However, the German Air Force, which was officially born at about the same time, was not subordinated to von Blomberg. It was established as an independent institution under Goering, who took the title of Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
In February 1938 there was a general reorganization of the German military set-up. Von Blomberg and Fritsch were both retired, and Hitler himself took the title of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Obersterbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht). At the same time Hitler created the Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, usually referred to as OKW), with authority over all three branches of the armed forces. Wilhelm Keitel was installed as Chief of the OKW, and remained in this capacity until the end of the war in 1945. The OKW was, in effect, Hitler's personal staff for all matters pertaining to the armed forces, and Keitel's function was that of Hitler's executive officer for the administration of the armed forces and the application of Hitler's policies.
As is shown by the chart on the wall (Chart "D" in the explanatory pamphlet which the prosecution has submitted), the three components of the armed forces were directly subordinated to Hitler and the OKW. Admiral Raeder continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (OKM) until 1943, when he was relieved by Admiral Doenitz. Goering continued to head the Air Force (OKL) until the last month of the war. As Supreme Commander of the Army to replace von Fritsch, Hitler selected General (later Field Marshal) Walter von Brauchitsch.
B. The German Army The German army, needless to say, was by far the largest and most important of the three branches of the Wehrmacht.
Von Brauchitsch continued as Commander-in-Chief only until December 1941, at which time Hitler relieved him and himself took the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Army in addition to that of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This dual capacity led to a merging and overlapping of the functions of OKW and OKH, and at times we may find it difficult to differentiate between their respective responsibilities.
The field formations of the German army were normally subordinated to OKH although, as we will see shortly, as the war progressed they were on numerous occasions subordinated to OKW. The largest field formation in the German army, as in most others, was known as an "Army Group", which was, ordinarily, a headquarters controlling two or more "armies". Army groups and armies were usually commanded by field marshals and Generalobersts, ranks which are respectively the equivalent of a fivestar and four-star general in our own military hierarchy. A German "army", however, was sometimes commanded by a mere "General", which is the same as a lieutenant general (three stars) in the American army.
Below the "army" were the lower formations, which followed the same general pattern in the German army as in others -- in order from top to bottom, come the corps and the division, and then the smaller units such as regiments, battalions, and companies. The most important types of divisions were the infantry division, the armored or panzer division, and the motorized or panzer-grenadier division, but the Germans used a number of other special types. In southeastern Europe, where many miscellaneous units were employed, we will frequently encounter the mountain division, the security division (Sicherungsdivision, usually composed of older soldiers), and the reserve division (usually composed of units still undergoing training). There were also infantry divisions formed from the personnel of the German Air Force, and known as German air force field divisions (Luftwaffenfelddivisionen).Side by side with the corps and divisions of the regular German army we find similarily designated formations of Heinrich Himmler's SS.
Not content with his powerful position as head of the SS and of all German police forces, Himmler inaugurated the recruitment and formation into military units of hundreds of thousands of SS men trained and equipped for front-line combat duty. This strictly military part of the SS was known as the Waffen (armed) SS, and by the end of the war it comprised no less than 30 divisions, as well as several corps headquarters and an army headquarters. Himmler's divisions were consecutively numbered and carried special names. In southeastern Europe, during the period covered by this case, the 7th SS Mountain Division "Prinz Eugen", the 8th SS Cavalry Division "Florian Geyer", and several others were very active. During the early part of the war, these SS soldiers were almost all volunteers, frantically devoted to the ideals, if such they may be called, of the SS. Later in the war a number of SS divisions were formed by forcible conscription from the populations of occupied countries. For some purposes, chiefly administrative in nature, the Waffen-SS units remained under Himmler's control, but for operational purposes they were under the command of the German army, and their employment differed little from that of the regular divisions of the army.
