her satellites.
A. The Partition of Yugoslavia and Greece.
In northern Croatia, it will be observed medium-sized portions were annexed by Germany, Italy, and Hungary. The remainder of Croatia, except for those parts of the Adriatic coast which Italy annexed outright, was established as an "autonomous" state, headed by Dr. Anton Pavelic, who called himself the "Poglavnik" of Croatia.
Most of the eastern part of Croatia was occupied by Italian forces, and the Germans were not particularly active there until the collapse of Italy in 1943.
In the southern part of Yugoslavia, Italy also took Montenegro under her control, and Italy absorbed still more by the device of "annexation" to Albania. Serbian Macedonia was annexed to Bulgaria.
The truncated Serbia which remained was put under German military occupational administration, although the southern part of this rump remainder was occupied by Bulgarian troops. It is this portion of Serbia which passed under German administration with which we will be chiefly concerned during the period up to August, 1942.
The occupational fate of Greece is shown on map "C". It will be observed that the greater part of the Greek mainland and the Peloponnesus came under the sway of the Italians. Bulgaria took the long arm of eastern Greece along the northern shore of the Aegean Sea. The Germans contented themselves with small, strategically situated portions. On the mainland, they occupied the area around Saloniki and a narrow strip along the Turkish border.
They maintained troops in Athens, although nominally control of Athens was shared with the Italians. They also occupied Crete and various smaller islands in the Aegean Sea.
B. Structure of the German Occupational Administration Four of the defendants in the box, as well as the deceased Boehme, occupied key positions in the German occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece during this period.
By far the most important, of course, was the defendant List, who, on 9 June 1941, was appointed by Hitler as Armed Forces Commander of all German forces in southeastern Europe, with the title Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Suedost (Armed Forces Commander Southeast). In this capacity, List was directly responsible to Hitler and the OKW. List also retained the title of Commander-in-Chief of the 12th Army. The defendant Foertsch was his Chief of Staff. List maintained his headquarters at Saloniki. In October 1941 List fell ill, and thereafter, up to August 1942, the defendant Kuntze was the acting Commander-in-Chief of the 12th Army.
Under List (and subsequently Kuntze) were three Military Commanders -- one in Serbia and two in Greece. The deceased Boehme, who commanded the 18th Mountain Corps of the 12th Army, was Commanding General in Serbia from September to December, 1941. He went to Finland at the end of the year and was replaced by General Paul Bader, who is also believed to be now dead.
In Greece a Military Commander for the Saloniki area and the northern Aegean islands was appointed by OKH, and a Military Commander for southern Greece, with authority at Athens and in Crete and the southern Aegean islands, was appointed by the German Air Force. The defendant Felmy was Goering's selection for this position.
Accordingly, during the period up to August 1942 we will be primarily concerned with the activities of the defendants List, Kuntze, and Foertsch, as well as such acts of Boehme and Bader as are relevant to this proceed ing.
We will not at this time discuss the acts of the defendant Felmy in southern Greece, inasmuch as the bulk of the evidence pertaining to Greece relates to the period after August 1943, when Italy capitulated and the Germans took over the entire occupation of Greece. It will, therefore, he more convenient to deal with all the evidence pertaining to Greece at a later stage.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Denney, please. You are starting into a different portion of your statement. This will he a convenient place to interrupt. The Tribunal will he in recess for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
MR. DENNEY: May it please Your Honors. We now take up the discussion of the activities of the defendants List, Foertsch, and the deceased Boehme during the period April to October, 1941.
The defendant List was an able protagonist in fields ideological as well as military. This is indicated in a letter of 23 April 1941 written by Alfred Rosenberg, who was later appointed Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories, to Martin Bormann. Part of this letter stated:
Art objects generally do not come into the question as far as the Balkans are concerned, only there are Free Masonry archives and Jewish libraries and other relevant research bodies. In my opinion, only the same attitude as that prevailing in occupied French territory can be taken and what I requested was really only an expansion of an already existing regulation. For with General Field Marshal List, and likewise with the General Quartermaster of the Army, the work has already been begun and my men are already at work with these circles in Belgrade. And on command of General Field Marshal List, as well as of his Deputy General, these men will also be employed in closest relationship with the Security Service (SD) in Salonika. As you know, Salonika is one of the largest Jewish centers.
The capitulation was barely finished; yet List, the soldier, was making himself a party to the "cultural" work of the Third Reich.
