Most recently, Fieldmarshal Albert Kesselring was tried by a British military court in Italy. The court found him guilty of responsibility for the Ardeatine caves atrocity, as well as for other war crimes against Italians committed by troops under his command in northern Italy. It sentenced him to be shot to death. This sentence of capital punishment against one of the outstanding military figures of the recent war again stimulated much discussion, and encountered not inconsiderable criticism, particularly in England. Whether or not as a result of such criticism, about ten days ago the British reviewing authorities commuted the death sentences against Kesselring, von Machensen, and Maeltzer to life imprisonment.
Because of the unusually deep interest which cases of this type have aroused, not only in military and legal circles but throughout the general public, and because the scope and sweep of this case is much greater than any of the previous cases to which I have referred, the prosecution may fairly be required, in opening this case, to do much more than outline the evidence which will be adduced in support of the indictment. Indeed , as this case progresses, I think it will rapidly appear that the evidentiary questions are of secondary importance. That the killings charged in the indictment occurred, that they were carried out by troops under the command of these defendants, and that they were in fact ordered by the defendants will not, I believe, be denied. The naked facts are terribly clear.
Nor, after the evidence is laid before you, can the true meaning of this case be drawn from learned arguments by counsel, analyzing and refining the laws of war as they are written in the Hague Conventions and in textbooks on international law. Of necessity, we will hear much discussion of hostages, and reprisals, and the necessary qualifications of belligerent armed forces. But the exposition of these technical problems of the law of land warfare, important as it may be, does not reach to the heart of this or similar cases in the year 1947.
The doubts which have been expressed concerning the wisdom and value of trials such as this one arise from a variety of conceptions and misconceptions. To some extent, these doubts are the natural result of the passage of time. Hostilities in Europe ended over two years ago, the devastated and stricken condition of Germany has aroused sympathy, and there is general desire to wipe the unhappy past from memory. So we hear it suggested by some that the present plight of Germany should shield men such as these from the consequences of crime, if criminals they be. But Germany is not the only devastated and stricken land, and for every crime there is not only a criminal but a victim. In the minds of many peoples are memories so mordant that they can not be forgotten. If the course of justice is stayed, these sores will only fester the longer and spread the wider. We can not restore the moral fabric of Europe by laying a shroud over unshriven and unburied corpses.
Other and quite different doubts have been raised by some who, with a blurred vision of military discipline; suppose that military men are a sort of race apart, who are not responsible for their actions because they are expected to obey orders. But the law and code of the German Army itself says that it is the duty of every soldier to refuse to obey orders that he knows to be criminal. This may be hard for the ordinary soldier acting under pistol-point orders from his lieutenant.
It is far less difficult for high-ranking commanders such as the men in the dock. These men are not named in the indictment because they are generals; they are named because they are charged with the responsibility for crimes. They must be acquitted if, under the law and the evidence, that responsibility can not justly be attributed to them, but they can not be acquitted merely because they are generals, any more than they can be indicted for that reason alone.
More fundamental and more cogent, I believe, are the doubts of those who question the wisdom and justice of attempting, by criminal prosecution, to enforce the laws of war with meticulous precision. Wars, such people say, are not fought on the dueling ground, and a polished observance of ritual can not be expected. Furthermore, there is a general feeling, not without substantial basis, that some of the laws of war as written in the Hague Conventions are obsolete, and on both sides were honored only in the breach. Then, too, it is felt, and rightly, that violations of the laws of war are committed in the best regulated armies, and it is therefore urged that the commanders should not be held to a strict and rigorous account for occasional laspses. I think that unarticulated doubts of this latter description underlie the criticism leveled against the death sentence which was imposed upon Kesselring, particularly criticism emanated from high-ranking Allied commanders who fought against him. The degree of Kesselring's guilt is, of course, not at issue in this proceeding, but in the course of it we will of necessity find occasion to draw certain comparisons and contrasts between the charges which were laid against Kesselring and those which are laid against the defendants here in the dock.
This case will achieve international meaning and significance, I believe, only if we adopt a realistic and practical approach to such questions.