As I stated earlier, the field forces of the German army were normally under the OKH, but not infrequently, particularly during the latter part of the war, they came to be subordinated directly to OKW. This was particularly true in territories which the German army had overrun and where military occupational authorities were established. In such regions, the Germans often appointed a senior over-all commander, to whom the heads of the Army, Navy, and Air Force units in that region were all responsible. Such a commander, with local authority over all three branches of the armed forces, was called an "Armed Forces Commander" (Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber). In southeastern Europe, where the Army was the all-important branch of the service, the armed forces commander was almost invariably an army general.
While the Armed Forces Commander had authority over all units of the German armed forces in an occupied region, the administration of the area, in conformity with German rules and policies, was commonly entrusted to an army general designated as "Military Commander (Militaerbefehlshaber). He had the primary mission of insuring security and order, and for this purpose had at his disposal the German police forces and, often, security divisions and regiments of the army. On matters of military government policy, the Military Commander usually took his orders direct from OKH, but as commander of the security and police forces allotted to him, he was tactically subordinate to the Armed Forces Commander in his territory.
Himmler's police and intelligence empire also reached into the occupied territories. Reflecting Himmler's leadership of both the SS and the German police, a Himmler emissary in the occupied territories was called a "Higher SS and Police Leader" (Hoeherer SS und Polizei Fuehrer, usually abbreviated HSSPF). His principal functions were to control the local police authorities and carry out other special missions of a security nature. The HSSPF's remained personally responsible to Himmler, but for tactical purposes were subordinated to the senior Military Commander in their territory.
D. German Military Organization in Southeastern Europe and Northern Norway.
The chain of command and order of battle of the German armed forces in southeastern Europe was complicated and changed frequently. The narrative is most logically broken into three principal periods of time.
From April 1941, when the invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia took place, until August 1942 the focal point of German military authority in southeastern Europe was the headquarters of the 12th Army. The defendant List commanded the 12th Army until October 1941, at which time the defendant Kuntze took charge as acting commander until August 1942.
During this period the defendant Foertsch was Chief of Staff to both List and Kuntze, the defendant Felmy commanded in southern Greece, and the deceased Boehme in Serbia. The defendant Weichs was also active at the beginning of this period. He commanded the Second Army, which invaded Yugoslavia from the north, but he and his army were withdrawn from the Balkans in May 1941 at the conclusion of large-scale operations.
The second period begins in August 1942 when Kuntze left the Balkans and Generaloberst Alexander Loehr, now deceased, became Commanding General of the 12th Army. At about the same time the defendant Speidel followed Felmy as the commander in southern Greece, and the defendant Geitner became Chief of Staff to the Military Commander in Serbia, General Bader, who had replaced Boehme in December 1941. In January 1943 the 12th Army was, as we say, "up-graded" and re-designated as Army Group "E". General Loehr continued in command of Army Group "E" with the defendant Foertsch as his Chief of Staff.
The third and final phase begins in August 1943, and thereafter the organization remained substantially unchanged until the end of the war. The new structure during this final period, shown in the chart on the wall, was largely the result of the Allied landing in Sicily; the resultant threat to German dominion in the Balkans required a stiffening of command and reinforcements. The defendant Weichs returned to the Balkans in over-all command, with a headquarters designated Army Group "F". Under him were General Loehr, with his jurisdiction now restricted to Greece, the defendant Rendulic, as Commander-in-Chief of the Second Panzer Army in Croatia, shown at the center of the chart, and General Felber, of whom we will hear much in these proceedings, as Military Commander for all of southeastern Europe, and with personal jurisdiction in Serbia, shown in the center of chart.
Under Loehr were the defendants Felmy, who returned to Greece in June 1943, and Lanz, both of whom commanded corps under Army Group "E". The defendants von Leyser and Dehner were corps commanders under Rendulic. Foertsch stayed on as Chief of Staff to Weichs and Geitner remained as Chief of Staff to Felber.
Speidel remained as Military Commander in Greece, under the command of Felber as Military Commander for all of southeastern Europe.
The situation in northern Norway is of importance in this case only during the fall of 1944, when the German forces in northern Finland retreated into Norway through the Norwegian province of Finnmark. These forces, comprising the 20th Mountain Army, had been commanded by Generaloberst Dietl, who was killed in an airplane crash during the summer of 1944. The defendant Rendulic left his command of the Second Panzer Army in Croatia and replaced Dietl in Finland. The various units subordinated to Rendulic's 20th Mountain Army are shown in Chart "G" of the prosecution's pamphlet.