Early in September 1941, List determined that matters in Serbia required a more forceful executive authority in that territory. With this in mind, List teletyped to OKW and OKH requesting that Boehme, at that time Commanding General of the 18th Mountain Corps, 12th Army, that he be assigned with his staff as Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia with supreme authority in that sector, directly responsible to List. List regarded Boehme as being "especially suited" for the position because he had "an excellent knowledge of conditions in the Balkans." This request was answered by a Hitler order of 16 September 1941 in which List was charged with the task of suppressing the insurgent movement in the southeast area, and Boehme was designated as Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia with executive power, directly subordinate to List. All military and civilian offices in Serbia were instructed to comply with Boehme's orders.
Upon receipt of the Hitler order, List, on 19 September 1941, advised the Military Commander in Serbia, the LXV Corps Command, and the German General in Zagrab, who was the liaison between the Croatian government and the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, that Boehme had received entire executive power in Serbia and that "all command authorities and forces of the Army existing there or to be transferred there are subordinated to him." He stated further, "Instructions for the carrying out of operations for the necessary protective measures will be given by me only to General Boehme, who is responsible for their being carried out."
One of the first acts of Boehme in his new post, for which List had stated he was "especially suited", was the publishing of an order, which he directed that the recipients destroy after dissemination, and which read as follows:
In March of this year Serbia shamefully broke her friendship treaty with Germany, in order to strike the German units marching against Greece in the back.
German revenge stormed across the country.
We must turn to new, greater goals with all our forces at hand. For Serbia, this was the sign for a new uprising to which hundreds of German soldiers have already fallen in sacrifice. If we do not proceed here with all means and the greatest ruthlessness, our losses will climb to immeasurable heights.
Your mission lies in carrying out reconnaissance of the country in which German blood flowed in 1914 through the treachery of the Serbs, men and women.
You are the avengers of these dead. An intimidating example must be created for the whole of Serbia which must hit the whole population most savagely.
Everyone who wishes to live charitably sins against the lives of his comrades. He will be called to account without regard for his person and placed before a court martial.
So it was that List's Corps Commander, now Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, set the same keynote as had von Weichs for the program of subjugation through terror which was to pervade in the Balkans for the ensuing years of the war.
Now that the chain of command has been clearly established, let us return momentarily to List's request of 14 September directed to OKW. His communication starts with the words "Threatening development of the overall situation in Serbia demands energetic measures." Later on, he states "the present command regulations are based on peaceful conditions and are unbearable under the present turbulent combat conditions". This request having been received at OKW, another order was issued, in addition to the Hitler order appointing Boehme mentioned above. After reciting that it had been established that the opposition to the occupying power was the result of a centrally directed mass movement and that each incident of insurgence against the German Wehrmacht, regardless of individual circumstances, must be assumed to be of communist origin, the order directed:
In order to stop these intrigues at their inception, severest measures are to be applied immediately at their first appearance, in order to demonstrate the authority of the occupying power and in order to prevent further progress. One must keep in mind that a human life practically counts for naught in the affected countries and a deterring effect can only be achieved by unusual severity. In such a case, the death penalty for 50 to 100 communists must in general be deemed appropriate as retaliation for the life of a German soldier. The manner of execution must increase the deterrent effect. The reverse procedure, to proceed at first with relatively easy punishment and to be satisfied with the threat of measures of increased severity as a deterrent, does not correspond with these principles and is not to be applied.
This was the answer of the Army High Command to List's plea for help in "turbulent combat conditions". The order was passed on by list to his subordinate units.
Not satisfied with the initial directive with reference to the killing of innocent people in the Southeast, an additional OKW order, signed by Keitel, came down on 28 September, 1941.
In this order it was directed that Military Commanders have hostages available at all times in order that they might be executed when German soldiers were attacked. The complete ruthlessness of the second Keitel order may be seen from the following provisions:
Because of attacks on members of the Wehrmacht which have taken place lately in the occupied territories, it is pointed out that it is opportune for the Military Commanders to have always at their disposal a number of hostages of different political persuasions, i.e.,
1) Nationalists,
2) Democratic Middle Class,
3) Communists It is of importance that among these are leading personalities or members of their families.
Their names are to be published. In case of an attack, hostages of the group corresponding to that to which the culprit belongs are to be shot.
Nowhere in this order did Keitel attempt to enlighten his commanders as to the means to be employed in identifying the "culprit". It was a matter of little concern to him, and the evidence will show that it concerned his field commanders even less. The manner in which this order was complied with will be detailed at greater length in the evidence which is presented to the Tribunal.
The 100:1 ration having been proclaimed, Boehme, on 4 October 1941, ordered the execution of 2100 persons, to be taken from the concentration camps at Sabac and Belgrade. Those to be executed were primarily Jews and communists. These killings were reprisals for the deaths of 21 German soldiers. On 9 October, 1941, the chief of the Security Police in Belgrade reported that 2100 Jews and gypsies were being executed by the Wehrmacht in reprisal for 21 German soldiers shot to death. The Security Police in this operation were to make available to the Wehrmacht the required number of victims. The report continues that 805 Jews and gypsies were taken from the camp in Sabac and the balance, 1295, were taken from the Jewish transit camp in Belgrade.