And I believe that such an approach has been adopted in the framing of this indictment, in the selection of evidence in support thereof, and in the basic theory of the prosecution's case. The prosecution fully recognizes that the laws and usages of warfare must be altered and adapted to reflect the developments in this terrible art which man has learned to practice with such appalling proficience. We have not sought and will not seek in this case to make murderers out of soldiers for the violation of rules framed in 1907, if those rules today are outmoded and generally disregarded.
So, too, the prosecution takes full account of the true nature of modern warfare as it relates to the responsibilities of commanders. We would not have arrested the defendants, we would not have requested that this court be constituted, and we would not have brought charges against these men, if they were to be accused of mere carelessness or responsibility for occasional or sporadic crimes committed by their troops.
On the contrary, we charge that these men inaugurated and executed a deliberate program of terror and extermination which was boundless in its arrogant contempt for the inhabitants of the lands which the Wehrmacht invaded and overran. It is perhaps the most elementary principle of human intercourse--the bare subsistence level of civilization--that human life should not be destroyed needlessly, or merely because it is regarded as inferior. This is not an elevated or noble principle, although the entire structure of human dignity is built upon it. This principle merely enunciates mankind's instinct of self-preservation, and its observance protects man from selfdestruction. It is so deeply roted in civilization that the world insists on its observance in war as well as in peace, and the laws of war are, essentially, nothing more than a gloss on this fundamental rubric. It is for denying and undermining the very basis of civi lization that these men are indicted.
Let us turn, then, to the indictment in which the charges against these men are set forth. Counts One and Two of the indictment relate to murders and other crimes committed against the civilian inhabitants of Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway, and Albania during the German occupation of those countries. Count Three charges the killing, in violation of the rules of war, of prisoners of war and other members of the armed forces of countries at war with Germany, and of members of the Italian aimed forces after Italy's capitulation to the Allied nations. Count Four accuses the defendants of ordering and committing murders and other crimes in furtherance of the "racial" and economic policies of the Third Reich--the slaughter of Jews, the imprisonment and mistreatment of other segments of the civilian population, and the deportation of thousands to slave labor in Germany.
Count One, more particularly, charges the murder of many thousands of civilians under the color of retaliation or "reprisal" for attacks on German forces or military installations, As will appear from the evidence, these killings were carried out pursuant to a plan and system, embodied in orders issued, distributed, and executed by the defendants and others, which called for the retaliatory killing of civilians at arbitrarily established ratios, such as 100 civilians for every German soldier killed, and 50 for each soldier wounded. Usually the Germans referred to the victims of these mass executions as "hostages".
As I said at the outset, the proof of these acts will present no difficulty. The evidence, is all set forth in orders, reports, and other documents issued and circulated by the defendants themselves. Lest your Honors find it hard to credit what the written word so starkly exhibits, the oral testimony of eye-witnesses will also be spread on the record.
The laws of war do, of course, recognize that in certain circumstances belligerents may take steps by way of reprisal. The taking of hostages, too, has been practiced between nations since ancient times. The killing of hostages is a much more recent development; it is not the emblem of an enlightened way of life, and most of the precedents are found in the history of the Germany army and its exploits during the First World War. Furthermore, as will clearly appear, most of the victims who met their death before German firing squads at Belgrade, or Kraljevo, or Athens, or Klissura were not "hostages" in any true sense of the word.
We will, in due course, endeavor to set forth in some detail the rules of war as they relate to "reprisals" and "hostages". At this point I wish to make only two observations. Both the London Charter and Control Council Law No. 10 declare the killing of hostages to be a violation of the laws of war. This declaration is binding on the Tribunal and the prosecution alike, and the prosecution believes that it is an accurate statement of the law. But the theory of the prosecution's case under Count One does not rest on this rule. We may concede for purposes of argument that the execution of hostages may under some circumstances be justified, harshly as those words may ring in our ears. But the law must be spared the shame of condoning the torrent of senseless death which these men, let loose in southeastern Europe.
Count Two of the indictment speaks in terms of destruction and devastation, totally unjustified by military necessity. Here, too, the victims were the peoples of Norway, Ygoslavia, Greece, and Albania, who saw their homes in flames, their towns and villages erased and their possessions looted and scattered.
Count Three of the indictment is quite different from the first two counts. The victims of the crimes charged in Count Three were not civilians and non-combatants; they were, for the most part, members of the Yugoslav and Greek armed forces who continued to resist the German invader after the defeat of the major units of the Greek and Yugoslav armies and the replacement of their national governments by "puppet" governments or German military occupational administration.