GERMAN MILITARY POLICY WITH RESPECT TO "HOSTAGES" Before turning to the particulars of the evidence, and to put this case in its proper setting, we may remind ourselves that the war crimes of the Germany army were not confined to southeastern Europe.
In particular, the practice of taking and executing so-called "hostages" from the civilian population was instituted at the very outset of the war, and was deliberately planned in advance.
In July, 1939, when plans for the invasion of Poland were being laid, the OKH distributed to the army field commanders a series of directives for the maintenance of security in Poland. This initial step was relatively circumspect; the field commanders were told that "hostages" could be taken, but that their execution would have to be approved in each instance by OKH.
The subsequent history of this order might be styled "the rake's progress". About two months later, when Poland had been conquered, the German Military Commander in the Polish city of Poznan ordered that:
.....hostages are to be taken from the Polish civilian population in every village in which troops are billeted.... In the event of attacks on members of the Wehrmacht of persons who are German by race, hostages are to be shot. Only senior officers holding the rank of a division commander will issue orders to shoot hostages.
The "War Diary" of a German rear area commandant carried the story forward. Two weeks later, on October 15, 1939, two hostages were shot in the village of Buk because a sentry had been shot at. Three days later, according to the diary, the following occurred in the Polish villages of Ottorowo and Samter:
In Ottorowo: A carbine had been stolen, the room in which the burglary was committed had been damaged, a swastika flag had been torn down and the Polish Eagle put up. Sentence was passed by a court-martial of the chief of civil administration and after a specified period of time had expired, 5 hostages each were shot in Ottorowo and Samter. The execution took place in the presence of the entire population. There were no tears, and the fine of 10,000 zlotys imposed on the village of Ottorowo was paid, probably with the help of the church.
In Samter: Catholic services may be conducted only once a week.
.... The county governor intends to remove gradually from his county the Polish intellectuals, the owners of large estates, and the clergy.
A Lieutenant, who is a district speaker for the Nazy Party in civilian life, attends to the moral welfare of the troops.
Under this beneficient moral tutelage rapidly emerged, in fearful shape, the German inferiority complex. The Poles were inferior peoples, but the Germans could not be quite sure that this was really true until all the educated Poles had been removed.
The following year the same pattern was repeated in France and the Low Countries. It is June, 1940, and the defendant List, with his Twelfth Army, is attacking across the Aisne River in France. The commander of the rear area of his army gives the order that:
As soon as acts of sabotage - fires also belong in this category - are found, hostages are to be taken. The arrest is to be announced publicly. If the acts of sabotage are repeated, the hostages are to be shot, according to the regulations previously issued, after sentence by a Court martial. Executions by shooting are to be reported to the Twelfth Army and announced publicly.
Belgian citizens, however, may be shot only with the consent of OKH.
As the scourge of war spread from country to country, the ways of the army grew even more savage. In 1941, as the Wehrmacht threw itself into the Slavic countries of Eastern Europe, the Germans encountered peoples whom they held in the contempt born of fear. In the Balkans and Russia, they spread such death and terror that the conscience of the world was made to reel and on October 25, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who is the President of a country still at restless peace, declared prophetically:
The practice of executing scores of innocent hostages in reprisal for isolated attacks on Germans in countries temporarily under the Nazi heel revolts a world already inured to suffering and brutality. Civilized peoples long ago adopted the basic principle that no man should be punished for the deed of another. Unable to apprehend the persons involved in these attacks, the Nazis characteristically slaughter fifty or a hundred innocent persons. Those who would "collaborate" with Hitler or try to appease him cannot ignore this ghastly warning.
The Nazis might have learned from the last war the impossibility of breaking men's spirit by terrorism. Instead they develop their "Lebensraum" and "new order" by depths of frightfulness which even they have never approached before. These are the acts of desperate men who know in their hearts that they cannot win. Frightfulness can never bring peace to Europe. It only sows the seeds of hatred which will one day bring fearful retribution.