On 9 October 1941 , Boehme informed List of "an execution by shooting of about 2000 communists and Jews in reprisal for 22 murdered men of the 8th Battalion of the 521st Army Signal Communication Regiment".
A partial report of this action was made to List and Boehme by a Major who commanded the 2nd Battalion of the 521st Army Signal Regiment. The Major's report enclosed a report of the Lieutenant who commanded the company which carried out a portion of this action. The Lieutenant's report is dated 13 October, 1941. The report is sordid in its detail; the shooting of 2200 Jews in the camp at Belgrade had been ordered on 8 October, 1941. The action took place on 9 October in a forest seven miles from Kobin, and on 11 October near the Belgrade shooting range on the road to Nisch. No detail was overlooked, films and pictures were to be taken by an Army Propaganda Company. By issuing spades and other tools to the inmates who were to be executed, the atmosphere of a working party was simulated. Only three guards were placed on each truck to further allay the suspicions of the wretched victims. The prisoners were happy to be leaving the camp, if only for a day of work in the fields. The soldiers were able to execute only 180 on 9 October, and 269 on 11 October. The executions were accomplished by rifle fire at a distance of 12 meters. Five shots were ordered for the shooting of each prisoner. Articles of value were removed under supervision. They were later sent to the Nazi People's Welfare or the Security Police in Belgrade. The Lieutenant reported that the attitude of the prisoners at the shooting was calm and that following the killings the troops "returned to their quarters satisfied."
It was while List was Armed Forces Commander Southeast that concentration camps were introduced in that area. The Military Commander in Serbia, in a letter of 22 June, 1941, spoke of a "concentration camp which I had been ordered to erect." He spoke of the future inmates as "communists and other criminal types".
List himself recommended concentration camps in an order of 5 September, 1941. He stated that the relatives of those people resisting the Army should be transported to concentration camps.
Often has it been urged that the German Army had no knowledge of concentration camps, or at best that they had nothing to do with them.
It has been the repeated refrain of the German military men that such matters were beyond the scope and beneath the concern of a soldier, and that such affairs handled by Himmler and his subordinates. In the Southeast, the Army not only had knowledge of the camps; they were in charge of some of them. An order of 11 September, 1941 will show that the Concentration Camp Serbia, in Belgrade, was made subordinate to the Military Commander of Serbia on that date.
Again, in an order of 18 September, 1941, issued by Bader of the LXV Corps, it was stated, in connection with mopping-up operations, that "the entire male population above 14 years of age is to be arrested, to be sent to a concentration camp which the Division will install, and to be detained there."
Boehme, in an order of 33 September, 1941 to the 342nd Division, directed that unit to "...evacuate Sabac by surprise attack of the entire male population, ages 14-70, and take it to a concentration camp..."
Boehme further concerned himself with the transfer of the Jarak concentration camp from the 342nd Division to the 64th Police Reserve Battalion in an order of 27 September, 1941, which specified in addition that inmates would receive half rations -- only 200 grams of bread daily and 200 grams of meat weekly.
Early in October, Boehme ordered that a concentration camp be located in the Zasaviza area, capable of holding 30,000 inmates. This camp was to be "guarded by restricted forces and closed from the outer world". In the same order, he directed that inmates from another concentration camp be brought to work on this new construction project.
The evidence will show how the Army used the concentration camps as collection points for innocent people who were to be channeled into German industry or to be used for such other purposes as might be directed.
Two final references to List concern his later acts prior to his post being handed over to the defendant Kuntze. On 4 October, 1941, he issued an order in which it was directed that men in insurgent territory who were not encountered in battle were to be examined and "if they are only suspected of having taken part in combat, of having offered bandits support of any sort, or of having acted against the Wehrmacht in any way, to be held in special collecting camp.
They are to serve as hostages in the event that bandits appear, or anything against the Wehrmacht is undertaken in the territory mopped up, or in their home localities and in such cases they are to be shot." This was in keeping with the spirit of an earlier order which he had issued on 5 September, 1941, which provided in part fort Immediate ruthless measures against the insurgents, their assistants, and their relatives (hangings, burning down of localities participating, increased arresting of hostages, deportation of family members into concentration camps).We are now turning to the period from October 1941 until August 1942 where we are primarily concerned with the defendants Kuntze, Foertsch, the deceased Boehme and the believed to be deceased Bader.
The defendant Kuntze succeeded to the command of the 12th Army late in October, 1941. The measures which had been started under his predesessor, List, were continued with increased severity. Kuntze received periodic reports of the activities of the troops under his command. These reports recited the seizing and killing of "hostages" and the wanton destruction of villages.