Pursuant to orders issued and executed by the defendants, these troops who continued to resist were not recognized by Germany as belligerents, and when captured were commonly denied the status of prisoners of war and were shot or hanged. We will, subsequently, discuss the rules of war pertaining to the qualifications of belligerent armed forces.
Count Three also charges other crimes against members of the armed forces of various other allied nations, particularly in pursuance of the notorious German order of October, 1942, under which numerous Allied "commandos" were coldly murdered after their capture. It also charges the murder of many officers and men of the Italian armed forces at the time of and shortly after Italy's surrender to the Allies.
Count Four, finally, strikes a still more sombre note. The crimes charged therein were in no way related to military operations. We find the defendants and their troops helping to "purge" southeastern Europe of the so-called "inferior peoples", such as Jews, and "politically unreliable" individuals such as "democrats" and "nationalists". We find them helping to enslave and deport the inhabitants of these lands to join the millions of other unfortunates from all over Europe who were sucked into Germany to work for their conquerors in mines and factories. We see the German army in a shameful role as the servant and tool of Himmler, Sauckel, and other Nazi worthies.
Such in summary, are the changes in this indictment. The Tribunal will observe, from the dates of the particular incidents set forth as illustrations of the charges, that all four courts cover the three and one half years from April 1941 to approximately October 1944.
All four types of crime were committed throughout this period, and often a single episode involved the commission of crimes under all four counts. Consequently, in outlining the evidence today and in presenting it during the next few weeks, the prosecution proposes to proceed chronologically, rather than count by count. We believe this will be conducive to a more orderly and intelligible presentation However, in presenting particular documents or witnesses, we will of course, specify which count or portion of a count the particular piece of evidence supports.
Before taking up the evidence in more detail, it will be helpful to spend a few moments in outlining the structure and organization of the German military machine, and the way in which it functioned in occupied countries, particularly in southeastern Europe. The prosecution has already submitted to the Tribunal, and to defense counsel, a brief memorandum on the organization of the German army, together with a series of charts showing the chain of command of the more important military units in southeastern Europe and northern Norway, with several maps of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Norway, and other mechanical aids to the understanding of this case. One of these charts has been enlarged for display on the wall of the courtroom.
A. The Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces.
DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for defendants List, and von Weichs): Mr. President, I am sorry I have to interrupt at this moment. I am surprised to hear right now the Tribunal has been presented by the prosecution with an information referring to the defense. We are now in a criminal procedure and as far as I know the person who makes a statement has to prove that it is true. I don't know now how the prosecution wants this information to be understood. If it should be regarded as evidence before this Tribunal in that case I must object to the submitted information already to this Tribunal for a summary of the prosecution is not a means of the evidence.
We know the criminal procedure and we know that it consists of evidence and documentary evidence. I cannot see from the information that I have received that a document is in question not been signed by anybody. However, if it is merely information that is no evidence then informing the Tribunal by this material, as far as I know foreign law, can only then be right when the defense agrees with it.
For information of the Tribunal can merely be affected when everybody agrees. In any case if this information is supposed evidence it has to be rejected. We are merely dealing with statements of the prosecution which have now to be proved, for which evidence has to be submitted. I just want to put an example now and I shall soon finish. This information also refers to this chart here, Chart D. It is supposed to serve as information for the Tribunal, to brief the Tribunal. The moment when I entered the court I saw two basic mistakes in this chart. The mistakes are in the chart although in the first trial before the Military Tribunal the position of the O.K.W. was discussed at large.
From this sketch we can see that the O.K.W. and the O.K.M. and O.K.H. -- they were supposed to be one group but that was never the case. The OKW was merely a working staff of Hitlee's and if one regards the results of the first trial, this staff cannot be put right or left in the chart beside that little box, that means "Hitler", this is a basic mistake.
I shall soon finish. The nedt mistake results from the fact that, for instance, army group F is connected with a line supposed to mean technical subordinates. That also is not correct. I therefore ask the Tribunal to ask the prosecution that the information which was submitted by the prosecution may be withdrawn for the assumptions contained in this information the prosecution will have to submit evidence.