GENERAL TAYLOR: Your Honor, this bring us to the point of the actual invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, and Mr. Clark Denny will continue with the reading of the statement.
MR. DENNY: May it please Your Honor.
THE INVASION OF GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA We may pass over very briefly the historical background of Germany's simultaneous and ruthless onslaughts against Greece and Yugoslavia in April, 1941.
The highlights are set forth in the judgment of the International Military Tribunal,1 and a fuller account may be found in the official transcript of the international trial.2 It appears from these accounts that, as early as August 1939, just before the attack against Poland, Hitler had discussed with Ribbentrop and Ciano how best the Axis partners could gobble up the neutral countries of Europe.
Hitler cynically suggested to Ciano:
Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process could be carried out more easily if, on every occasion, one partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with the uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind.
In making the suggestion, Hitler was no doubt catering to Mussolini's imperial ambitions in the Balkans, which had been reflected earlier that year in the Italian occupation of Albania. For the next year, however, Germany was sufficiently occupied with the 1. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Vol.
I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp. 210-213.
2. Vol. III, Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp. 307-324.
campaigns in Poland, Norway, the Low Countries and France, and the next Axis moves in southeastern Europe did not occur until 28 October 1940, when Italy launched its contemptible and ill-fated attack against Greece. It was, furthermore, Mussolini's inability to beat down the heroic resistance of the Greeks that lead Hitler to march into the Balkans the following year.
We may be sure that it was from no particular sympathy with Mussolini's plight in Albania and Greece that Hitler decided to come to his aid. On the contrary, there is every indication that Hitler and the German military leaders were pleased over the discomfiture of their Italian allies, whom they held in such contempt throughout the war. But Hitler was disturbed in Greece from which the valuable oil fields in Rumania could be bombed. And furthermore, as Rommel's campaign in North Africa began to attract attention, Hitler's thoughts turned increasingly towards the eastern Mediterranean and the possibility of establishing German superiority there. Accordingly, in November 1940, Hitler issued Top Secret instructions to Brauchitsch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, directing him to:
Make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland, north of the Aegean Sea, in case of need, entering through Bulgaria and thus making possible use of German Air Forces units against targets in the eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Rumanian oil areas.
All this time, however, the German High Command was chiefly preoccupied with preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union, which they had planned for the following spring. This formidable military task required all the forces the Germans could muster and accordingly Hitler and the generals wished to carry out any enterprise which might have to be undertaken in the Balkans with the utmost economy of means. Therefore, there was at this time no intention whatsoever of invading Yugoslavia in addition to Greece; on the contrary, Hitler began an intensive diplomatic campaign to swing Ygoslavia to the side of the Axis and induce her to join the so-called "Tri-partite Pact", to which the principal adherents were Germany, Italy, and Japan.
A. The plan of Attack.
By December, the plans for the invasion of Greece, known under the code name "Marita", had begun to take shape:
My plan therefore is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next month, (b) after setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send a task force for the occupation of the Aegean north coast by way of Bulgaria and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland.
To carry out the essential first step of persuading Bulgaria to permit the passage of German troops from Rumania to Greece, the defendant List was sent to Sofia, where he secured the necessary consent at a conference early in February, 1941. At the same time, Bulgaria agreed to join the Tri-partite Pact, and a time schedule was established, pursuant to which List, with his Twelfth Army, would commence the building of bridges across the Danube from Rumania into Bulgaria on the 28th of February, Bulgaria would adhere to the Pact on the first of March, and Lists's forces would move across the bridges into Bulgaria on the second of March. All of this happened according to schedule, and List's army started across Bulgaria toward the northern frontier of the Greek mainland. Simultaneously, diplomatic pressure on Yugoslavia was increased, and on the 25th of March the Yugoslav Premier and the Foreign Minister signed the Tripartite Pact at Vienna. Had all gone as planned, Yugoslavia's adherence to the Axis would have enabled List to attack from Bulgaria into Greece without fear that the Yugoslavs might invade Bulgaria and cut him off.