On 2 November, 1941, a situation report was signed, on behalf of Kuntze, by the defendant Foertsch. This report gives as one of the reasons for the unrest in the southeast, refers to:
The fact that refugees expelled from the separated territories (from Croatia - 110,000; from Hungary - 37,000; from Bulgaria 20,000) who were transported across the frontier without means and without sufficient care.
The report then set forth the methods to be followed by Kuntze's subordinates in combating opposition. It was stated that he had charged Boehme with the suppression of Serbia and Croatia. He ordered that "all prisoners taken during combat or mopping-up operations will be hanged or shot to death" and that "for the time being, arrests are being made only for purposes of interrogation or to supplement reconnaissance."
In addition, he directed that all male civilians be temporarily collected in camps.
Late in November, or early in December, 1941, Kuntze went to Belgrade. Some notes were made on this trip. One of the items which concerned Kuntze was the question of resettlement. This memorandum provided:
The question of the resettlement of women and children of the insurgents, as well as other unreliable elements, is still being examined. The retention of these people in Serbia, south of the Danube, does not appear to be practical. There are still difficulties with respect to shelter, rations, and guard which oppose the transfer into the Banat.
All Jews and gypsies are to be transferred into a concentration camp at Semlin (at present there are about 16,000 people there). They were proven to be the bearers of the communication service of the insurgents.
On 20 December, 1941, Kuntze's subordinate, the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, Bader, who had succeeded Boehme earlier in the month, issued an order to his troops. After reciting that there had been proper compliance with the prior orders concerning reprisals, he stated:
The reprisal measures will be continued further. In order to exclude any existing doubts concerning them, I am referring to the fact that these groups of prisoners are to be differentiated: Reprisal prisoners are persons who, for reason of their attitude, are destined for reprisals for German human lives, for example, communists not encountered with weapons, gypsies, Jews, criminals, and the like.
Hostages are persons who play a role in public life and on the basis of their personalities exercise a certain influence on the population in their realm of activity. They comprise the most varied strata of the population. They guarantee with their lives the public peace, order and security in their part of the country.
Prisoners of the unit are persons who are taken in the course of an operation, as suspicious. They require a further examination by the administrative sub-area headquarters authorities. They will either be released or transferred to the reprisal prisons.
It is clear that there was to be no change, save for the worse, under Kuntze as Armed Forces Commander Southeast, in the matter of "hostage" takings and retaliatory killings.
The policy as set forth was implemented by further orders of the German division commanders. Hoffman, the Commanding General of the 342nd Division, on 6 January, 1942, issued an order to his troops which provided "Communists, in any event, will be shot immediately after a short interrogation; only in special cases will they be brought back to the Division."
A particularly harsh policy was established by Kuntze made effective on 6 February, 1942. He called for detailed reports on counter measures taken by subordinate units. He further directed that persons who loitered around the battle field should be considered as having taken part in the battle and therefore should be shot.
With the advent of spring, Kuntze anticipated increased activity from the people of the occupied area. With this in mind, he issued an order on 19 March 1942. He emphasized the degree of importance which he attached to the regimental commanders and stated that Himmler's secu rity units and the Serbian police should cooperate closely with the German troops.
He directed that "captured insurgents are to be hanged or shot as a matter of principle. If they are used for information purposes, this only postpones their execution. In an appendix to the same order, he advised "It is better to liquidate 50 suspects than lose one German soldier." He dictated that in areas which had been mined, the Serbian population, among others, should be used to clear the terrain. And appeared there again the 100:1 ratio in the event death came to any German.
Later in March, on the 23rd, Kuntze sent a teletype to Bader, in which he agreed that inserrectionists not captured in battle should be deported for work in Norway. He failed to explain how the identity of those to be deported could be established.
Kuntze had more to say about forced labor on another occasion. Bader, in an order of 25 March, 1942, mentioned an earlier order of Kuntze, dated 18 March, which directed:
Persons who are arrested because of being suspected of supporting or collaborating with the insurgents arc to be handed over to concentration camps; whore they arc to be interrogated (by the SS) who will make further disposition, for example, handing over as forced laborers in the German interest sphere.
From this same order, it is evident that three concentration camps were presently available in this area at Sabac, Belgrade-Delinjo, and Nisch, with a fourth to be opened shortly at Semlin.
Kuntze advised OKW from time to time of the success of the measures he was directing in the Southeast. On 7 April 1942 he informed them that since 1 September 1941, 11,522 of the enemy had been shot in battle and 21,809 persons had been killed in retaliation measures. On 23 June 1942 Kuntze advised OKW that a total of 37,477 had been shot in battle or in way of reprisals, as of that date, in Serbia and Croatia.