GENERAL TAYLOR: May it please Your Honors, the document in question is, as I stated quite briefly, not evidentiary. It is in the nature of a brief. Dr. Laternser, who has been before the IMT, is fully familiar with the procedure. There has been such a brief submitted before every trial that has taken place in this courtroom. It is not evidentiary. It is to enable the Tribunal and defense counsel to follow the opening statements.
The matters contained therein will, to be sure, be supported by documents which will be submitted during the prosecution's case in chief.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, speaking through the presiding judge, wishes to state that this document which I now have before me was considered by the Tribunal as merely informative. The members of this Tribunal are members of courts in the States who have had many years of not only trials but Appellate experience, and I am certain that I speak the thoughts of my associates when I say to counsel that we shall only decide this case upon the evidence as presented.
It should be kept in mind that the members of this Tribunal have been in this city here, and its surrounding country, for only about one month. Naturally we are desirous, and it is necessary, that we become informed on the procedure that is to be followed in these cases. It is necessary that we learn about the type of the case and the things that will be presented, but I assure counsel for the defense, the defendants, and all other parties concerned that the decision of this court will be based solely upon the evidence as presented, and after counsel for the defendants and the defendants themselves have had a full and fair opportunity to present any matters in rebuttal which may have been presented on behalf of the prosecution.
You may proceed, General Taylor.
GENERAL TAYLOR: When Hitler came to power in 1933, the German armed forces (which then consisted only of the Army and Navy, since the Air Force did not yet officially exist) were controlled and administered by a cabinet department called the Reich Defense Ministry. Under the Reich Defense Minister, at that time von Blomberg, the highest officers of each branch of the service were called respectively the Chief of the Army Staff, that being General von Fritsch, and the Chief of the Naval Staff (Admiral Raeder).In May 1935, when Germany started openly to overthrow the armament restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, von Blomberg was given the title of Reichsminister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and von Fritsch and Raeder were thereafter called the Commanders-inChief of the Army and Navy respectively.
However, the German Air Force, which was officially born at about the same time, was not subordinated to von Blomberg. It was established as an independent institution under Goering, who took the title of Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
In February 1938 there was a general reorganization of the German military set-up. Von Blomberg and Fritsch were both retired, and Hitler himself took the title of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Obersterbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht). At the same time Hitler created the Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, usually referred to as OKW), with authority over all three branches of the armed forces. Wilhelm Keitel was installed as Chief of the OKW, and remained in this capacity until the end of the war in 1945. The OKW was, in effect, Hitler's personal staff for all matters pertaining to the armed forces, and Keitel's function was that of Hitler's executive officer for the administration of the armed forces and the application of Hitler's policies.
As is shown by the chart on the wall (Chart "D" in the explanatory pamphlet which the prosecution has submitted), the three components of the armed forces were directly subordinated to Hitler and the OKW. Admiral Raeder continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (OKM) until 1943, when he was relieved by Admiral Doenitz. Goering continued to head the Air Force (OKL) until the last month of the war. As Supreme Commander of the Army to replace von Fritsch, Hitler selected General (later Field Marshal) Walter von Brauchitsch.
B. The German Army The German army, needless to say, was by far the largest and most important of the three branches of the Wehrmacht.
Von Brauchitsch continued as Commander-in-Chief only until December 1941, at which time Hitler relieved him and himself took the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Army in addition to that of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This dual capacity led to a merging and overlapping of the functions of OKW and OKH, and at times we may find it difficult to differentiate between their respective responsibilities.
The field formations of the German army were normally subordinated to OKH although, as we will see shortly, as the war progressed they were on numerous occasions subordinated to OKW. The largest field formation in the German army, as in most others, was known as an "Army Group", which was, ordinarily, a headquarters controlling two or more "armies". Army groups and armies were usually commanded by field marshals and Generalobersts, ranks which are respectively the equivalent of a fivestar and four-star general in our own military hierarchy. A German "army", however, was sometimes commanded by a mere "General", which is the same as a lieutenant general (three stars) in the American army.