But for once, Hitler's time table was upset. The following day the Yugoslavs repudiated their government's adherence to the pact and the Premier was removed from office.
Yugoslavia "emerged on the morning of the 27th of March, ready to defend, if need be, her independence".1 The same day, Hitler and his generals met in council of war.
It was pointed out that the uncertain attitude of the new Yugoslav government not only represented a threat to List's rear in the attack against Greece, but would also constitute a potential menace behind the German forces which were being assembled for the attack against the Soviet Union. Hitler announced his determination "to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit." No diplomatic inquiries were to be made, no assurances by the Yugoslavian government were to be regarded, and the attack was to start at the first possible moment.
Political considerations played a large part in the plans. The old feuds between the Serbs and the Croates were to be capitalized to the 1. The words are those of Colonel H.J. Phillimore, Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom, before the International Military Tribunal.
Vol. 3, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 317.
utmost. Turkey was to be frightened out of her wits by the ruthlessness of the attack. The cooperation of the neighboring Balkan states was to be secured by territorial promises. Hitler said:
Politically, it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lightening like undertaking. In this way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croates will come to our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to these states; the Adriatic coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.
The military plans for a simultaneous attack against Yugoslavia and Greece, to replace the plans for the Greek campaign alone, were drawn up during the last few days of March, 1941. The plan for Yugoslavia was called "Operation 25", and was dove-tailed neatly into "Marita". List's Twelfth Army, in addition to pushing across the south Bulgarian frontier into Greece, was to send an armoured assault group across Bulgaria's western border into southern Yugoslavia with the objective of capturing the key city of Skoplje, and then continuing across southern Yugoslavia into Albania and joining forces there with the Italians. Another of List's armoured groups, under the well-known General (later Fieldmarshal) von Kleist, would push from Bulgaria into Yugoslavia in a northwesterly direction toward Belgrade. To complete the concentric operation, strong German forces were to be assembled at the southern Austrian border, and strike southward into Croatia, and a smaller force was to advance southward from Rumania toward Belgrade. The German Air Force, in addition to its normal support functions, was to destroy the city of Belgrade by attacks in waves at the very outset of hostilities.
B. The Invasion.
The plans were well-laid, German strength was overwhelming, and everything went like clock-work. At dawn on Sunday morning, April 6, Belgrade was mercilessly bombed, List attacked south into Greece and west into Yugoslavia, and the next day Scoplje was taken and Kleist started northwest toward Belgrade.
Soloniki fell on the ninth. On the 10th, the German Second Army, which had been assembled in southern Austria under the command of the defendant von Weichs, started south through Croatia at great speed and captured Zagreb. On the 11th, List effected a junction with the Italians in Albania. On the 12th, Yugoslavia's north front against von Weichs collapsed; the Germans had played cleverly on the ancient Serb-Croat enmity, and the Croates offered little resistance and began to clamor for independence. By Easter Sunday the 13th, Kleist's forces held all of Belgrade, and the Germans began a complacent division of the spoils between themselves and their satellite allies. The Yugoslav government capitulated two days later, and by the 16th of April large scale operations had come to an end. The campaign in Greece took longer, but the Greek forces in the north were forced to surrender by the 22nd of April, and by the 28th Athens had fallen. In anticipation of the campaign against Russia, now only a few weeks in the future, the Germans began pulling out of Yugoslavia and Greece as many troops as could be spared and transport could move, leaving behind only enough for security purposes and for the invasion of Crete which, under the cover name "Merkur", was to start out on the 20th of May.
C. Von Weichs and the 100:1 "Hostage" Ratio As appears from the foregoing account, the three principal military figures of the German campaign in southeastern Europe were von Kleist and the defendants List and von Weichs.
After the capitulation of Yugoslavia, Kleist departed almost immediately to head an armoured group in the attack on Russia. List remained as Supreme Commander of the armed forces in the southeast, and his actions in this capacity will shortly be described.