Below the "army" were the lower formations, which followed the same general pattern in the German army as in others -- in order from top to bottom, come the corps and the division, and then the smaller units such as regiments, battalions, and companies. The most important types of divisions were the infantry division, the armored or panzer division, and the motorized or panzer-grenadier division, but the Germans used a number of other special types. In southeastern Europe, where many miscellaneous units were employed, we will frequently encounter the mountain division, the security division (Sicherungsdivision, usually composed of older soldiers), and the reserve division (usually composed of units still undergoing training). There were also infantry divisions formed from the personnel of the German Air Force, and known as German air force field divisions (Luftwaffenfelddivisionen).Side by side with the corps and divisions of the regular German army we find similarily designated formations of Heinrich Himmler's SS.
Not content with his powerful position as head of the SS and of all German police forces, Himmler inaugurated the recruitment and formation into military units of hundreds of thousands of SS men trained and equipped for front-line combat duty. This strictly military part of the SS was known as the Waffen (armed) SS, and by the end of the war it comprised no less than 30 divisions, as well as several corps headquarters and an army headquarters. Himmler's divisions were consecutively numbered and carried special names. In southeastern Europe, during the period covered by this case, the 7th SS Mountain Division "Prinz Eugen", the 8th SS Cavalry Division "Florian Geyer", and several others were very active. During the early part of the war, these SS soldiers were almost all volunteers, frantically devoted to the ideals, if such they may be called, of the SS. Later in the war a number of SS divisions were formed by forcible conscription from the populations of occupied countries. For some purposes, chiefly administrative in nature, the Waffen-SS units remained under Himmler's control, but for operational purposes they were under the command of the German army, and their employment differed little from that of the regular divisions of the army.
As I stated earlier, the field forces of the German army were normally under the OKH, but not infrequently, particularly during the latter part of the war, they came to be subordinated directly to OKW. This was particularly true in territories which the German army had overrun and where military occupational authorities were established. In such regions, the Germans often appointed a senior over-all commander, to whom the heads of the Army, Navy, and Air Force units in that region were all responsible. Such a commander, with local authority over all three branches of the armed forces, was called an "Armed Forces Commander" (Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber). In southeastern Europe, where the Army was the all-important branch of the service, the armed forces commander was almost invariably an army general.
While the Armed Forces Commander had authority over all units of the German armed forces in an occupied region, the administration of the area, in conformity with German rules and policies, was commonly entrusted to an army general designated as "Military Commander (Militaerbefehlshaber). He had the primary mission of insuring security and order, and for this purpose had at his disposal the German police forces and, often, security divisions and regiments of the army. On matters of military government policy, the Military Commander usually took his orders direct from OKH, but as commander of the security and police forces allotted to him, he was tactically subordinate to the Armed Forces Commander in his territory.
Himmler's police and intelligence empire also reached into the occupied territories. Reflecting Himmler's leadership of both the SS and the German police, a Himmler emissary in the occupied territories was called a "Higher SS and Police Leader" (Hoeherer SS und Polizei Fuehrer, usually abbreviated HSSPF). His principal functions were to control the local police authorities and carry out other special missions of a security nature. The HSSPF's remained personally responsible to Himmler, but for tactical purposes were subordinated to the senior Military Commander in their territory.
D. German Military Organization in Southeastern Europe and Northern Norway.
The chain of command and order of battle of the German armed forces in southeastern Europe was complicated and changed frequently. The narrative is most logically broken into three principal periods of time.
From April 1941, when the invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia took place, until August 1942 the focal point of German military authority in southeastern Europe was the headquarters of the 12th Army. The defendant List commanded the 12th Army until October 1941, at which time the defendant Kuntze took charge as acting commander until August 1942.
During this period the defendant Foertsch was Chief of Staff to both List and Kuntze, the defendant Felmy commanded in southern Greece, and the deceased Boehme in Serbia. The defendant Weichs was also active at the beginning of this period. He commanded the Second Army, which invaded Yugoslavia from the north, but he and his army were withdrawn from the Balkans in May 1941 at the conclusion of large-scale operations.
The second period begins in August 1942 when Kuntze left the Balkans and Generaloberst Alexander Loehr, now deceased, became Commanding General of the 12th Army. At about the same time the defendant Speidel followed Felmy as the commander in southern Greece, and the defendant Geitner became Chief of Staff to the Military Commander in Serbia, General Bader, who had replaced Boehme in December 1941. In January 1943 the 12th Army was, as we say, "up-graded" and re-designated as Army Group "E". General Loehr continued in command of Army Group "E" with the defendant Foertsch as his Chief of Staff.