The defendant von Weichs and his Second Army were scheduled for ultimate employment on the Russian front, but did not take part in the initial attack. Von Weichs remained in Croatia until the latter part of May, while List completed the conquest of Greece and Crete. In the meantime, the puppet government of Croatia, headed by Pavelic, was being established, and von Weichs participated in the recruitment and organization of Croatian militia units, known as "ustashi", who were strongly anti-Serbian and whom the Germans were counting on to maintain security in Croatia.
Thereafter, von Weichs and his Second Army headquarters departed, and von Weichs did not return to the Balkans until August 1943. Short as was his stay in the southeast in 1941, he left an indelible imprint as the result of his methods of "pacification".
Just after the German attack on the Soviet Union, the Russian radio broadcast a report that, as a result of the alleged murder of two German soldiers in Belgrade, 100 Serbs had been shot to death. The defendant List, upon making inquiry, learned that no such episode had in fact occurred in Belgrade at that time, but that the Russian report was undoubtedly based on an episode which had occurred in April, 1941, in the course of von Weichs' southward march. As a result of the incident, von Weichs had issued on the 28th of April, 1941, the following order, distributed throughout the Second Army down to battalion level:
The increase in malicious attacks on German soldiers necessitates most stringent counter-measures. Only immediate and ruthless measures guarantee the maintenance of peace and order and prevent the forming of bands.
1) A Division sent out a detachment to carry out the disarmament of a Serbian village. The leader rode on ahead with another officer and a Wachtmeister, whereupon he was overtaken by a Komitadschi band (in Serbian uniform) and was shot to death. His companions were seriously wounded. This occurrence gives us cause to make the following statements:
a) After conclusion of the Armistice there is no Serbian soldier in the whole area who is authorized to carry arms.
b) Whoever is found in Serbian uniform with weapon in hand transgresses the bounds of International Law and is to be shot to death immediately.
c) If in any area an armed band appears, then even those men capable of bearing arms who are seized because they were in proximity of the band are to be shot to death, if it cannot immediately be ascertained with certainty that they were not connected with the band.
d) The bodies of all persons shot to death are to be hanged and left hanging.
e) Arresting hostages after a surprise attack is wrong and is by no means to be taken into consideration. On the contrary, action is to be taken only according to letters a) to d).
2) As preventative protection of the troop against such malicious surprise attacks, I give the following orders: These orders are given in part.
* * * * * * * * * * *
d) In the endangered villages, placards are to be posted wherein the population is notified of the serious consequences to be expected from surprise attacks (the posters will be sent separately).
e) In all localities of the endangered area which are occupied by troops, hostages are to be taken immediately (from all classes of the population) who are to be shot to death and hanged after a surprise attack. This measure is to be made public in the villages immediately.
3) In cases of surprise attacks on the troops, the Division Commanders should examine in detail whether the troop leader in question is to be blamed. In the reports of the Division, regarding encountered surprise attacks, there should always and immediately be a statement to the effect that the attacks were atoned by ruthless measures and account be given as to the manner employed.
The placards which were posted in Serbian villages as a result of this order read as follows:
By a mean and malicious surprise attack, German soldiers have lost their lives. German patience is at an end. As atonement, 100 Serbs of all classes of the population have been shot to death. In the future, 100 Serbs are to be shot without consideration for every German soldier who comes to harm as a result of a surprise attack conducted by Serbs.
Irrelevant as any such circumstance might be, there is nothing to indicate that von Weichs received any directive or suggestion from above calling for the issuance of any such order. It appears that he conceived the order in his own mind and issued it on his own initiative.
It epitomizes the German terror which raged in the Balkans for the next three and one half years. It embodies the two fundamental policies which List and his successors applied: That the enemy should be denied even the bare right of continued resistance and his troops no longer be recognized as belligerents entitled to the protection of the laws of war, and that attacks against German soldiers should be suppressed by executing civilian "hostages" at the astonishing ratio of 100:1. The only important respect in which subsequent practice departed from von Weichs' precedent was that his injunction that "hostages" should not be arrested after an attack, but should always be taken in advance and executed after the attack, was found to present serious inconveniences. With a required ratio of 100:1, it was impossible to keep enough hostages on hand to meet all contingencies, and in subsequent months the Germans repeatedly transgressed this rather formal and academic restriction which von Weichs had laid down.
THE OCCUPATION: LIST AND KUNTZE (April 1941 - August 1942) As von Weichs and Kleist withdrew from the Balkans and turned their attention to Russia, the German High Command drew up blueprints of the military occupational administration for southeastern Europe, which List was to head.
To understand the organization which was created, we must first look at map "A" in the prosecution's explanatory pamphlet, which shows the partition of Yugoslavia effected by Germany and her satellites.
A. The Partition of Yugoslavia and Greece.
In northern Croatia, it will be observed medium-sized portions were annexed by Germany, Italy, and Hungary. The remainder of Croatia, except for those parts of the Adriatic coast which Italy annexed outright, was established as an "autonomous" state, headed by Dr. Anton Pavelic, who called himself the "Poglavnik" of Croatia.
Most of the eastern part of Croatia was occupied by Italian forces, and the Germans were not particularly active there until the collapse of Italy in 1943.
In the southern part of Yugoslavia, Italy also took Montenegro under her control, and Italy absorbed still more by the device of "annexation" to Albania. Serbian Macedonia was annexed to Bulgaria.
The truncated Serbia which remained was put under German military occupational administration, although the southern part of this rump remainder was occupied by Bulgarian troops. It is this portion of Serbia which passed under German administration with which we will be chiefly concerned during the period up to August, 1942.
The occupational fate of Greece is shown on map "C". It will be observed that the greater part of the Greek mainland and the Peloponnesus came under the sway of the Italians. Bulgaria took the long arm of eastern Greece along the northern shore of the Aegean Sea. The Germans contented themselves with small, strategically situated portions. On the mainland, they occupied the area around Saloniki and a narrow strip along the Turkish border.
They maintained troops in Athens, although nominally control of Athens was shared with the Italians. They also occupied Crete and various smaller islands in the Aegean Sea.
B. Structure of the German Occupational Administration Four of the defendants in the box, as well as the deceased Boehme, occupied key positions in the German occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece during this period.
By far the most important, of course, was the defendant List, who, on 9 June 1941, was appointed by Hitler as Armed Forces Commander of all German forces in southeastern Europe, with the title Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Suedost (Armed Forces Commander Southeast). In this capacity, List was directly responsible to Hitler and the OKW. List also retained the title of Commander-in-Chief of the 12th Army. The defendant Foertsch was his Chief of Staff. List maintained his headquarters at Saloniki. In October 1941 List fell ill, and thereafter, up to August 1942, the defendant Kuntze was the acting Commander-in-Chief of the 12th Army.
Under List (and subsequently Kuntze) were three Military Commanders -- one in Serbia and two in Greece. The deceased Boehme, who commanded the 18th Mountain Corps of the 12th Army, was Commanding General in Serbia from September to December, 1941. He went to Finland at the end of the year and was replaced by General Paul Bader, who is also believed to be now dead.
In Greece a Military Commander for the Saloniki area and the northern Aegean islands was appointed by OKH, and a Military Commander for southern Greece, with authority at Athens and in Crete and the southern Aegean islands, was appointed by the German Air Force. The defendant Felmy was Goering's selection for this position.
Accordingly, during the period up to August 1942 we will be primarily concerned with the activities of the defendants List, Kuntze, and Foertsch, as well as such acts of Boehme and Bader as are relevant to this proceed ing.
We will not at this time discuss the acts of the defendant Felmy in southern Greece, inasmuch as the bulk of the evidence pertaining to Greece relates to the period after August 1943, when Italy capitulated and the Germans took over the entire occupation of Greece. It will, therefore, he more convenient to deal with all the evidence pertaining to Greece at a later stage.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Denney, please. You are starting into a different portion of your statement. This will he a convenient place to interrupt. The Tribunal will he in recess for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)