The third and final phase begins in August 1943, and thereafter the organization remained substantially unchanged until the end of the war. The new structure during this final period, shown in the chart on the wall, was largely the result of the Allied landing in Sicily; the resultant threat to German dominion in the Balkans required a stiffening of command and reinforcements. The defendant Weichs returned to the Balkans in over-all command, with a headquarters designated Army Group "F". Under him were General Loehr, with his jurisdiction now restricted to Greece, the defendant Rendulic, as Commander-in-Chief of the Second Panzer Army in Croatia, shown at the center of the chart, and General Felber, of whom we will hear much in these proceedings, as Military Commander for all of southeastern Europe, and with personal jurisdiction in Serbia, shown in the center of chart.
Under Loehr were the defendants Felmy, who returned to Greece in June 1943, and Lanz, both of whom commanded corps under Army Group "E". The defendants von Leyser and Dehner were corps commanders under Rendulic. Foertsch stayed on as Chief of Staff to Weichs and Geitner remained as Chief of Staff to Felber.
Speidel remained as Military Commander in Greece, under the command of Felber as Military Commander for all of southeastern Europe.
The situation in northern Norway is of importance in this case only during the fall of 1944, when the German forces in northern Finland retreated into Norway through the Norwegian province of Finnmark. These forces, comprising the 20th Mountain Army, had been commanded by Generaloberst Dietl, who was killed in an airplane crash during the summer of 1944. The defendant Rendulic left his command of the Second Panzer Army in Croatia and replaced Dietl in Finland. The various units subordinated to Rendulic's 20th Mountain Army are shown in Chart "G" of the prosecution's pamphlet.
GERMAN MILITARY POLICY WITH RESPECT TO "HOSTAGES" Before turning to the particulars of the evidence, and to put this case in its proper setting, we may remind ourselves that the war crimes of the Germany army were not confined to southeastern Europe.
In particular, the practice of taking and executing so-called "hostages" from the civilian population was instituted at the very outset of the war, and was deliberately planned in advance.
In July, 1939, when plans for the invasion of Poland were being laid, the OKH distributed to the army field commanders a series of directives for the maintenance of security in Poland. This initial step was relatively circumspect; the field commanders were told that "hostages" could be taken, but that their execution would have to be approved in each instance by OKH.
The subsequent history of this order might be styled "the rake's progress". About two months later, when Poland had been conquered, the German Military Commander in the Polish city of Poznan ordered that:
.....hostages are to be taken from the Polish civilian population in every village in which troops are billeted.... In the event of attacks on members of the Wehrmacht of persons who are German by race, hostages are to be shot. Only senior officers holding the rank of a division commander will issue orders to shoot hostages.
The "War Diary" of a German rear area commandant carried the story forward. Two weeks later, on October 15, 1939, two hostages were shot in the village of Buk because a sentry had been shot at. Three days later, according to the diary, the following occurred in the Polish villages of Ottorowo and Samter:
In Ottorowo: A carbine had been stolen, the room in which the burglary was committed had been damaged, a swastika flag had been torn down and the Polish Eagle put up. Sentence was passed by a court-martial of the chief of civil administration and after a specified period of time had expired, 5 hostages each were shot in Ottorowo and Samter. The execution took place in the presence of the entire population. There were no tears, and the fine of 10,000 zlotys imposed on the village of Ottorowo was paid, probably with the help of the church.
In Samter: Catholic services may be conducted only once a week.
.... The county governor intends to remove gradually from his county the Polish intellectuals, the owners of large estates, and the clergy.
A Lieutenant, who is a district speaker for the Nazy Party in civilian life, attends to the moral welfare of the troops.
Under this beneficient moral tutelage rapidly emerged, in fearful shape, the German inferiority complex. The Poles were inferior peoples, but the Germans could not be quite sure that this was really true until all the educated Poles had been removed.
The following year the same pattern was repeated in France and the Low Countries. It is June, 1940, and the defendant List, with his Twelfth Army, is attacking across the Aisne River in France. The commander of the rear area of his army gives the order that:
As soon as acts of sabotage - fires also belong in this category - are found, hostages are to be taken. The arrest is to be announced publicly. If the acts of sabotage are repeated, the hostages are to be shot, according to the regulations previously issued, after sentence by a Court martial. Executions by shooting are to be reported to the Twelfth Army and announced publicly.
Belgian citizens, however, may be shot only with the consent of OKH.
As the scourge of war spread from country to country, the ways of the army grew even more savage. In 1941, as the Wehrmacht threw itself into the Slavic countries of Eastern Europe, the Germans encountered peoples whom they held in the contempt born of fear. In the Balkans and Russia, they spread such death and terror that the conscience of the world was made to reel and on October 25, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who is the President of a country still at restless peace, declared prophetically:
The practice of executing scores of innocent hostages in reprisal for isolated attacks on Germans in countries temporarily under the Nazi heel revolts a world already inured to suffering and brutality. Civilized peoples long ago adopted the basic principle that no man should be punished for the deed of another. Unable to apprehend the persons involved in these attacks, the Nazis characteristically slaughter fifty or a hundred innocent persons. Those who would "collaborate" with Hitler or try to appease him cannot ignore this ghastly warning.
The Nazis might have learned from the last war the impossibility of breaking men's spirit by terrorism. Instead they develop their "Lebensraum" and "new order" by depths of frightfulness which even they have never approached before. These are the acts of desperate men who know in their hearts that they cannot win. Frightfulness can never bring peace to Europe. It only sows the seeds of hatred which will one day bring fearful retribution.
GENERAL TAYLOR: Your Honor, this bring us to the point of the actual invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, and Mr. Clark Denny will continue with the reading of the statement.
MR. DENNY: May it please Your Honor.
THE INVASION OF GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA We may pass over very briefly the historical background of Germany's simultaneous and ruthless onslaughts against Greece and Yugoslavia in April, 1941.
The highlights are set forth in the judgment of the International Military Tribunal,1 and a fuller account may be found in the official transcript of the international trial.2 It appears from these accounts that, as early as August 1939, just before the attack against Poland, Hitler had discussed with Ribbentrop and Ciano how best the Axis partners could gobble up the neutral countries of Europe.
Hitler cynically suggested to Ciano:
Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process could be carried out more easily if, on every occasion, one partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with the uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind.
In making the suggestion, Hitler was no doubt catering to Mussolini's imperial ambitions in the Balkans, which had been reflected earlier that year in the Italian occupation of Albania. For the next year, however, Germany was sufficiently occupied with the 1. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Vol.
I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp. 210-213.
2. Vol. III, Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp. 307-324.
campaigns in Poland, Norway, the Low Countries and France, and the next Axis moves in southeastern Europe did not occur until 28 October 1940, when Italy launched its contemptible and ill-fated attack against Greece. It was, furthermore, Mussolini's inability to beat down the heroic resistance of the Greeks that lead Hitler to march into the Balkans the following year.
We may be sure that it was from no particular sympathy with Mussolini's plight in Albania and Greece that Hitler decided to come to his aid. On the contrary, there is every indication that Hitler and the German military leaders were pleased over the discomfiture of their Italian allies, whom they held in such contempt throughout the war. But Hitler was disturbed in Greece from which the valuable oil fields in Rumania could be bombed. And furthermore, as Rommel's campaign in North Africa began to attract attention, Hitler's thoughts turned increasingly towards the eastern Mediterranean and the possibility of establishing German superiority there. Accordingly, in November 1940, Hitler issued Top Secret instructions to Brauchitsch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, directing him to:
Make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland, north of the Aegean Sea, in case of need, entering through Bulgaria and thus making possible use of German Air Forces units against targets in the eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Rumanian oil areas.
All this time, however, the German High Command was chiefly preoccupied with preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union, which they had planned for the following spring. This formidable military task required all the forces the Germans could muster and accordingly Hitler and the generals wished to carry out any enterprise which might have to be undertaken in the Balkans with the utmost economy of means. Therefore, there was at this time no intention whatsoever of invading Yugoslavia in addition to Greece; on the contrary, Hitler began an intensive diplomatic campaign to swing Ygoslavia to the side of the Axis and induce her to join the so-called "Tri-partite Pact", to which the principal adherents were Germany, Italy, and Japan.